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This thesis uses an historical example—the "moral treatment" of
the insane in Britain at the end of the eighteenth century and the
beginning of the nineteenth—to defend a particular theoretical under¬
standing of the social construction of human nature.
In the Introduction, comparable work in the history of psychiatry
and in the sociology of medical knowledge is discussed, as well as the
theoretical structure which holds the substantive part of the thesis
together. This latter feat lire, described as "the theory of praxis in
historical materialism", is an interpretation of the Marxist theory of
history which attempts, within the necessary constraints of that theory,
to indicate the subjective element of man's activity in creating his
own history. The substantive part of the thesis utilises this theory
in order to portray some of the rich detail by which moral treatment
appeared as a meaningful and progressive way of treating the insane.
Chapter One examines the prehistory of moral treatment: the social,
institutional, medical and intellectual contexts of the mid-eighteenth
century, as they affected the treatment of both the insane and the
deviant population generally. In Chapter Two, the creation of the
concept of moral treatment itself is dealt with through an examination
of the work of Philippe Pinel in Paris and the ^uke family in York.
Chapter Three focusses on the various manifestations of moral
treatment once it was taken up as a progressive practice in a variety
of institutional contexts. Its relation to contemporary concerns such
as the idea of moral community, penal reform, the necessity to work, are
all discussed in detail; as is the significance of its practice to the
ideologists of capitalist social relations.
In Chapter Pour the internal history of moral treatment is examined,
X
and its status as knowledge evaluated. Chapter Five deals with the
transformation of moral treatment after the 1830s and the reasons for
its gradual demise. There is no separate conclusion, "but a short Coda
discusses some of the theoretical issues raised from a slightly diff¬
erent perspective.
INTRODUCTION
A review of the theoretical and substantive
contexts within which this work is written.
One element in the fundamental cause of the failure
of socialism—only an element, but an important one,
no longer to be ignored, no longer to be regarded
as secondary—is the absence of an effective Marxist
doctrine of political psychology.
—Wilhelm Reich
Solely because of the increasing disorder
In our cities of class struggle
Some of us have now decided
To speak no more of cities by the sea, snow on roofs,
women
The smell of ripe apples in cellars, the senses of the
flesh, all
That makes a man round and human
But to speak in future only about the disorder
And so become one-sided, reduced, enmeshed in the business
Of politics and the dry, indecorous vocabulary
Of dialectical economics
So that this awful cramped .coexistence
Of snowfalls (they're not merely cold, we know)
Exploitation, the lured flesh, class justice, should not
engender
Approval of a world so many-sided| delight in





The central point of the following pages is to provide an inter¬
pretation of the changes in the treatment of the insane in Britain
that occurred around the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of
the nineteenth centuries. This will bo done mainly by looking in detail
at what was recognised to be one of the central means by which these
changes were able to take place. This was "moral treatment", a phen¬
omenon which dominated all that was considered to be progressive in
the period from the 1790s until the mid-nineteenth century. Moral
treatment will be examined here as history, as theory, and as practice.
This thesis was written whilst its author was a member of an
interdisciplinary university department, and the approach used here
is itself consciously interdisciplinary. It is therefore important
that before the substantive part of the thesis can be presented, it
must be established precisely what academic areas of interest are to
be invoked.
The thesis is written in the form of an historical account because
I felt that that format provides the most coherent vehicle for laying
tare the features of moral treatment. But the reasons underlying this
decision were not primarily governed by historiographical considerations.
My main interest in working with historical materials is to use an exam¬
ple, such as the changes in the treatment of the insane, in order to
1
By ".Britain" is meant primarily England and Wales. Where other coun¬
tries are discussed, and ooth Scotland and France receive some detailed
attention, the purpose is to illustrate the perceived influences of which
English practice took notice, arid not to provide an exhaustive account
of the pra.ct.-.cee in these other countries. The reason for this apparentethnocentrism is purely strategic. There is more than enough to exulainfor England, where the variety of approaches was itself substantial^without trying to taKo account on different local conditions in other
countries. A more general picture would be more valuable, but it would
need to oe drawn from a numoer of detailed studies of local changes. This
study os. England, is meant as a contribution to that project.
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support an explicit theoretical and ideological argument. This distinc¬
tion is vitally important, but may be difficult for the reader whose
interests lie mainly in the history of science of medicine to under¬
stand. Unless this is appreciated, however, much of this introduction,
and all of the Coda, will appear rather superfluous to what might seem
to be fairly straightforward historiographic intentions. But more
fundamentally, to read the substantive part of this thesis without
recognising this intention would be to misread its essential purpose.
At the same time it is recognised that much of the historical
material being examined here is of interest to more than those working
within the same theoretical and ideological milieux as the author.
I draw on work from many disciplines, and I hope that some of my com¬
ments will find their way back to those disciplines. In order to
clarify this, the remainder of this introduction will be devoted to
a review of the different intellectual contexts within which this work
is written, or on which it is dependent, or which it ca,n be seen as a
contribution towards. These areas of interest are not discrete and
indeed the present work is written partly to indicate some necessary
connections between them. But for the purposes of exposition, and
especially for the reader who' may only be familiar with one of them,
these interests may be summarised as l) the history of psychiatry;
2) the sociology of medical knowledge; and 3) the theory of praxis
* in historical materialism.
1. The History of Psychiatry
The history of psychiatry is an area in which a great deal of
research has been done in the last 20 years. Unlike some historical
subject areas, the history of psychiatry has not remained the province
of one academic speciality, but has been repeatedly examined from
different perspectives. Practising psychiatrists, historians of medicine,
sociologists, D.iterary critics, and social administrators are some of
the groups who have studied eighteenth- and nineteenth-century attitudes
to the insane and the changes in their treatment.
The following review of the literature is not meant to "be exhaust¬
ive, hut it is intended to include most of the work done in the last
two decades which could he said to add in any way at all to our under¬
standing of changes in the treatment of the insane in the period from
roughly 1750 to 1850, and specifically to an understanding of moral
treatment.
No attempt will he made at this stage to define "moral treatment":
it is, after all, one of the aims of this thesis to demonstrate the
complexity of the concept. For the present it is enough to note that
the phrase was first used in the 1790s and was popularised hy two people.
0&& of these was Samuel Tuke, the treasurer to a small Quaker asylum
known as "The Retreat" near York, who brought the phrase "moral treat¬
ment" into common use with the publication of his Description of the
Retreat in 1813.1 The other was Philippe Pinel, a Parisian doctor who
made public his new method of "traitement moral" in 1801.2 "Moral
treatment" rapidly became taken up as the essence of all that was pro¬
gressive in the treatment of the insane, and attempts were made to incor¬
porate it as a mode of therapeutic practice into the numerous asylums
that were being constructed at this time. As a result of this it was
Reprinted as S. Tuke, 1969. Henceforth referred to as Description.
2 .• #
This was in his Traite Medico-Philoscphique sur L*Alienation Mentals
on La Marie, published in France in ISoi, and in translation in Britain
as A Treatise on Insanity in 1806 (reprinted as Pinel, 1962). This
Treatise made Pinel's work widely known in Britain although, as will
be shown, he had been writing about moral treatment since the 1780s.
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transformed, from its original specific meanings into a diffused and
general approach to therapy. The term continued to be used throughout
the nineteenth century, but by mid-century its demise was already becoming
apparent. The "active" period of moral treatment, in which it was devel¬
oped as a growing and creative force, covers the time from its prehistory
in the mid-eighteenth century until the provision of public asylums for
the insane became compulsory in 1845. It is this period that will be the
main focus of interest here.
A number of practising psychiatrists today have expressed an interest
in this period of their own professional history. The most impressive
body of work is that which has been done by the team of Richard Hunter
and Ida Macalpine. Their anthology of readings, Three Hundred Years of
Psychiatry 1535~l860,"^~ which is now 15 years old, still remains the best
introduction to the history of psychiatry. A full list of Hunter and
Macalpine1s work appears in the bibliography to this thesis, although
in addition to the works listed under their own names they have provided
substantial biographical introductions to reprints of monographs by Samuel
2
Tuke and John Conolly, two of the most influential moral therapists.
Writing biographies of outstanding predecessors has been popular among
Hunter and Kacalpine, 1963. Henceforth referred to as HMA.
2
On Tuke see the introduction to the Description, and on Conolly see
Conolly, 1964, 1968, and 1973• It is interesting that Hunter and Macalpine
have made hardly any comments on what they considered moral treatment to
be. Nearly every time they have referred" to it, the phrase lias been placed
in inverted commas as though it did not really exist. This attitude ties
up with their general approach to the value of psychiatric history—to
point out precursors of today's more advanced practice and knowledge.
From this point of view, moral treatment becomes a ragbag of attitudes
in which we can recognise parts of today's practice by the more scien¬
tific terras of, for example, psychotherapy, milieu therapy, and occupation¬
al therapy. (For Hunter and Macalpine on moral treatment see especially
their 1965 and HMA, pp. 602,-6 , 684-7.)
other practising psychiatrists. Denis Leigh, for instance, has written
"biographical essays on Gonolly as well as on John Ilaslam, another mad-
doctor of this period."*"
Moral treatment itself lias been examined from a number of perspec¬
tives? through the biographies' of individual practitioners such as
Gonolly and Tuke; through the institutional history of the madhouses
? .3
and asylums; as an aspect of the administrative history of the insane;
4-
in its relation to the growth of the psychiatric profession; as it was
5
affected "by the medical theories of the time; through a straightforward
examination of what the moral therapists appeared to be doingand
through a "Whiggish" attempt to locate moral treatment in terms of sim-
7
ilar motivations and ideologies to those held in psychiatry today.
Whatever the different interests and perspectives of these authors,
all of them have unearthed interesting materials taken together they
prov5.de a comprehensive basis from which to begin any further research
into this period of the history of psychiatry.
Similar valuable research has been done under the auspices of uni¬
versity literature departments, where historians interested in analysing




Walk, 1964; Rothraan, 1971; Parry-Jones, 1972.
3J X. Jones, 1972.
l\.
Walk and Walker, 1961; Scull, 1974, 1975a, 1976.
5






standing of that world. This applies j>articularly to a brilliant
Study of Conventions of Madness in Middle English Literature" and, to
a lesser extent, to three examinations of madness in imaginative liter-
2
ature of the eighteenth century. All this work has proved valuable
in the preliminary research leading to the present study.
One aspect of. most of the historical accounts mentioned up to now
is that they take little interest in such concepts as "moral treatment"
in their own right. Few historians have bothered to ask why the tern
"moral", for instance, was used in a way that we no longer use today.
There axe just a few writers who have concerned themselves with this
. 3 ^
question? names which may be mentioned in this regard are Dam, Grange,
<5
Skultans, Scull, and Foucault.
Of all these names the two which have provided the most substantial
contributions to the literature are undoubtedly those of Andrew Scull
and Michel Foucault. Scull's doctoral thesis on museums of Madness?
The social organisation of insanity in nineteenth century England^ is a
1
The title of a FhD thesis by Doob (1970). See also her 197^.
2
Deporte, 197^.* Byrd, 197^; Reed, 1952•
3 Dain, 197^. Dain makes some pertinent comments on the intellectual
resources used in moral treatment, but ignores the vast intellectual
chasm separating Pinel's and the Tukes' use of the word "moral". At
the beginning of his major study of moral treatment and related conceptshe writes, for instance, "Hereafter the terms 'psychological medicine','moral treatment', 'moral management', and 'moral therapy' are used inter¬
changeably to mean the new system introduced by Pinel, Tuke, and others"(ibid., p. 5).
l\.
Grange, 1961, 1963. These two papers include some of the most orig¬inal material on moral treatment to have been written, but they havebeen largely ignored by later writers in this area.
5
Skultans, 1975.
Scull, 1974. His 197.5a and 1976 are papers based on material extractedfrom that thesis.
major document of which all subsequent work must take account. There
are many similarities between Scull's approach and mine which cannot
be discussed at this stage but which will become apparent as my own
account unfolds. The major difference in subject matter between Scull's
work and my own is that his primary interest is in the institutional
history of the insane, and in the growth of the psychiatric profession
which was to govern those institutions. My own primary interest is in
moral treatment, a phenomenon which sometimes expressed itself as a
coherent practice in those institutions, but which must also be apprec¬
iated as a body of knowledge with its own internal history and signif¬
icances. There are also a number of theoretical differences between
Scull's approach and nine. We make use of different sociological models
to explain our historical materials, but wa do share a strong belief in
locating what we have found in terms of the soc5.al construction of society
by its members. This method of approach is discussed below in Section 2
of this introduction.
The work of Michel Foucault is less easy to describe. His Madness
and Civilisation was first published in 1961"' and it is no exaggeration
to cay that this one work has almost single-handedly redefined cur under¬
standing of psychiatric history. In this book Foucault attempted to
expose the origins, discovery almost, of insanity and its treatment as
meaningful concepts in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. It is
thus inevitable that Foucault has covered much of the ground that is to
be approached here. But while agreeing with many aspects of his account
1 Published in French as Histolre de la Folie a l'ftge Classique, it
appeared in a second edition in 1972 (Foucauit, 1972aJT The English
translation (Foucault, 1971) is about'half the length of the original.
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and even occasionally repeating his conclusions, I think there is
ample justification for further enquiry. Foucault's work is not gener¬
ally accepted in this country; his style and rhetorical flourishes
alienate himto many, and while it is -true that it is this same aspect
of his work that makes him attractive to others, this is not seen by
the present writer as grounds for acknowledging value. More to the
point is the evidence he uses to support his intricate web of explan¬
ation. And it is here that Foucault, especially with the English
material, appears to rely on very few sources, some of which viere not
very scholarly secondary accounts written in the late nineteenth cen¬
tury."'" But insofar as he provides a stimulating reinterpretation of
what has become a rather stale legend, Foucault's work must be recog¬
nised as a worthy basis from which to begin a more detailed, and if
necessary more pedestrian, account of moral treatment. For those
unfamiliar with Foucault's style and general approach, it can be summed
up in the following quotation from Madness and Civilisation;
Life in the asylum as Tuke and Pinel constituted it per¬
mitted the birth of that delicate structure which would
become the essential nucleus of madness—a structure
that formed a kind of microcosm in which were symbolized
the massive structures of bourgeois society and'its values;
Family-Child relations,centered on the theme of immed¬
iate justice; Madness-Disorder relations, centered on
the theme of social and moral order. It is from these that
t h e- physician derives his power to cure; and it is to
the degree that the patient finds himself, by so many old
links, already alienated in the doctor, within the doctor-
patient couple, th^-t the doctor has the almost miraculous
power to cure him.^
One way of introducing the account to be presented here is to say
that it will attempt to explain at length precisely what the values and:
See the bibliography in Foucault, 1972a.
2
Foucault, 1971, p. 27^.
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structures were that were reproduced in asylum practice, values and
structures which Foucault. discusses "but which often remain opaque and
dense to the reader.
2. Sociology of Medical Knowledge
The works discussed in the previous section are the main secondary
accounts of moral -treatment and the history of the treatment of the
insane, to which the present work may be seen as an addition. On the
other hand, it was stated at the beginning of this introduction that
this account should be seen only secondarily as a contribution to our
understanding of the history of the insane. It is primarily a socio¬
logical work, an attempt to present, through empirical evidence, some
support for a particular mode of understanding what may bo called the
"social reality of human nature". This male of understanding is one
which has been discussed and theorised in a variety of contexts s the
aim here will be to contribute to that theoretical work from within the
social history of one part of society—the treatment of the insane.
A good starting point for this journey is Foucault's comment to
the effect that
What is constitutive is the action that divides madness,
and not the science elaborated once this division is made
and calm restored.x
This comment applies both to the concept of madness (or insanity) itself
and to the significance of the therapeutic interventions to which the
appearance of madness has been subject. Foucault lias emphasized many
times that we live so much within the logic of one mode of thought that
it is almost impossible for us to enter another.2 To do so is not
1
Foucault, 1971, p. xi.
2
See for instance the example he gives of a "certain Chinese encyclo¬
paedia" (mentioned in a story of Borges) "in which it is written that
11
entirely impossible but it does require an imaginative recreation in
our own minds of* the "constitutive action" by which any particular mean¬
ing is generated.1
Before going any further with this approach it might be as well
to remind ourselves of the alternative viewpoint, that the "science
elaborated" is the.more important aspect, both of the history and of
the practical use of the concept of human nature today. As far as the
practice of contemporary psychiatry is concerned, it is strongly plural¬
istic, making use of knowledge derived from many aspects of human life.
But at the same time, there has always been a strong tendency, in Britain
at least, to ground the theoretical legitimation of psychiatry in one
particular cognitive mode, that of science. One of the best-known of
modern psychiatric textbooks begins with the sentence,
This book is based on the conviction of the authors that
the foundations of psychiatry have to be laid on the ground
'animals are divided into: (a) belonging to the Emperor, (b) embalmed,
tame, (d) sucking pigs, (e) sirens, (f) fabulous, (g) stray dogs,
(h) included in the present classification, (i) frenzied, (j) innumer¬
able, (k) drawn with a very fine camelhair brush, (l) et cetera, (m)
having just broken the water pitcher, (n) that from a long way off* look
like flies.' In the wonderment of this taxonomy, the thing we appre¬
hend in one great leap. . .is the limitation of our own, the stark
impossibility of thinking that" (Foucault, 1970, p. xv).
1
As far as Foucault's own work is concerned, he considers that he wrote
Madness and Civilisation before he had formulated a clear idea of the
implications of writing history. In his words, "An enterprise by which
one tries to measure the mutations that operate in general in the field
of history; an enterprise in which the methods, limits, and themes pro¬
per to the history of ideas are questioned; an enterprise "by which one
tries to throw off the last anthropological constraints; an enterprise
that wishes, in return, to reveal how these constraints could come about.
These tasks were outlined in a rather disordered way j~in my earlier
booksJ, and their general articulation was never clearly defined. It
was time that they were given greater coherence—or at least, that an
attempt was made to do so. This book ("The Archeology of Knowledge"!
is the result (Foucault, 1972b, p. 15). J
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of the natural sciences.
The authors continue that it
seems to us far-fetched to claim that sociology or
cultural anthropology occupy as basic a position in
relation to psychiatry as do the mental and biological
sciences. . .Our knowledge of medicine and physiology
is detailed, relatively precise and capable of clear def¬
inition. Our knowledge of sociology is scanty, impre¬
cise and not easily capable of confirmation or refu¬
tation.-^
It is perhaps not surprising that this type of argument occurs
within the psychiatric profession itself, given the scientific rationale
of medicine generally and the less than confident status of psychiatry
v?ithin the medical hierarchy. However it i3 also a point of view that
pervades much of our thinking today, and it can even be found in the
otherwise rigorously sociological work of Andrew Scull. According
to Scull,
whatever one's opinions on the extent of scientifically
based knowledge of mental illness today, there would, I
think, be a widespread consensus on the lack of any real
knowledge base in early nineteenth century medicine which
would have given the medical profession a rationally ?
defensible claim to possess expertise vis-a-vis insanity.
But what Scull does not ask, let alone answer, is what it is that would
constitute a "rationally defensible claim" to expertise. At what stage
does, or could, psychiatry become.scientific?
The answer, if we are to follow the logic of Fcucault's reasoning,
is that such a question is misconceived. Psychiatry, mad-doctoring, or
any method of treating the insane, must always be acknowledged as
Slater and Roth, 1969# PP« 1» 3# emphasis in the original. See also
the paper in defence of "scientific psychiatry" by the President of the
Royal College of Psychiatrists (Roth, 1973).
2
Scu'll, 197^, p. 238. This is not a totally isolated instance of
thiS IciDCl of argument in Scull's work. Elsewhere he describes one mad-
doctor's attack on his colleagues as "gratuitous" because of "the absence
of any adequate theoretical understanding or rational therapy" (ibid.,
P. 78).
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possessing a "rationally defensible claim" to its practice. Not because
it had some claim to ultimate truth but because, as practice, it had
meaning in the societies and in the "constitutive actions" which created
it. This understanding of the determinant bases of meaning is also one
which, as a general basis for enquiry, may be seen as providing the sub¬
stantive basis for two important areas of sociological investigation.
The first of these, known as the "sociology of knowledge", has
concerned itself with the macro-sociological implications of this insight;
that is, into the general nature of the social production of knowledge.
Morality, religion, metaphysics, and all the rest of ideo¬
logy as well as the forms of consciousness corresponding
to these. . .have no history, no development; but men,
develojjing their material production and their material
intercourse, alter, along with this their actual world,
also their thinking and the products of their thinking.
It is not consciousness that determines life, but life
that determines consciousness. . . . jjdur] manner of ap¬
proach, which conforms to real life, . ." .[concerns itself
with] the real living individuals themselves, and con¬
sciousness is considered solely as their consciousness.
After Marx, this approach—which remained only a programme for research
in his writings—was developed into a distinct branch of sociology, most
notably by Karl Mannheim, with whose work the sociology of knowledge is
2
usually associated. For many years this approach concerned itself only
with the more cultural aspects of men's thought, such as political ideo¬
logies, artistic expression, and religious beliefs. More recently however,
sociologists of knowledge have confronted the dominant cognitive mode of
3Western thought—science itself.
1
K. Marx and Engels, Trie German Ideology, in MSCW, vol. .5, pp. 36-7,




On this see Bloor, 1973 and 1976, and Barnes, 1974. As Barnes points
out. A sociological theory whxch has to make a special exemption of a
particular institution or sub-culture, like, for example, natural science,
deserves to be treated with the greatest suspicion" (ibid., p. l6;4).
1/+
One feature of the Mannheimian tradition of the sociology of
knowledge is its emphasis on the intellectual aspects of thought.
These aspects are, naturally, of concern to the academics who write
about them, "but are hardly the major concerns of most people most of
the time. And yet the knowledge which "the man in the street" uses to
make sense of his everyday life—his assumptions, expectancies, comraon-
sense beliefs as to how things naturally are—all this is as much
socially constructed as the more intellectual ideas of a society.
One comprehensive attempt to express this recognition (on the theo¬
retical plane) is in a book entitled The Social Construction of Reality.
In the introduction to that work the authors ask
How is it possible that subjective meanings become
objective facticities? . . .How is it possible that
human activity. . .should produce a world of^things?
. . .In other words, an adequate understanding of the
"reality sui generis" of society requires an inquiry
into the manner in which this reality is constructed.
This inquiry, we maintain, is the task of the sociology
of knowledge.^-
By their general statement of the necessary concerns of a sociology of
knowledge, Eerger and Luckmann have opened the way to the empirical
work that needs to be done to substantiate what is still a relatively
2
novel understanding of human nature. Their programme leads cn to the
second area of sociological investigation mentioned above.
This latter approach is typified by a concern with the micro-
sociological features of social reality, with how men actually produce
Bsrger and Luckmann, 1971» p. 30.
2
It will be noted in this discussion of changes in the sociology of
knowledge that I am saying nothing of the theoretical traditions under¬
lying these changes of emphasis in practice. Other writers have suggested
that such different theoreticians as Durkheim, Schutz, and Wittgenstein
have inspired the changes recorded here. To what extent this is true is
an interesting question, but not one that needs to be answered here,
given my concern with only the practical effects (for empirical research)
of the shift in emphasis.
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and reproduce the minute details of their existence. Even when mem¬
bers of a society are producing intellectual or scientific knowledge
they are doing so in the same way (precisely as members of the society)
as everybody else. Given the substantive concerns of this thesis, I
want to discuss one area where this approach has proved particularly
fruitful: the sociology of deviance. Deviance, according to this method
of viewing the social world, is no longer something that men have, a
quality (or defect) over which they have no control. It becomes in¬
stead a status conferred on them by other men.1 This approach has
been worked out in some detail by the symbolic interactionist school
of sociology, and it is now being given expression by the ethnomethod-
ologists.
It must be stressed, however, that this approach to knowledge—at
least as understood here—does not involve a denial of "something
there", a material reality of which we have to make sense or confer
meaning upon. It is rather that the phenomena of the material world,
whether they appear as "mental illness" or as any other name we give
to them, are not unproblematically given; they are always negotiated,
constructed within a social discourse. A recognition of deviance is
a product of this discourse and not of the material world per se.
1 " ... A nice fictional example of this is provided by H.G. Weils in
his short story, "The Country of the Blind". In this story, Nunez,
a mountaineer, loses himself in a distant valley. All the inhabitants
of this isolated land axe blind, cut off for generations from the rest
of the world. Far from recognising the sighted visitor as a saviour
"Deviance is not a property inherent in any particular kind of behav¬
iour, it is a property conferred upon that behaviour by the people who
come into direct or indirect contact with it" (Erikson, 1966, p. 6,
emphasis in the original). For a general discussion of this subject
see Pearson, 1975» PP. 64-78.
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or leader, they consider his faculty of sight as a handicap due to
a physical deformity in his eyeballs. During their long sojourn in
the valley the "blind people had developed their other senses and had
established an equilibrium with their environment. They worked at night
when the valley was cool and slept in the heat of the day. Nunez stum—
bled around in the dark and saw all sorts of things that for the blinded
were not important. Eventually he was examined by the doctor.
"His brain is affected," said the blind doctor.
The elders murmered assent.
"Now, what affects it? . . .This," said the doctor,
answering his own question. "Those queer things that are
called the eyes, and which exist to make an agreeable
soft depression in the face, are diseased, in the case of
[Nunez], in such a way as to affect his brain. They are
greatly distended, he has eyelashes, and his eyelids move,
and consequently his brain is in a state of constant irri¬
tation and destruction. . . .And I think I may say with
reasonable certainty that, in order to cure him completely,
all that we need do is a simple and easy surgical oper¬
ation—namely, to remove these irritant bodies."
"And then he will be sa,ne?"
"Then he will be perfectly sane, and a quite admirable
citizen."
"Thank heaven for science I" said old Yacob, and went
forth at once to tell Nunez of his happy hopes.x"
There is no disagreement in this story as to whether sight or blindness
exists: it is rather that what is usually recognised as normality is
here recognised as deviance because the "constitutive action" underlying
Wellijj, 1955, pp. 14-2-3 (first published 1904). In view of what might
be called Wells' own breadth of vision in being able to conceptualise
the variety of social normalities open to man, it is instructive to turn
to the "myopia" of some modern psychologists. One of them (Meehl, 1973)
has presented a case for accepting an organic basis for schizophrenia
on the grounds that schizophrenia is analogous to a "colour psychosis
. . .in a society entirely oriented around the making of fine colour
discriminations" (ibid., p. 83). While accepting that the recognition
of colour psychosis is dependent on the precise values of this fictional
society, Meehl emphasises that the important thing is that the physical
basis of the psychosis can be traced to "a mutated gene pn the x chromo¬
some" and which the medical profession could treat. In other words,
whereas Wells was warning us of the totalitarian dangers of accepting
medical definitions as ends in themselves, Meehl is assuring us that his
profession (he was President of the American Psychological Association)
is ready to do just that.
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the recognition is, in the Country of the Blind, based on different
social interests.
Ethnomethodology takes very seriously the "constitutive action"
by which such phenoniena as mental illness are created. By directing
its attention at the diagnostic procedures of psychiatrists,1 the feat-
2
vires of the institution in which the "ill" person finds himself, the
tolerance level of patients' wives, and other social contingencies
U
unconnected with qualities of the "mentally ill person" him or herself,
this line of research has done much to unsettle our conventional apprec¬
iation of what mental illness is.^ In the work of ethnomethodologists,
mental illness (or madness, or insanity) becomes a chimera, something
fluctuating endlessly between the negotiations of everyday life. It
loses all the substance that 200 years of organised psychiatry have
given it and becomes, like the equally taken-for-granted concepts of
suicide and sex,^ something profoundly problematic.
In the last few years there has been much empirical research in




Goffman's work on Asylums (Goffman, 1968) is the seminal work here,
but see also the study by Rosenhan (1973) in which he shows how he and
his colleagues, posing as patients, had their normal behaviour redefined






For a general theoretical exposition of this approach see Blum, 1970,
or Coulter, 1973; and for an excellent, but so far unpublished, account
of how raw data of "what actually happened" are "worked up" into a de¬
fined state of mental illness, see D. Smith, no date.
H/thnomethodological examinations of Doth these concepts appear in
Garfinkel, 1967. The study of suicide from this perspective is becoming
increasingly popular. See for instance J.N. Atkinson, 1971.
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ethnomethodology to enable the researcher to unpack the presentation
in which medical knowledge appears. Stimulating work has been done on
epilepsy,1 diabetes, and medical knowledge as a product of the bedside
2 t
manner of hospital practice, to name three recent studies. The fruit-
fulness of this approach is becoming increasingly evident. What does
need to be said, however, is that because they concern themselves
entirely with the minutiae of everyday life, these micro-sociological
approaches to the demystification of deviance (or of any other social
phenomenon) tend to give a distorted view of the overall picture of
how social order is constructed. Phenomenological and ethnoraethodo-
logical sociology stresses quite rightly that "All social reality is
3
precarious. All societies are constructions in the face of chaos".
But in the majority of empirical studies undertaken within this epis-
teraological frame of reference, there is an overwhelming emphasis on
the mechanism of constructions, and very little attention is paid to
their rationale. Or, to put it another way, micro-sociology asks
how society is constructed in a certain way, and not why it is so
Zf
constructed.




See the papers by P. Atkinson and T. Posner in Dingwall et.al.,
1977. That this anthology on the social construction of medical know¬
ledge contains a paper based on Chapter Two of this thesis (Fears, 1977)
is, if nothing else, an indication of the interest of current medical
sociology in the theoretical issues raised here.
3
Berger and Luckmann, 1971, p. 121.
k
In terms of types of research undertaken, this has led to work which
"criticises the welfare state, but only the low-level officials who
manage caretalcing institutions; it does not challenge high-level official¬
dom which shapes the policy and character of these institutions, welfare
budgets and research funding" (Pearson, 1975, p. 73).
ethnomethodclcgical paradigm of any concern for the phenomenon of
social change. Why do people lose preference for one social order or
version of human nature and begin to believe in another, and why at
certain periods in history is an intense effort made to change existing
conceptions of legitimacy?
To return to Foucault's original comment, we need not only a method
to uncover the mystifications by which the concept of "insanity" becomes
something apparently beyond human authorship; we also need an explana¬
tory framework within which to understand why this particular "consti¬
tutive action"should have taken place at all. Why was insanity "dis¬
covered" in the eighteenth century and the asylum movement "born" in
the nineteenth? We need to know how individual men and women gave life
to new concepts, but we also need to know why they should have bothered
to do so—why those people in those ways. We need, in short, a pro¬
foundly historical sociology, one that can deal with man's construction
of himself within both its diachronic and synchronic dimensions. The
next section is devoted to an exposition of just such an historical
sociology, one that will be used as the theoretical core of this thesis.
3. The Theory of Praxis in Historical Materialism
The following account of what I am calling "the theory of praxis in
historical materialism" is not meant to be exhaustive or definitive. It
is however the theoretical basis on which the substantive part of this
thesis rests. The theory will be described in as much detail as is nec¬
essary to show a) why it is a useful tool for understanding the history
of psychiatry, and b) why it is valid today as a method of research.
While I can obviously make no claim to providing any sort of definitive
interpretation of historical materialism, I have attempted to express
an interpretation which is true to the intentions of the major practi¬
tioners of M?~rxism~Leninism. In other words, I am writing from within
20
historical materialism, and. not using aspects of it because they appear
useful to another theory of history or consciousness.1
Put at its simplest, what is meant by the theory of praxis in
historical materialism is a particular interpretation of the role and
meaning of subjective factors as they appear within objective history.
It will be argued that while original innovations such as moral treat¬
ment were not completely determined by external and objective factors,
the consciousness that gave rise to them was itself a creative part of
earlier objectivities. The making of history involves the activity of
man in the world in which he finds himself, but what is original in this
activity must itself be described in terms of the constituents of that
world.
In many ways this understanding of the importance of praxis is
similar to the recognition, voiced in the last section, of man's author¬
ship in his cognition of the world. Some Marxists have attacked the
concepts of praxis for precisely that reason, because it appears to
them to be
an uncritical product of that very system of capitalism
which all socialists wish to see radically replaced. Praxis
thinking does not reflect capitalism as it really is, but
For an example of the latter see Gabel's work on false consciousness
(Gabel, 1975)• For readers of this thesis unfamiliar with historical
materialism it may seem that I use a number of concepts—such as "bour¬
geois", "interests of the working class"—which are opaque to them and
not defined here. I have attempted to explain technical terms, such
as "praxis", which are relatively new to the Marxist vocabulary. How¬
ever, for the majority of ray terms I must rest my case on what I take
to be a consensus within Marxist scholarship that such terms refer to
meaningful and relatively unproblematic descriptions of the world.
That this consensus exists can be confirmed by comparing some of the main
sources used in the research for this section. See for example K Marx
and Engels, The German Ideology (MECW. vol. 5) and Marx's Cardial s vol. I
(K. Marx, 197*0, compared with the non-Marxist authors Oilman (1971) cr
Venable (194-6) ,• or with the trilogy by the Maoist George Thomson (1971,
1973, 197*0.
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merely the illusions of "spontaneity" and "creativity"
which this system has about itself.
There is certainly a tendency in contemporary (non-Marxist) sociological
2
parlance to use the term "praxis" as a fashionable synonym for "practice".
That use of "praxis" does not imply the existence of any theoretical con¬
text except that which each writer individually chooses to apply to his
work. The understanding of praxis which informs J.hls work is one which
has been consciously fashioned out of the Marxist theory of history in
order to explain man's role in his own history. The justification for
a concept of praxis in historical materialism in encapsulated in Marx's
comment that
Men make their own history, but they do not make it just
as they please; they do not make it under circumstances
chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly
encountered, given and transmitted from the past.3
Praxis is to be sought in every creative moment of this activity, con¬
stantly constrained and yet irrevocably new. The most explicit modern
discussion of praxis in this sense is to be found in the work of Jean-
Paul Sartre. According to Sartre,
If one wants to grant to Marxist thought its full complex¬
ity, one would have to say that man in a period of exploi¬
tation is at once both the product of his own product
and a historical agent who can under no circumstances be
taken as a product. This contradiction is not fix^d;
it must be grasped in the very movement of praxis.^"
Hoffman, 1975» P» 232, emphasis in the original.
2
See for instance the collection of essays on the current state of the
sociological profession entitled Sociological Praxis (Crawford and Rokkan,
1976).
3
K. Marx, Eighteenth Brumalre of Louis Bonaparte, in K. Marx and Engels,
1958, vol. 1, p. 2*7.
Sartre, 1968, p. 87, emphasis in the original. On this subject see
also his 1976, passim., a major work in which he attempts to specify
the general requirements for writing history sensitive to the existence
of praxis. A long and not entirely satisfactory discussion on the Marxist
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From the point of view of making sense of any particular historical
phenomenon—such as the birth of moral treatment—it is therefore nec¬
essary to appreciate what is creative about the action which constitutes
it as meaning. But to understand why it is meaningful, it is necessary
to appreciate the "circumstances directly encountered, given and trans¬
mitted from the past". These circumstances include not only material
facilities, such as the existing provision of asylums or whatever, but
the whole range of social, psychological, and biological features which
are recognised as constituting human nature. Historical materialism
works with a very precise formulation of the course that human history
has taken, and that course must now be reviewed~although there is no
space here to do more than review the basic features of the way in which
praxis has manifested itself in our society.
Human history begins, according to the main authors of historical
materialism, with the utilisation by man of a distinctive feature of
his nature. Unlike other species whose nature is fixed for them, the
distinctive feature of human nature is its ability to create its own
future. From his earliest beginnings, mankind has provided the basis
for his own future development.
Men can be distinguised from animals by consciousness,
by religion or anything else you like. They themselves
begin to distinguish themselves from animals as soon as
they begin to produce their means of subsistence.1
This "means of subsistence" refers not only to external products such
as foodstuffs, it refers to human nature itself, a phenomenon which is
concept of praxis is also provided by Sanchez Vazquez (1977)• What
Sanchez Vazquez does illustrate very clearly is how Marx's Theses on
encapsulate ail the essentials of praxis philosophy (pp.115-2?).
K. Marx and Engels, The German Ideology, in MECW. vol. 5, p. 31,
emphasis in the original.
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not a fixed attribute but a developing process. In Marx's words,
[man] confronts nature as one of her own forces, setting
in motion arms and legs, heads and hands, in order to
appropriate nature's productions in a form suitable to his
own wants. By thus acting on the external world and chang¬
ing it, he at the same time changes his own nature. He
develops the potentialities that slumber within him, and
subjects these inner forces to his own control.1
Or, to put it another way, the dawn of human history can be dated to
the precise moment that man gave up accepting "what is" and achieved
a change in the world:
the satisfaction of the first need, the action of satis¬
fying and the instrument of satisfaction which has been
acquired, leads to new needs; and this creation of new
needs is the first historical act.
The word that Marx used to describe man's role in this process of
change is "labour". It is labour that is the basis for man's objecti-
fication of himself in the world as a specifically human animal, and it
is labour that makes human nature something that cannot be defined once
and for all.
In short, the animal merely uses its environment, and
brings about changes in it simply by his presence; man by
his changes makes it serve his ends, masters it. This is
the final, essential distinction between man and other
animals, and once again it is labour that brings about
this distinction.-^
This process is a dialectical one because it involves the trans¬
formation of the various elements as they interact with, and on, each
other. All the aspects of human nature (rationality, physical abilities,
consciousness, etc) are not static elements but are constantly being
transcended and transformed as man produces human history himself. 0ne
1
X. Marx, 197^, p. 169.
K. Marx and Eagels, The German Ideology, in KBCW, vol. 5, p. kZ.
3
- Engels, "The part played by labour in the transition from ape to man"
in Engels, 1972, p. 260, emphasis in the original.
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example given by Engels was of the earliest, man who, in malting use of
pieces of flint, gradually developed them into tools. In so doing,
however, he not only developed the flint as a useful artefact; he also
developed his hands. In Engels' words, the human hand became "not only
the organ of labour, it is also the product of labour".1 Produced out
of the dialectic interplay between man and the world that confronted him,
the hand became an objective basis for future creative manipulation. It
is this dialectical process, in which man's nature is transcended through
his own productive activity and becomes the objective basis for future
change, that is the essence of progress as understood by historical
2
materialism.
As stated, this continuing transcendence of man's nature applies
not only to organs such as the hand, but to consciousness itself. Con¬
sciousness is a necessary product of man's activity being purposive.
Man creates consciousness in becoming aware of his needs just as much
as he does in satisfying them.
The animal is immediately identified with its life activity.
It does not distinguish itself from it. It is its life
activity. Man makes his life activity itself the object of
his will and consciousness. He has conscious life act¬
ivity. 3
Engels, 1972, p. 252, emphasis in the original. On this aspect of
human nature see Sedgwick, 1966, p. 183, especially note 37; aiso the
extended discussion in Sanchez Vazquez, 1977, PP. 218-23.
2
Historical materialism is thus essentially rationalistic and progress-
ivistic. The nature of this rationality will be commented on later. It
is now possible, however, to understand the meaning of such phrases as
Mao's "The history of mankind is one of continuous development from the
realm of necessity to the realm of freedom. This process is never ending"
(Mao, 1972, p. 203). What is meant here is not that the constraints on
man are gradually loosened, but that as he becomes more in control of the
production of his own future, the more he will be free to choose which
course to take. The freedom.to make this choice will be as much due to
the existing development of his consciousness as to the range of material
artefacts he can call to his aid.
3
K. Marx, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of ]8M, in MECW, vol. 3,
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Initially man's consciousness is of a limited form, unable to distin¬
guish the effects of his activity, from that of nature. Only as the material
basis of society provides the means for man to have a greater degree of
control over his activity (this process itself being a product of man's
developing consciousness working on the products of his already existing
labour), is man able to increase his self-awareness and use his con¬
sciousness freely, without having it confronting him in forms (such as
religion) over which he appears to have little control. Consciousness
is the specifically human attribute through which man's material accomp¬
lishments are mediated in order that they can be used as the basis for
further control of the nature that confronts him. Consciousness is both
an objective factor and the possibility for that objectivity to be
changed."'"
the argument of the substantive part of this thesis is that this
role of consciousness is the key to understanding moral treatment.
p. 276. One well-known example which Marx used to make this point is
the comparison between a bee and an architect. As he put it, "We have
to consider labour in a form peculiar to the human species. . . .many
a human architect is put to shame by the skill with which a bee con¬
structs her cell. But what from the very first distinguishes the most
incompetent architect from the best of bees, is that the architect has
built a cell in his head before he constructs it in wax. The labour
process ends in the creation of something which, when the process began,
already existed in the worker's imagination, already existed in an
ideal form" (K. Marx, 197^, PP. Io9-70).
•*
This active role of consciousness in man's formation of his own nature
has also been delineated by the Brazilian educator, Paulo Freire. On
this see especially Freire, 197?-, part 2; 1976a. There are of course
many similarities between the above account and interpretations of his¬
tory by writers who do not consider themselves to be Marxists. The
general principle of the creative basis of human nature has been elo¬
quently expressed in such diverse fields as anthropology (Geertz, 1963),
philosophy (Natanson, 1969), and sociology (Bavarian, 1973). Historical
materialism differs from these phenomenological accounts in insisting
that the form of this nature can only be understood in conjunction with
the contents that is, the objective course that human nature has in prac¬
tice had. to follow.
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Before going on to that, however, there is one further series of
questions that needs to be confronted. Why do the forms of conscious¬
ness take the particular shape that they do? Why has human history
taken a specific course, and what are the features of that history in
the period being examined here?1 Again, only a general outline can be
given, but it is one that must stress, on the one side, the contingent
features of the (natural and social) world with which man is confronted,
and on the other, the active striving by men to produce their means of
subsistence, both physical and intellectual.
To do this, men
not only act on nature but also on one another. They
produce only by co-operating in a certain way and mutually
exchanging their activities. In order to prodxice, they
enter into definite connections and relations with one
another and only within these social connections and re¬
lations does their action on nature, does production,
take place.^
In other words, in order to create the means of production men have to
form social relations of production. Labour, like language, can only
exist in a social world. When the means of production were primitive,
so were the social relations of production simple and direct. Distri¬
bution to the community of all that was produced by the community was
the operating principle governing social relations. As the means of
No attempt will be made here to give a detailed exposition of his¬
torical change, nor will justification be made for the historical mater¬
ialist assumption that history is best understood as constituted of
epochs which are determined by the ownership of the means of produc¬
tion, and overwhelmingly typified by the struggle between the class
which owns the means of production and those which do not. What I am
concerned with here are the particular manifestations of this struggle
in the period of early industrial capitalism (i.e. in the period when
the class, cr group .of men, which, derived its power from its ownership
of the manufacturing means of production, was attempting to consolidate
its economic strength in the areas of political and ideological influ¬
ence).
2
K. Harx, Wage labour and Capital, in K. Marx and Engels, 1958, vol. 1,
P. 89.
production became more powerful, so the relations of production took
on certain clearly defineable forms. As a surplus was produced over
and above what was needed to maintain a society at a subsistence level
of existence, so it began to split into divisions or classes based on
the objective relationship of its members to the means of production.
In capitalist society the primary objective distinction is between
those who own the capita]., the capitalist class, and those who have
only their labour power, the 'working class. This "totality of produc¬
tion relations"1 incorporates in its very structure a contradiction,
in that the objective interests of the two major classes are opposed.
This contradiction expresses itself in many ways, but the one that con¬
cerns us here is in the phenomenon of consciousness, the understandings
that men have of themselves, the representations they make in-their minds
of the world they see in front of them. The key to understanding the
dominant mode of consciousness of bourgeois society is in the concept
of "commodity", the production of which is the principle aim of the
1 2
capitalist means of production.
"Commodity" is merely the term used to denote the external objects
that men use to satisfy their wants. The existence of commodities is
not peculiar to any particular mode of productions what is peculiar to
the capitalist mode of production is the particular form which commod¬
ities assume. In pre-capitalist societies commodities exist primarily
in terms of their use-value; that is, their ability to serve the purpose
for which they are made. The use-value of a shoe is to clothe the foot,
1
X. Marx, Wage Labour and Capital, in K. Marx and Engels, 19>8, vol. 1,
p * 90.
2
The following discussion of commodity production is based on the first
chapter of Capital, vol. 1 (K. Marx, 19?^, pp. 3-58).
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the use-value of human labour is to satisfy men's needs. Commodities,
however, have another functions that in which their value derives not
from their active use—that is, what they can be used for—but from
their exchange-value. This ability of value to be exchanged rather than
to be immediately used in consumption is a feature of all societies ex¬
cept the most primitive. But once value is separated in this way from
the labour that created it, it begins to lose its appearance as something
created by labour. It assumes a separate nature as a thing, something
whose value is only expressed in its facility as exchange-val-ue. Money
is the prime example of this. Money is "the general commodity with which
all others are exchangeable"j5" money is the product whose use-value is
its exchange-value, the visible representation of the exchange abstrac¬
tion.2
In pre-capitalist societies commodity production is not the main
feature of the society. A feudal society, for instance, does require
to produce some commodities for exchange, but this is merely in order to
maintain the status quo as an unchanged series of obligations and duties.
A feudal ruling class might require its peasantry to produce excess rice
in order to trade for salt it does not have but needs in order to main¬
tain this same peasantry as a healthy workforce? or it night exchange
home-produced woollen goods for precious metals in order to endow its
representatives in the Church with symbols of authority and prestige.-5
The obligation of the worker to produce is invested in the authority
1
. Engels, 1972, p. 175.
2
Sohn-Rethel, 1965, p. 120. See also Hoffman's comment that it is
the "social role of money to ensure that social relations do in fact
assume the fetishistic appearance of things" (Hoffman, 1975, P- 91)*
3
See also the discussion in Ash, 1977, pp. 5/l~5.
29
of the representatives of the ruling class who, in effect, order him
to produce the required surplus value. The growth of capitalism in¬
volves the production of commodities over and above any formal obli¬
gations established by the feudal ruling class. As the production of
these commodities increases—that is, as commodities to be exchanged
and not as use-values—so a society emerges in which the dominant value
is that of exchange and ho longer that of use. Labour, or any other
commodity, comes only to be valued according to the surplus value it
can create through the medium of exchange. This conception of surplus
value as though it were created through the exchange of commodities and
not through the labour which had created the commodities: this is the
dominant feature of bourgeois consciousness, and it is this that Marx
has described as the "fetishism of commodities". To demonstrate what
he meant, Marx drew an analogy from "the nebulous world of religion":
In that world, the products of the human mind become
independent shapes, endowed with lives of their own, and
able to enter into relations with men and women. The
products of the human hand do the same thing in the world
of commodities.i
In other words, he argued,
We are concerned only with a definite social relation be¬
tween human beings, which, in their eyes, has here assumed
the semblance of a relation between things.
Instead of recognising that it is a human decision (made over many years
by many people) to reproduce one form of society and not another one,
the "fetishism of commodities" obscures the praxis by which man creates
his world. It is a general concealment, in which all manifestations of
this praxis are to some extent affected, from understandings of human
1





nature to the laws protecting the rights of private property.
Commodity production may thus be said to "mystify" reality: it
reproduces reality yet it does so in a way which conceals what it is
that makes it real. What makes it real is, according to historical
materialism, the labour power of the vast majority of the population.
And it is the recognition of this fact which provides the key to the
demystification of social life. It may at this stage quite legitimately
be .asked, if this "false consciousness" of the world is so pervasive,
how are we to break out of it? How can this present account, for in¬
stance, proclaim a "better" understanding of the treatment of the insane
than those produced within the logic of the fetishism of commodities?
Two answers may be given, both stemming from Marx, and both relying on
an interpretation of the concept of ideology.
One fairly common understanding of "ideology" is that it is merely a
wrong way of seeing the world. There is support for this view in the
pages of The German Ideology, in which Marx and Engels first developed
their historical materialist account of consciousness. Ideology appears
there as an essentially passive reflection in men's minds of their mat¬
erial relationships:
If in all ideology men and their relations appear upside-
down as in a camera obseura, this phenomenon arises just
as much from their historical life-process as the inversion
of objects on the retina does from their physical life-
process. . . .
(Our method! is a matter of. . .setting out from real,
active men, and on the basis of their real life-process
MECW.vol. 5, p. 7. Or as Mao puts it in a, more obviously Marxist form,
"Is there such a thing as human nature? Of course there is. But there is
only human nature in the concrete, no human nature in the abstract. In
class society there is only human nature of a class character; there is
no human nature above classes. We upho].d the human nature of the prole¬
tariat and of the masses of the people, while the landlord and bourgeois
classes uphold the human nature of their own classes, only they do not
say so hut make it out to he the only human nature in existence" ("Talks
at the Yenan Forum on Literature and Art, 194?.", in Mao, 196?, p. 3l).
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demonstrating the development of the ideological reflexes
and echoes of this life-process. The phantoms formed in
the "brains of men are also, necessarily, sublimates of
their material life-process, which is empirically verifi¬
able and bound to material premises.!
On the one side lies this confused, false, and passive view that men
have of themselves, and on the other, Marxism, based on a recognition
of the material world.
(our] manner of approach is not devoid of premises. It
starts out from the real premises and does not abandon
them for a moment. Its premises are men, not in any
fantastic isolation and fixity, but in their actual,
empirically perceptible process of development under
definite conditions. . . .Where speculation ends, where
real life starts, there consequently begins real, positive
science, the expounding of the practical activity, of the
practical process of development of man. Empty phrases
about consciousness end, and real knowledge has to take
their place.2
Marxism is thus a science, a means by which the social (and of course, to
many, the natural) world may be understood.
Whatever Marx and Engels meant in 1845 and 1846 when they were
writing The German Ideology, this assertion of positivist surety has
done little to encourage research into the precise ways that ideology
exerts the power it seems to hold. According to the passage just quoted,
ideology can have no history of its own: it is merely the pale and empty
reflection of real history. Works such as this thesis would take about
ten pages to write—that is, just space enough to describe the material
changes in the social relations of production and to align moral treat-
3ment to them," The critique of ideology degenerates into a simple uninask-
4
ing of illusions, an activity for which many Marxists have assumed that
1




For an example of this sort of approach see Kaigh, 19?4.
4
On this see Lichtheim, 1965, pp. l83ff.
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they are automatically the holders of the scientific tool with which
to analyse social reality. This conception of ideology proves not only
useless as a means of untangling the activity of praxis in history, it
also ignores the historical source of its own epistemology. It impli¬
citly rejects the continual process of history and attempts to capture
change in a philosophy which, in so doing, it changes from a material¬
ist one to a branch of metaphysics.
That is one oonception of "ideology". An alternative one, which is
not explicitly defined by Marx, can nevertheless be found to permeate
all that is creative in Marxism-Leninism. It is encapsulated in Sartre's
aphorism that "Marxism is History itself becoming concious of itself".^
As already stated, human nature is not, according to historical mater¬
ialism, fixed once and for all. It develops dialectically as man appro¬
priates the world and objectifies himself in this appropriation. Con¬
sciousness is an aspect of this process: consciousness is not a passive
mode of experiencing the world but a means in the creation of human
nature, produced out of labour and itself a resource in the production
of what is distinctively human in man. Ideological forms of conscious¬
ness, such as animism and political economy, are merely examples of that
limited consciousness as, it must be stressed, is Marxism itself. These
forms of consciousness are inherently limited because they are attempts
to define man's purpose in the world (or some aspect of it) when that
purpose is constantly being changed, and that precisely by the material
existence of these forms of consciousness themselves.
According to this mode of thought, consciousness cannot be neatly
separated into ideological and scientific aspects. It is rather that
1
Sartre, 1976, p. 4-0.
2
According to this definition, then, "science" cannot be opposed to
"ideology", or even "scientific knowledge" to "ideological knowledge".
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knowledge "becomes less ideological to the extent that it allows man
to exert greater conscious control over his own future. Each form of
consciousness may "be assessed insofar as it recognises the material
reality of a particular time.
The material reality of our time is the fetishism of commodities.
If this mode of consciousness is spelt out in all its manifestations—
from the laws of private property to the practice of psychiatry—we
will gradually he able to develop a consciousness which can "be used to
defend new interests not committed to the maintenance of capitalism.
This new way of thinking will still require a change in the material
conditions to "be, as moral treatment was befor it, "both meaningful and
progressive. My own feeling is that thesa:material changes are taking
place and that this present contribution in the sphere of ideas is in
some way complementary to these far more- significant changes in the
1
economic and political world.
We exist within history as much as did those to whom we direct our
attention. Our reason is formed out of the dialectical interplay of
the forces and relations of production as much as axe our factories,
churches, and universities. As much as those we study, we "make [[our}
All knowledge this side of perfect communism (which we can "barely con-
ceptualise at this stage) is to some extent ideological, "based as it
is on an imperfect consciousness of what could be possible. Equally,
much knowledge is scientific to the extent that it contributes to ova:
attaining that state. Cn this see Sedgwick's comments on Gramsci's
conception of science (Sedgwick, 1966, pp. 185-6).
1
In the words of Santiago Garrillo, "In present conditions, the only
way towards changing the ideological-political apparatus which upholds
the capitalist regime is the creation of a new correlation of forces
by means of political, social and cultural struggle. . . .Certainly one
of the great historical tasks of the present time for the conquest of
state power by the socialist forces is the determined, resolute, intell¬
igent struggle to turn the weapon of ideology, trie ideological state
apparatusses, against the classes which are in power" (Carillo, 1977,
pp. 41, 45).
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own history. . .under circumstances directly encountered, given and
transmitted from the past". Within that logic we can attempt to expose
"laws of human nature" as so much petrified praxis. The point of doing
this is not to produce a general theory of ideology, but to aid in the
transformation of that petrified praxis. Or, as Sartre has put it,
The dialectic reveals itself only to an observer situated
in interiority, that is to say, to an investigator who
lives his investigation both as a possible contribution
to the ideology of an entire epoch and as the particular
praxis of an individual defined by his historical and per¬
sonal career in the wider history which conditions it.1
To accept this dictum is not to imply that one has an automatic guarantee
of top quality research data. That will only come from rigorous work
by the researcher, whatever his ideological commitments. All that is
claimed here is that the "theory of praxis.in historical materialism"
provides a theoretical basis which is intellectually adequate to explain
changes in the treatment of the insane, as well as being sociologically
2
reflexive in that it is able to account for its own meaning.
* * *
The air is now cleared and the precise intellectual debates within
^
Sartre, 1976, p. 38.
2 . . .
There is a similar recognition of the materialist implications of the
sociology of knowledge from a bourgeois academic viewpoint in Barnes,
197^f pp. 15^-7. Where this present account differs from that of Barnes
is in its conception of the nature of rationality. Barnes maintains that
the "sociologist will be unable to advance his understanding of belief
and action by categorizing it in terms of his own criteria of rational¬
ity, efficacy or truth" (ibid.. p. 43), and that "belief systems cannot
be objectively ranked in terms of their proximity to reality or their
rationality" (ibid.., p. 15^). My argument is that any description of
the world must do precisely that to be meaningful at all, which is in¬
deed what Barnes does by locating the meaning of his work within contemp¬
orary debates in bourgeois universities on the nature of science (ibid.,
P. -1-55). In contrast, I try to locate the rationality of my work in the
consciousness produced by those who have identified themselves with the
interest of the working class.
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which the following account is written have been revealed. The relation¬
ship of the following account to existing work in the history of psych¬
iatry, the sociology of medical knowledge, and historial materialism
has been discussed. The disadvantage of such a broad approach is that
it may appear to involve a cavalier attitude to many of the usual con¬
cerns of medical and psychiatric history. There is nothing here, for
instance, on the "real" causes or incidence of insanity, nor on the
social history of the insane.1 These might appear to be a legitimate
concern of any social historian of the treatment of the insane; but from
the viewpoint adopted here, to include a discussion of them would be merely
to confuse the argument. On the other hand, the advantages, indeed
necessity, of working simultaneously within different intellectual con¬
texts should by now be obvious. An additional advantage of this type of
approach is that it provides not only an account of the specific pro¬
duction of theories and practices in the treatment of the insane, but
that it illuminates the general production of cultural forms in capital¬
ist society.
There will be few references in the substantive part of this thesis
to the theoretical issues raised in this introduction. We do not need
to understand an architect's knowledge of mathematics and physics when
we are walking through a building constructed from his plans, and yet
without those theoretical components the building could never have been
It will also be noted that there is far less time spent on the "post-
history" of moral treatment than there is on its "pre-history". This is
because the main interest here is in understanding the praxis that estab¬
lished moral treatment as a meaningful activity, not in providing a full
description of a historical phenomenon. The praxis that led to the "de¬
cline'^ ofmoral treatment was informed by different values, different
material interests; and although these values and interests are not entire¬
ly ignored here, it is not felt that to examine them in any detail would
add to an understanding of moral treatment itself.
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erected. In the came way the theoretical structure of this thesis has
been laid bare for those with a technical interest in its rationale. But
the value of the thesis must lie in its practical use to us as historians
or sociologists or whatever, and not because of its theoretical pedigree.
In many ways, what is presented here is very similar to work in the
history of art, especially that of T.J. Clark or Max Raphael. Clark has
emphasized the need to elucidate the relationship between a work of art
and the society in which it appears,what he calls the verb of which the
work of art is the noun.
If the history of art has a specific study, it is exactly
this—the process of conversion and relation, which so
much art history takes for granted. I want to discover
what concrete transactions are hidden behind the mechan¬
ical image of "reflection", to know how "background" be¬
comes "foreground"; instead of analogy between form and
content, to discover the network of real, complex relations
between the two.
Similarly, Raphael has provided a number of "monographies" in which
the individuality of the work of art and the generality of the conditions
out of which it was produced are completely integrated in his study of
2 . .
them. However, while recognising that my own research has much in
common with some art history, no claim is being made of following the
3
precise methods of particular art historians. It is rather that a
T.J. Clark, 1973» P* 12, emphasis in the original. See also Clark's
appeal for a dialectical art history in the Times Literary Supplement
(T.J. Clark, 197*0. Clark's methodology is discussed by Tagg (1977,
especially pp. 188-90).
2
Raphael, 1968. One of the case studies that Raphael provides is of
Picasso's painting of Guernica (op.cit.. chap, 5). Raphael situates this
work of art both within the objective history of which it is a part and
within Picasso's own ideological place within the history of his time.
On Raphael's approach see Tagg, 1975.
3
My understanding of the social determination of cultural forms also
owes much to the art history of Arnold Hauser (1962).
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number of researchers in related fields have discovered that they are
doing similar work. In very different ways the essays by Sartre on
1
Jean Genet's creation of his own image, and by Rodinson on Mohammed's
2
creation of a new religion, are also examples of research which the.
present account has taken as ah inspiration.
What the best of this type of work has in common is that it does
not rely on complex theoretical concepts to make its point. Although
the issues involved and the approaches taken are indeed complex, the
writers accept that a text must stand or fall on its own merits it must
convince as practice as well as theory. Finally then, a work of history,
once written, is no more than a pliable resource to be used by the reader
in accordance with his ends. Its quality lies less in its existence as
a convincing account than in the extent to which the reader is able to
repeat the whole process of rethinking history.
The last word in this introduction may be left to Sartre, whose
work has remained a constant encouragement throughout my writing of
this thesis:
What is honourable about reading is this: the reader
freely allows himself to be influenced. . . .The reader
invents us: he uses our words to set his own traps for










In the following account of changes in the treatment of the
insane the central focus will he, as already announced, on the
phenomenon of moral treatment. Moral treatment will he examined as
a means of changing the treatment of the insane both as a theory of
what was known and as a practice of what was done. The substantive
content of the thesis is divided into two main parts. In Part One
the crystallization of the concept of moral treatment is followed,
a crystallization that made use of numerous and disparate fragments
of existing ideologies and practices. The metaphor of "crystallisation"
is used because it captures the imagery of formation, of using existing
resources to make a new and indivisible whole. It will be shown that
moral treatment was such a construct, with the difference that, unlike
natural crystals, the significance of moral treatment derived only from
the men in whose hands and minds it was fashioned.
Part One is divided into two chapters. Chapter One concerns
itself with the prehistory of the announcement of moral treatment-—the
social and intellectual context that made it possible for moral treat¬
ment to appear as both meaningful and progressive. Chapter Two is
devoted to an examination of the creation of moral treatment in the
work of the Tuke family at York and of Philippe Pinel in Paris. Chapter
Two also assesses the significance of the phenomenon at this stage of
its career.
At this time (that is, until about l8lj>) moral treatment was
merely an experiment, one method among many contemporary therapies.
It was with the publication of various accounts of moral treatment as
a successful practice that it emerged into the world, to be used as a
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ready-made resource in the treatment of the insane. Part Two follows
the fortunes of moral treatment after this emergence. Because it was
now an established "fact", one which had a concrete praxis to appeal
to for its validation, this phase of moral treatment is most appropri¬
ately described as one of Petrification. Chapters Three and Four deal
with the petrified forms of moral treatment as they appeared both as
social practice and as natural knowledge.
The heyday of moral treatment was short-lived. By 18^5 it was
both proclaimed everywhere and indistinguishable as a method of treat¬
ment from many others. The concept of moral treatment had been trans¬
formed from a distinct ideology into a general term, and what had been
distinctive about the early practice of moral treatment began to appear
under a new banner. These transformations of the petrified fragments
and their re-crystallization into new forms will be dealt with in
Chapter Five.
CHAPTER ORE
The Prehistory of Moral Treatment:
A survey of the social and intellectual
world into which moral treatment was to
appear.
We must cease once and for all to describe the
effects of power in negative terms: it "excludes",
it'^represses", it "censors", it "abstracts", it
"masks", it "conceals". In fact, power produces;
it produces reality; it produces domains of objects
and rituals of truth. The individual and the





Let us start with the "basic datum of any social investigations
the people who were involved.
Those recognised as insane"^ in the 1790s were kept in a number
of large and small institutions. Table 1 gives a rough idea of the
numbers involved. The first national attempt to find out what the
figures were was not made until 1806, but this was far from being an
exhaustive survey. The number of insane listed as being in private
custody and in the workhouses is probably underestimated, but this
does not seriously alter the general picture. For most of the
institutions private records were kept which allow at least an outline
of provision to be drawn. From the lunatics' point of view we can
divide the facilities into the predominantly custodial-only and the
therapeutic. From the point of view of the institutions this is not
so easy to do. Some are obviously purely custodial and others over¬
whelmingly tied to a rehabilitative programme, but in many the decision
to emphasize one or other aspect rested with the head keeper, or super-
intendant, or physician, and often policy changed as personnel changed.
However the distinction is worth making because although the 1790s
were a time when the concepts of both custody and therapy were being
questioned, this occurred within an intellectual and institutional
context when they had had very precise meanings. To understand the
significance of this change it is necessary to uncover something of
these meanings as they appeared to the physicians and reformers
The terms "insanity", "madness", "asylum" etc. are used here because
they were the terms used in the period being researched. There was a
change in the concepts being used at this time, and this itself requires
comment. As far as possible this comment will be made consciously and
not hidden within an evaluaiional rewriting of the past as "psychiatric
history" or its antithesis, "The Manufacture of Madness" (Szasz, 1973)*
Table 1
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1813 SC, Report end Appendices. 1807 SC, Report. Even at the
time these figures were published they were held to be gross under¬
estimates. Halliaay in an appendix to this Report gives detailed,
and much higher, figures for two counties.
C
Burrows, 1820, Appendix. 1816 SC, Report. e Anon, 1796. The
physician in charge of this house is stated to have haa about 200
patients he was treating for insanity, many of whom he boarded out in
peop3.es' homes.
f
Retreat, State of the Institution. 1800. s Gray, 1813. h J. Currie,
1803, vol. 2, Appendix 2. x Cameron, 1934. J Brockbank, 1934.
k
Bateman and Rye, 1906. 1 H.T. Phillips, 1973. m Hunter, Macalpine
and Payne, 1936.
of the 1790s.
1. The theory and. practice of confinement
Of the "single" lunatics (that is, those confined alone) in private
custody we have little information, ho public records were kept of
their numbers and, although we have the usual anecdotal stories about
isolated cases, it is more likely that these have been remembered more
because of their exceptionality than because they were typical of the
mass. In any case, no theory of care was developed around the single
lunatic. Vhere they were treated at all, and many of the wealthy ones
obviously were, it would have been by a mad-doctor or apothecary1 with
an interest in insanity who for various reasons did not admit the
patient to a private madhouse. Those who could not afford the expenses
of a doctor were left to their own resources, or if a nuisance, held in
confinement.
There were a number of small custodial madhouses which functioned
on a nursing-home principle: that is, they provided a place of confine¬
ment for those lunatics who were judged to be dangerous and who could
pay for more than the very minimum. Examples of unnecessary restraint
and coercion are frequently used to portray the eighteenth-century private
madhouse trade, but as with all institutions existing in a free market,
you got what you paid for. It is possible to point to examples of rich
patients who were put away by relatives who wantea to get their hands on
the family fortune, but it is equally possible to find examples of kind-
ness and concern.
The term "mad-doctor" is a contemporary one referring to a medical
specialist in insanity. It could be used to refer to a physician, an
apothecary, or a surgeon, the three strata of the meaical profession at
the time. All three had representatives in the "Trade in Lunacy" (another
contemporary term), the only difference being the status or wealth of
their clients. On the structure of the eighteenth century medical pro¬
fession see Hamilton, 1951; ft". and J. Parry, 1976, pp. 104-17.
~
On the former' see almost any of the evidence given to the I8l6 bC.
The important point is not the existence of individual examples
hut the underlying factor which led them to develop as solutions.
This factor was of course that the insane constituted a social prob¬
lem. They could not support themselves, they were sometimes violent,
and at the very least they appeared as a nuisance. There was nothing
new about this: the itinerant lunatic had been recognised as a prob¬
lem at least since Shakespeare's time, but so too had the existence
of the Parish responsibility for its dependents who could not care for
themselves.1 This was the deciding factor for most of those classified
as insane: what it was that their parish decided to do with them. A
variety of means had been tried in the seventeenth century to cope
with the problem of order that the insane presented, but by the late
Examples of "good" custodial care are harder to point to, if only
for the reason that good news is not newsworthy. If Faulkner's adver¬
tising tract for his madhouse (Faulkner, 1789) is to be believed,
"every indulgence, as far as is consistent with physical and mental
operation, is allowed. . ." (p. 23). A more reliable source of evi¬
dence is perhaps that of patients' relatives. Charles Lamb wrote
to Coleridge about the madhouse at which his (lamb's) sister was
conf5.ned after killing their mother: "The good lady of the madhouse,
and her daughter, an elegant, sweet behaved young lady, love her,
and are taken with her amazingly; and I know from her own mouth she
loves thes, and longs to be with them as much" (letter of 3^8. October
1796, in Lamb, 1907, vol. 1, p. 37)- The poet William Cowper was at
Dr Cotton's madhouse in St Albans from 1763 to 1765 and had no words
of criticism for his custodian at "all; indeed he summed up the mad¬
house proprietor's attitude as "ever watchful and apprehensive for
my welfare" (Cowper, 1816, p. 69). But as Cotton was charging be¬
tween three and five guineas per week to patients at his house at
this time, the concern is perhaps not surprising. (See HMA, p. ^25.)
That is, since the Poor Law Act of l601.
46
eighteenth century the solutions were becoming institutionalised.1
One answer was to treat the insane offender purely as an offender and
to sentence him to one of the penal institutions. John Howard has left
a description of what it was like for the lunatic in prison:
. . .in some few gaols are confined idiots and Lunatics.
These serve for sport to idle visitants 3>t assises, and
other times of general resort. Many of the bridewells are
crowded and offensive, because the rooms which were designed
for prisoners are occupied by the insane, when these are ^
not kept separate, they disturb and terrify other prisoners.
But, as Howard points out, the numbers involved were very small. A
disruptive lunatic dependent on his parish for support was far more
likely to be boarded out in a private madhouse or workhouse.
By the late eighteenth century the workhouse was undoubtedly the
major institution for the social control of deviance. The importance
of the insane in these workhouses, at least as far as the workhouse
ethos was concerned, was minor. But the aims of the workhouses were
so closely tied to many of the ideological concerns that were popular
in the eighteenth century that all the institutional innovations, for
the insane or for any other deviant group, were to some extent depen¬
dent on the example the workhouses had set. The specialist facilities
for the insane that were to appear later developed a specialised
rhetoric, but this rhetoric can hardly be assessed without understanding
the basis in social practice from which innovations were to emerge.
One of the first workhouses to be built in England was at Bristol.^
This particular workhouse is of interest here because not only was the
In the seventeenth century the most usual course of action was for
a relative of an insane person to petition a Justice of the Peace, and
for the latter to authorise the .parish to provide financial assistance
or safe keeping or to send the lunatic to o. House of Correction. 1'or
examples, see JJ.H. Tuke, 1882, pp. 41-2; HMA, pp. 137-9; Eessler, 19.56.
Fessler points out that the custodial madhouses were merely an extension
of the earlier ad hoc arrangements whereby the parish authorised payment
to an individual to look after the "village lunatic".
J. Howard, 1973, vol. 1, p. 8.
3
The most comprehensive survey of the early workhouse movement is
'+7
rhetoric surrounding its establishment quite explicit in its claims
of what the point of the new institution was to be, but also because
this workhouse had a large number of insane inmates. The first pro¬
posal for a Bristol workhouse appeared in a book published by a Bristol
merchant in 1695, John Cary's An Essay on the State of England, in
.Relation to its Trade.1 Cary noticed that as each parish within a
city like Bristol was responsible for its own poor, some parishes were
likely to have a much heavier burden than others. These were likely
to be the parishes in the suburbs of the town. They received little
income from commerce, but they attracted the poor, both because they
were cheaper places to live in than the commercial areas, and because
once the poor started to move in, others were attracted to the area.
Cary saw the solution of providing for these poor in a general poor
rate for the whole city being used to create a general provision for
2
all in the workhouse. This idea was given legislative voice by
the Bristol Poor Act of 1696 which allowed parishes to combine their
responsibilities for more efficient administration of the Poor Law.
As a direct consequence of this Act one building was opened in Bristol
in 1698 to accommodate the poor of eighteen parishes, and one uniform
rate was levied in each parish.
The workhouse was a building conceived as a containment of idle¬
ness, both physically and metaphorically: life in the workhouse was
still to be found in the kebbs' history of English local government.




. .it Cities and Towns were made but one Poor's Bate, or equallydivided into more, these Inconveniences might be removed, and the Poor
maintained by a more impartial Contribution'1 (ibid.. p. 166;.
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constructed to symbolise the values of society—the competitive,
dynamic of commercial capitalism, that had made Bristol such a prosper¬
ous place. There was the physical contribution that the inmates could
makes assistance in simple manufacturing processes such as beating hemp,
dressing flay., carding and spinning wool, stripping and rolling tobacco,
and picking oakum. Although the aim was to get real work acne, just
as important was the instillation of the right attitudes
. . .if a reward were given to that Person who should spin
the finest Thread of either (wool or flax], to be adjudged
yearly, and paid by the County, 'twould very much promote
Industry and Ingenuity, whilst every one being prickt on
by Ambition and Hopes of Profit, would endeavour to exceed
the rest, by which means we should grow more excellent in
our Manufactures.-1
The confined space was the new society writ small; a moral universe
with no escape except that which could be obtained by following the
rules. Foucault, in describing the similar institution of the nSpital
General in France, has written,
The prisoner who could and who would work would be
released, not so much because he was again useful to
society, but because he had again subscribea to the
great ethical pact of human existence.**
Foucault has captured exactly the idea of the workhouse as a moral
fable, in whose confined space the seeds of entrepreneurial competition
were to be sown and nurtured.
In practice, the whole idea of turning the workhouses into centres
where the poor could be profitably employed was repeatedly shown to be
1
Gary, 1695, p. 158.
2
Joucaulc, 1971, pp. 59-60. This is not to say that there were no
major axfj.erences between the iiopitaux Gencfraux and the workhouses.
The former were much more inclusive, the one in Paris, for instance,
holding 600C inmates by the 1660s. But insofar as the HopitauxGeneraux ana the workhouses accepted the thesis that "mendicancy and
idleness g"orcj the source ol al.i disorders" (jSdict of 1656 authorising
the establishment, of^the Hcfeital General in Paris, quoted in Foucault,°
op.ext. , p. 47), it is legitimate to compare them.
z*9
invalid. For a number of reasons, relating both to the difficulties of
getting the paupers to work and of selling the goods and services they
produced, the practical expression of the workhouse as a House of
Industry was a failure.1 A number of workhouse overseers did believe
however that, although the workhouse regimes themselves did very little
to keep the poor rate down or to encourage their inmates to work, the
very existence of a workhouse in a small community often had a startling
effect. As the master at Maidstone workhouse put it in i?2^,
very great Lumbers of lazy People, rather than submit to
the Confinement and Labour of the workhouse, are content
to throw off the Mask, and maintain themselves by their
own Industry.
This idea of the workhouse as deterrent remained one of its most popular
images throughout the eighteenth century.^
It was however as an expression of ideology that the workhouse
really inspired such men as John Cary. Whatever an individual work¬
house's failure as a means for producing profit, the principle of the
institution remained an attractive one to many. Part of this attraction
derived from the obvious element of social control expressed in the
whole notion of a workhouse; the idea that only by taking the aims of
their society seriously can people be made to abstain from civil diso-
bediance—ana this was a real problem that Bristol faced on a number of
occasions. But Cary's ideas are more complex than that. As an ideo¬
logist at a time when his class was breaking down barriers imposed by
a less democratic authority, Gary expresses the positive, liberating
Kumerous reasons are given in 3. and B. Webb, 1927, pp. 227-40.
2
in Anon, 1732, p. 128. This work consists entirely of letters and
documents from workhouses and provides a revealing picture of the every¬
day workhouse practices of that time.
^ 3. and B. Webb, op.cit., pp. 243-5.
element of bourgeois thought as re11." The passage in which he does
this is. worth quoting at length because it contains many of the themes
that sections of the English middle class have continued to repeat up
to the present day:
Idleness is the Foundation of all those Vices which prevail
amongst us, People aiming to be maintained any way rather
than by Labour betake themselves to all sorts of Villanies,
the ill Consequences whereof cannot be prevented but by
encouraging Youth in an early relight of Living by Industry,
which would keep up a true English Bpirit in them, and
create a Lesire to secure a Property in what they have;
whereas a sloathful repenaance on another's Bounty makes
Men slavishly give up all at the will of their Benefactors,
and having no Properties of their own to secure, are easily
perswaded to part with their liberties; this a former iieign
knew well, when the Ministers of that Court found an Inclin¬
ation in the People to sell their Privileages for Luxury
ana Lase.^
Instead of the moral ties bonding men to their patrons, man was to be
made free. The material benefits of this freedom were obvious to a
prosperous merchant like Cary for whom the unfetterea exploitation of
labour and capital was also the source of his enrichment.
That servitude and not enrichment was the likely outcome of any
person's stay in a workhouse hardly needs comment, but it is not enough
Cary was not just a merchant who happened to write about the subject
he knew best; he was an active propaganaist for the trading section of
the community for most of his life. He took an active part in local
Bristol politics and was chosen by the committee of trace of that city
as their representative in London. Cary wrote a number of works on all
aspects of commercial capitalism, from international markets to the con¬
cept of "industry" (that is, work; itself. His best-known book,the
Essay on Trade (Gary, 1695) was described by that other bourgeois ideo¬
logist, Jonn rocke, as "the best discourse I have ever reaa on the
subject" (LIvB).
2
Cary, 1695, p. 165.
3 Vide ihe. Communist manii-esto; ". . .the feudal relations of property
became no longer compatible with the already developed productive forces;
they became so many fetters. They had to be burst asunder; they were
burst asunder. Into their place stepped free competition, accompanied by
a social and political constitution adapted to it, and by the economical
and political sway of the bourgeois class" (I'lECw. vol. 6, p. 489').
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*to write off the workhouses merely as attempts at social control ox
the poor. Their meaning is hidden deep within the logic of bourgeois
rationality: it is both an expression of the moral worth ol ino.iviu.uals
in a society committed to commodity production as well as a means to
conceal that morality within the objective needs of that society.
This is a theme that was to be repeated endlessly in the eighteenth-
and nineteenth-century institutions for the control of deviance, as
well as in the theoretical constructions that were, createu to justify
their existence.
As already stated, the Bristol workhouse is of particular interest
because it took on a special function of caring for the insane, 'ihe
building had always been known as St Peter's Hospitaland although its
first inmates were a hundred boys, these were soon joined by the aged,
the infirm, and lunatics, the latter eventually becoming the sole inhab¬
itants. The first mention in the Bristol Corporation of the Poor
Court records of a lunatic at St Peter's is in 1707. By 182jj the trans¬
formation was complete and the building was recognised as the Bristol
lunatic asylum.^
It is sometimes asserted that because Bristol was aheau of its
time in recognising the insane as a separate category, this meant that
their treatment was in some way "better" than that of the insane in the
3mixed workhouses. What evidence we have suggests that St Peter's was
run with the same overriding concern for economy that typified all
workhouses at the time. The insane inmates appear to have had little
medical attention. Hot until 1763 do the Court books announce ". . .that
the Physicians and Burgeons of this House should be desired to visit
(once a Week at least) the frenzy objects and report the State of
1
H.T. Phillips, 1973
Butcher, 1932, p. 10
^ See for instance X. Jones, 1972, pp. 20-1.
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their Health to the Committee."" The following year a cola bath for
the lunatics was installed on the physician's advice. Two year3 later
it fell into the adjacent river following the collapse of a wall due
to disrepair. Overcrowding was another perennial problem. There were
complaints in 1767 of children having to sleep eight to a bed; and in
1785 by getting rid of some "workshy" inmates the total number of
inmates was reduced to 325. But within thirty years the figure was up
by half as much again.
One thing is certain: whatever the treatment of the insane at
St Peter's, as fax- as establishing the principle of workhouses went,
Bristol was ahead of its time. National legislation authorising parishes
2
to erect workhouses was not passed until 1722, and legislation allowing
them to combine into Unions, as Eristol had done, did not appear before
1782? .
A thorough survey that was made of workhouses in 1732 suggests
that at that time few recognised lunatics were being piacea in them.
For instance, huie 14 of the liegulations of St Andrew's workhouse in
Holborn stated
That no pension be allowed to any Pensioner out of the
House, unless in Cases of Lunacy, Plague, Small-Pox,
Four-disease, or laiotism. .
A similar sentiment was expressed at Bedford, workhouse. This must be
seen in the context of the reasoning governing the establishment of
4 these v.-orkhouses: if the poor were made to enter an unpleasant insti¬
tution before being offered any assistance they wouia try harder to be
"
Quoted in Butcher, 1932, p. 114
2
9 Geo. I, chap. 7
3 22 Geo III, chap. 83
b
Anon, 1732, p. 19. The first edition published in 1723 does net
mention lunatics at all.
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self-supporting. It has already been pointed out that the principle
of deterrence was an important one for the advocates of the workhouse;
that is, the belief that it was not so much the actual reformation
that was achieved with those who became inmates, as the example that
was set to those who did not. .A typical comment, was this from Brent¬
wood workhouse:
In the Work-House at this Place, there are only at present
4 or 5 ancient People, past their Labour, one incurable,
and half a dozen small Children, under the Government of
a Mistress: And tho', the poor People being helpless,
there is little or no work aone in it, yet the setting
of it up has had this gooa Effect, that the Poor's Hates
are lessened above one half, by exciting the Industry of
the poorer Sort, who are willing to exert their utmost
Endeavours to maintain themselves at Home, rather than
"I 7
to be put into the work-House.
With this philosophy underlying the foundation of the workhouse move¬
ment the existence of lunatics within a -workhouse would be at best
irrelevant, and at worst a nuisance.
Some comities never took much interest in the lunatics in their
workhouses. Perhaps some areas received less than their share, or
perhaps the local administrators took a more relaxed attitude to
their dependents. Or perhaps the existence of a local asylum intro¬
duced an element of choice, encouraging workhouse overseers to get
rid of some of their more disruptive inmates. A comparison of two
counties for which we have detailed information supports this latter
thesis. Suffolk in 1807 had at least ^7 pauper lunatics, all of them
held in workhouse cells except for 13 who were in a privately-endowed
lunatic asylum in Lorwich and 2 at St Luke's in London. Horfolk at
the same time had 112 pauper lunatics, of whom 51 were in the Aorwich
asylum, 20 in another asylum, three in gaol, four in Houses of
Letter from Brentwood workhouse, in anon, 1725, p. 57
5^
Correction, 14 not confined at all, and only 20 in workhouses.1 These
figures, wliatever their insi.aeq.uacy in providing a complete ana reliable
account, do at least indicate the differing use made of the facilities
available for the insane at that time.
We do have a number of descriptions of what life was like for the
pauper lunatic in a mixea workhouse. William Perfect, a physician with
an interest in insanity, aescribed how in 17?6 he visited a maniac in
the Rochester workhouse. The lunatic was attached to the basement
floor by fetters and iron staples, in a room visible to the passing
2
public who apparently gave him gin to encourage his mad behaviour.
A more extreme example of this simple mechanical restraint is found
in the records of a Yorkshire public asylum.
ho. 240. Admitted February 18'th, 1819, Aged 75 years.
Insane years. When aged 39 [i.e. in 17851 she drowned
her infant chill and from that perioa had been chained in
a cell in the workhouse of Barnsley, until the time of her
removal to this place.-5
This simple policy of segregation or confinement may have been effective
in terms of reducing the lunatics' nuisance potential; but it could
only be tried If the lunatic was recognised as being separate, without
the potential for reform that the rest of the deviant population was
held to possess.
Certainly there was a recognition that the insane created special
problems of order for the workhouse, but it was a problem that was not
solved by the methods that were recognised as being appropriate to the
institution of the workhouse. Even St Peter's in Bristol, adapteu for
use as a workhouse-hospital, never really developed a policy whereby
1
See the letters from llalliday in the appendix to the 1807 SC Report,
P • 13 •
2
Perfect, 1787, pp. 131-4*
^ Quoted in Bolton, 1928, p. 6]7*
the reformative ideals of the workhouse could be adapted to the spec¬
ialised case of the insane, Xt was this failure of the workhouses to
generalise the bourgeois solution to deviance across the whole spec¬
trum of the deviant population that provided one of the major planks
in the attempt to build a hospital movement. Insanity was recognised
as a distinctive social problem precisely because it remained intract¬
able to the generalised solution to deviance of the workhouse.
hot everyone drew the conclusion that a hospital was the best
solution for the problem of the pauper lunatics. The private madhouses
have already been mentioned and in terms of size of provision they
remained important until the mid-nineteenth century. as the over¬
crowding in the workhouses grew so did the number of entrepreneurs
who agreed to board out parish paupers at a minimum charge. For a
small regular payment the parish could fulfill its responsibility to
its deviants without involving itself in any capital expenditure or
overcrowding its reformative institutions with the apparently
unreformable.
This vras especially true in the home counties, served by the
very large houses in the East End of bondon of Thomas warburton a.na
Sir Jonathan Miles, houses which were to become infamous with the
2
disclosures of the 1816 and 1827 Select Committee reports.
See Parry-Jones, 1973- hot until I8T3 was it made mandatory for
all county authorities to provide a place in a medically-supervised
asylum for all' their lunatics.
2
Miles owned Hoxton House from 1790 (although the house had been run
as a madhouse by his family since l6$'5;« la 1819 it held 3^8 patients.
Warburton, who started his career as a butcher's boy. became a porter
at Whitmore House and subsequently servant, keeper, and owner (i-iitfora,
1823a). In 1819 it held 78 patients, ivarburton also owned the ned
and White Houses in Bethnal Green which he set up to cope with the
less affluent overspill of whitmore House. In 1819 the xted and white
held 797 patients, a large number of ivarburton1 s charges came to
him from Thomas Eunston, heaa-keeper at St Luke's Hospital, who
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Given that most of these paupers were only being confined at
all because they were believed to be,dangerous by the parishes who
were paying to have them boarded out, the main problem confronting
the administrators of these madhouses was one of restraint. Mechan¬
ical restraint, such as the use of chains and strapping the patient
into his bed, was cheap and effective. In the Red and White mad¬
houses,
They were in the habit of treating those men by chain¬
ing them down of an evening about an hovx previous to
dusk, in things called cribs, which are boxes contain¬
ing straw, and leaving them there till the following
morning, locked in, without any attendance being paid to
them in the course of the night, let whatever would oc¬
cur; and on the Saturday evenings, they were locked
down in the same state, and kept until Monday morning,
without being unchained or allowed to get up to relieve
themselves in any way whatever.^
And this was in 1827 when continuing reports of cruelty had led to
yet another official enquiry into the madhouses. In another asylum
frequently had between six and seven hundred names on the waiting
list for St Luke's (Dunston's evidence to the 180? SC, Report,
pp. 9-13). Bunston received a retaining fee of £500 per annum
from Warbarton for recommending patients to him and is said to
have "amassed a fortune of £30,000" (Morris, 1958, n.p.) from this
source. The relationship was strengthened when Warburton's daugh¬
ter married Dunston's son, an apothecary who was later to become
visiting doctor to Warburton's houses. One vivid example of War-
burton's mis-use of public funds was given by the publisher Charles
Knight, then Overseer in the parish of Windsor. In 1818 the parish
v?as in debt and one of the largest outstanding debts was to War-
burton. This was for £4-00 in respect of a pauper who had been
confined in one of Warburton's houses for ten years for causing
3, public nuisance. Knight went to enquire and at the madhouse was
received at the door "by a civil, man-servant" who turned out to be
the cured lunatic. He was subsequently discharged. (C. Knight,
1864-1865, vol, 1, pp. 195-7).
*
Evidence of William Solomon, ex-patient at one of Warburton's
madhouses, 1327 SC, Report, p. Jl.
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when the keepers were asked the reason for putting them
[the patients] in irons, [the keepers replied] that it
would require a larger expense than' they could afford
to keep^ servants to take care of them if they' were not
ironed. ^
As an institution to deal with the insane, the private madhouse was
not necessarily custodial or coercive any more than the workhouse was
necessarily reformative. But whereas the workhouse was a public
institution and was basea on the ideology of those who controlled
the public purse, the private madhouses were by definition ciependent
only on the private concerns of their proprietors. Many of the propri¬
etors saw their madhouses as a financial investment with monetary
profit the only aim of their "Trade in Lunacy". Others, as will be
shown later, saw their enterprise not so much a financial as an ideo¬
logical investment in which they could demonstrate the superiority
of the values they had elected to live by. In some of these madhouses
and private asylums significant innovations in the treatment of the
insane were to be made.
This concludes the review of predominantly custodial facilities.
Before turning to the radical innovations in therapy that were to be
made it is necessary to ketch in the background of the provision that
was made for the insane that could be said in any way at all to be
based on a commitment to therapy rather than to confinement.
2. The beginnings of therapy for the insane
In the eighteenth century the major institutional embodiment of
therapeutic principles was the public hospital. These hospitals
were committed to the cure of their patients as well as to their
care, and in numerical terms these constituted the most important of
all the institutions in which the insane were likely to find themselves.
Evidence of Br n. Fowler, visiting physician to Fonthill madhouse,
in the iBlj? EC, First Report, p. 46.
5S
Table 2 gives details of the size and source of finance of the public
hospitals that existed in the 1790s. At that time not ail of these
Table 2





Date of Lumber Original
Founding of neds dource of Finance
1377 266 (1800; Endowment
1713 55 (l?7i) Endowment






1751 228 (1793) Public subscription
176^ 30 (1767) Public subscription
1766 80 (1787) Public subscription
1777 72 (l792; Public subscription
1790 6^ (1790) Public subscription
1790 12 (1819) Public subscription
Liverpool
Leicester
hospitals took what couia be called a progressive approach to the
treatment of the insane. In fact some of them provided little more
than a rough confinement. The reasons for this can to some extent
be located in the motivations that lea to their foundation in the
first place; the rhetoric surrounding this usually reliea more on
an appeal to philanthropic benevolence than on any belief that the
hospital could provide a sure cure for insanity.
It is well known that throughout the eighteenth century extremely
large amounts of money were being made in trade and commerce, far more
than could easily be spent by men who had neither the opportunity nor
the desire to repeat the extravagances of the gentry.1 The founding
1 ...
Some indication of the very large amounts involved is provided by
D. Owen, 196j>, pp. 79-80. diehard Aeynolds, manager of carby's furnaces
at Aetley and Coalbrookiiale, retired from business in 1789 and devoted
the rest of his live to philanthropy, Much of his money was given
anonymously, but estimates have been made that he was regularly distri¬
buting l8000 per annum. Amongst other institutions, he gave to Bristol
Infirmary, almshouses, and orphan asylums.
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and. endowment of hospitals appeared to provide a very suitable invest¬
ment for the surplus wealth; Guy's Hospital, for instance, was estab¬
lished almost entirely with money made by its founder out of the
"South Sea Bubble" speculation.
The usual course with the founding of a public lunatic hospital
was for a number of interested persons1 to circulate a letter asking
*
p
for subscriptions. Two themes can be discerned in the motivations that
people had for giving so generously. On the one hand was the felt desire
to do something about the social problem of deviance, to control the
disorders of an increasingly complex society. But more immediately
important for many philanthropists was the self-satisfaction they got
from the act of giving itself. Philanthropy established its donor a3
a member of a certain stratum in society. By getting on the subscription
list of a hospital, the smallest subscriber was able to attend the same
social functions as the largest. For many of the nouveau riche middle
class at this time, to identify with the aristocracy was one of their
greatest hopes; the subscription hospital provided an opportunity
for paternalist largesse of the most impeccable kind. Such passages
as the following express this blend of sentiment based on philanthropy
and self-interest that many subscribers felts
In the case of St Luke's, this meant one physician, two merchants,
one apothecary, one druggist, and one other "gentleman" (French, 1951,
P. 5).
?,
In York, the suggestion that a lunatic asylum should be built
there was met by an enthusiastic response of three hundreu names,
with many subscribers contributing £100 and some as much as £500
(B. Owen, 1965, p. 71). Bethel Hospital in Norwich, although orig¬
inally the result of an endowment, "promptly became a favourite
philanthropy for charitably inclined Norwich testators" (ibid., p. 76)During the eighteenth century it received 35 legacies totalling
nearry £8000, and from 1751 to 1791 St Luke's received Eiore than
£80,000 in legacies.
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Hospitals improve the disposition of mankind, by cultivating
charity. A degree of dependence upon public opinion, ana
munificence, is therefore useful.
If affluence and independence could universally prevail, the
benevolent would not experience the inexpressible pleasure of
relieving the distressea; neither could there exist that
grateful satisfaction, which modest indigence ever feels from
well-timed succour.^
The rhetoric being expressed here is, at least with hindsight, fairly
obvious in its implication, but even this is surpassed in the trans¬
parency of its intent by a suggested prayer for the patients at Guy's
Hospitals
Bless all the worthy Governors of this hospital; excite in
our hearts a grateful sense of their charitable care for
our welfare, and grant that they may plentifully reap the
reward of their labour and love, both in this life, ana
that which is to come.3
This was one strain of ideological support for subscription hospitals
that many physicians eagerly emphasized. It located them firmly within
a conservative philanthropic traaition which assured them that they were
helping to eliminate the social problems around them merely by patronage
of worthy causes. By itself, this sort of motivation would only have
established hospitals like Bethlem: grana facades concealing benign
neglect. Which of course it did, notably at St Luke's and at York
Asylum, where the initial public enthusiasm soon died away and the enter¬
prising person in charge was left to rim the hospital primarily for profit.
Hot all hospitals, however, were so simply tied to this sort of paternal
benevolence. While this may have been adequate for those who were primarily
concerned with raising their status within the ruling class, there were
others who were more concerned with the vicissitudes of the class on
1
Blizard, 3-796, p. 33.
2
J.C. Lettsom, Of ..the Improvement of Medicine in London, quoted in
Trent, 1948, p. 337. ~~
3
Quoted in Woodward, 1974, p. 20.
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whom the whole society was dependent. This motivation was the same
as that which lea to the workhouse movementi the desire to ao some¬
thing about the large numbers of potential workers.who were a drain
rather than an asset to the productive economy.
As the true foundation of riches and power is the number
of working poor, every rational proposal for an augmen¬
tation of them merits our regard
wrote Jonas Hanway in 1750.1 Another merchant, John hellers, estimatea
in 1714 that 200,000 people died every year in Britain from curable
diseases, and of this number three-quarters were poor and could not pay
for treatment.
Every Able Industrious Labourer, that is capable to have
Children, who so Untimely nies, may be accounted Two
Kunared Pound loss to the Kingaom.^
Insanity was never of course recognised as a major cause of death, but
it was a social problem in that it prevented people from working: it
tied up resources, and it had proved intractable to the workhouse regime.
The future physician to Liverpool Lunatic Asylum, William Currie, argued
for the establishment of an asylum there ox: the grounds that
when the Poor-house shall be relievd from the Insane. . .
the respectable magistrates. . .will then find it easier
to extirpate vice, disoraer, and guilty ialeness, from this
great family of the lowest and most ignorant class of
society.
But why a hospital and -not just a custodial madhouse? One reason is that
the subscription hospitals were not just for the paupers; in fact, in
q
Quoted in D. Owen, 1965? p.15.
2
J. Sellers, Essay towards the Improvement of Physick, 1714, quoted
in Sellers, 1935» p. 111.
3
James Currie, Liverpool advertiser. Let 15th, 1789, printed in J. Currie,
1805, vol. 2, Appendix 2, p. 29. Similar axntiments were expressea by the
Manchester physician, John Aikin: "ny placing a number of them in a common
receptacle. . .they are removed from the public eye to which they were
multiplied objects of alarm, and the mischiefs they are liable to do to
themselves and others, are with much greater certainty preventea."
(Aikin, 1771? pp. 65-6. For a recent commentary see Scull, 1974, pp. ^8~6o.)
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spite of Currie's impassioned plea it is likely that most of the patients
in the subscription hospitals were not paupers at all. A major reason
for subscribing to a hospital was that it gave the subscriber the right
to nominate patients. This was seen as an insurance policy, giving the
subscriber the opportunity to get rid of any of his servants who devel¬
oped unpleasant diseases, or it might save him a protracted expense if he
had to pay for a relative to be cared for privately. This was the
sober philosophy of a class to whom money, while available, was a
resource by which commodities were to be carefully assessed in terms
of their rational value. The subscription hospital, like the other
forms of personal insurance then being developed, representee the bour¬
geois need to protect its own life style.
The other reason Currie, like other reformers of the time, should
be enthusiastic about a hospital as a solution to social problems was
that the hospital as an institution incorporated many of the cultural
ideals that were seen as progressive at the time. .Specifically, it
appeared to its enthusiasts to embody the norms of scientific activity.
This is not to say that science itself is progressive: it will be argued
that scientific knowledge, like religious aoctrine, can be used to
legitimate the status quo as much as it can to justify change, but in
the last quarter of the eighteenth century science was the ideology of
progressivism. As one of the most optimistic writers of the time
This was made quite clear in a circulated letter appealing for
subscribers to gt auke's: ". . .it appears that the expenses necessarily
attending the confinement ana other means of cure are such as peooleborn in middling circumstances cannot bear, it generally requiring
several months, and often a whole year, before a cure is completed; sothat many persons who could easily support themselves for the same lengthof time under any other oisease, do not apply for and are indeed pronerobjects to receive benefit oi a Charity of this sort, and whose families




Who shall say where this species of improvement must
stop? . . . , The conclusion of the progress which has
here been sketched is something like a final close to
the necessity of human labour.d
It was in the new manufacturing towns such as Manchester and Liverpool
that this philosophy found its strongest expression. In Manchester the
physician in charge of the Infirmary and the Lunatic Hospital, John
Ferriar, belonged to the group whose members held many positions of
social and economic power in the Manchester of the last quarter of the
2
eighteenth century. This was the Manchester Literary and Philosophical
Society, a group of men who between them were responsible for the admin¬
istration, police, health, ana welfare of one of the fastest-growing
3
towns in the country. Manchester was not tied like some towns, such
as York, to a corporate authority who governed manufacture and trade
Li
accordirg to some earlier conception of progress. Its authority, as
William Godwin, quoted in woodcock, 1963, ?. 82.
2
Manchester at this time was physically and politically isolated from
central government. Until the l840s the journey from London to Man¬
chester took 20 hours, and until 1832 Manchester haa no Members of
Parliament. It was not until 1838 that Manchester even haa an electee
local government of its own. For a discussion of these points ana their
effect on the growth of organised administration in Manchester, see
Thackray, 197^ •
8 Some of the problems involved can be seen merely be reciting the
statistics of population and riots. The population increased from
15,000 in 1760 to 118,000 in 1801. There were food riots in 1757»
■ 1762, 1795» and 1818; and political riots in 1792, 1809, 1812, ana
1819.
Li.
On York at this time and on the stranglehold exercisea by the
Company of Merchant Adventurers see Sellers, 1018; Armstrong, 1974.
expressed in the activates of men Like Terrier, was synonymous with j.ts
dynamic. Accordingly, the rhetoric that was popular with the "lit and
Phil" invoked an appeal to talent rather than to authority, and to science
rather than to God, l«ot that these intellectuals were atheists, but
their Christianity was an undogmatic one that was easily made subservient
to the needs of progress. A number of these men were Unitarians, a
Protestant sect which denied the triune nature of the neity and empha¬
sized instead the humanist aspects of Christianity.1 Joseph Priestley,
one of the most famous of the Unitarians, expressed the general combi¬
nation of values and beliefs that underlay many of the "lit and Phils"
at this time: "The social millenium will be brought about by the
influence of the commercial spirit aided by Christianity and true philo-
2
sophy." "True philosophy" was of course science, and the hospital
appeared to be an appropriate place in which to develop it.
The reason for this can be analysed from a number of perspectives.
The aim of the present discussion is to analyse the social and intellectual
context from which moral treatment was to emerge. The subscription hos¬
pital with all its values ana significances was part of that context;
but, as already stated, not every hospital remained in the forefront
of progressive thought. One of the most famous hospitals in the history
of psychiatry was the Lunatic Hospital at Manchester. The example of
this hospital provides a useful basis on which to show both the role
Unitarianism originated with the Reformation but it was not until
the late eighteenth century that it became at all popular as a venicie
for humanist thinking. A typical Unitarian remark"was that made byThomas Lelsham in 1811 that Jesus was "a man constituted in all respects
like other men, subject to the same infirmities, the same ignorances,
prejudices and frailties" (quotea inHastings, 1921, vol. 12, p. $2^).
For a review of the contribution made by Unitarians towarus social change
see Holt, 1952, passim.
2
Priestley, A Letter to. . .Edmund Burke, quoted in Thackrav. 197^.
p. 688.
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of individual thinkers in the development of moral treatment, and the
intellectual resources these thinkers made use of to express themselves
at that time.
The scientific approach favoured by John Ferriar, physician at
Manchester Lunatic Hospital, was one that is probably best described as a
"rigorous empiricism"."^ In his Medical Histories ana deflections of
1792-8 he described how he had trieu. all the stanaara medical therapies
for insanity of his day, from tartar emetic through the "antiphlogistic
regimen" of saline purgatives to the old standby of bleeding. He recom¬
mended or dismissed each of the therapies in turn depending on the results
he had noticed in his own practice. Ferriar discussed Locke's theory of
2
the nature of madness —that it was due to misdirected perception—but
he did not let his theoretical discussion interfere with his trial-ana-
error approach to treatment. This in itself was quite an innovation
because all medical therapies of the time were underwritten by a consid¬
erable body of taken-for-granted assumptions.
Before looking at Ferriar's specific contribution to the treatment
of the insane it is necessary for a while to move the focus of investi¬
gation on to these background assumptions, towards the intellectual
context from which Ferriar was able to present his own work as a meaning¬
ful contribution.
There were two main traditions or types of thinking on which
Ferriar could have drawn, which I will call the "commonsense" and
Or, in his own words, "conducted on the strict principles of induc¬
tive philosophy" (Ferriar, 1792-8, vol. 2, p. v).
On Locke's thinking on madness see the extracts from his Journal
for 5th Lovember 1677 s-nd 22nd January 1678, quoted in oewhurst, 1965,
pp. 6^/, 101-2. Locke s contribution to eighteenth—century theories ox
insanity is discussed below (pp. 75-6).
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the "theoretical". The essence of the cornmonsense tradition was a
reliance on existing beliefs, a conviction that if a certain practice
had been made use of for generations, there was something intrinsically
correct in its continued use. In the treatment of the insane this
approach can be seen both in the strictly medical therapies and in
the more general management of the insane as a special category of
person.
Bleeding (or phlebotomy) for instance was perhaps the oldest of all
the medical therapies a physician could draw on. according to a medieval
commonplace book
Phlebotomy clears the mind, strengthens the memory, cleanses
the stomach, dries up the brain, warms the marrow, sharpens
the hearing, stops tears, encourages discrimination, devel¬
ops the senses, promotes digestion, produces a musical voice,
dispels torpor, drives away anxiety, feeas the blooa, rias
it of poisonous matter, ana brings long life. It eliminates
rheumatic ailments, gets rid of pestilent diseases, cures
pains, fevers, ana various sicknesses ana makes the urine
clean and clear.•*-
This quotation received its contemporary, medieval, sense because it
drew on the theoretical concepts of the four humours—each with its
propensities and roles which any bleeding of a patient had to take into
account. Pre-eighteenth century meaical theory is discussea belowj
but at this stage of the discussion the significance "of the continued
practice of bleeding lies in the fact that many roaa-doctors continued
to believe in it for purely commonsense reasons. In 181.5, for instance,
the physician at Bethlem reported that his patients
. . .are ordered to be blea about the latter end of Hay,
or the beginning of May, according to the weather; ana
after they have been bled they take vomits once a week
for a certain number of weeks, after that we purge the
patients; that has been the practice invariably for years,
long before my time; it was handed, down to me by my
1
Quoted inDoob, 1970, p. 162.
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father, and I do not know any bettor practice.x
This is quite explicitly a justification for a certain practice
based on the physician's belief in his own personal authority as an
experienced practitioner of the art of medicine. It 3.s perhaps not
surprising that it was at Bethlem, the only hospital for the insane
founded before the eighteenth century, that this type of belief was
most strongly held.2 All the physicians there came from the same
family (Monro) and the strongly defended their right to monopoly in
treating the insane and, when that was erouea, their authoritarian
approach to mad-doctoring, all through the eighteenth century.
On the subject of the general management of the insane, the
physicians at Bethlem were equally dependent on conventional wisdom.
In 173S William Battie, the physician at Bt Luke's Lunatic Hospital,
attempted to develop a theoretical approach to management. This was
not possible, argued John Monro at Bethlem. lor him, "management was
never to be learned, but from observation." The patients, Monro
continued,
should be accustomed to obey, and though talked to kindly,
it should still be with authority. . . .liveryone is not to
1
Thomas Monro, evidence to the 1815 SC, First lienort, p. 95.
2
The Bethlem of the eighteenth century was built in 1676 in the
Moorfields district of nondon. Although it aid allow the casual visitor
to wander around the wards for purposes of -entertainment until 1?70,
Bethlem always had a policy of curing its patients. The first incurable
patients were not even admitted until 1728 (u'uonoghue, 1914;.
3
There were four generations of Monros at Bethlem. James Monro
was physician from 1728-31; John, his son, from 1751-91; Thomas,
John's son, from l791~lSl6; ana Henry, Thomas' son, from 1816-56.
It is an indication of the strength of their reputation that even
when one of the family was dismissed from Bethlem in I8l6 after
disclosures of cruelty and incompetence, his son was appointed in
his place.
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be accosted in the same manner, some are to be commanded,
others are to be soothea into compliance, but we should
endeavour in every instance to gain their good opinion.
Little changed in the policy of Bethlem over the following half-
century. Management remained a problem of establishing personal auth¬
ority, as John Haslam, the apothecary, pointed out in 1798:
. . .by gentleness of manner and kindness of treatment,
I have never failed to obtain the confidence, ana concil¬
iate the esteem of insane persons, ana have succeeaea by p
these means in procuring from them respect ana obeaience."
Bethlem was certainly not alone in conceiving of management in this
way. There was a generally felt need to establish control over the
insane through personal influence and the medical literature of the
1790s is full of various suggestions as to the best way to go about
it. One popular method was by "catching the eye". There are a number
of graphic accounts of how this was done, of which the following is
typical:
I then suddenly unlocked the door—rushed into the room
and caught his eye in an instant. The business was then
done—he became peaceable in a moment—trembiea with fear,
and was as governable as it was possible for a furious
madman to be .k
^
Monro, 1962, pp. 36, 38, 9-0 (first published in 1758).
2
Haslam, 1798, p. 128. The apothecary's position at Bethlera at this
time involved the tasks of daily medical aaministration. The physician
attended only for specific consultations.
^ Pargoter, 1792, pp. 50-1. This madhouse proprietor's patient has
gone unrecorded, but a more famous example of the same technicue was
that practised by .Francis Willis on king George III during his insanity.
According to one visitor to Willis' madhouse, "on his first meeting
a new patieno, his usually friendly ana smiling countenance changed its
expression. He suddenly became a different figure commanuing the respect
even of maniacs. His piercing eye sesmea to reaa their hearts and aivine
their thoughts as they formed ana before they were even uttered. Xn
this way he gained control over them which he usea as a means of cure."
(Anon, 1796, p. 769; translation from Macalpine and Hunter, 1969#
pp. 270-2.)
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Sensational though this type of management might appear it resteu on a
x
very conventional base: that of the physician as personal authority.
For many physicians the essence of meuical practice was the patron-
client relationship. It was a one-to-one relationship in which the
individual claims of the patron were answered by the personal attention
of their physician. The operative word was "service", fashioned to the
neeas of the particular patron. hot that the patients at iethlem
employed the Monros in any sort of personal capacity: it was the
physicians' ideological perception of themselves as living in a world
where personal authority based onascribea status was important that was
expressed in the management of the insane, rather than any "real" rela¬
tionship between doctors and patients.
For John Monro the antithesis to the projjer role of the physician
was a meaical profession basea on education rather than on patronage.
In his one venture into print he attacked the idea of "reading lectures"
or book learning on the subject of insanity as degrading mad-ooctoring
to the status of a "trade" that any entrepreneur could practice. he
saw medicine being corrupted by the introduction of bourgeois ideas,
and its deterioration by becoming a "career open to talent" rather
than a profession for those who were fitted to it by virtue of being
gentlemen.
1
Benjamin Bush, the "father" of American psychiatry, acknowledged this
aspect of the "eye" therapy by comparing tne therapist to a tamer of wild
animals. "The first object of a physician, when he enters the ceil, or
chamber, of his deranged patient, should be, to catch his bib, and look
him out of countenance. The oread of the eye was early imposed upon every
beast of the field. The tyger, the mad bull, ana the enraged dog, all
fly from it: now a man deprived of his reason partakes so much of the
nature of those animals, that he is for the most part easily terrified,
or composed, by the eye of a man who possesses his reason." (nush, 1962,
p.175: first published in 1812.)
2
Cn this see Jewson, 19?'+.
3 Monro, 1962, p.
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For the Monros then, and for those who agreed, with their conception
of medical authority, the commonsense appeal that the management of
the insane ought to be a question of 'personal "governance" was primarily
an ideological expression of the social relations of a pre-capitalistic
mode of production. The achievement of "normality" was seen in the
context of a conformity to a personal untheorised discipline; but one
which could be re-enacted in every case because the "insane were like
that". That the insane were "like that" was of course precisely because
the physicians insisted on treating them within authority relationships
over which the patients had little control.
This "commonsense" tradition of management appe&lea. to the more
conservative sections of the medical profession, but F.erriar and a grow¬
ing number of the profession rejected the conception of authority solely
because it was authority. For these physicians, the subscription hos¬
pital, with its emphasis on the bourgeois vadues of investment and
utilitarian knowledge, was an ideal place to work, but there was still
a need to "manage" the patients. Chains ema whips were uismisseci as
crude anu barbaric, and "catching the eye" was inappropriate to the
conditions of the large public hospitals.
hot surprisingly then, many physicians turned to their theoretical
resources for justification of a new approach, rittle will be saia here
about the variety of medical theories based on advances in other sciences
using concepts derived from such diverse fields as hydraulics, optics,
classical atomism, and electrical theories." These theories were usee
by mad-doctors to justify their medical therapies, but they were not
believed to be of any importance in the management of the insane. For
For a discussion of these theories see Carlson and Jimpson, 1969
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the theories legitimising that practice it is necessary to turn to the
less esoteric uiscussions on human nature that took place at the time.
Two main approaches to human nature can be distinguished, in the eight¬
eenth century, appraoches which may be very broadly describeu as the
"hierarchical" ana the "construetivist".
The "hierarchical" theories of human nature all derived essentially
from the medieval moael shown in Figure 1. This drawing is a represen¬
tation of a model that was being continually modified in the light of
scientific and lay debates as to how man's nature was contructea, but
it did have some essential features to which all proponents of the
model were committed. The most important feature of tiis conception of
human nature was its reliance on "Reason"—traditionally the means by
which man was related to God. However much this Reason had teen secu¬
larised in the "Age" which has been given its name,, it was still held
to be the aspect of man's nature by which all else was to be juagea.
It was the ability to reason which many thinkers presented as the one
essential characteristic of humanity. According to Blaise Pascal,
writing iu the mid-seventeenth century,
I can easily imagine a man without hands, feet, head. . .
but I cannot imagine a man without {rational] thought;
he would be a stone or a brute.c
A man without reason was a man without sense, and this belief was re-
fleeted in the contemporary definition of insanity as "vitiated reason".J
The main cause of this destruction of reason was held to lie in the
passions. These passions, or moral affections, of love, hate, fear,
joy, etc., had been given to man by God (it was believed) for him to
For some interesting comments on the Renaissance contribution to this
process of secularisation, see B. Clarke, 1975, pp. 22?-9; 0. Hill,
1974, PP. 87-9, 220. '
O
Pascal, 1>62, p. 162.
See for instance Monro, 1962, p. 5« For the source of this belief
see boob, 1970, chap. 1.
Figure 1


























Sources: Docb, 1970, chap. 1; Burton, 1932. vol. 1, pp. 15^-69;
Bamborough, 1952, passim.; Deports, 1974, pp. 12-25.
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use according to the dictates of reason. Since the time of Aristotle
there had been a continuing debate as to how much, if any, good the
passions actually created"^ but the general consensus for Most thinkers
was that the passions were useful, if dangerous. In the words of
Richard Head, society physician and one-time vice-president of the
Royal Society,
The omnipotent Creator has given us these natural
commotions for very wise ends; which seem to be, that
thereby we may be urged with a kind of impetuosity to
shun evil, and embrace good, wherefore the passions
are not lad in themselves; it is their excess that
becomes vitious, and when they rise to such an extrava¬
gant pitch as not to be governed by the dictates of
reason.^
3
This belief was reiterated by other medical writers and by lay moralists,
of whom probably the best-known examples are Alexander Fope and oaauel
Johnson.**
One interesting point that a recent commentator has made is that
there vfas considerable ideological attraction for writers in this
imagery, particulary for Pope and Johnson, who wanted as little change
I
as possible in society.These ideologists emphasized the need to keep
On this see Grange, 1962a; Doob, 1970, p. 87, note 113•
^
Mead, 1763-5i vol. 3» P« 129 (.first published in 1751)• A very similar
account was provided by the popular religious writer Isaac "watts in 1729 s
"Since the passions are certain principles or powers in human nature,
which include in them some commotions of flesh and blood, as well as
some operations of the mind, we may reasonably suppose, that the design
of our Greater in working them into our original constitution, was for
the service of our minds ana our bodies. Though it must be confessed
in our fallen and degenerate state, they often prove our snares and our
torments" ^watts, 1810, p. 602).
3
See Vere, 1778, pp. 75-82; Armstrong, 1795s Book 4-, lines 4-69-78
(first published in r/44-).
See for instance Pope's Essay on Man and Johnson's Easselas,two essays
which deal predominantly with this theme. A recent commentary on iiasselas
from this point of view is provided by Grange, 1962b.
^ Foss, 1971s pp. 202-4-.
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artistic expression under the control of reason—an authority which was
repeatedly invoked to legitimate the political, ideological and cultural
status quo. "He therefor©," wrote Samuel Johnson in 1750, "that would
govern his actions by the laws ox virtus, must regulate his thoughts by
those of reason."1 It will be shown in the next Chapter that the
reason-and-passions imagery was to bs put to very different uses later
in the century, but for the greater part of the eighteenth century, and
especially for many in the medical profession, the hierarchy of "reason
and th© passions" was used as a core image by which to demonstrate that
human nature could not change.
In th© treatment of insanity, the implications of this theory
appeared to many mad-doctors to be that there was little to be done.
The vitiation of reason was held to be too important a factor for any
but the strongest passions to have any effect at all on the patient's
condition,. Fear was about the only passion that most mad-doctors ever
mentioned as being strong enough to have an effect on the insane, al¬
though its use was as likely'to be Justified by a commonsense appeal
to the madman's cowardice as to any theoretical conception of human
nature.^
Underlying all the arguments presented by the adherents to this
hierarchical conception of human nature was a profound pessimism towards
the notion of improvement, whether in society or in the individual.
Hot everyone who used the "passions" imagery was necessarily conservative,
1
S. Johnson, 1750, p. 52.
g
Richard Head stated in 1?51 that "Mad-folk. . . are all cowards{ and
when they are once sensible of being thoroughly conquered, they easilysubmit ,ivi the future, and dare not offer violence to themselves or others"
MCtul, l,-oJ~5, vol. 3? p» 50). An almost Identical statement appeared in
John Wesley s popular handbook on self-medication, Primitive Physick (17^7,30 editions by 1/91) and in the third edition of Encyclopaedia .oritaruiica
(1797: vol. XL, p. 28k). —*——— —'
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of course; these concepts were after all a basic intellectual resource
of European thought. Eut it was very easy, for those who so wished, to
sea in this conception of human nature a clear demonstration of that
principle made famous by Popat "whatever is, is right".1
This was one, hierarchical, view of human nature. An. alternative
view which emerged during the eighteenth century is the one which I will
2
call here the "constructivist" approach. The thinkers who took this
latter approach to man's nature did not reject the existence of reason
and the passions, but they looked at them in a, new way. One of the
most influential of these new ways was the philosophy of sensationalism,
a theory of nan which emphasized the role of the senses in lis nature.
John Locke was one of the founders of sensationalism; another was the
Abbe Etienne de Condillac. Condillac's Treatise on the Sensations of
175'f is an interesting document for the present discussion to consider
because it shows quite clearly how the sensa.tionalists made use of both
the old and the new imageries of human nature.
In his Treatise, Gondillac attempted to demonstrate how the origins
of human nature were located in the senses by comparing man to a status.
Give a statue senses, argued Gondillac, and hs will gradually grovr and
develop t
Instructed by experience in the means of relieving or
in forestalling its wants, it will reflect on the choice
it must make. It will then examine the advantages and
disadvantages of objects which until then it has either
avoided or sought. . . .It will feel the advantage of
being ruled by experience; and accustoming itself to make
use of its knowledge will learn to resist its desires and
1
Essay on Man. Epistle I.
2
I am not suggesting that all eighteenth century thought on humannature can be dichotomised in this way, merely that to pick out thesetwo broad traditions helps to clarify the -trends in social thought whichhave some tearing on the treatment of the insane.
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even overcome them. Interested in avoiding pain it will
emancipate itself from the sway of its passions, extend
the power of reason over its will, and become free.1
"The statue is therefore," continued Condillac, "nothing but the sum of
2
all it has acquired. May not this be the same with nan?"
The implications of this approach for a theory of insanity appeared
to be considerable. Already in 1678, John Locke was applying sensational¬
ism to his thinking on the etiology of madness$
, . .those that thinks long & intently upon one thing corns
at la3t to have their minds disturbs about it & to be a
little crackd as to that Particular. For by repeating
often with vehemence of imagination the Ideas that doe
belong to or may be brought in about the same thing a
great many whereof the phansy is wont to furnish, those
at length come to take soe deepe an impression that they
all passe for cleare truths & realitys though perhaps
the greatest part of them have at several times teen supplied
only by the phansy <1 are noething but the pure effects of
imagination.-^
Given the fact that it was the traditional view of madness that was
held at Bet-hlem, the only large public hospital for the insane in the
first half of the eighteenth century, it is perhaps not surprising that
sensationalism was not quickly taken up by practicing mad-doctors.
The first mad-doctor to commit himself unequivocally to sensationalism
was William Battle, physician at St Luke's, the rival public hospital
for the insane which was built on the other side of the same London square
as Bethlera.
Battle voiced his opinion in a Treatise on Insanity of 1758, the
first such work to be published in English. Battie stated quite clearly
his belief that "madness, or false perception" was nothing else than
1




Journal entry for 22nd January 1678, quoted in Lewhurst, 1963, p. 101.
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"a praeternatural state or disorder of Sensation".1 Unlike the belief
that madness was vitiated reason, an all-or-nothing condition in which
the patient was either with reason or without it, sensationalism seemed
to offer a more gradable and empirically verifiable conception of madness.
The new theory opened up the possibility of determining a precise cause
of the ailment, and by extension a precise remedy. Battle gives examples
of the etiology of madness which showed how direct he envisaged the
relationship to be between impression and faulty sensation. "I lately
met," he recounted, "a Sailor, who became raving mad in a moment while
Z
the Sun beams darted perpendicularly upon his head." Kan's digestive
tract was also a frequent cause of madness
occasioned by the contents of these viscera being stopt
in such a manner as to compress the many nervous filaments,
which here communicate with one another by the mesenteric
ganglia, and which enrich the contents of the abdomen with
a more exquisite sensation. Thus the glutton who goes
to-bed upon a full stomach is hagridden in his sleep.
So, argued Battie, if wrong sensations were the cause of madness, the
aim of therapy must be to create the right ones. This could be done
either by physical measures ("shake with violence the head and hypo¬
chondria by convulsing the muscular fibres with emetics, rougher purges
and errhines" ), or by changing the environment. And for a man like
Battie, who had already helped in the foundation of the first hospital
of its kind in the country, there was still a great deal that could be
done in that respect. In his words.
We have therefore, as Men, the pleasure to find that
Madness is, contrary to the opinion of some unthinking
persons, as manageable as many other distempers, which
1
Battie, 1962, p. 6 (this is a facsimile copy of the 1753 edition).
2
Mm P. ^7.




are equally dreadful and obstinate, and yet axe not looked
upon as incurables and that such unhappy objects ought by
no nsans to bs abandoned, much Jess shut up in loathsome
prisons as criminals or nuisances to the society*'1'
Here was an optimism concerning the -treatment of the insane which
2
Battle grounded in theory rather than common sense* The theory of
sensationalism soon develops! into one of the most popular and fashionable
theories for the discussion of human nature of the later eighteenth
century, especially in its more sophisticated form of the "doctrine of
the association of ideas." What might appear surprising, in view of
Battle's therapeutic optimism, is that although the medical profession
continued to incorporate all the new thinking into its theories, it did
little to translate them into innovations in practice.
Thomas Arnold, for instance, pliysician to Leicester Lunatic Hospital
and owner of one of the largest madhouses in the country, used an
1
Battie, 1962, p. 93.
2
Compare with John Monro's profound theoretical pessimism? "Though
they [the physicians at Bethleni] did not publish their thoughts on a
distemper which was more immediately the object of their car©, that was
not owing to any design of keeping their manner of practice a secret, but
that they thought it disingenuous to perplex mankind, with points that
must for ever remain dark, intricate, and uncertain" (Monro, 1962, p. 3).
3
The doctrine of the association of ideas was formulated by David
Hartley (in his Observations on Man of 17^9) out of a combination of
sensationalism and a theory of physiological vibrations which he took
from Kewton's writings on optics. The doctrine attempted to give some
physiological basis to the realisation that impressions on the censes
affected the brain. Thus, for Hartley a physical cause of insanity could
be over-indulgence in opium or alcohol: "their greatest and most immed¬
iate Effect arises from the Impressions made on the Stomach, and the
disorderly Vibrations props-gated thence into the Brain" (Hartley, 17-19,
vol. 1, p. 393). Cure for Hartley, as for Battle, consisted in"creating
the correct sensations; but Hartley, although a physician, preferred to
emphasize what he saw as the correct religious sensations based on mil's
moral purpose. (For a modem exposition of the aoc-trine, see K.M, Young,
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explicit associationist psychophysiology in his definition of insanity.
Ke defined insanity as either the perception of things "which have no
external existence in his [the patient's] senses at that tine'1 ("ideal
insanity"), or as correct perception in which the powers and importance
of the objects of sensation are misjudged ("notional insanity").1 Arnold
accepted that tho passions were a frequent cause of insanity in that
"every passion is accompanied with a corresponding state of body" which
is transmitted to the brain, and "the intense vibrations [the physical
mode by which association takes place], once excited in the brain, are
disposed to supjjress, or obscure, all others that are not immediately
o
connected with them." But when he came to write on management, Arnold
fell back on the commonsense platitudess "firmness and authority must
not be forgotten"5 the patients must submit "to all due controul"; the
physician should gain the patients' "esteem and confidence" and once he
has that he should be able to obtain "their obedience to orders"; and
3
so on.
John Haslam, apothecary to Bethlem, provides the most graphic example
of the management potential of the doctrine of tfc.3 association of ideas
not being used to underwrite an innovation in the treatment of the insane.
In his Observations on Insanity of 1798, liaslam defined insanity as
. . .an incorrect association of familiar: ideas, which
is independent of the prejudices of education, and is
always accompanied with explicit belief, and generally
with either violent or depressing passions4
1
Arnold, 1782-6, vol. 1, pp. 73-4.
»5 vol. 2, pp. 332-3.
Arnold, 1809, pp. 37, 23, 39, ^i. It is an indication of the division
in Arnold s mind between the medical treatment of insanity and the manage¬ment of the insane that there was a gap of 21 years between the dates of
publication of his books 011 these two aspects of mad-doctoring.
k
Haslas, 1798, p. 10.
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More importantly, ha gave an explicit account ox the practical implications
of applying associateonisra to insanity s
We have a number of patients in Bethlcia Hospital whose
ideas are in the most disordered state, who yet act, upon
ordinary occasions, with great steadiness and propriety,
and are capable of being trusted to a considerable extent.
A fact of such importance in the history ox the human
mind, might lead us to hope, that by superinducing diff¬
erent habits of thinking, the irregular associations may
be corrected. . .the object should therefore be to prevent
such recurrence by occupying the mind on different subjects,
and thus diverting it from the favourite and accumulated
train of ideas.1
And yet, in spite of this awareness that the potential for change was
there, all of Haslamps practical writings express a traditional faith
in the need to "obtain an ascendency over them" as a prerequisite to
2
acquiring the "confidence, obedience and resi>ect" of the patients.
In fact, Haslam fought all his life against the practical innovations
3
that were made in the treatment of the insane.
To summarise, the doctrine of the association of ideas was an
intellectual resource of the 1790s, fashionable, used by the medical pro¬
fession, that could without modification have been used to justify changes
in the treatment of the insane. That it was not must bs seen in terns
1




^ Some idea of Kaslam's continuing conservatism can be seen from the
title of a paper he gave in 18^3: "Cn .Restraint and Coercion; Considered
not Merely as Measures of Security, but essentially contributing to the
Cure of Insanity" (Haslam, iSjSO).
k
Psychiatric historians have tended to ignore the place of association-
ism in the history of mad-doctorings in two recent accounts of this
period (Bynum, 197^; Cooler, 1976) it is maintained that it was not
until the in troduction of phrenology that a scientific rationale was
found on which to develop the management of the insane. A notable excep¬
tion to this is the paper by Hoeldtke (1967) which provides a detailed ~
summary of the influence of the doctrine on mad-doctoring, although he
dees not deal with the treatment of the insane.
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of the aims of physicians who were, in the main, satisfied with the
"commonsense" assumptions as to the nature of the doctor-patient
relationship.
The point must be emphasized because there is a strong tradition
within both bourgeois psychiatry and Marxism which maintains that the
doctrine of the association of ideas is inherently progressive. The
essence of this argument is that sensationalism, associationism, and
all the other eighteenth-century materialist philosophies were progres¬
sive because they attempted to provide a scientific understanding of
human nature which rejected the metaphysical belief that man was placed
in the world by an omniscient God. According to this tradition, the
material understanding of himself provided man with the opportunity to
do something about his position in the worlds it gave him the scientific
basis to reject a social order which was supposedly sanctified by the
Word of God.1 Condillac's imagery of a status coming to life certainly
implied an optimistic approach to man's potential. Ana it was an opti¬
mism that was explicitly recognised in the field of education where
sensationalism was seen to provide a philosophical basis for a more
rationalist education* one that took account of the aptitudes ana needs
of the students as well as of the pedagogic needs of the teacher.*"
What must be stressed, however, is that there is no necessary
connection between the provision of the possibility of improvement and
its attainment. Too much Marxist writing accepts as necessary a pro-
gressivism of science, an error which leads not to false optimism but
also to the degradation of what is scientific in Marxism itself. The
truth of no theory can be guaranteed, whether it is the doctrine of the
Marx's own contribution to this appears in The Holy Family, MMCw,
vol. 4, pp. 124-34 •
2
On this see Simon, I960, especially pp. 45-7.
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association of ideas or historic materialism, outside of the use to
which it is put.
The question whether objective truth can be attributea to
human thinking is not a question of theory but is a prac¬
tical question. Must must prove the truth, i.e., the reality
and power, the this—worldliness of his thinking in practice.
The dispute over the reality or non-reality of thinking
which is isolated from practice is a purely scholastic
question.
A theory which provides the theoretical opportunity for the devel¬
opment of consciousness, as did both the doctrine of the association of
ideas end historical materialism, does not in itself provide the prac¬
tical accomplishment of that opportunity, as demonstrated respectively
2
by the eighteenth-century mad-doctors and by Stalin. History is always
a creative processs
It is by transcending the given toward the field of poss¬
ibles and by realising one possibility from among all the
others that the individual objectifies himself and con-tri¬
butes to making History.-5
Theories emerge as the creative ideological expression of a particular
(scientific, religious, social, or political) practice. They can be
used to create a change in that practice or they can be used to create
a defence of the status quo. Only in practice can we assess the value
of a theory, a practice which must be judged by the degree to which .it
reduces the alienation of man from the products of his own labour,
unravels the mystifications in which he conceals what he has produced,
and gives him the opportunity to consciously control the production of
1
Marx, Feuerbach Thesis No. 2. HSCW» vol. 5, p. 3.
2
What must also be stressed is that Hartley himself did not see his
doctrine as progressive or materialistic; he devised it to provide abasis on which the mystical and subservient relationship between man and
has God could be demonstrated according to tne principles of natural
science. (On this point see Leslie, 19??.. ')
n
Sartre, 1?68, p. 93.
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his own lifo. In the eighteenth century the doctrine of the association
ideas was used for these ends, as Marxism has been in the twentieth; "but,
and as the above examples demonstrate-, associationism could equally well
be propounded theoretically, while practice remained repressive.
The one practice that did not remain oppressive (as in the old
sense of denying consciousness to the insane) was that of John Ferriar.
Having looked at the intellectual resources available to him, we are
now in a position to see how his work marks a major break with most
of the other mad-doctors in that he did not justify his treatment of the
insane from 'within the various theoretical and comstonsense epistemo-
1ogles of insanity available to him. He still used some of the opinions
that were expressed in the various orthodoxies, but his innovation came
not from developing them t>ut from applying a number of theoretical and
comaonsease assumptions in a new way. In his words,
A system of discipline, mild, but exact, which makes the
patient sensible of restraint without exciting pain or
terror, is best suited to those complaints. In the furious
state, the arms, and sometimes the legs must be confined,
but this should never be done when it can possibly be avoiaed.
When the patient is mischievous and unruly, instead of order¬
ing stripes, I shut him up in his cell, order the window to be
darkened, and allow him no food but water-gruel and dry
bread, till he shows tokens of repentance, which are never
long delayed, upon this plan. Previous to this kind of
punishment, I find it useful to remonstrate, for lunatics
have frequently a high sense of honour, sua are sooner
brought to reflection by the appearance of indignity, than
by actual violence, against whrch they usually harden themselves."1"
There is no reliance here either on the personal authority of the phys¬
ician or on the impersonal authority of theory; this is the authority
of the harsh world outside cf the asylum, at once impersonal and personal,
in which a ran was judged by what he-himself could do. It was achieve¬
ment, not obedience, that Ferriar was trying to induce in his patients.
1
Psrri&r, 1792-8, vol. 3, pp. 109-10,
m
Within the boundaries of Manchester Lunatic Hospital Ferriar had
no constraints placed on his therapeutic innovations. What did act as
a constraint was the physical shape of the hospital itself. The
public hospitals were generally built on the gallery principle—long
wards stretching from one end of the building to the other. Figure 2
shows the Hew Bethlem of 1815 (now the Imperial War Museum), constructed
on this principle. This type of plan provided the building with a
grand facade to impress the subscribers with their munificence. It was
also a direct descendent of the Bethlem built in the seventeenth century
which needed its wide galleries for the visitors to stroll up and down.
As far as the patients were concerned, the architecture of the asylum
reflected its custodial function but little more.
St Luke's was also built on the gallery principle, with 17 single
rooms to a ward} and presumably Manchester Lunatic Hospital was based
on a similar plan because Ferriar commented on the difficulty the old
model presented in instilling in his patients the virtue of self-restraint.
"It has long been ay wish," he wrote,
that a room might be appropriated in our hospital, to con¬
valescents, and that the privilege of admission to it might
be made the reward of regular behaviour among the patients.
Such a distinction would act powerfully in creating a habit
of self-restraint, the first salutary operation in the mind
of a lunatic. For in the cure of disaases of this nature,
the patient must 18minister to himself"; medicine nay restore
him more early and more completely to the command of his
intellectual operations; discipline must direct him in
their exertion.1
Tho implications of what Ferriar was suggesting may not appear
very revolutionary to us, but this is precisely because we are living
within the parameters of this logics psychiatry i_s the amnesia of what
1
Ferriar, 1792-8, vol. 2, pp. 111-2.
Figure 2
Plan of the hew Bethlem l8lj>
ce: 1815 SC, Repart, plate 7»
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has been discontinuous in the history of the treatment of the insane.
What has to ba brought to light here is the reasoning that allowed this
new "therapy" to appear as precisely that. If the new method was so
effective (and many of its principles are still asserted today;, why
had no one thought of it before?
In medical terms, what was happening was fairly straightforward.
Madness had traditionally been divided into mania and melancholy, but
that classification was based on medical reasoning (for example, by
identifying which humours were unbalanced) and referred to diagnostic
categories. Ferriar was suggesting the classification of patients'
behaviour according to their conformity to social norms. Convalescence,
and by extension therapeutics generally, were to be defined not around
what was wrong with the patient, but what was to be made right with him.
Understanding the significance of this is not so straight-forward.
True, there is a connection between this change and the social demands
of a market economy, but is this enough to override the influence of
other factors? What are we to make cf interpretations of what Ferriar
was doing, such as "matter-of-fact compassion untingea by sensation,
moral condemnation, or concealment"?"1' Was there nothing compassionate
about Ferriar's methods at all? The answer to these questions can only
be given fully in the next chapter, when the focus turns to moral treat¬
ment itself. At this stage I wish only to reiterate what was stated in
the Introduction, that in the last analysis all value is created by nan
himself. From a sociologies.! point of view, we can either attempt to
provide a completely naturalistic account treating expressions of value
as merely interesting productions of social life; or we can attempt to
understand the significance of doing "this type of research and then
1
K. .Tones, 1972f p. '±5. Ferriar's own interpretation of his method as
"A system of mildness and conciliation" (Ferriar, 1792-8, vol.2, p. 108),
has been accepted without comment by Hunter and Macalpine (HHa, p.
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subject the expressions of value we find to a rigorous assessment in the
light of our values.
The first approach say be called "value-free sociology"; the second
is historical materialism. Seasons were given in the Introduction why
the latter is being used here. Briefly, it ifiay be said that what was
good about Ferriar's method was what is good about capitalism generally.
It destroyed the patron-client relationship, the ties to which people
were committed irrespective of their worth or achievements. What it
had to put in its place has yet to be fully explored, but what can be
seen at this stage was a complete dissatisfaction by a number of medical
practitioners with the conventional models of care and cure.
Under pre-capitalist social relations the insane,, if they had money,
could establish a personal relationship with a member of the medical
profession. The patient provided the patronage, the physician a wonder¬
ful array of therapeutic services in which we may agree that "medical
knowledge must be seen as a form of social interaction with the consul-
1
tative relationship"."1" Those who dio. not have money were, as has been
shown, either given charity, confined on the grounds of the jar causing a
nuisance, or ignored.
By the late eighteenth century, however, these divisions had almost
disappeared. By then we may almost accept Bohn-Bethel's statement that
With capitalist commodity production, moreover, at the
stage when it reaches maturity—as it did in England in the
eighteenth century—the market penetrates into the entire
width and breadth of^social life to become coextensive
with society itself.^
Almost, but not quite. Ferriar after all was an exception; the medical
profession as a whole was not eagerly searching for new methods of
treating the insane The bourgeois values of equality of opportunity
1
Jevrson, 197^ f p. 376.
^
sohn-Rethel, 19o5, p. 118.
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had not reached all institutions where the insane were being kept. To
understand precisely why this was not so it is necessary to appreciate
something of the professional characteristics of the group through whom
these values would have to be mediated.
Physicians, like everybody else in the 1790s, were affected by the
profound changes in material production and the realignment of peripheral
groups to the change in ownership of the means of production. The
medical profession does not fit easily into the class model of society,
but this is not to say that it is part of a distinct social category
which exists outside of class conflict. On the contrary, what we are
seeing here is the ideological expression of the medical profession coming
to terms with class struggle. The medical profession, unlike merchants
such as Cary or Sellers, had always stood aside from the creative source
of their society's wealth; but like Cary or Sellers, or indeed anyone
else, there were dependent on their relationship to the ownership of the
means of production for their livelihood. In other words, they needed
someone to pay them for their work.
The decline of aristocratic patronage and the rise of a dependence
on the bourgeois institutions of the hospitals and insurance has been
noted. By the 1790s these coexisted in mad-doctoring as in all the
other medical specialisms. The typology of intellectuals that Gramsci
developed1 is a useful one for understanding the shifting class allegiances
of the medical profession at this time. On the one hand, physicians can
be considered under G^amsci's heading of "traditional intellectuals".
Physicians did all they could to retain their high status in society{
as the society changed, so did the rhetoric they used to justify their
position. The Monros, with their connections in Court circles, undoubtedly
x
Gransci, 1971c Pp. 10-18.
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saw themselves as part of th© ruling class."1"' But so did Ferriar, at
2
least as far as the commercial interests of .Manchester were concerned.
In this respect, many of the physicians come under Grarasci's other
heading of "organic intellectuals". These are the thinking element of
a class; a group who, at a time when their class is struggling to achieve
dominance, attempt to develop a Weltanschauung in which to assimilate
Thomas Monro (1759-1833), physician to Bethlem from 1791 to I8l6,
was educated at Harrow ana Oxford, where he received his BA and Mr
degrees. Besides bis post at Bethlea, his private madhousef and his
official duties in the College of Physicians, he is mainly remembered
as a patron of the arts. He did offer considerable financial ana
moral support to struggling young watercolour artists such as Thomas
Girtin ana William Turner. "In winter evenings he [Monro] encouraged,
young men to make a studio of his house. There they put their sketches
into pictorial shape under the doctor's eye, ana he gave, them their
supper and half a crown apiece for their v?ork" (Roget, 189-1, vol. 1,
pp. 78-9, see also Victoria and Albert Museum, 1976). This "enlight¬
ened patronage", as the bhB calls it, may have been appropriate for
the state of artistic production at that time, but it was not typical
behaviour for a mad-doctor.
2
Ferriar was not only a member of the Manchester Literary and Philo¬
sophical Society, the informal administrative body governing Manchester,
but was also at various times its secretary and vice presiuent. He
was physician to the Lunatic Hospital, the Infirmary, and the dispensary,
as well as influential in establishing the Fever Hospital and the Man¬
chester Board of Health. (Cn Ferriar's career see Brockbank, 1950.)
Another physician who identifiea strongly with the ascenaant miaale
class was James Currie (1756-1805), the first physician at Liverpool
Lunatic Asylum. The son of a Presbyterian minister, Currie starteu
his career as a trader in America. Not having much success at that,
he decided to become a physician. He studied at Edinburgh ana Glasgow
universities and took his Mb degree in 1780, He was appointed physician
to Liverpool Infirmary, was a very active advocate of the abolition of
the slave trade, and gradually became the most successful of all the
Liverpool physicians. His recognition of the type of society that had
made him wealthy v?as so clear that in 1793 he published an anonymous
letter, attacking Pitt for leading the country into war. His thesis
was that "Our prosperity depends on commerce; commerce requires peace,
and all the world is at war—this is the short and melancholy history
of our situation", (a letter. Commercial and Political, aadreasea to *
the_Rt. Hon. William plut. . This quotation is from the fourth
edition of 1795, reprinted in W.W. Currie, 1631, vol. 2, p. ^29. OnCurrie's career see Thornton, 1963, passim.)
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the traditional intellectuals. The suggestion that lunatics should
learn discipline and self-restraint is exactly what v?e would expect
from an intellectual representative of the bourgeois class in the 1790s.
In other words, the cliange from one ruling class to another was
not accompanied by a sharp break with all that went before. On the
contrary, the class coming to dominance attempted to assimilate all
it could of traditional status and knowledge in order to legitimate
its own claims to material power. This was made easier in Britain by
a very gradual transition from a society ruled by landed property to
one ruled by capital. The opportunity for any entrepreneur with money
to buy land and thus take on the attributes of a member of the gentry
had been a feature of English society for generations."" Against this
background, the main concern of the medical profession appears to have
been to assimilate into as high a status as possible. It is only because
of the uncertainty as to what that meant in England in the 1790s that
there was no consensus of how deviants from the social order should
be handled. If the picture appears blurred it is because it was blurred?
the medical profession wanted to hold on to the best of both ruling
2
classes as well as to maintain an ideological purity.
See Perkin, 1972, pp. 56-62. Engels also commented on this phenomenon
and ncted caustically the consequences of the failure of the bourgeoisie
to emancipate itself ideologically from an earlier ruling class: "The
English bourgeoisie are, up to the present day, so deeply penetrated by
a sense of their social inferiority that they keep up, at their own
expense and that of the nation, an ornamental castle of drones to repre¬
sent the nation worthily at all state functions; and they consider them¬
selves highly honoured whenever one of themselves is found worthy of
admission into this select and privileged body, manufactured, after all,
by themselves" (Engels, 1892, p. 277).
2
An eloquent statement of a commitment both to commercial capitalism
and to the paternalism of a class which always knows best was made by
Currie, physician at Liverpool Lunatic Asylum: "We may consider
a nation as a great trading company. . . .Each partner in the business
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With this review of the medical profession, the content of this
chapter is complete. What has been described here is the- nexus of
ideas and practices that constituted the treatment of the insane in
the 1790s. If certain aspects have been emphasized at the expense of
others, it is because I have attempted to draw out what was most
significant for the history of the majority of the insane themselves.
King George III, for instance, has received virtually no attention
here in spite of his repeated bouts of insanity. This is because the
therapies that were devised for the Icing were not the sort that could
be or were applied on a large scale to the pauper population of the
public asylums. Ke was treated by physicians of the highest rank, who
had little interest in innovating methods which would benefit anyone
other than their own aristocratic patrons. This is not to decry the
interest that the therapies used on the king have for indicating con¬
temporary changes of opinion; but this can be done just as easily and,
from the point of view of this thesis, more appropriately, by examining
changes in treatment which affected the majority of those designated
1
as insane.
For similar reasons I have not directly confronted the concept
of insanity itself as an epistemological question, but have preferred
is not equally concerned, it is true, because every one does not throw
the came share of property, talents, and activity, into the common
stock, but all are interested in the general success, and the welfare
of each is connected with that of the whole. . . .while some plan
and regulate, others must labour and execute. . . .This comparison
may serve to illustrate the immense consequence of the labouring poor.
They demand our constant attention. To inform their minds, to repress
their vices, to assist their labours, to invigorate their activity, and
to improve their comfortsj- these are the noblest offices of enlightened
minds in superior stations. . (This appeared in a letter to the
Liverpool advertiser as a reason why Liverpool should have its own asylum.
In J. Curric, Ib0j>f vol. 2, Appendix 2, pp. 19-21.;
On George Ill's illnesses ana their interpretations, the most compre¬
hensive work is Hacalpine and Hunter, 1969. Other accounts appear in
Trench, 1964 and j.q. and H.U. Cantu, 196?.
to let its definition appear in the use that was made of it. The
label of "insanity" or "madness" is perhaps applied to people in every
society, but what can only bo found by empirical investigation is
who the people are in every society who do get so described.
In the 1790s a number of such descriptions, of the insane and
of the appropriate therapies to which they should be subjecteu, were
being discussed ana tried out. Left to itself, the British medical
profession might have continued to generate gradual change along the
lines already established, whether it would, or not is something we
will never know because at that time a number of things happenea
outside of the profession's narrow ideological and professional con¬
cerns . These external developments were to have the effect of trans¬
forming the whole future course of the treatment of the insane in
Britain. These factors were both social ana intellectual, but the
overriding influence was that of "moral treatment", a practice which
appeared almost simultaneously in a small private asylum in Yorkshire
and in a large public asylum in Paris. It is to that practice that we
must now turn.
CHAPTER TWO
The Creation of Moral Treatment:
An assessment of the work of Philippe
Pinel in Paris ana the Tuke family at
York.
From the time when Pinel obtained the permis¬
sion of Couthon to try the humane experiment
of releasing from fetters some of the insane
citizens chained to the dungeon walls of the
JBicetre, . . .a new school of special medicine
has been gradually forming.
—"Prospectus", The Asylum Journal, 1
We do not say that the management at the Retreat
. . .cannot be surpassed, - that it has not been
equalledf and often approached in private houses.
But this we do say, that no writer before Mr Tuke
had pointed out the principle of gentleness and
attention to comforts as the governing principle
in the management of the insane; and that he, in
halving pointed this out as the governing princi¬
ple, has rendered a service to humanity of the
greatest importance.
—Anon, The British Review, lSl.5
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Two names dominate all discussion of the concept of moral treat¬
ment? Pinel and the Tukes. Accurately or not, their work is seen
to embody all that is important about moral treatment. More than that,
they were the authors in whose.work moral treatment was first presented
as a coherent and distinctive therapeutic approach to the treatment
of the insane. This chapter is devoted to an examination ana assess¬
ment of these legendary figures| not necessarily to deflate this
aura of importance, but to ask what it was about their work that naae
it appear so valuable to them and to us.
1, Phil rope Pinel
First Pinel, perhaps the single most remembered name in the history
of psychiatry. His is certainly the name most revered by the medical
profession, if only because he was, unlike the Tukes, a member of that
profession. And if Pinel's is the most famous name, the most famous
image we have of his work is the painting by Robert Fleury showing him
ordering the chains to be removed from the patients at the Bicetre
hospital in Paris. With this drs-matic gesture Pinel acquired for himself
the title of "liberator of the insane", a title which remained untarnished
until Foucault's recent assessment of the whole legend. Pinel's contem¬
porary reputation in France rested as strongly on his nosographical
theories and his teaching career1 as it did on his work with the insane,
but on this side of the Channel it was his work as a mad-doctor or, more
specifically, as the originator of "moral treatment" that was seen as
his major contribution to medicine.
His work with the insane began with his appointment as visiting
1
Pinel was Professor of Hygiene from 1794, and later of Pathology as
well, at the Paris medical school. His work there established him as
the founder of a new school of nosography. On this sec Ackerknecbfc.
1967 c
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physician to Dr Belhomme's private asylum near Paris in 1?85. Pinel
published a number of articles on insanity in the following decade, and
on the 25th August 1793 he was appointed to the staff of Bicetre public
asylum.1 The reputed "unchaining" took place in September of that year.
In 1795 Pinel was transferred to another public asylum in Paris, Sal-
petriere, where he instituted similar reforms (and regarding which another
picture was painted to show the unchaining). In 1801 Pinel published his
Trait/ medico-ohilosophiqus sur 1'alienation mentals, ou la manic, which
was translated into English in 1806 as A Treatise on Insanity."' He was
purged by the restoration government in 1822 and died in 1826.
What was it about this "moral treatment" that was so powerful that
it allowed Pinel to release the "furious maniacs" from their chains and
shackles and in so doing to start a revolution in the treatment of the
insane? There is no evidence that Pinel ever sat down and wrote "moral
3
treatment is. . ." but what he has written can leave us in no doubt
On this period of Pinel's career see Rosen, 1946, p. 336.
p
A facsimile reprint of the 1806 translation was published in 1962.
All references, unless otherwise indicated, are to this eaition. The
introduction to the 1806 edition is by its translator, D.D. jJa.vies,
although it does incorporate some of Pinel's material. Pinel's own
introduction to the first French edition of 1801 has been translated
as pages 30-49 of Riese, 1969. The text of the second, much revised,
French edition of 1809 has never been translated in full, walk (1934,
pp. 819-22) gives some extended quotations from it, and Pinel's intro¬
duction to this edition has been translated as pages 329-4l of Zilboorg
and Henry, .1941, although it is described there as the introduction to
the first edition.
3 Pinel of course did not write at all of "moral treatment", as this
is an English translation. The phrase he used was "traitement moral"
which doss, at least superficially, translate as "moral treatment".
But, as will be shown, it is the social and intellectual contexts in
which these phrases were used that gave them their significance. The
difference between the French and English versions of the phrase, whichis concealed within the translation, may be of no interest to the history°-f psychiatry but it does illustrate the different forms that class
struggle took in the two countries.
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of what he was trying to achieve. It is scarcely an exaggeration to
say that the whole of moral treatment can he summed up in the words he
is reputed to have said to tine first inmate of Bicetre he set fx'ee in
1793 s
Captain, I will order your chains to be taken off, and give
you liberty to walk in the court, if you will promise to
behave well, and injure no-one.1
There is no real difference between the sentiment being expressed here—
that is, the need to operate self-restraint—-and that v.'hich appeared in
Ferriar's comments on the management of the insane. The only difference
is that Ferriar's suggestions remained as peripheral comments, whereas
Pinel's work, flamboyant and expressive, claimed to provide a whole
new theory and practice for the treatment of the insane, hot that Pinel
ever claimed he was being totally original: he even maintained that
"the credit of this system of practice has been hitherto almost exclu-
2
sively awarded to England". But what the English writers had not done,
and what Pinel's work can be seen as an attempt to remedy, was to provide
a complete exposition of the new therapeutic principles.
One particularly vivid example demonstrating what Pinel meant by
moral treatment was of "An instance of violent mania cured by prudent
and vigorous coercion". A patient was sent to Bicetre, violently Insane
after his father had lost all his property in the Revolution. "Rever
did a maniac give greater scope to his extravagance"; he strutted about
believing himself to be the prophet Mohammed; he attacked all he met,
including his wife and the governor of the asylum. "What could mild¬
ness and remonstrance do for a maniac, who regarded other men as particles
1
Quoted inJwinslowJ] 1839, vol. 2, p. l'+7.
2
Pinal, 1962, p. 107.
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of dust?" Moral treatment in this case consisted of putting the patient
in a strait-waistcoat and confining him to his cell for an hour. This
did not stop the "maniacal violence"; so a similar punishment was tried
again and, when that failed, again. At last
. . .another explosion of his proud and turbulent disposi¬
tion made the governor feel the necessity of impressing this
maniac with a deep and durable conviction of his dependence.
For that purpose he ordered him to immediate confinement,
which he declared should likewise be perpetual, pronounced
this ultimate determination with great emphasis, and solemnly
assured him, that, for the future, he would be inexorable.
This apparently had the desired effect, as two days later "our prisoner
very submissively petitioned for his release". However "his repeated
and earnest solicitations were treated with levity ana derision". At
last a deal was engineered between the patient's wife.and the governor:
the patient was to be released if he would promise to the governess to
restrain himself ostensibly without the knowledge of the governor who,
the patient was told, would be extremely angry if he found out what his
wife had done.
After this, our lunatic was calm for several days, and in
his moments of excitement, when he could with difficulty
suppress his maniacal propensities, a single look from
the governess was sufficient to bring him to his recoll¬
ection.
Within six months the patient was discharged cured and "is now indefa-
tigably engaged in the recovery of his injured fortune" concluded Pine!
with satisfaction.^
Many other examples could be given but they all illustrate the
basic point: by a variety of means of sophisticated deception and
1
Pinel, 1962, p. 105.
2
Ibid.. P. 106.
3 One interesting feature of this example is that, as in "catching theeje , tne authority o.i the asylum superintendent or governor remainsabsolute. The difference is that here the patient is given an opportunityto develop some initiative of his own: the choice appears to be his,albeit within the greater authority of (the representative of) the insti¬tution.
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intimidation the patients were induced to restrain themselves, to incor¬
porate in their behaviour the principles of discipline that Pinel extended
to them. There is no reason why we should not believe, that this was far
more effective than the direct use of chains or threats to restrain the
patients, but one question remains. Why call this "moral treatment' ?
"Management" perhaps, but not "treatment" in the conventional meaning
of the word—and what did it have to do with "moral"? There was certainly
nothing mysterious about this phrase to Pinels in fact the impression
his Treatise gives is that the phrase was already in use in England.1
There is no evidence at all that its use in England does predate Pinel,
but this is not the same thing as saying that a similar approach did not
exist there. The theoretical principle on which Pinel based his work
was no more than that which the English medical writers mentioned as a
matter of course: the management of the passions or moral affections.
In Pinel's words,
L'analyse des fonctions de 1'entendement humain est sans
doute fort avancee par les travaux reunis aes iaeologistes,
mais il est une autre analyse a peine ebaucbee et pour
laquelle le concours de la medecine est necessaire, e'est
celle des affections morales, de leurs nuances, de leurs
degres divers, ae leurs combinaisons varices.-^
On page 103 of the English translation (Pinel, 1962) appears a quota¬
tion beginning "In the moral treatment of insanity, lunatics. . A
footnote attributes this quotation to the Encyclopaedia Britannlca but.
it does not appear in any of the three editions published before 1801
(Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1771, 178O, 1797). what happened was that the
English translator mistranslated the title of the source of the quotation
which is correctly given by Pinel (1801, p. 11'+; as Plbliotheoue Pritan-
nj£ue. The article being quoted is by a Swiss physician (i/elaHive, 1?98./and describes his visit to the Hetreat private asylum near York. It
was from this asylum that moral treatment was first announced as an
indigenous practice in mngland, but that was not until 1811 (see Hunterand Macalpine, 1963) and after the person who used the phrase had readPinel s Treatise. This development is examined in the second part ofthis chapter. Jr
2
Pinel, 3.801, p. xxxv. "The analysis of the human understanding liasbeen much advanced by those who have reconciled various brandies of
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The long-standing recognition of the importance of the passions in
"human nature" was here being reaffirmed by Pinel. As was discussed in
Chapter One, the medical profession had never completely ignored the
effects of the passions, but neither had they ever incorporated them
as a major part of mad-doctoring theory. Scattered references to the
subject can be found throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,
and by the late eighteenth century most English mad-doctors mentioned
the passions in their various treatises, especially in discussing the
etiology of insanity. Hasiam, for instance, divides, its causes into
the "physical", such as heredity, fever, "suppression of periodical or
occasional discharges and secretions"; and the "moral", that is, those
"applied directly to the mind" such as anger or ungratified desire,
"in short, the frequent and uncurbed, indulgence of any passion or
2
emotion, and any sudden and violent affection of the mind"." But while
Hasiam recognised the importance of the passions, as he die of the
association of ideas, in causing insanity, he was never able to recog¬
nize that they might have an equally strong effect in curing it.
One physician who partially recognized the value of the passions
in the cure of insanity was William Falconer, physician to Bath General
Hospital. In an essay entitled A dissertation on the Influence of the
knowledge into a science of ideas. But another study which is barely
outlined at present requires the assistance of the physician. This is
the analysis of the moral affections or passions—their modifications,
their different degrees, and their varied combinations" (translation by
Grange, 1961, p. Wf). The following discussion leans heavily, at least
for its inspiration, on this paper by Grange which, with her other paners
on Pinel, contributes more to cur understanding of his work than a aozen
of the usual haglographic accounts. For examples of which see baussure,
i950; Woods and Carlson, 1961; or Zilboorg and Henry, 1941.
. ^or D'ri exemple iroia 1664 see HMA, pp. 171~3> and for a general discus¬
sion of this subject, Grange, 1962a.
2
Kaslam, 1798, pp. 99-IOO.
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Passions upon Disorders of the Body (for which the Medical Society of
London awarded him its Fothergillian Medal for 1788), Falconer asserted,
in discussing melancholia, that "it is obvious that there must be here a
large scope for the management of the mind and passions" and went on to
suggest travelling, sport, the invocation of shame, music, gambling,
and philosophy as means by which suitable passions could be moved to
overcome the disorder. But .when it came to discussing mania, all
Falconer's imagination left him and he fell back on the old. sureties.
Since mania was "irrationality on all subjects", the aim of therapy
must be "to eradicate the former false impressions by others still more
violent", either by drowning or the inculcation of terror. And if that
did not work, "maniacal persons are almost altogether cowardly" so "that
threats will often compel then to act and speak rationally".1
Other tentative recommendations of the need to manage or govern
the passions were made by Perfect and by Harper, both mad-doctors with
2
whose work Pinel was familiar. On the whole, however, these sugges¬
tions as to the place of the passions in therapy remained as principles
to be stated, rather than as therapeutic strategies to be applied.
Pinel appreciated "the practical contributions of the English
authors but he did not think much of their own understanding of what
they were doing. After discussing the works of Battie, Arnold, Pargeter,
and Ferriar, Pinel concluded
But a careful!., impartial examination discloses nothing but
vague dissertations, repetitions, compilations, scholastic
formality, ana some scattered facts which from time to
time serve as rallying-poiuts but which offer no real body
1
Falconer, 1788, pp. 77--Q, 82-3.
See perfect,, 1787, p. 268; and Harper, 1789, p. . Pinel givesevidence in his Tfcaite of having read virtually all the specialist
writings on insanity that were published in England in the eighteenth
century.
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of doctrine "based on a sufficient number of observations.1
What Pinel attempted was to draw together the observations of the English
physicians into a coherent approach. lie took hold of the well-established
theory of the passions, so old it was almost a platitude, and developed
it into a practical basis by which to extend to the insane the oppor¬
tunity to create their own recovery. At the end of his discussion of
the "instance of violent mania cured by prudent and vigorous coercion"
Pinel summed up what he had achieved in both theoretical and practical
terms?
These internal struggles between the influence of his man¬
iacal propensities ana the aread of perpetual confinement,
habituated him to subdue bis passions, and to regulate his
conduct by foresight and reflection. He was not insensible
to the obligations which he ovrea to the worthy managers of
the institution, ana he was soon disposed to treat the gov¬
ernor, whose authority he had so lately deridea, with pro¬
found esteem and attachment.c
This was moral treatment? it was literally treatment effeetea through
3
the creative manipulation of the patient's moral affections.
There were two ways in which this manipulation took place. One wa,s
along the lines of "balancing the passions", the good with the bad, an
Introduction to the 2nd edition of his Traite, in Zilboorg and Henry,
19'bl, pp. 33^-5.
2
Pinel, 1962, p. 106.
3
A contemporary of Pinel, Jean Itard, attempted to use the same method
to educate the "loung lavage of Aveyron", the feral boy discovereo. at this
tine living vtild in a forest. Pinel himself was very sceptical of what
could be done with the boy but Itard believed he coulu use "that sublime
art. . .of moral medicine". As he put it, "Guided by the spirit of their
doctrine. . .1 reduced to five principal heads the moral treatment or
education of the Savage of Aveyron. My objects were, (l) To attach him
to social life. . . (2) To awaken the nervous sensibility by the most
energetic stimulants. . . (3j To extend the sphere of his ideas. . .
W I°lead him to the use of speech. . . (5) To exercise frequently the
most simple operations oi the mind, upon the objects of his physical
wants. . ." (Itara, 1972, pp. 101-2, first published l80l). Pinel's
assessment of the boy as innately deprived of certain sensory faculties
can be seen in a recently translated paper he gave on the subject fin Lane.
1976, pp. 37-69).
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idea that originated Kith Aristotle;1 the other was through the use of
the authority of the hospital governor or physician to subjugate the moral
affections of the patients. By this twofold manipulation of the passions,
Pinel was able to provide the basis for a radical change in the treatment
of the treatment of the insane, although the practice of moral treatment
as understood by Pinel marked very little advance on what was already
happening in England.^ It may just be that although the phrase affec¬
tions morales" is a direct translation of "moral affections", it was the
simple fact that English physicians preferred to write of "passions"
rather than the more cumbersome "moral affections" that explains why
"moral treatment" did not originate in this country. If one looks only
at the intellectual context of Pinel's innovative practice, this would
seem a justifiable conclusion to make. Put if this intellectual under¬
standing of the importance of the moi-al affections is placed in the precise
See Grange, 1962a.
2
One of Pinel's best known pupils, J.E. Esquirol. was far more explicit
about the role of the passions in moral treatment. The following passage
from Esquirol shows something of the therapeutic possibilities that Pinel's
work was believed to have created for the control of the passions.* "Ac-
thing is more difficult than to control the passions of man in health .
How greatly augmented is the difficulty, when we wish to direct those
of the insane! A certain address is necessary, and great skill in seis¬
ing upon a fitting opportunity for this application, now, we must oppose,
and conquer the most obstinate resolutions, inspiring the patient with a
passion stronger than that which controls his reason, by substituting a
real for an imaginary fear; now, secure his confidence, ana raise }iis
fallen courage by awakening hope in his breast. Each melancholic should
be treated on principles resulting from a thorough acquaintance with the
tendency of his mind, his character and habits, in order to subjugate
the passion which, controlling his thoughts, maintains his delirium"
(Esquirol, 196.5, p. 228, first published 1820j. A similar recognition
of the role of the physician in "opposing" individual passions was made
by the American physician Benjamin Hush. Hush argued that an essential
element of therapy was to encourage "the passions. . .to neutralise
and decompose each other, and thus to lessen their influence upon the
body" (Rush, 1962, p. 204, first published 1812).
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social context within which Pinel was working, it takes on a much deeper
meaning- and one which goes a long way to explain why this version of
moral treatment appeared in France and not in -Britain.
In the early 1790s the treatment of -the insane in France was far
less developed than it was in England. Private facilities existed for
the rich, but for the majority there was a far greater reliance on chains
and dungeons than there was in England. A survey of 178.5 reported that
"One could hardly find, in the kingdom of France, four or five places
fit for the treatment of the insane",1 Pinel was fully aware of this and
looked with envy across the Channel to what he saw as the impressive
reforms talcing place in England. In 1789 he published an article entitled
"Observations sur le regime moral qui est plus propre,.a retablir, dans
* * ?
certains cas, la raison egaree aes maniaques". ' The publication of that
article at that particular time is very significant, hot only did it
establish Pinel's concern with moral treatment as early as 17S9, it also
ties his social understanding of the treatment of the insane to specific
historical events. In this article, Pinel wrote
Les egards qu'on temoigne en Angleterre aux Kaniaques, & les
efforts qu'on fait dans leurs Etablisseraens fsic"] publics pour
les ramener a la raison sont certainement dignes de servir
de raodele. On a rapporte dernierement dans ion Papier pubxic
Angloxs que dans 1'Hopital de Saint Luc la proportion de
ceux qui avoient recouvre leur entendement avoient ete ae
dix sur douze. Qui airoit que dans une nation rivale de
1'Angleterre pour^les luraieres on dut trcuver un si grand
nombre d'asyles ou ces malheureux sont comme abandonnes &
prives de toutes les ressources de I'Art o.e guerir»3
Cwxombiei et Doublet, Ins true tron3 sur la maniere de gouverner les
in»££9C_s_et__irp^aillcr a leur guarison. 1783, quoted in dausiureTl^O,
p. .1.22".. An indication oi the quality of care is the authors' statement
th&t. it was common practice to have only one bed to every four patjentsin the asylums.
2
Pinel, 1789.
3 "The regard that is shown in England towards the insane, and the effort
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In the same article Pinel discussed a recent French translation of a
history of Bethlem.1 As Grange has pointed out, this translation also
had an appendix contrasting the poor conditions in France with the good
in England. It concluded with a call for reforms in the treatment of
the insane in France "and insisted that France, under a free government,
must follow the remarkable lead of the English". And, as Grange continued,
"in 1789, when the Bastille fell, this was the book which Pinel recommen¬
ded".2
Pinel was strongly committed to the social aims of the devolution
and saw his work as a contribution to the intellectual improvement of
post-Revolutionary France. He was also a close friend of many of the
ideologues, and one of the strongest influences on his thought was that
3
of P.J.G. Cabanis, who was also made a professor of medicine at the
Paris medical school in 1794. For Cabanis the moral basis of life, its
value as a social activity, was laid in the physical construction of
human nature itself. Like Locke and Condillac, Cabanis was a sensation¬
alist t believing in sensory impressions as the basic psychological events.
From this point of view, abnormal psychology was a result of too-great
sensitivity, or violent impressions, as might occur at the time of a
that is made in the public asylums to recover their reason, is certainly
worthy of serving as a model. It has recently been reported in an English
paper that the proportion of those who recovered, their understanding in
St Luke's Hospital has been ten out of twelve, what will people say of
a nation that rivals England in reputation yet where there 3-re such a
great number of asylums where the unhappy inmates are as gooa as aban¬
doned ana deprived of all the resources of the art of healing?" (Pinel
1789. p. 14.; " 0 v '
Ihis '.as Bowen, 1/84, an extremely idealised account of contemporarypractice at Bethlem published, in order to raise funds.
2
Grange, 1963, p. 375.
3 At one stage Pinel helped Cabanis to find a hiding place for Condorcetwhen the latter was being hunted by the police (see Rosen, 1946, p. 332).For an account of Cabanis' medical theories see ibid., pp. 334-5 ana
Ackerknecht, 1967, pp. 5-6. * '
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social revolution. The moral world affected the physical hotiy through
the central nervous system, so medicine must be the moral science parti¬
cipating in man's infinite improvement. "It is now beginning to be per¬
ceived," Cabanis wrote8 "that medicine and moral philosophy form but two
branches of the same science."1 The influence of Cabanis can be seen in
2
Pinel's construction of his medical theory but also xn his approach to
the practice of medicine. Cabanis believed that by knowing ana improving
our physiological constitution we will at the same time be able to improve
our moral condition. And conversely, argued Pinel, a moral improvement
in rnan such as the increase in liberty that a social revolution provides
will in itself lead to physical improvement. Before the devolution
there was much "rnaux de nerfs", "toutes les affections spasmcdiques",
"les maladies catharrales" and other complaints. But now, wrote Pinel
in 1790, "line annee s'e&t a peine ecoulee, et tout a pris une face
3
nouvelle." The political change, according to Pinel, was directly
responsible for the improvement in physical well-being. Everyone noticed
Zf
the changej "Je me porte mieux depuis la revolution", a commonly-heard
phrase in 1790, was for Pinel a physical recognition of the moral effects
1
Cabanis, 1806, p. 30^, first published in 18C&. This conjuncture
between medicine and philosophy can be seen in the title of Pinel's
Traite but it is lost in the English translations "Treatise on Insanity".
The full French title is Traite feeaico-Phllosophique sur 1'Alienation
Hentale.
2
In terms of the dichotomy used in the previous chapter to describe
hierarchical and constructivist theories of human nature, it can now be
seen that Pinel used the imagery of one (the role of the passions) in
a way which had up to that time been the prerogative of the other (the
role of the sensations). There was nothing intellectually profound in
his use of these resources; indeed, what is perhaps most noteworthy is
that Pined extended a theoretical interpretation of human nature hardly
at all. * "





We are now in a position to appreciate the full significance of the
word "moral" to Pinel. It referred not only to the moral affections that
were to "be manipulated in therapy, but also to the moral normality of
post-Revolutionary France that was to be lived by its citizens. "Traite-
ment moral" was an explicit practical expression of the moral science that
Gabanis called for, based on the aims of the Revolution and on a knowledge
of physiology: it was both prescription and description; an affirmation
of faith as well as the material basis on which a new society could be
built of healthy citizens. In Pinel's quite unambiguous words,
The doctrine of balancing the passions of man, by others of
equal or superior force, is not less applicable to the treat¬
ment of the insane than to the science of politics/'
In the revolutionary period of the 1790s this doctrine had quite specific
implications. It will be seen later how short-lived was Pinel's "revo¬
lutionary optimism", tied as it was to the interests of bourgeois normal¬
ity. But initially Pinel did have extremely high hopes for the moral
improvement of his patients, as he did for mankind in general. At the
same time it must be stressed that Pinel's iaea of improvement was not a
limitless one in the sense that, say, William Godwin's philosophy was.
This equation of moral and physical improvement, propounded by Cabanis
and taken up by Pinel, was not uncommon in pre-Revolutionary Prance,
Darnton (1968) has pointed out that it was not only the sensationalists
who held this belief; it was also energetically spread by the mesmerists.
Mesmerism was based on very different theoretical principles to sensation¬
alism, but its advocates did believe, like the sensationalists, in a
natural order to which men ought to try and align their moral, oruer.
The mesmerists believed that "morality issu[edj from the world's general
physics" and consequently "any change, any alteration of our physical
constitution thus produces infallibly a change, an alteration of things
in our moral constitution. Therefore, it suffices to purify or corrupt
the physical order of things in order to produce a revolution in its
morals" (Ricolas Bergasse, writing in the 1780s, quoted in uarnton, op.cit.„
pp. 114, 120). This appears almost as an incitement to insurrection, but
in fact the mesmerists took little part in the Revolution, and as uarnton
points out, they preferred to spenu their physical energy in large wooaen
tubs purportedly massaging each other into harmony with nature.
2
Quoted in Spurzheira, 1817, p. 2^4
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Pinel was always very conscious of the social normality his patients
were to return to and never attempted to create in them a desire for
anything except the normality of post-Revolutionary France.1 One aspect
of this was that Pinel had very little sympathy for some categories of
deviance: for these the tolerance of the physician was quickly exchanged
for the -punitive repression of the moralist. After oescriDing one cas>-
of a former nun, "a perverse and untameable character" vrho was "a source
of trouble and strife" to all, Pinel continued,
But is it not a fact that one can only expect such a
return of insight and gratitude from women of pure morals?
How can one expect it of certain undisciplined ana perverse
women whose alienation results from shameful vice, loose
living, drunkenness and vile intrign.es? One dissipated
young womanf for instance, did nothing but grumble during
her stay at the Oaipetriere; she seeraea to have sworn
implacable hatrea against ail who preventea her from having
her way. Every method of treatment tried for proved use¬
less, ana so we had her charged with various delinquencies
of a grave nature which she had committed before her admis¬
sion, end taken away to the St uenis remand prison; the
same thing has happened on several occasions to other
women who were brought to the Salpetriere in consequence
of loose living and drunkenness.^
An interesting contrast with this essentially conservative use of
the theory of the passions is provided by the French Utopian socialist
An interesting comparison with Pinel's revolutionary optimism is that
used in the treatment of mental illness in the present-uay Peoples'
Republic of China. According to one visitor (Ridel, 1973; the Chinese
explicitly incorporate their social optimism into their therapeutic
programmes for the mentally ill. Ridel describes four aspects of Chinese
life which make up the specific practice of-revolutionary optimism in
psychiatry there: (a) the principle of subordinating the feelings of
the individual to the neeas of the groups of which he is a member; (b)
the belief that the individual is part of the revolution which will
ultimately be victorious; (c) the belief that participation in this
revolution gives meaning and purpose to life? ana (a) the belief in the
infinite capacity of man to learn ana improve himself (op.cit., p. 736).
2
This is from the 2nd edition of Pinel's Trait,e (1809), quoted in Walk,1956 f P • 8<cl. Rote that the women were only charged with penal offences
idLfe-E Pinel s treatment of them as insane had proved unsuccessful.
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Charles Fourier,. Fourier, writing in the 1820s and 130st conceived of
a communitarian settlement which he named "Harmony". The name referred
to Fourier!s ideal that in this settlement all man's passions would be
harmoniously orchestrated so that he would live in peace and happiness.
In his words,
My theory is limited to utilizing the passions, just as
nature gives them and without changing anything. That is
the whole mystery, the whole secret of the calculus of
passions.te attraction. The theory does not ask whether
God was right or wrong to endow human beings with partic¬
ular passions; the societary order utilises them without
changing them and just as God has givon them.1
Hhile Pinel had used this same theory to justify the social normality
of pcst-Kevolutionary France, Fourier saw in it the possibility of a
completely new and soc.is.list community. Whatever the theoretical justi¬
fication for this, Fourier's socialist ideals remained hopelessly im¬
practical because he was so selective as to wliich passions he actually
took notice of. Amongst other omissions, he left no place in his society
for what would prove to be the disruptive passions of anger or of hate.
In concluding this assessment of Pinel it must be said that he was
convinced that moral treatment was an established fact in England. This
was because he drew his evidence from a few select sources, written by
physicians who were concerned about the lot of the insane, but who could
hardly be said to be caring for the majority of them. We can even go so
far as to say that because the break between the old and new societies
was so much more distinct in France than in England there was more inter¬
est there to a radically different approach in medicine as in other intel¬
lectual fields. Few physicians in England had anything like Pinel's
commitment to building a new societyj they were too conscious of their
status within the old one, or at least within the society that was
1
Fourier, 1972, p. 205.
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gradually coming into being in England. It is partly because of this
that much of the impetus to reform the treatment of the insane in this
country came from outside the medical profession altogether. Certainly
many of those who established an approach to the insane at this time
had a very different position within the social relations of production
to that of Currie or Ferriar. These other groups devised therapies
appropriate to the expression of the social values they considered impor¬
tant, and in so doing they used the intellectual resources available to
them in ways often very different from those used by the medical pro¬
fession in either England or France.
In order to appreciate the meaning of "moral treatment" in the
English context it is now necessary to turn to one of these alternative
approaches. This is the work of the Takes; reformers who, for reasons
very different to those of Pinel, developed what they also called "moral
treatment".
2a The Tubes
The institution at which the Tukes developed their version of moral
treatment was a small private asylum near York called "The Retreat". A
number of reasons have been passed down to us to explain why the Retreat
was founaed, but one which must be remembered is the existing provision
of care for the insane at York at that time. It is possible that the
Retreat would never have been founded at all if the York public lunatic
asylum had been fulfilling a similar function to that of the public
hospital in handlester. York Asylum had been founded by public subscrip¬
tion in 177? in a similar blaze of philanthropic glory to that which
heralded all the subscription hospitals but, unlike some of the other
hospitals, it did not maintain its sense of dedication. From the begin¬
ning there Was difficulty in getting enough pauper lunatics because tho
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parish authorities would not pay the eight shillings per week the hospital
charged to look after thorn. In 1784 a limited number of "superior" or
"opulent" patients were admitted to "create the means to relieve the
necessitous".1 By 1792 there were 12 patients paying "a considerable
sum", 42 parish paupers paying eight shillings, and 18 patients being
kept for less than eight shillings because they did not receive parish
'assistance. The generous paternalism of this policy was not all it
seemed. In 1791 a female member of the Society of Friends was a patient
at York Asylum. Her family in Leeds asked some of the local Quakers in
York to visit her, the asylum refused to allow a visit to take place,
and a few weeks later the patient died. As a result of this incident
the Quaker membership in York decided to do something positive about
4
what they saw as the lack of suitable care for the insane, and the
foundation of another lunatic asylum in York was proposed. It was to be
a cross between a subscription hospital and a private madhouse in that
it depended on subscriptions to raise the necessary capital, but admis¬
sion, and the chance to become a subscriber, was to be solely fox- members
1
Gray, 1815, pp. 14, 17.
?
A. Hunter, 1792, Appendix, pp. 2-5.
3" Description, p. 22. It was not until the mid-1810s that the conditions
inside the asylum were made public. For details see Gray, op.cit.;
Higgins, 1816.
4
Initially they experienced difficulty in persuading other Quakers of
the validity of this belief. A first proposal for funds in 1792 received
little response so that a second one a year later included a long section
answering the objections that had been made. These were overrulea on the
grounds that (a) there were enough insane Quakers to justify such a ven¬
ture? (b) the new asylum would, be for the entire country—already patients
o.tten had to travel long distances to an existing madhouse so the siting
of a new institution in York would not exclude members of the Society
living in another area; and (c) York was a good place because land was
cheap where, the air was healthy and free from the .smoke of manufacturingtowns, and agricultural produce was cheap and plentiful (Description,
PP. 34-9). * — -1—-»
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of the Society of Friends.1 This private hospital, to be known only as
"The Retreat", was built in 3.795 and opened its doors to its first patients
in June of the following year.
The person primarily responsible for founding the Retreat was
William Tuke, a tea merchant ana small-scale cocoa manufacturer who was
aged 64 when the Retreat was opened. Tuke knew nothing about the treat¬
ment of the insane when he started his new venture, so he employed
Timothy Maud, a distant relative and retired surgeon, to act as super¬
intendent to the Retreat. Maud died within two months of the opening of
the Retreat, and Tuke was left without a superintendent. He tried to
get John Hipsley, the former heaamaster of a school he (Tuke) had also
founded, to take the post, but Hipsley refused. As an interim measure
Tuke took on the job himself. There were not many patients at this time,
only 18 being admitted in the first 12 months, but Tuke aid not have an
easy time of it. The head-keeper was careless and allowed a suicidal
patient to strangle himself, so he was sacked. The housekeeper was not
really capable enough for the job and when another patient died she had
to leave. The sum of three shillings and sixpence had to be spent on
2
searching for a missing patient. A combination of these and other inci¬
dents led Tuke almost to despair: as he wrote to the Retreat's meaical
adviser, "Thus thou wilt see the Family has been greatly deranged indeea".^
1
Although the Retreat has always been, and still is, an institution run
strxctly in accorcance wxch tue iueais of the Dociety of Friends, only two
years af s.er opening it was taking in non-Quaker patients. The reason ap¬
pears to have been financial, in that by taking non-Quakers at a higher
rate of charges it was possible to subsidise more poor Quakers a.t the
minimum rate (Minutes of the Committee appointed bv the Subscribers of
the Retreat, 28th June 1798, Ms in ha).
2
Waste Book, entry for 5th Hovember 1796 (Ms in RA).
Letter to William Maud (Timothy Maud's son), 1st December 1796 (Ms in
RA, emphasis in the original).
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At last a replacement superintendent was found. This was George
Jepson, a jA-year-old ex-weaver who had no medical qualifications but
had practised medicine as a lay doctor in the west hiding. Jepson Wa,s
already working as the "Keeper to the Men latients at the Retreat, and
Tuke initially had doubts as to whether he should give him the greater-
responsibility. Tuke confessed that
Had he been more experienced in the Government and order
of a pretty large family, I should not have much aoubt
respecting him. I consider him as a steady religious
Friend, and in that respect to be fully confiued in.
By the summer of 1797 Jepson had apparently proved himself anu was given
the job. He remained until he was retired at the age of 80. Under
Jepson's superintendence the Hetreat evolved the particular therapeutic
2
approach for which it became famous.
when the Hetreat opened its doors its approach to the "management"
or control of the unruly patients was not particularly original. The
aim was always to give the insane members of the society of Frienas
better accommodation than that usually provided at private asylums.
The first Annual .Report proclaimed that
We have strenuously avoiaea that gloomy appearance,
which frequently accompanies places appropriated for
those who are afflic tea with disoraers of the mina.-5
But many of the early patients hap been insane for a long times once a
1
Letter to William Maud, 13th February 1797 (Ms in HA).
2
The following discussion might give the impression, by constantly re¬
ferring to the "Lukes5" contribution to moral' treatment, that Jepson aiu
not exist, or was at least unimportant, .-aiile not wishing to undervalue
Jepson's contribution to the Hetreat or for that matter that of his wife,
the "female superintendent", it was the members of the Tuke family who
remained the spokesmen for the Hetreat, ana it must be assumed that they
retained the ultimate authority, at least in the early periou. Apart
from a few early Reports by William Tuke, the bulk of the publisheo mat¬
erial on the Hetreat was by bamuei Tuke, William's grandson, treasurer
to the He treat who made the asylum famous by the publication in 1813 of
his description of the Hetreat.
3
Hetreat, state of the Institution, 1797, p. 3.
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specifically Quaker institution was opened many of them were transferred
from St Luke's or a private madhouse and presented a particular problem
of control. The second Annual Report admitted that "out of 23 cases now
in the House, all of them, except two or three, were, at their admission,
of so long standing as to be considered incurable".1 With this kind of
patient, long used to the constraints of chains or straps in anotner
institution, some form of external control was considered necessary.
The most detailed description we have of the early years is in a
2
letter by a Swiss physician who visited the Retreat in mid-1798. This
doctor described at length the facilities for the furious;
On the ground floor, there are cells in which the maniacs
are confined in their fits of fury, during which time their
liberty would be dangerous. A small window gives them light,
of which they can be deprived at pleasure; a little door
which opens to the outside, gives their keepers an opportunity
of observing them, without their being able to perceive it.
The only furniture of these neat ana wainscotted rooms is a
bed. ... In endeavouring to keep the patient in entire
dependance, everything which couia convey any idea of terror,
has been carefully avoided. He is not fastened with cords,
nor bound like a criminal. Two strong bandages are nailed
to the floor and pass under the bed without his perceiving
them; on the back of the waistcoat are two buckles which
receive these bandages; the patient is in this manner more
or less secured and has power at the same time to turn him¬
self to the right or to the left. The feet are secured in
like manner. He is thus kept unaer the greatest restraint,
without appearing to be so. tie is retained in bed by a kind
of enchantment. He does not hesitate to acknowledge that he
is at the discretion of those who surround him. The necessity
1
Retreat, State of the Institution. 1798, p. 9. In oraer to attract
more recent, and curable, cases to the Retreat it was early deciaea to
provide more financial inducements. The 1799 Annual Report stated that
^igements n°t exceeding six months from their first appearance"
patients usually admitted at the eight-shilling rate would be chargedhall that for up to one year, ana patients on the four-shilling rate wouldbe admitted jgrgdis. in loOG two patients were admitted under this rule,recovered within six months, and were discharged, without paying any
charge at all (Anon, 1828, p. 17j.
2
1. A SIi^11 part °£ this letter was published approving!(in Lug.-J.oh) la an Appendix to the description (pp. 221-3). A much longe:translation appears m walK, 19)7+, pp. 813-7.
uM-
which presses him on all siO.es soon subdues the most furious
and malicious inclinations.
Mildness ana firmness: the greatest restraint with the least excitement;
but this was a policy only for the very bad cases. "This is the severest
punishment that they employ, it is seldom that they have occasion to use
2
it."
For the majority of patients the strongest restraint that was used
on them consisted of local ana temporary control. "Strong Leather Mittins"
3
and "a Strong Leather Cap""^ were bought but the most usual expense of
this kind was for "strait-waistcoats''. Of the first 15 patients, five
M-
were charged for a v.'aistcoat or repairs to one. As with the more ex¬
treme forms of restraint, the waistcoat was not used inaiscr.iminat.ely
but only to control the outbursts of unwanted behaviour as ana when they
occurred. The case notes on John Baker are typical;
He requires no particular attention but to prevent him
from tearing or sullying his Clothes cs to guard against
any sudden starts of Passion when he strikes the other
Patients if not well watched & has often attempted to
strike his Physician, on such occasions it is found
proper to put on a strait waistcoat for a Lay or two
to make him ashamed of his Conduct.$
"To make him ashamed of his conduct"; in this phrase we can hear again
the echo of Ferriar's and Pinel's plans to make their patients reflect
on their actions, to make them realise that their minus were not com¬
pletely destroyed but could, with the right encouragement, recover suf-
ficiently to rejoin normal society again. Ey this criterion the threat
1
balk, 19^+, p. 8l6,
2
Xhid.
3 Cash Book, entries for l6th February .1798 and 2*fth February 1798(Ms in HA). "" '7
k
Patients' Disbursements, 1796 (Ms in HA).
5
Case Book I, entry for John Baker, zHh November, I798 (Ms in Ha).
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of "the straitjacket was a crude instrument ox control: it was virtually
the only one known to William Take and his colleagues when the lietreat
was opened, but it was soon discarded once more sophisticated fcrras were
found.
There was one other means•of control used initially, again because
it was common practice to do so. This was the use of fear. An account
of the early days of the Retreat, written for subscribers in 1828, aa~
mitted that
The basis of the system at that time generally adopted, was
the position, that fear is the great principle by which the
insane are to be governed ana the practical consequences
deduced from it, were, that their attendants should commence
their intercourse with them, by an appearance of austerity,
and perhaps the display of physical prowess; in fact, that
in some cases of violent excitement, the cudgel and the whip
were the most suitable instruments of coercion, v.e believe
it may be said that the hetreat commenced with an assent to
the general correctness of these views."
Over the years a number of innovations were made in the way patients at
the lietreat were cared for. by l8ll the practice at the Retreat consti¬
tuted enough of a consistent and thought-out therapeutic programme for
William Tuke to ask his grandson Samuel to write up and publish a
Description of the Retreat. This was done and in this work Samuel Tuke
described the core feature of the regime at the Retreat as "moral treat¬
ment", This was the first time this phrase had been used .in iinglish to
describe an indigenous practice in this country.-"
In the Description Samuel Tuke never actually defined what he meant
by moral treatment although he devoted the longest chapter in the book
Anon, 1828, p. 10. For a confirmation of this by Samuel 'Puke see
S. Tuke, 1846, pp. 14-15.
2
The work's full title is Description of the Retreat an Institution near
"ty of Irrenas; containing an account
. Treatment, ana a otatemont of
'there was one earlier use of the phrase "moral treatment/' in "an
article which Joke published anonymously m the Philadelphia meuicaj
journal iae_Jlc..lgcti.c. repertory and Ana.lvti.ca.') Review in 1811 (see punter
and Macaipine, 1965), but there is no evidence that this article ever
became known on this siue of the Atlantic.
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to it. At one stage he referred to moral treatment as "management";
elsewhere as the "means [by which] the power of the patient to control
the disorder, is strengthened and assisted", as well as "modes of coercion"
and even "the general comfort of the insane". In the pages of the
Description is, however, a full account of what, in the everyday practice
of the He treat, moral treatment did come to mean. In order to bring out
the dominant features of this practice, it will be discusseu here unaer
three main headings: (a) the lunatic as child; (b) the social world
recreated in the Hetreat; and (c) work.
a. The lunatic as child. There are a number of comments by Samuel Tuke
and others referring to the similarity between the insane and children;
both needing socialisation into the correct norms of society, both having
to learn the "normal" way to live. Deia Rive was the first to comment
on this phenomenon as it appeared at the Hetreat:
You will perceive that in the moral treatment of the insane,
they do not consider them as absolutely deprived of reason;
or in other words, as inaccessible to the motives of fear,
hope, feeling, ana honour. It appears, that they consider
them rather as children, who have too much strength, and who
make a dangerous use of it. Their punishments and rewards
must be immediate, since that which is distant has no effect
upon them.^
Samuel Tuke himself agreed that "There is much analogy between the jud¬
icious treatment of children, and that of insane persons".^ what he
meant by "judicious treatment of children" can be seen from the comments
he made in his diary on the occasion of his daughter's first birthday:
It appears to me that in our little girl the faculties and
Description, pp. 131» 138.
2
Quoted in ibid., p. 223.
3
P* 130. dee also p. 178 for a description of how the "assiuuity"of the superintendent's "parental. . .affection" was rewarded bv the
patient's "almost filial attachment".
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the passions have advanced together, and that rrom the first
indulgence of anger she ha.s fully understood, the consequent
conduct of her excellent mother as marking disapprobation.
How necessary is it, then, to check evil in its first appear¬
ance, and to stuay to teach the control of the passions
whilst they are yet tender and flexible k"
To teach children to have total control over themselves so that
they would grow up to be good members of society was central to che
dukes' philosophy of life. It is only within this philosophy of life
that it is possible to appreciate what Tuke understood by the "passions"
or by other terms which up to now have appeared in a predominantly
medical context. The Tukes made use of the same types of control over
their patients as Pinel haci done, but whereas he saw his work in terms
of medical doctrine, the Tukes saw theirs in terms of a specifically
religious one.
This religious doctrine was the one propagated by the Society of
o
friends. God is the ultimate source of all reason and morality; man
on his own is both irrational and evil. According to the Quakers, man
can only become rational or good by allowing the "Spirit of God" which
exists in every man to be allowed to express itself. To do this, arguea
the Quakers, required Season to keep its dominance over the passions.
"Reason" for the Quakers-was thus an essentially mystical concept, the
function of man's rational faculty which only retained its ability to
function correctly because man acted in accordance with the wishes of
1
Diary entry for 25th November 1812, in S. Tuke, i860, vol. 1, p. 189.
2.
In many ways Quaker doctrine was not dissimilar to that of other
eighteenth century Protestant sects, but it is one with sufficient inter¬
est oj. its own to be treated separately. The account given hox*e refers
to Quaker beliefs at the end of the eighteenth century: it does not pur¬
port to describe present-day ideology. The main contemporary source
used is Gxarkson, 1807• Clarjtson was not a Quaker but he was sympathetic
to their aims, especially when expressed in social action as in the move¬
ment to abolish slavery. His Portraiture remains the most extensive
description 01 Quaker practice we have ior this period, deconuary sources
used are mainly Tolles, I960; Isichei, 1970; Kaistrick, 1970; Crubb, 1930.
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the Spirit of God. The passions or moral affections of love, joy, fear,
anger, etc., are what God gave to man to control his nature. Only too
often, argued the Quakers, these passions are allowed to indulge themselves
and man loses simultaneously his moral dignity and his reason.
This is familiar imagery but there is nothing in the description
to suggest that Samuel Tuke was interested in toe various medical theories
to which the same concepts were often tied,"'" A number of present-day
commentators have emphasized that the Takes1 commitment to treatment of
the mind, rather than to medical remedies of the boay, placed them in a
r~t
contentious position vis-a-vis contemporary medical opinion.^ The essence
of this argument is that insanity at that time was believed to be primarily
a physical derangement, that its mental manifestations were just the ex¬
ternal visible sign of underlying pathology. Ron-physical causes of in¬
sanity were accepted but once physical degeneration had set in what was
the point of using non-physical methods to cure it? Or, to use a metaphor
popular with modern exponents of this approach, if a television set has
a faulty tube, there is no point in trying to change the station.
what those who emphasize this argument ignore is that medicine has
always worked with an implicit recognition that the mind and the boay
1
Very little will be said here of the medical personnel employed at the
Retreat or of their policies as very little importance was placed on this
aspect of care. However there was always a visiting physician on call,
the first being Thomas Fowler from 1796 until his death in l801. As
with the use of fear, "Bleeding, blisters, seatons, evacuants, ana manyother prescriptions, which have been highly recommended by writers on
insanity, received an ample trial" (Bescriution, p. Ill);"but Fowler anahis successors only used them, as they aid fear, cautiously ana withoutreference to the medical theories of insanity with which they were usuallyassociated. In the oescriprion Tuke discussed all the resaical therapiesthac. had been tried at the Retreat, but the only one he was at all encour¬
aging about was the warm bath.
See Bynum, 1974, pp. 329-31; Scull, 1973a, pp. 230-4.
3
See R. Hunter, 1973.
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influence each other."'" humoural theories, the doctrine of the association
of ideas, sensationalism: these are all attempts to provide a scientific
explanation of this influence. And'they were all being used in the
eighteenth century, by mad-doctors, to explain the causation of insanity.
The Tukes did no more than Pinel in pointing out that what worked as a
cause could just as easily work as a cure. In dainuel Tuke's woras:
If we adopt the opinion, that the disease originates in
the mind, applications made immeaiately to it, are obviously
the most natural; and the most likely to be attended with
success. If, on the contrary, we conceive that minu is
incapable of injury or destruction, and that, in all cases
of apparent mental derangement, some bouily disease,
though unseen and unknown, really exists, we shall still
readily admit, from the reciprocal action of the two parts
of our system upon each other, that the greatest attention
is necessary, to whatever is calculated to affect the rnina.^
If anything offended the medical profession it was not that this consti¬
tuted an attack on the Cartesian dualism they were all supposed to be
committed to, but that the Retreat's version of moral treatment did not
use any of the sophisticated forms of knowledge that physicians haa to
3
spend so much time and money in acquiring.
As far as the concept of disease is concerned, there is an alternative
view, the "ontological", which holds that disease is not a physiological
deviation from normal but the intrusion by bacteria, demons, or other for¬
eign bodies which run an independent and self-sufficient course of their
own. The "physiological" concept of disease, on the other nana, accepts
its definition as being dependent on the social norms of health or, as
Galen put it, on the state "in which we neither suffer pain nor are hin¬
dered in the functions of daily life" (quoted in Temkin, 1963, P- 637, on
which paper this discussion is based). A vivid commentary on this dichotomy
is provided by a Professor Pettenkofer who tried to disprove Koch's claim
that it was the virulent cholera bacillus that was the sole cause of cholera.
Pettenkofer ate a sandwich containing a pure culture of the bacilli, he
suffered no ill effects and thus was able to continue to maintain that
the bacillus was not sufficient cause for the illness—it also depended on
the patient's consititution, his mental and physical health (example given
in Offer and Sabshin, 1966, p. 6). As far as psychiatry is concerned, it
is continually made evident that whatever concept of disease is used to
account for the existence of insanity, in treatment the distinction cannot
so easily be made.
^ description, pp. 131-2.
3
Also, as will be argued, there was often a large discrepancy between the
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One lay source that Samuel Tuke acknowledged as having an influence
on his thinking was John nocke's work on education. In 1811 he wrote in
his diary how much he was impressed by Locke's insistence on the neect
for man to achieve "a mastery over his inclinations". To Samuel Tuke
this was a fundamental aspect of the real needs of human nature. The
passage from Locke which Tuke cited continues in a similar vein, empha¬
sizing the conventional hierarchical imagery of man and of society:
. . .he that knows not how to resist the importunity of
present pleasure or pain, for the sake of what reason tells
him is fit to be done, wants the true principle of virtue
and industry, ana is in aanger of never being good for
anything.^
"To obtain the power here spoken of," added Tuke, "is the true object of
wisdom in its spiritual and genuine sense."
The words are clear enough, although they seem on the face of it to
contradict some of the argument that has been developed thus far. Here
is a commitment to the same hierarchical view of human nature that in
Chapter Que was seen to be recognised as a block to improvement in the
treatment of the insane. Hut whereas most meaical writers up to the mia-
eighteenth century saw the insane as deprived of reason and thus beyond
conception of social normality held by the medical profession and that
held by many of the lay reformers who enterea into the debate.
1
Diary entry for 19th September 1811, in 3. Tuke, i860, vol. 1, p. i£&.
Tuke stated that he was quoting from a work entitlea "beauties of Locke",
p. 206,
2
Ibid,, p. 165. Locke's writing on education incluues many sentiments
which could have been repeatea without moaification by Samuel Tuke. Lor
instance, in 1693 Locke wrote of how parents were helpea in the eaucation
of their children by the natural tenaency of children to take "a Pleasure
in being esteem'd and valu'u, especially by. . .those they depend on".
If the parents "caress ana commena them when they do well, shew a cola
and neglectful Countenance to them upon aoing ill (this]. . .will ofitself work more than Threats or blows, which lose their force when once
grown common, ana are of no Use when Shame aoes not attena them" (Locked1934, p. y+). Hut if the principle was ola, it took a creative thinker
like Samuel Tuke to be able to apply it to the insane in a meaningful
way.
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normal therapeutic approaches; for the Tukes, as for all Quakers, the
full source of reason existed only in God and therefore everyone was
equally imperfect and amenable to improvement before Him. Pinel worked
with a similar model of human nature, except that he located the "reason"
his patients lacked in his own authority, the authority of the physician.
The Quakers saw their use of reason as grounded in their religion. It
was a theory of man's place in the world which, for the Tukes at least,
meant that groups like the insane could now be treated as fully human.
What the insane lacked in human nature, all men lacked as soon as they
let their passions get out of control. This humanist aspect of moral
treatment has been made much of by present-day claimants to its inspira¬
tion. Without denying that the Quaker epistemology did indeed extend
its offer of humanity to all sections of society, we must not forget
what the precise formulation of that humanity was: a stark image of
man, relegating many of the richest and most popular aspects of conven¬
tional behaviour to the status of "problem". Every activity which
created excitement or stimulated the imagination was likely to be class¬
ified as dangerous. On playing cards, for instance, one commentator
wrote,
I have been told that large drops of sweat have fallen from
[[the card players']] faces though they were unaer no boaily
exertions. How what must have been the state of their minus
when the card in question proven decisive of their loss?
Beason must unquestionably have fled: and it must have been
succeeded instantly either by fury or despair. . .It is not
necessary to have recourse to the theory of the human mina
to anticipate the consequences that would be likely to
result to grown-up persons from such an extreme excitement
of the passions.
Like this writer, Samuel Tuke was aware of holding no explicit "theory
of the human mind" but he did accept the need to keep it firmly disci¬
plined along the lines that God was believed to sanction, besides card
1
Clarkson, 1807, vol. 1, p. 29.
12?
playing, other proscribed activities were theatre-going, music, dancing,
and reading novels.
As Tuke pointed out, "the faculties ana the passions advance
together". In children and lunatics could be seen the raw material of
human nature. Only be constantly exerting discipline over the baser parts
of this nature could they receive the Dpir.it of God and thus grow into
fully human creatures. It was a central belief of the Quaker philosophy
that every member of the Society had a duty not only to discipline himself
but all others with whom he came into contact. "Vigilance" over the moral
conduct of individuals was a Christian duty . . .and any interference
2
with persons who might err, was solely for their goou." At the local
and national Quaker meetings this precept was institutionalised into
the post of "Overseer" which was created to "admonish" any deviants.
What was more natural than that the Takes should attempt to instil
this precept into the everyday life of the hetreat?
Samuel Tuke accepted the official doctrine in these matters but he was
sufficiently sensitive to try and understand why such activities should
not be allowed. The following comments on Ann daacliffe's The Mysteries
of Udolpho (1794) ore typical of his approach towards culture generally,
a perspective which was on the liberal end of Quaker opinion at that
time; "The intention of this romance appears to be good. 1st—its object
appears to be to show the advantages of a careful education, ana the nec¬
essity of discouraging that sickly sensibility too common in females in
high life, ana which so much undermines their powers of usefulness and
happiness. 2nd—to discourage that love and ready belief of the marvellous,
so common to the human mind, by relating a number of incidents which have
had every appearance of supernatural, but which were found to proceed from
natural causes. These illustrations are excellent; but I am nevertheless
of the opinion that the work is, on the whole, likely to do more harm than
good. It represents man in a state which he is not in; viz., a state in
which he requires no superior aid to be innocent ana happy. The incidents
are so extraordinary that it manes common life appear insipid, and lessens
the relish for the world in which imagination is less conspicuous than
understanding ana truth" (diary entry for 26th august 1611, in o. Tuke.
i860, vol. l, pp. 163-4-).
2
Clarkson, 180/, vol. 1, p. 181. As with all Quaker social behaviour,
explicit justification for it was held to exist in the Bible. In this case
the appropriate text was Matthew XVIII, verses l$-l8.
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Within this general aim there was even a place 1or fear, not as
used by the medical profession in the treatment of the insane to induce
abject terror, but within "that degree which naturally arises from the
necessary regulations of the family".1 As "in the education of children,
whose imperfect knowledge ana judgement, occasion them to be less influ¬
enced by other motives", fear helps to lead people along the right path.^
According to Tuke, the trouble with using the effects of fear on the
patients was that, being a. violent passion, it had the effect of inducing
equally violent reactions. If we want the patients to act in a mild
manner like obedient children, he argued, then they must be treated with
mildness.
A milder passion than fear was, according to Samuel Tuke, the pa¬
tients' "desire for esteem", what he meant by this was that once it had
been established that certain behaviour would not be tolerated, as with
small children, it was possible to manipulate the patients' need to be
approved and liked, and thus get them to conform in order that they might
satisfy this need. Tuke's comments on the "desire for esteem" are
similar to the ones Ferriar made on the privilege of acunission to his
convalescent room:
This principle (the desire for esteem] in the human mind,
which doubtless influences, in a great aegree, though often
secretly, our general manners; and which operates with
peculiar force on our introduction into a. new circle of ac¬
quaintance, is found to have great influence, even over the
conduct of the insane. Though it has obviously not been
sufficiently powerful, to enable them entirely to resist
the strong irregular tendencies of their disease; yet when
properly cultivated, it leans many to struggle to conceal
and overcome their morbia propensities; ana, at least,
materially assists them in confining their deviations, within
1 Description, p. l4l.
2
Ibj.d« , p. ihZ. Again, this was a point which John Locke had made as
early as 1693. In Locke's words, "Fear and Awe ought to give you the first
power over their Minds, ana Love and Friendship in riper Years to hold it"
(Locke, 193^> P- 28).
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such bounds, as do not make them obnoxious to the family.
The struggle is highly beneficial to the patient, by strength¬
ening his mind, and conducing to a salutary habit of self-
restraint; an object which experience points out as of the ^
greatest importance, in the cure of insanity, by moral means.
Whether this desire for esteem is described as a passion or, as
Tuke saw it, as "a principle in the human mind", the point to be noted
is the enlargement of the concept of human nature to take into account
one of the most pervasive of all bourgeois values. It is not a univer¬
sal feature of human psychology to worry about others' recognition of
individual achievements. In most societies each individual is ascribed
a position in life and conforms to it. As individuals gradually broke
away from the material and ideological constraints of feudalism they
2
developed a self-awareness of themselves as individuals. For the
middle-class Quakers of eighteenth-century England a prominent feature
of their self-image was their material achievements as traders, shop-
3
keepers, and small-scale manufacturers. Individual achievement was
the basis for both their material success as entrepreneurs and for their
consciousness of themselves as successful men and women. .But conscious¬
ness of this kind does not exist for long on its own: it needs continual
confirmation in the eyes of others. The Quakers, and other marginal
middle class groups at this time, felt a necessity both to express the




On this see the discussion by Stone (1977, pp. 221-69) of the "growth
of affective individualism", the changing conception by man of himself as
he came to value self-awareness ana individual autonomy.
A survey of 217 Quaker marriages about 1780 showed the followingbreakdown of Friends' occupations: professionals (bankers, schoolmasters,
physicians), 21/u{ mei chants (.including dealers and shopkeepers^, Sj/o;craftsmen and artisans, l4>a. There were no unskilled occupations at ail
(Irom do.is trick, 1950? p. 32 j. On the social background of Quakers see
also Isichei, 1970, pp. 173-6.
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as widely as possible. As Quaker children were socialised into a constant
awareness of the importance of this principle, so at the Ketreat were the
insane similarly to be enclosed within an evocation of a family/ hot an
abstract timeless family, but one where the restraint of the patients'
baser nature was effected through their neea to be approved, their need
to do something worthwhile.
b. The social world recreated at the Hetreat: The strictly disciplined
family into which the insane were to be resocialisea was also a reflection
of the social world that the Takes inhabited. The class structure of
contemporary York was reproduced in the daily life of the Betreat. Those
who could afford it were allowed to have their own rooms and to keep
their own servants. The "upper class" patients were also, when in a
state of convalescence, allowed to eat their meals at the same table as
the superintendent, and with similarly-placed patients of the opposite
sex. The "lower class" of patients were also occasionally allowed to eat
at this family table, to remind them of the condition to which they should
all aspire. Although everything about the Retreat, from the rules of eat¬
ing to the quality of the wood the beds were made from, confirmed the
hierarchy of the social world, this hierarchy was seen to exist only
within the deeper authority of the Society of Friends. At the York
public lunatic asylum the rich patients received personal and lavish
attention from the physician while the poor were ignored. This sort of
t behaviour was unimaginable at the Retreat, where the patients were both
Quakers and inhabitants of a class structure. The class structure was
still constantly being reproduced in the Retreat, but only as a mediation
of the Quaker religious doctrine.'1'
1
For documentation of this aspect of life at the Retreat see
Description, pp. 99-103.
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All the refinements of polite society were emphasized. The female
superintendent occasionally gave a tea—party to which all the patients
were invited. "All who attend, dress in their best clothes, and vie with
each other in politeness and propriety."1 Visitors were appointed by the
Subscribers' Committee to visit,the patients and encourage them in correct
ways of thinking. Some idea of the philosophy behind this venture can
be seen from the remarks of one particularly zealous visitor, Catherine
Cappe. According to Cappe,
something towards preventing every species of moral depravity
[amongst lunatics] might be done, and probably much more than
is commonly apprehended, by the introduction of those general
habits of order, and that sense of propriety and decency in
conversation and behaviour, which the frequent visits of res- 9
pectable ladies would have a powerful tendency to produce. . .
Not that this was believed to be all that necessary at the iietreat. At
that institution, according to the lukes, the only "moral depravity"
likely to be found was that brought there by patients who had been forced
to stay in non-Quaker institutions and who had learnt there "ill language",
3
' "vicious habits", and "other exceptionable practices".
The "mildness" of the regime at the Retreat was announced, not only
in the daily attitudes of the staff, but in the construction of all the
physical features which turned it into an asylum. The doors locked, but
with a small spring lock instead of the usual noisy bolt. "In pushing
the door without noise, it shuts as with a key. This small attention
<4-
spares the captive a painful humiliation." The iron window frames,
1 Description, p. 178.
2
Cappe, 1816, p. 375. Cappe did most cf her visiting at the York public
lunatic asylum. In the essay quoted here Cappe also comments approvingly
on what Samuel Tuke had raitten about building on the patients' desire
for esteem (ibid.. p. 3?8).
3
Retreat, State of the Institution. 1797, P« 8
4- Dela Rive, 1798, p. 382, translation from Walk, 195**, p. 8l6. Rut
see tii3 Description, p. 101 on the continuing use of bolts.
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designed to prevent escape, were also covered with wooden sashes in order
to give the appearance of being ordinary windows. The better behaved
patients were allowed knives and forks to eat with, instead, of the usual
degrading spoon."1"
Religious observance, a core feature of Quaker society, was of
course present in the therapeutic programme of the Retreat. Like all
other aspects of life at the Retreat, the major worth of religion was
seen to be the extent to which it banished the anti-social behaviour from
the order being established there.
Many patients attend the religious meetings of the Society,
held, in the city; and most of them are assembled, on a first
day afternoon, at which time the superintenaent reams to
them several chapters in the Bible. A profound silence gen¬
erally ensues; during which, as well as at the time of ream¬
ing, it is very gratifying to observe their orderly conduct,
and the degree in which those, who are much disposed to
action, restrain their different propensities.^
For fervent Quakers like the Tukes, to engage their patients in religious
activities was an obvious course to take. As Samuel Tuke pointed out,
where "the precepts of our holy religion. . .have been strongly imbued
in early life, they become little less than principles of our nature".J
Religion to the Quakers meant much more than Bible readings; it was the
main intellectual resource by which they expressed the rationality of
their material life. Of course, according to Quaker belief, this is the
inverse of the truth: rationality derives from God and man attempts to
develop institutions and laws in which God's will and spirit can be ex¬
pressed. But from a materialist point of view what is interesting about
1
That spoons had to be used at all was a matter of concern. See
Description, footnote to p. 1?'K
2
rbidr., P» 161.
^ Sbid.. P. 160.
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Quaker ideology is the way that long-standing tenets of Christian "belief
were modified to fit in with the material interests of those who developed
the Quaker doctrine.
The particular blend of commodity production and Christianity that
appealed to the Quakers can be seen in most, of the pronouncements of
their leaders. George Fox, founder of the Society, worked as an itinerant
preacher affirming the moral need for commerce built on a. basis of hon¬
esty and trusts
In fairs, also, and in markets, I was made to declare against
their deceitful merchandize, cheating, and cozening; warning
all to deal justly, to speak the truth, to let their Yea be
Yea, and their Kay be Kay; and to do unto others as they
would have others do unto them; forewarning them of the
great and terrible day of the Lord, which would come upon
them all.1
An efficient trading system was one aspect of the new society God was to
bless: another was practical knowledge, as William Penn pointed outs
For their learning be liberal. . .but let it be useful
knowledge, such as is consistent with Truth and godliness
... .1 recommend the useful parts of mathematics, such
as building houses or ships, measuring, surveying, dialing,
navigation. . .
Since the Bible was the reputed source of all this inspiration, it was
a common practice to provide textual commentary which demonstrated, the
Lord's approval of capitalism. Thomas Chalkly, a Quaker merchant and
philanthropist, wrote the following rather curious passage in his
journal for 17^9s
Our Saviour saith, Labour not for the Meat which perisheth,
but for that which endureth for ever, or to eternal Life.
By which we do not understand, that Christians must neglect
their necessary Occasions, and their outward Tirades and
Callings; but that their chief Labour, emd greatest Concern
ought to be for their future Well-being in his glorious
Kingdom; else why did our Lord say to his disciples, Children,
Journal entry in loQS, quoted in Grubb, 1930, p. 20.
?.
Letter to his wife on the occasion of leaving England in 1682., quoted
in Baistrick, 1950, 32.
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have you any meat? They answered., lioj and he hid them cast
their Lets into "the Sea, and they drew to Land a Let full
of great fishes; and Fishing being their Trade, no uoubt
they sold them, for. it was not likely they could eat era
all themselves. . .
Ko doubt they did, hut how Chalkly could equate in his mind "meat
, . .which endureth for ever" with fish that had to be sold at a. profit
"because there was too much to eat hefore it went bad demonstrates an
extreme example of a contradiction that always occurs when written doc¬
trine is used to justify change. The requirements of commercial capital¬
ism also found their way into the moral code by which so much social
activity was proscribed. Gaming, betting, and lotteries were, of course,
forbidden but Friends were allowed to buy stocks on the market if they
were "under the idea that they are likely to obtain better security, or
2
more permanent advantages". But if they bought stocks for speculative
purposes only, for reasons unconnected with investment, they were consid¬
ered to be gambling, and thus acting below their moral dignity. Given
this interpretation of religious activity, it is therefore not surprising
to find Samuel Take writing that "Of all the modes by which the patients
may be induced to restrain themselves, regular employment is perhaps the
3
most generally efficacious".
c. Work: In terms of Quaker religious teachings, productive ana profit¬
able labour was thus one of the central social activities by which man
expressed his moral dignity, with hindsight it is perhaps not surprising
that it was accorded an important place in the therapeutic programme of
Quoted in Tolles, I960, pp. 6l-2. These quotations arc not meant to
suggest that the Quakers had a monopoly on such sentiments. They are
merely examples of the particular Quaker expression of what was a wide-
ranging, if still a minority, attitude.
2




the Retreat, "but also in terms of contemporary therapeutic practice it
was recognised as the greatest innovation that the Tukes made in the
treatment of the insane.
Hot all of the impetus for this came from the Tukes themselves.
One patient's relative wrote to William Tuke of the patient in question
that "if he was under strict discipline, I am fully of the mind he he
made to earn his Bread". In the same year, 1797, the first Annual
Report announced the value of employment in controlling insanity:
In describing the particular benefits of this Undertaking,
it seems proper to mention that of occasionally using the
Patients to such employment as may be suitable and proper
for them, in order to relieve the langour of idleness and
prevent the indulgence of gloomy sensations.
By the following year, Dela Rive was able to write of the provision of
employment at the Betreat.
As soon as the patients are well enough to be employed,
they endeavour to make them work. The women knit, sew,
make beads, sweep the rooms, and the men do works of
straw and twigs and other works of ingenuity according
to their different capacity. The superintendent had made
an experiment a few days before, which had answered very
well. The house is surrounded by some acres of land which
belong to it, he had undertaken to make the patients cul¬
tivate this land, giving to each a task proportioned to
his strength, he found that they were fond of this exer¬
cise, and that they were much tetter, after a day spent
in this work, than when they had remained in the house,
even when they had the liberty of taking a walk.3
Once the value of getting the patients to work was established the
practice was never stopped. Samuel Tuke had little to add in 1813 to
Dela Rive's description, except that by that time the practice of encour¬
aging employment was no longer experimental. One dominant feature of the
type of work that was done was that each patient was allotted a task
appropriate to his or her class position. For the educated and upper
1
George Withy, letter to William Tuke, 9th January 1797 (.Ms in RA).
2
Retreat, State of the Institution. 1797, p. 9
3
Dela Rive, 1798, p. 32.5» translation from Walk, 19J&, p. 8l6.
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class patients "regular employment" meant regular exercise of -the tody
through walks in the garden and exercise of the mind through the useful
study of "mathematics and natural science".1 The lower class patients
were expected to do the manual labour in the garden, to assist in the
domestic chores, and to give help when needed with the refractory
patients. There is not a lot in the description about the value of
work at the Retreat, apart from the above statement that Tuke considered
it the most important aspect of moral treatment, but what there is sug¬
gests that Tuke had an imaginative understanding of how work, if raean-
ingful to the patient, could be used as a means of self-restraint.
It was not at the time unheard of for physical labour to be
recommended for lunatics or for hospital patients generally, but it was
not an established principle. Abel-Smith, in his history of hospitals,
mentions in passing that at Radcliffe Infirmary in Cxfora in 1
patients carried coal to the wards, helped in the laundry, ana were
3
"employed on the water engine". William Elizard, vnriting in 1796,
admitted that the use of work in general hospitals was a neglected sub¬
ject but maintained that
Some kind of work would often prove salutary in the view
of their recovery, dud the perfect re-establishment of
their hjsalth, as well as useful in its effects upon their
habits.
Elisard suggested that patients be encouraged to work both in and out of
doors. Because he was writing at the time of the Napoleonic wars he
Description, p. 183.
2
See for instance ibid., pp. 153-5 for an example of a gardener who was
found to benefit from suitable work but for whom the institution was unable
to provide enough appropriate supervision to enable him to be suitably
employed.
J Abel-Smith, 1961, p. 11, note 2.
h.
Blizard, l?9o, pp. 69-70.
mentioned the usefulness of patients making lint for "bandages and thus
helping their injured comrades, as well as training the women patients
in useful jobs by which they could support their families.
There were also occasional recommendations on the value of work
by mad-doctors,1 although there was also some isolated criticism from
the medical profession at the emphasis laid on work tied to social
regeneration rather than to the medical needs of the patient. John
Haslam, the apothecary at Bethlem, was probably the most outspoken
exponent, of this point of view. In a monograph entitled Considerations
on the Moral Management of Insane Persons, published soon after the
Retreat had become famous, Haslam very pointedly -wrote,
The different forms of the disease would necessarily re¬
quire different modes of occupation. . . .dome skill, and
much caution, are also required, to seize the proper time
when employment will become beneficial: as I have known
many persons relapse, in consequence of having been pre¬
maturely, and injudiciously urged to active occupation.4'
Rut Haslam, as usual, was behind the times when it came to approving
new methods.
A private asylum run by another Quaker comes closest to the Retreat'
particular version of "occupational" therapy. This was Erislington House
a private asylum near Bristol opened by Howard Fox in l806. According
to Fox, his treatment was based on "assimilating the regimen of the
Insane to the regular ordinary and wholesome occupations of the soundest
3intellect". What he meant by this can be seen by his installation of
a bowling green and a fives court, and by the fact that whenever
1
For examples of suggestions, see Cullen, 1784, vol. 4, p. 164; Cox,
1804, pp. 32-3; Arnold, 1809, p. 44.
Haslam, 18.17, p. 72.
Foxt jl809<"j P« 2. Another prospectus for his asylum appears as pp. 71-'
of Duncan, I809. See also Parry-Jones, 1972, pp. 112-J.
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possible he employed his patients. According to an advertising brochure,
more than one patient had paid, for his cure and residence at Erislington
House by the work he had done there. One painter and plasterer was paid
£73 in one year, on top of the money he- had earned to pay for his keep.
The Hetreat was thus not unique in its methods, but it is the institu¬
tion which has dominated the mythological tradition which has been be¬
queathed to us. Pined in France, Chiarugi in Italy, Tuke in England,
"Universal Liberators of the insane"; these are the images we must
confront.1 Even Pinel, who was fully convinced of the necessity "to
carry into decided and habitual execution the natural law of bodily
2
labour" in the treatment of the insane, produced no detailed plans
of how to employ his patients. On the basis of the comments he made
in his Treatise it seems his recognition of its value was more in the
nature of a symbolic attack on the idleness of the aristocracy than a
real attempt to work out how the bourgeois virtue of productive labour
3
could be applied to the treatment of the insane.
In concluding this section it may be said that, although work
therapy did not originate at the lietreat, it was one of the central tenets
Chiarugi is often mentioned alongside the names of Pinel and Tuke as
being an initiator of moral treatment, in his case at Florence as early
as 1783-9. From the little secondary material available in English it
seems as if his version of moral treatment was as different from Pinel's
and Tuke * s as theirs was from each other (see Mora, 1973? Grange, 1963).
Chiarugi's work is omitted from this present account purely for reasons
of language (he wrote in a Florentine dialect) but, as Mora points out,
this is the same reason that was partly responsible for his non-recogni¬
tion in the 1790s.
2
Pinel, 1962, p. 216.
3
Pearly hal^ of his total remarks on the subject concern an (unnamed)
Spanish asylum where those who were engaged in agriculture and. horticul¬
ture were much more likely to be cured than "the Spanish nobless. . .
whose pride of birth and family presents ursurmountable obstacles to a
degradation [JL.e. workj so blessed and salutary" (ibid.. p. 21bj.
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oi the therapeutic programme there. Xt was not. the most important, but
it was received as being an important contribution to the treatment of
the insane. The reasons this should have been so have already been
raised to some extent in the discussion in Chapter One on workhouses,
and they will be examined in more detail below (in Chapter Three, section
3) in the assessment of the place of work in the county asylums, he
may turn now to a deeper assessment, of the place of work at the lie treat,
as an aspect of the overall regime of moral treatment from which it
derived its significance.
3. Assessment of Moral Treatment
The first question that ought perhaps to be asked is, "what was
different about Pinel's'traitement moral' and the Tubes* "moral treatment*"?
Both used the word "moral" in its ethical sense of invoking norms and
values by which men, and specifically the convalescent insane, were to
live. At the same time both Pinsl and the Tukes drew on very different
bodies of knowledge in order to support their auctions as intellectually
meaningful. Pinel's model of man had its roots aeep in Greek neuicine
and medieval theology. The belief that God haa given man his moral
affections to control his body along the lines laid down by Cod's purpose
in the world was turned by Pinel into a secular optimism: that the insane
could be helped to overcome their isolating disabilities with the aid
of the therapist in manipulating these same moral affections. Tuke, on
the contrary, saw little hope for man's salvation in this worlds all
that man could do was to follow the moral laws established by (the Quaker
version of) Christianity. What this effectively meant was a humanistic,
if bourgeois, extension of opportunity to all. Everyone was equal, albeit
evil, under the omnipotence of God's Season. The insane were as capable
of accepting this discipline as anyone else. Here then were two intell¬
ectually different theories. In practice, however, when they were used
to underwrite moral treatment as a meaningful activity they appeared to
have similar possibilities.
One point that does need clearing up is the extent to which Pinel
or the Tuk.es could "be said to be "influenced" by each other. Pinel
started work at Bicetre in 1793; the Retreat opened in 1796. bela Eive
visited the Ee tareat in 1798 and wrote of its "traidement moral" there in
an article which Pinel had seen by the time he wrote his Traite« This
Traite of 1801 was reviewed in the Edinburgh Eeview in 1803.1 There
is no evidence that the phrase "moral treatment" was used to describe
the therapeutic practice of any institution in this countary before Samuel
Tuke described it as the programme of the Retreat. His earliest announce-
?
ment in print was in 1811" but in this the phrase is used as though it
were a commonly-used expression unworthy of note. We do knew that while
Samuel Tuke was working on his description he read Pinel's Treatise. On
the 7th January l8ll Tuke wrote in his diary that he "made some selections
from Pinel". Two days later he recorded that he "wrote on moral treat-
3 • - .
ment of the Retreat". This timing suggests at least that Tuke considered
he was working in the same reformative tradition as the "Great Han". In
any case, the important factor is that Tuke's reading of Pinel's usage
of "moral treatment" was unproblematic precisely because they both used,
it to invoke similar norms of social behaviours obeying the superintendent
or governor, employment, self-discipline. In this meaning of the wora
moral the superficial resemblances wsre sufficient to justify the use
of the same term.





given up to now have this invocation of behavioural norms in common.
Whatever intellectual resources were drawn upon to justify or provide
a theoretical framework in which to conceptualise moral treatment, the
practices remained remarkably similar. Ito points need to be made about
this similarity. Firstly, the patients were treated as individuals
suffering from individual .complaints. This was a dramatic change from
the mad-doctoring (or lay approach to madness) that conceived of insanity
as essentially a symbolic expression of man's place in the world. Manip¬
ulation of the passions may have been an old established principle, but
in the Middle Ages it remained a principle, like the present-day prescrip¬
tion of antibiotics, to be applied according to general conceptions of
pathology and not to the .individual requirements of the patient. In many
ways the understanding of the meaning of madness in the eighteenth century
is closely analogous to that of creative literature at this time.'1"
Before the mid-eighteenth century novels had heroes, but only as ideal¬
ised models or symbolisations of good or evil (or other universal principles).
Similarly, the madman in that period (when he was not being Ignored or
merely confined) was often used as a vehicle for expressing a fundamental
truth about human nature, or man's place in society. But with the growth
of a bourgeois consciousness that broke up the old hierarchies, both in
the material world and in the ideological representations of that world,
madness and the novel began to take notice of "real" people. The novels
1
The following account of the changes in the novel draws on the discussion
in Mauser, 1962, vol. 3, pp. 61-5.
2
The types and forms of this symbolism are unfortunately ouside the bound¬
aries of^this thesis. For examples of the various "uses" to which maaness
was put in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries see Jonathan owixt's
"Digression on Madness" (in dwift, 1958, pp. 162-80) and the examples given
xn tinasay, 192?. Foucault provides a recent commentary on this phenomenon(Joucault, 1971, pp. 65-76). The last institutional display of the mauman
as symbol patients who could be visited for purposes of entertainment at
Beth I em—wfl » s+.rvnr>«a -in icon
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of Fielding and Richardson, for instance, show an obsession with the
everyday trivia of their heroes' existence. The old absolutism crumbled
before the daily achievements of a class to whom the symbolism of the
world resided precisely 5_n what could be achieved in that world.
This leads onto the second point: that although the growth of
bourgeois sensibility gave to the madman and hero an attention which
was missing before, it was an attention which was closely circumscribed
by the material demands of commodity production. The insane were lib¬
erated from their chains and immediately captured within the weft of a
mysterious and altogether more amorphous fabric, bourgeois freeaom.1
It is in the practices of the lie treat that there can be seen, perhaps
more than in any other institution, a synonymity between the ethical
injunctions of the middle-class way of life and the practical forms
needed to produce that way of life. Moral treatment as teaching of
right and wrong, and moral treatment as practical treatment of the mind
were established as one practice. This 'was so obviously necessary to
Samuel Tuke that he did not remark on it; to have done so would have
been to raise the possibility of alternative moral systems.
It was not until some years later that the medical superintendent
of the Retreat commented on this conceptual ambiguity of the wora "moral"
as it had been established by Samuel Tuke. This was aone by John Thurnam,
who in 1845 published reviews of the statistics of the Retreat and of
o
the general incidence of insanity throughout the country. Thurnam
1
There is an interesting parallel he-re with our recent abolition of
the Chimpanzees lea Party at rcnoon ZjOO, This freedom from being im¬
prisoned as a symbol or_as entertainment did not result in ail chimpan¬
zees being set free or in the closing down of zoos. It merely changed therationale under which they are confined—and the chimps don't even have




acknowledged that although he believed that moral treatment was a branch
of practical medicine, in his Statistics of the Retreat he had dealt with
moral treatment "more perhaps as a branch of ethics than as one of psych¬
ology and practical medicine"."'' This statement was made in the context
of a discussion of general non-medical therapies a physician should use
with his patients,2 therapies which "include[a] everything capable of
acting either on the intellectual or affective part of our nature"."'
This was definitely moral treatment as a branch of psychology. Ana
yet, as Thurnam himself admitted nine pages later, moral treatment at
the Retreat was based on
calling into activity, as much as practicable, the remain¬
ing mental faculties, of cultivating in the patient the
moral, sense of right and, (wrong; ana as a consequence, the
power of self-restraint.'1'
In other words, the ethical and behavioral aspects of moral treatment
could not be separated. Moral treatment involved "treating them [the
patients] in fine, as much as possible, as responsible beings and as
5
if they were sane".
Thurnam did not attempt to resolve any possible ambiguity between
the two meanings of "moral", nor is it likely that he was conscious
of their distinction in the way that has been discussea here. The practice
£of moral treatment at the Retreat was successful precisely because there
1
Thurnam, l£&5a, p. 101.
2
Oee ibid., pp. 101-12. There was also of course the changed wider in¬
tellectual ana social context within which Thurnam was writing, a context
in which the ethical content of moral treatment was no longer freely
admitted. See below, Chapter Four.
Thurnam, l&;+5b, p. 30.
^ I^id., pp. 38-9.
Ibid. Emphasis in the original.
This statement refers to its iueological success; that is its recognition
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vias no disjuction between the moral behaviour required ana the social
and psychological behaviour required of the patients. Foucault has
described the regime there as "a milieu as much as possible like that
of the Community of Quakers".^ What Foucault has not emphasised is that
the programme was agreed by all. The "Community of Quakers" with all
its religious (moral) and social (behavioural) connotations existed
prior to the establishment of individual Quakers as therapists or as
patients. It was this unity that gave moral treatment its strength but
which at the same time concealed its limitations.
Something of the limitations that were to appear as moral treatment
emerged from the specific milieu of the Hetreat can be seen in a distinc¬
tion that a recent philosopher has made between "scientific" and "phenoin-
2
enological" psychiatry. The former invokes a "causal viewing of phenomena"
which presupposes the very "what it is that's wrong" that it is the pur¬
pose of enquiry to find out. A nice example of this "scientific" ap¬
proach is provided by a historian of mental disorder, Basil Clarke.
According to Clarke,
Having an awareness of the patterns and ranges of behaviour
among one's fellows, ana what changes them, is of the same
oruer as the impulse which causes people to learn and sort
out the local flora and its uses, ana the local fauna and
the physical environment in similar terms. The classifica-
tory logics used for all these may sometimes be rough ana
home-made out of hints from other experience within the same
society—such as the legends or myths or social customs ana
relationships—and in some cases perhaps they suffer also
from the effort to explain them comprehensibly to exotic
anthropologists; but in the long run and at their test they
represent the dispassionate comprehensions of a cool collec¬
tive eye. Sciences, and medical expertise in particular,
as a success by all the relevant parties. Nothing is imolied about
the ability of moral treatment to "cure" insanity.
1




can not unreasonably be seen as elaborated from this pri¬
mary exploratory impulse
Science, according to this schema, is an objective measuring of the world.
The tools are devised by the observers in accordance with the existing
characteristics of the objects to be measured. The success of scientific
techniques is taken as the justification for their use. But, like the
logic of the inhabitants of the Country of the blind, this method is
grossly inadequate when it comes to measuring human potential.
It is here, according to Latanson, that "the real challenge is to
locate the individual in the texture of his immediately given reality
as he lives it." batanson (following Husserl) calls this "immediately
given reality" the patient's "Lebenswelt" (life-world). It is a term
with a particular significance in phenomenological philosophy but it is
also appropriate in the present context because it helps to clarify the
distinction between the therapeutics that moral treatment was (at least
sometimes) in the Hetreat and what it became when the same injunctions
were applied outside. What hatanson emphasizes is the need of the
therapist to appreciate his patient's "Lebenswelt":
Without such structural seeing of the individual's Lebenswelt
therapeutics becomes a mode of rhetoric, an instrument of
persuasion. And persuasion if it fails gives way to vio¬
lence. When therapeutic violence fails, the right of' the
patient to his morbidity is acknowledgedr nothing further
can be done "for" him because nothing more can be done "to"
him. Acknowledged failure then assures the accommodation
of the patient in a special stratum of the social order.
Lost to the Lebenswelt, he nevertheless secures a special
status within it.3
This progression from a "structural seeing", through "persuasion", and
at last to "acknowledged failure" was to be the fate of moral treatment.
i
1
B. Clarke, 1975, pp. 303-4.
2
Latanson, 1969, p. 106.
14id,, p. 107.
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It was a fate that was not given by anything intrinsic in moral treatment
itself; what was given were the social and political interests within which
all treatment of the insane had. to accommodate itself. The Betreat pro¬
vided comfortable confirmation to its administrators that not only was
human nature constituted as the Quaker religion maintained; if also ap¬
peared to demonstrate that their bourgeois mines could be instilled into
very unpromising human material.
It is of course debatable just how much "structural seeing" of the
patients there was, even in the Betreat. Certainly in terms of the highly
verbalised and psychoanalytic practice of therapy that Batonson is com¬
mitted to, the tern is hardly appropriate at all. And yet Thumam's
assertion that moral treatment consisted of "treating them [the patients]
in fine, as much as possible, as responsible beings and as if they were
sane" implies at least a commitment to understanding the normative qual¬
ities of the patients' lives. What it does not imply, any more than dees
Nathnsoafs use of the term, is en appreciation of the structural forces
within which all individual therapy is given meaning. The scientific
approach emphasizes the objective understanding of the world independent
of the subjective characteristics of its objects; the phenoiaenological
approach emphasizes the "lived experience" of each individual object.
What is needed is a research methodology which makes clear the unity of
tho two but which doss not diminish the full importance of either aspect.
To repeat the quotation that was used as a synonym for praxis in
the Introduction,
Ken make their own history but they do not make it just as
they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen
by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered,
given and transmitted from the past.^-
]
Karx, 18th Brimaire of Louis Bonanaxto. in Marx and Engels, 19.58,
vol. 1, p. Z-'i j.
Only by appreciating these circumstances in any particular case is it
possible to folly understand the activities being investigated, either
from the subjective or from the objective point of view. The passage
just quoted continuest
The tradition of all the dead generations weighs like a
nightmare on the brain of the living. And just vihen they
seem engaged in revolutionising themselves and things, in
creating something that has never yet existed, precisely
in such periods of revolutionary crisis they anxiously con¬
jure up the spirits of the past to their service. . .
This passage is particularly applicable to the Tukes, existing as they
did in a contradictory position within the class struggle. Eighteenth-
century Quaker beliefs were an expression, on the ideological, plane, of
the material interests of a class which was trying to achieve & gradual
infiltration into the ranks of the ruling class. The absence of a radical
break 'between the landed aristocracy and the commercial bourgeoisie has
already been noted. The primary aim for many of those who made their
wealth out of trade or manufacturing was to assimilate themselves into
the ranks of a ruling class based on privilege and not achievement. They
expressed this material contradiction in their ideology by developing a
religion that emphasized both man's wcrthlessness in the face of an
absolute God as well as the need for practical, utilitarian knowledge
by which man could mould his future. This religion was both conservative
and radical, but it fitted exactly the material position of the eighteenth-
century trader, especially in a small town like York, where the civic
authority of the Merchant Adventurers remained strong without adapting
itself to the changed commercial requirements of the eighteenth century.1
1
William Tuke had direct experience of the authority of the York Company
of Merchant Adventurers. When a young man, he was apprenticed to his aunt,
Mary Tuke, who had opened a tea wholesalers' in York. To trade in York
at this time it was necessary to be a Freeman of the City, and a member
1^3
The Tukes9 use of moral treatment at the Setreat was thus a creative
expression of their own praxis, a visible representation of the values
that gave their lives meaning. When moral treatment was applied only to
those already committed to these values, it could be seen as a genuine
recognition of "what is", or at least an attempt to reproduce that "what
is" amongst a few who (for reasons outside their control) wore temporarily
not normal. As such, it involved both a phenomenological "seeing" and a
scientific recognition of the material elements of which their praxis was
constituted.
At the same time it must be noted that this interpretation of moral
treatment as an expression of praxis is not the only one that can be made.
Moral treatment involved a forceful intervention into peoples' lives. It
was soon to be taken up as providing the practical 'basis for a major change
in the mode of treating all the insane. This dual function of moral treat¬
ment can. be clarified by reference to a typology which was devised to ac¬
count for the popularity of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament movement
of the 1960s." This typology involves describing political activity in
terms of its expressive and instrumental functions.
Expressive activity is that in which an individual directs his
attention, not primarily towards the achievement of practical changes, but
of the Company. Mary Tuke was a Freeman by virtue of her father being
one, but she was not a member of the Company and was refused membership
because she was neither the daughter nor the widow of a member. She traded
in spite of this and was subjected to numerous fines (which, she refused tc
pay) and indictments (which she ignored). After seven years' harassment
she agreed to pay a. moderate fine and was subsequently loft alone (see
Kennell, 1926).
Parkin, 1968. pp. 33-55» He bases the typology on a distinction made
by max lobor between an "ethic ox ultimate ends" and an "ethic of respon¬sibility" in Ms (Weber's) essay "Politics as a Vocation" (in Gerth and
Mills, 1970, chap, d, especially pp, I20ff.)„
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towards those
which reflect Ms cherished "belief's and his self-iiaage. The
reward to the person in these instances is not so much a
matter of gaining social recognition or monetary rewards as
of establishing his self-identity and confirming his notion
of the sort of person he sees himself to "be. . . .Just as
we find satisfaction in the exercise of our talents and
abilities, so we find reward in the expression of any attri¬
butes associated with our egos.-*-
Expressive political activity emphasizes the principles underlying a par¬
ticular stance, whilst instrumental activity is that directed towards the
achievement of narrowly practical ends. Whereas instrumental activity
frequently falls short of its stated aims, expressive activity can never
bo said to have failed "because political activity in support of the
p
values it upholds can be claimed to be beneficial in and of itself". "
As Parkin has pointed cut, most political activity involves both instru¬
mental and expressive motivations, but the analysis remains a useful one,
certainly from the point of view of making sense of the Campaign for
Unclear Disarmament, but also of the phenomenon being examined here.
Its use lies, however, not in the fact that such motivations exist,
but in the underlying reasons that may be given as to why individuals
should be moved by such motivations. Again Parkin's analysis is a useful
one. lie argues that whereas instrumental political activity against the
status quo is what we would expect from working-class political movements
(that is, they want to change the basic social structure of society),
for middle-class deviant groups -there are strong material reasons for
them to take up more "expressive" activities. Parkin points out that
1
D. Katz, "The functional approach to the study of attitudes", I960,
quoted in Parkin, 1968, p. 3-d.
2
P« 39._ Parkin provides an interesting quotation of Richard
Grossman1 s .in which he stated his belief that the role of the Labour Party
was not to attain power at any cost, but thai it must express fundamental
principles; and if that meant being in opposition for a time, so be it
(ibid., p. 35).
although large numbers of middle-class intellectuals, students, and pro¬
fessionals are profoundly dissatisfied with the norms and values of con¬
temporary capitalism, they have a considerable vested interest in not
upsetting the status quo too much. Most of these middle-class groups
enjoy greater material security than the majority of the working class
as well as the more obvious better economic rewards * Given this ambig¬
uous position of many middle-class individuals within the class structure-
where their self-identity conflicts with their material interests—there
is a strong attraction for them in taking part in radical political move¬
ments of a predominantly expressive kind.
By directing the main focus of grievance on to issues of a
moral nature, movements based on the middle class are in a
sense able to avoid any direct challenge to the legitimacy
of tils existing social structure. . . .Such problems can
generally be treated as isolated and distinct matters, each
of which requires a separate solution, rather than as off¬
shoots of one basic problem whose solution requires funda¬
mental social change. Campaigns against hanging, colour
discrimination, the Bomb, ana so forth, put forward distinct
and limited demands, each of which can be met without thor-
oughgoing re-adjustments in property or class relationships;
they could in fact be aspects of any society, and not nec¬
essarily a capitalist one, and are treated as such.-
A further point is that, whereas activity in the mainstream of
political life is likely to contain large elements of both instrumental
and expressive influence, it is on the margins of society, in the groups
who do net fit easily into the class structure, that the clearer "types"
emerge. Although the main focus of his book is on political movements,
Parkin extends his analysis to fringe religious sects. He suggests that
the popularity of fundamentalist sects like Jehovah's Witnesses and Prim¬
itive Methodism amongst lower-status groups in society is that they call
for revolutionary changes, changes which would improve the material
1
Parkin, 1903, p. 'j'k (emphasis in the original). Parkin does provide
ample evidence, on the basis of questionnaires administered to CM) sup¬
porters, that this is a valid interpretation of "middle class radicalism"
(the title of Ms book).
146
condition of these groups. On the other hand, religious sects such as
the Moral Rearmament Crusade and the Quakers, which appeal most strongly
to dissatisfied sections of the middle class, emphasize the expression
-v
of moral values through individual contemplation and personal adjustment."1"
The total picture is of course a complex one and this sketch does not do
justice to the range of reasons that may be given as to vrhy particular
beliefs should be held by particular individuals. What it does do,
however, is to clarify ibe practical significance of moral treatment. The
treatment of the insane provided a vehicle for the Takes, as members of
a middle-class religious sect, to express their high moral position
vis-a-vis the rest of society, but without attacking any of the funda¬
mental problems of that society. The Quakers in the late eighteenth
century had lost their earlier aggressiveness towards authority and were
2
at that time predominantly a quietist sect. The Tuke family especially-
believed in strict conformity to traditional values. Samuel Tuke
described his father Henry as "a zealous Tory",' a man whose political
judgement could be seen to agree entirely with Pope's opinion that
4
"whatever is, is right".
Parkin, 1968, p. 5.5 •
^
I&ichei, 19?0, pp. 190-200.
S. Tuke, i860, vol. 1, p. 96.
4
Samuel quoted the following letter from his father, written in 1807 s
"Bad men will mix with and disgrace every party; but I do not think that
this is sufficient ground to set any administration aside, and when I know
that one is preferred by the King to another, and treats him with more pro¬
priety and respect, that alone I acknowledge would give a considerable bias
to my mind in their favour, and I think it is a principle of action which
is supportable by all those considerations which should regulate the ac¬
tions of men" (ibid., pp. 96-7). It is perhaps also significant that
Ilenry Tuke was never involved with the Hetreat but spent all Ms time in
the family business.
1^7
Against this context, Samuel's commitment to moral treatment can be
seen as one of "middle class radicalism1", an expression of moral superior¬
ity in an imperfect society. It must also be seen, however, as an instru¬
mental attempt to implement change in that society. This latter emphasis
can be seen in Samuel's approach to moral treatment generally,1 and in
his limited forays into the world of politics. In 1807 Samuel upset his
father and grandfather by giving £50 of the family company's money towards
the election expenses of William Wilberforce. Such direct action offended
his father's quietist philosophy, as well as the fact that Wiiberforce
was opposing Henry Tuke's choice of candidate. In 1833 the Parliamen¬
tary seat for York again became vacant and this time Samuel himself was
proposed for the position of Liberal candidate, by a petition signed by
nearly 300 people. He refused the candidature but he did support the
man chosen in his stead, Thomas Dundas, A speech Samuel gave in support
of Hondas is interesting for its clear portrayal of the "expressive"
motivations underlying Tube's thinkings
It [[the "moral principle"] is the foundation on which ail
that is excellent, all that is glorious in private or public
character, is built. . . .Else Freemen to the moral dignity
of your character. . .though it is abundantly easier to
shrug our shoulders in despair than to put them to the
wheel—yet let us not be of those who less steadily pursue
the course of moral truth, the course of reason and intell¬
igence; and then brother Freemen, though it seem an arduous
This can be seen especially in his discussion of the place of work at
the Retreat, as well as in the following comment cn singingt "In the
early part of the experiment some of the patients wished to have singing
introduced at the close of the reading, to which I readily acceded. On©
of them brought me the book, and pointed out the hymn they had. chosen,
which I read and they sang. I was doubtful whether the exercise left so
good an impression as a psalm of David read impressively. I did not,
however, in the least discountenance the practice; but they have gradually
given it up" (diary entry for 3rd March 1819, quoted in Tvlor, 1900, p. 67),.
2
On this see W.K. end E.M. Sessions, 1971, pp. 79-80.
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tasks you will succeed.
But while this speech is a clear example of the expressive orientation
to political activity, the very fact that Take gave it at all, in favour
of a particular candidate, is an indication of the instrumental elements
in hie political and social convictions.
It is especially in the activities which were likely to affect the
fortunes of the working-class members of society that Take's instrumental
orientation emerges most clearly. At the Retreat, an essentially middle-
class institution, work retained a primarily expressive function. But
at tiie comity asylums, as will ho seen in the next chapter, the same
practice lost its moral aura and was presented as a straightforward
method for producing work and reproducing workers.
This division of the inspiration for moral treatment into instru¬
mental and expressive elements is one method, of expressing its signi.fi-
2
cance without denying either its progressive or its reactionary aspects.
Another method, complementary to the above, is the Gramsclan one used in
Chapter One to locate physicians within the class structure.*^ It was
argued there that physicians occupied an ambiguous place in the class
struggle of the late eighteenth century and that sometimes they ought to
be seen as "traditional intellectuals" and sometimes as "organic intell-
1
Speech given 9th November, 1833, quoted in Tyler, 1900, pp. 111-2,
2
It is interesting that a similar use of Parkin's expressive/instru¬
mental typology has been made use of to analyse the work of the eugenist
Francis Galton. Mackenzie (1976) discusses the explanation of another
writer that Galton's motivation to develop eugenics was essentially an
expressive one. Rot so, argues Mackenzie, who suggests that while"it is
possible to see some expressive force in Galton's work—-i.e. that "Galton
was interpreting generally and naturalistically a salient facet of his
own social experience" (p. 309)—a more important feature of Galton's
work was "the advancement of the interests of the professional middle
class. The middle-class 'expert', rather than the priest, aristocrat or
plutocrat, should exercise power in an efficient modernised eugenic
society" (Ibid.).
3
See above, pp. 88-90.
ectuals". A similar caso could be made for Samuel Tuke (and a number of
other moral therapists). In moral treatment as "expressive" activity
it was still in an embryo stage, the rhetoric of an essentially trad¬
itional intellectual that all was not well with his society but that he
had no wish to do more than express Ms moral discontent with the order
of things. Moral treatment as "instrumental" activity, on the other
hand, is a proclamation of an organic intellectual of the new middle
class, a commitment to a practical creation of a new society. The work
of Samuel Tuke, like that of ambitious physicians such as Currie and
Ferriar, is an example of the change in the ruling class at the end of
the eighteenth century, and of the need by groups marginal to -the ruling
class to align themselves to it,
Another feature of the meaning of moral treatment is the way in
which it concealed its own identity. The Tukes developed a coherent
social practice which Samuel Take called "moral treatment". But in the
same moment that this concept was created and given meaning in specific¬
ally human terns, the Tubes explicitly concealed from themselves the
rationalist basis of their own creative work. As already discussed,
moral treatment was not only a socially constructed therapeutic of the
mind j it was believed to derive its validity and importance from its
invocation of a specific moral code. But moral theories do not drop
from the sky? they ere created out of specific straggles by individual
people in order to defend their material interests on an ideological
plane. One of the distinctive characteristics of bourgeois thought is
the way it conceals its commitment to a particular class and expresses
its partial interest as a total interest, This is why morality is not
revealed as the expression of material interests that it in fact is;
that is, as the normative "substance" that maintains the social relations
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of production; l>ut is presented as injunctions which are supposedly
based on natural or supernatural knowledge. As fingeis has put it,
All moral theories have been hitherto the product, in
the last analysis, of the economic conditions of society
obtaining at the time. And as society has hitherto moved
in class antagonisms, morality has always been class moral¬
ity; it has either justified the domination and interest
of the ruling class, or, ever since, the oppressed class
became powerful enough, it has represented the indignation
against this domination and the future instincts of the
oppressed."1'
Only in Marxism, the confrontation by man of the possibility of making
2
his own history, can morality be revealed for what it is."
This does not in itself explain why morality was being announced
so aggressively in the 1790s. As will be seen, 'the "moral" part of
moral, treatment was soon dropped as unnecessary? what else could non¬
medical treatment of insanity be except moral—that is, the inculcation
of correct behaviour? We only call morality to our aid when we went to
change society (or resist change to it). But as one commentator has
pointed out, the "moral challenge to transform society only sounds when
3
the practical means of its realisation are at hand".* For some of the
groups connected with the treatment of the insane, the time was right in
the late eighteenth century and morality provided the right kind of
"**
Engels, Herr Eusren Luhring's Revolution in Science, quoted in Ash,
1977, p. 59.
2
That is, morality does not disappear with socialism but is recognised
as the ideology that it is. In Lenin's words, "we repudiate ethics end
morality in the sense that it is preached by the bourgeoisie, who derived
ethics from God's commandments. We of course, say that we do not believe
in God, and that we know perfectly well that the clergy, the landlords
and the bourgeoisie spoke in the name of God in pursuit of their own
interests as exploiters. . . .We say that our morality is entirely sub¬
ordinated to the interests of the class struggle of the proletariat. Our
morality is derived from the interests of the class struggle of the prole¬
tariat" ("The Tasks of the Youth Leagues", 1920, in Lenin, i<#7, vol. 2,
p. 66'?.
3 Ash, 19^-r, p, 83.
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ideological cover by which they could justify their change of practice.
The enthusiasm which groups like the Quakers had for morality can
be seen in terms of the particular status of their social class at that
time. On the one hand, they were members ox a class which wanted to
establish its moral right to rule. In terms of a debate with represen¬
tatives of the older ruling class, it had to establish in areas like that
of the treatment of the insane that its approach was better than what
had existed before. Since it was very difficult to do this in terms of
numbers of cures or other quantitative measures, the obvious criterion
to turn to was the qualitative one of moral superiority. There is much
more to it than this of course—for one thing, the insane only became a
problem as the relations of production changed. But, from the point ox
view of the form of cultural production known as morality, the rising
bourgeois class had to establish its credentials and its credibility.
This was made much easier by the fact that in iaany respects aristo¬
cratic and bourgeois interests coincided, Insofar as both classes wanted
a stable society vrith the mass of the population working quietly and not
expecting more than the basic means of subsistence, they could unite in
their production of moral rhetoric. And this is precisely what they did.
To put it in terms of the intellectual concepts that have appeared fre¬
quently in these pages, the Tukes lived in a world governed by God's
Heason. So did the High Tories of the Anglican Church; but so, it began
to appear, did the atheistic rabble who had overturned all that was be¬
lieved to be correct and natural in French society.
On the one side was the imagery that equated social order with
moral order, and that the Tukes themselves used a variant ofj
Society requires not only that the passions of individuals
should be subjected but that even in the mass and body, as
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well as in the individuals, the inclinations of men should
frequently "be thwarted, their will., controlled, and their
passions brought into subjection."
But Burke did not appeal to God so much for his beliefs as to that other
great legitirnator, Nature. "Why do I feel so differently from. . .
[defenders of the French Revolution] ? For this plain reason—because
.Z
it is natural that X should."
Gn the other side were those who despised everything that Burke
stood for and who saw the Revolution as an inspiration for change in
Britain. One of these was John Thelwall, "the outstanding leader of the
Jacobins",^ who invoked the same "nature" to oppose Burke's mysticism:
State hypocrites preach about hostile interests, patriotism
and natural enmityI Natural enmity! Are not all men
brothers by the law of Nature that submits them all to ^
the same physical conditions and the same moral impulses?
Nature, Reason; all the old certainties were now being taken by
the ideologists of reform and revolution, men like Paine and Godwin who
wanted these universal concepts to act as the basis for change, not order.
1
Burke, 1910, p. 57 (first published 1790).
Ibid.. p. 77 (emphasis in the original). Not that Burke was above
quoting the Bible himself to make his points. At one stage he quoted
BccleBiastea to show that "The occupation of a hair-dresser, or of a
tallow-chandler, cannot be a matter of honour to any jjerson—to say nothing
of a number of other more servile employments" (ibid., p. 4-7)•
^ Thompson, 1968, p. 173*
Thelwall, Spies and Informers, 1795t quoted in Gestae, 1906, p. 55.
The real importance of Thelwall's rhetoric was of course not its theoretical
argument but the practical implications of its message. No member of the
ruling class could ignore such inflammatory language as the following
appeal to the working class, especially when it was published as part
of a polemic against Burke himself? "Rouse then, once more, to the inves¬
tigation of your rights: for, if ye will be ignorant, ye must be slaves.
. . .Compare what ye are with what ye have a right to be. Compare your
powers and your faculties with your condition: the bounty of nature*with
your scanty enjoyments, and unsatisfied wants; the wealth resulting from
your productive labour, and the abject wretchedness of ycur general state.
Compare these things, and consider well the causes" (Thelwall, 1796,
pp. 90-1).
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If Nature was temporarily redundant as a means of ideological control,
what was needed was something more potent, something that would unite
all in the interests of the few. That force, as we now know, was that
other perennial ideology, religion, this time in its guise of evangelical
Christianity?" The Tukes were not evangelicals, hut their ideas and those
of other enthusiasts of moral treatment were, as will he seen, very
similar.
One of the basic tenets of evangelicalism was that man was funda¬
mentally evil.
. . .man is an apostate creature, fallen from his high
original, degraded in his nature, and depraved in his
faculties; indisposed to good, and disposed to evil; prone
to vice, it is natural and easy to him; disinclined to
virtue, it is difficult and laborious; that he is tainted
with sin, not slightly ana superficially, hut radically
and to the very core/'
This is our natural lot, according to William Wilherforce, "the greatest
3
name among the Evangelicals". Evil existed for reasons that only God
could be entirely sure of; but no matter, its necessity was now assured.
If there had been no evil
there would have been no room for the exercise of faith
and patience, no conquest to have been obtained over
passion, and consequently no virtue.^
1
to this point see Kiernan, 1952, pp. 45-8.
Kilberforce, 1834, p. 21 (first published. 1797). Note the similarity
with Samuel Tube's beliefss "My principle is thisi That moral evil in
man, individually, is the root of the chief social evils which exist in
the world or in nations. . .man is by nature prone to indulge himself
in things which are not good. . .he lusteth to evil" (letter from Tuke to
his son, 30th November 1848, quoted in Tyler, 1900, p. 199).
3
According to Henriques, 1961, p. 21?. Other extended dismissions of the
evangelicals occur in G.I. Foster, i960 and Kcwse, 1952.
4
W. Allen, 1811, p. 1. This homily appeared on the opening page of a now
journal, The_ Philanthropist, to which Samuel Tube was himself to"become a
contributor.
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So in religious terms this doctrine meant that "before the omnipotent God
man could only cringe in his fear and impotence, and in social terms it
meant that rational social change was impossible because man's intrinsi¬
cally immoral nature would continue to thwart his rational hopes. But
vihat man, or at least the self-appointed defenders of public morals,
could do was to make the social order work efficiently in the face of
threats from across the Channel and from the restless masses in the
cities.
"Moral imperialism''1* did not of course originate with this period
but it did experience a frenetic renaissance. From the point of view of
the treatment of the insane, its value was that it provided another basis
on which to locate moral treatment. Moral treatment in the Betreat was
based on the praxis of a< class which considered that it had a right to
rule, at least in terms of its receiving the benefits of its economic
domination of large sections of British society. This was a praxis
which asserted its authority against the moral decadence of the older
ruling class, but it war> also a praxis which had to establish a relation-
chip with the other emerging class of that time. It was this other class,
previously known only as the "poor" of the rural villages, which appeared
to be taking on a new and frightening identity as it filled the manufac¬
turing towns. And the principles of moral restraint, given intellectual
respectability by the evangelicals, and practical illustration by reform-
2
ers like the Tukes, appeared to provide just the right medium of control.
The phrase is from Parkin, 1972, p. 282. Unfortunately Perkin does not
delve very deeply into the nature of this phenomenon. For a recent com¬
mentary similar to that developed here but from within the context of the
sociology of deviance, see Scull, 1974, pp. 97ff.
2
It was not only the poor and insane who were to be restrained. In
contrast to the optimistic rationalism of belief in the "2mobie Savage",
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Why was all this necessary? One answer that has boon given is that
there was no direct relationship between the ruling class reaction to
the French Revolution and the philanthropic enterprises.1 The evangel¬
icals themselves were under no such illusion. As God had established
order in the moral world, so it was the duty of the natural rulers here
on earth to maintain order in the social world, Wilberforce and the
other members of the Glapham Sect who made up the core of the evangelicals
were aristocrats, "the praying section of the Tory party", as one of their
2
number put it. Their concept of moral right is almost too transparently
a reflection of the social right they were trying to defend during the
social instabilities of the years of the Napoleonic wars. "For to the
present the poor must be taught their duties by Combination laws, and
the rich must bo taught their responsibilities by the Bible" wrote
3
Wilberforce in 1797*' But as we have seen from Thomas Chalkly and
his spare fishes, this was a Bible that could teach anything. That it
should teach such things as the edicts of the Proclamation Society can
only be seen as a function of the interests of those who ran such crgan-
isations,
statements began to appear like "The social state is a state of restraint,
and its duties cannot be well performed by those who, from habit or res¬
traint, have not imposed on their passions and inclinations the restraints
rendered necessary for the welfare of the whole. The inhabitants of the
islands of the Pacific Ocean were genuine portraits of man in his unre¬
strained state" (Sir R. Phillips, 18X3, p. 380).
1
D, Owen, 1965, pp. 97£f.
2
Baldwin Edwards, quoted in C.I. Foster, I960, p. 32.
3
Quoted in J.L. and B. Hammond, 1917, p» 2-1-6.
Li.
This society, whose full title was the "Society for Giving Effect to Ibis
Majesty's Proclamation against Vice and Immorality", was founded by wilber¬
force in 1787. Its most famous activity, "a piece of pious cruelty for
which there can be no defence"—and this from an apologist for wilberforce
(Howse, 3,952f p. 119)—-was the persecution and enforcement into a state
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It could be argued that writers like Wliberforce or Hannah More
are extreme examples of what, at least as far as the insane are concerned,
was generally a far more benign attitude towards the "lower orders" of
society. But if the harshness, the moral imperialism that is always
present in Wilberfores's rhetoric, does not appear in that of his friend
Samuel Tuke, we must not assume that Tuke did not agree with it. It is
rather that the Quakers at the Retreat did not need talking down to
quite so brusquelyj they were, after all, already members of the same
moral community. But once we shut the Retreat gates behind us ana look
outwards to the public asylums, all the suggestions about "self-restraint"
and "modes of coercion" appear to take on very different and much harsher
implications. Once outside the Retreat gates ail the constituent ele¬
ments of what was an expression of the Tukes* living praxis appear as
so many fragments. A practice devised for the respectable bourgeois
followers of a small religious sect was to bo adopted as the basis for
the treatment of the insane who were neither respectable,, middle class,
nor Quaker. The practice of the Retreat was to be recognised as incor¬
porating a number of general therapeutic principles capable of infinite
modification. But in terms of the Tukes' own praxis they had become
what can only be described as petrified fragments of practice and know¬
ledge. Moral treatment had been established\ it was a social fact. It
is true that the subsequent history of moral treatment owes much to the
Tulr.es* work in the Retreat and in the nascent asylum movement. But it
is a truth, like all such, that depends on the recognition of those who
have received it. In the case of moral treatment this was an acceptance
by the other reformers thai the Tukes1 work was a suitable basis on
of destitution of Thomas Williams, a publisher of Paine*s Ago of Reason.
On this see also J.L, and B. Hammond, 1917, pp. 2-i-2~3»
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which to build. The petrification of the fragments of moral treatment
that was to take place outside of the Retreat gates must not be seen
as a degeneration of the principles that were established within them.
The praxis recognised at the Retreat was intended to establish a final
hegemony over certain forms of deviance. It was precisely this that-





The Emergence of Moral Treatment:
A survey of the practice of mora,! treatment
as it developed, outside cf the Re-treat.
The savage. the rustic, the mechanical drudge,
and the infant whose faculties have not had
time to unfold themselves. . .may, for the most
part, be regarded as machines, regulated prin¬
cipally by physical agents. Rut. man, matured,
civilised, and by due culture raised to his
proper level in the scale of being, partakes
more of a mora.l than of an animal character,
and is in consequence to be worked upon by
remedies that apply themselves to his imagina¬
tion, his passions, or his judgement, still more
than by those that axe directed immediately to
the parts ana functions of his material organi¬
zation. Pharmacy is but a small part of physic;
medical cannot be separated from moral science
without reciprocal and essential mutilation.
—J. Re id (a London physician), I8l6
We treat mankind as constituted of habits, and
our principle is to eradicate those which are
tad, and to implant others that are bettor.
—J.To Backer (founder of Nottingham
County Lunatic Asylum), 1811
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In 1813, Kith the publication of the Description of the Retreat,
moral treatment was made easily available to the world, or at least to
that section of it concerned with the treatment of the insane. It was
released from the praxis which had given it its meaning, to be used
according to the intentions of other men and according to the religious
anri medical conceptions of normality through which these other men attempted
to understand thair world. The immediate course it took has been well
documented and there is little that can be added here to our knowledge
of the external features of the recognition of moral treatment.. The
Description was published almost simultaneously with the discovery of
cruelty and neglect at York Lunatic Asylum and at Bethlem, * disclosures
that were to lead to the Select Committee enquiries of 1813 and I816--
probably the most exhaustive investigation into the state of the insane
ever made in this country. Whatever the effect of these enquiries, their
immediate result was to make public the immense variety of conditions
under which the insane were held. Alongside the graphic horror stories
they demonstrated the existence of private madhouses and asylums where
conditions were every bit as humane as at the Retreat, and without the
Quaker zealousaess for discipline. What they demonstrated, in fact, was
the existence of the insane in a free market, in a series of institutions
still governed by financial profit and not by ideological concerns of
reform. Those who could afford to pay for the best got the lest, and
those who were boarded out at minimum cost by their parishes got minimum
care. There were exceptions to this rule, such as Manchester Limatic
Asylum and the Estreat, but institutions like these were not a real
On this see for instance K. Jones, 1972, pp. 6'4-?8; and Hunter and
Macalpine, Introduction to Descriptiont pp. 6-19.
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l6l
alternative for the majority of the insane.
Before proceeding any further it is necessary for a moment to shift
the focus away from the immediate problems of the insane to the social
world in which they existed as an increasingly visible group. The quarter
century following 1790 was arguably one of the most traumatic in the
history of this country. A number of events and processes were taking
place at that time which produced a qualitative and irreversible change
in the nature of life here. One of these events, the French Revolution,
has already been commented upon. The overturning of established order
just across the Channel had the effect of causing many to reassess their
ideological position towards the status quo. Few would have gone so far
as to agree with Joseph Priestley that
Now is the time to speak out without any fear, both on
Civil and religious subjects, while the advocates for
tyranny are overawed.-*•
In fact, it was precisely because Priestley and others were announcing
such subversive opinions that so many of the traditional ruling class
felt the need to state the exact opposite and further, to do something
about it. For all, the effect of the French Revolution was to ensure that
•things would never be the same again.
By the time the .Description was published the French Revolution
was a distant event. There was no longer a real threat of widespread
insurrection here. And yet the England of 1815 was more -unsettled than
that of a quarter century before. There were two major causes of this,
not unconnected; and certainly between them they created a volatile
situation. One was the war with France, the other the rapid growth of
industrial capitalism. There is no space here to review till the effects
1
Letter to Br Lindsay, quoted in Simon, I960, p. 6k.
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of these events, nor is there any need. As far as the treatment of the
insane is concerned two points only need be stressed. These are the
changes in the numbers of the insane and the social status of those recog-
$
nised as such. The two factors axe closely tied together because if any
one thing typified the content of social thought at that time it was the
concern with an increase in the numbers of the poor. The provision of
specific types of accommodation for the insane in the 1810s must be seen
in the context of the overwhelming increase in the number of dependents
cn poor relief. By 1803 there were supposed to be over a million people,
p
or one in nine of the population, in receipt of relief. Ana this was at
a time when England was in a war economy and in a healthy trading position
on the world markets. After the war ended in 1815 the massive capital
expenditure by the government fe3.1 dramatically (from £106 millions in
1815 to £53 millions in 1818). Overseas markets dried up as they developed
their own plant and resources. Exports dropped by £? millions. All this
had the effect of putting large numbers out of work. In Shropshire, for
instance, 2^- out of the 3^ blast furnaces stopped working and 7000 workers
2
were made redundant.
Another effect of the ending of the war was the flooding of the
laboux market with discharged soldiers and sailors. By .1817, 300,000
had been discharged since the peace was signed. Many of these ex-service¬
men found their way into the asylums and madhouses; indeed, one of the
Koxton madhouses made a speciality of confining naval lunatics.-^ As
1
Perkin, 19?2, p. 22.
2
J.L. and B. Hammond, 1917» PP- 10'f~5.
3 Hoxton House in east London, owned, by Sir Jonathon Miles, was authorised
by the Admiralty to confine members of the Hoyal Havy who had become in¬
sane. During the war the numbers kept there increased from two officers
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Scull hao pointed out, the number of identified insane rose from 2248 at
the time of the 180? Select Committee Report to 6000 in 1819. Even when
the rise 5.n population is taken into account, this still, represents an
increase from 2.26 to 5.40 per 10,000.1 Alarmist statements began to
appear in the press, such as John Rei&e3 well—known "'Madness strides like
a Colussus in the country".2 The reality was less vivid, but there was
some increase, however it is measured. One indicator is the number of
licensed madhouses, which increased from 4-5 in 180? to 72 in 1815.
It is impossible to assess the relative importance of the various
3
reasons for this growth. The war was obviously one, the state of the
economy another. Another was undoubtedly the increasing percentage ox
the population which lived in urban as opposed to rural'areas. The mental
abnormalities which could bs supported or concealed in the rural community
became disabling when the person concerned was confronted with the exacting
4
discipline of factory production. All of these factors are well known.
and 16 seamen in 1792 to 17 officers anu 133 seamen in l8l4. Five years
later the population of Hoxton House was 348, although this does include
an undisclosed number of non-servicemen (1815 SC deport, appendix 2; perl*"
iamentary Returns, 1819a).
1
Scull, 1974, p. 566.
2
J, Reid, 1808, p. 166. For other, more considered, opinions, see
Parry-Jones, 1972, pp. 11-13•
3
It will be noted that nothing is said here of the possible organic, psych¬
ological, or sociogenic causes of insanity. These are questions of interest
to social scientists but are not the focus of enquiry here. Insanity is
accepted in this thesis as a social phenomenon. How it "got there" is seen
as important only to the extent that it can be answered within the question,
"what was done with xt?" This might narrow the range of enquiry but it re¬
quires the researcher to maintain a consistently sociological approach and
not to reduce the argument to another level (psychological, biological, etc.)
when it suits him.
4
Most of the statistics of lunacy at this time do not make the distinc¬
tion between the mentally ill and the mentally subnormal. The latter would
have been particularly vulnerable to "breaking down" or becoming visible
once they moved out of their familiar village environment.
16d
To us there is no doubt that they are social factors existing indepen¬
dently of the intentions of the individual members of the growing working
class. But for those who saw it as their responsibility to get rid of
unemploymentf the problem appeared not so much a social as a moral one
which could be solved by the moral control of individuals.
This was a time of great insecurity for those who had -traditionally
assumed the mantle of the ruling class. Here w?.s society in a state of
unprecedented turmoils how best could they ensure that its traditional
order would be maintained? A whole spectrum of solutions were put forward
foo: l1policing the poor", to quote a contemporary phrase. It is possible
to point to a number of representatives of the rural land-owning class
as well as to ideologists of the manufacturing towns who made attempts
to deal with this problem. Educational and Poor Law historians have
long made use of this spectrum of ideas to locate the policies that were
put forward in their various fields."1' In the field of the history of the
treatment of the insane this social context has hardly been touched on by
other writers, so it will be necessary here to establish at least the
main parameters of the debate. If moral treatment is to be described
as an ideology of this or that class, or even if it is only to be labelled
as "progressive", or not, this can hardly be done without knowing what it
was that counted as radical and as conservative thought at the time.
The crux of the problem was that the mass of the population of
the growing towns were no longer constrained within the traditional ideo¬
logies that had enclosed the peasantry, quite literally, in a series of
obligations and duties from birth to death. The traditional Tory view
was that -there was an organic relationship between the different "ranks"
J"
See for instance Poynter, 1969 (on poor relief); and Silver, 1965 (on
education).
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of society. It had been possible to hold this view in a stable agrarian
economy; but the combination of the French Revolution and the growth of
the manufacturing towns had provided material proof that the old social
relationships need not last forever. And yet, as we know, when the
bourgeois class attained economic and political power it did not abolish
the aristocracy. In many ways it attempted to emulate the Tory pater¬
nalism toward the "lower orders" in order to convince itself that there
remained a place in ruling-class ideology for the values and attitudes
of the aristocracy themselves. Not all High Tory philosophy was accept¬
able to the reformers, of courses it was, after all, the House of Lords
which blocked one Reform Bill after another all through the first half
of the century. But some members of the aristocracy accepted what
they saw as their responsibility towards the poor; just as the poor
had a responsibility to work and obey, so the rich had a responsibility
to govern and to look after those who could not look after themselves.
This was the basic philosophy of cne influential reformer, Lord Ashley,
better known by his later title as the seventh Lord Shaftesbury.
Ashley realised that to "help" the poor was a necessary task in order
to maintain the status quo, a point that his friend Robert Southey
made to him in 1832 s
I agree with you that the state of the poor cannot be
discussed too much, for till it is improved physically
and morally and religiously we shall be in more danger
from them than the West Indian planters axe from their
slaves.
Letter of January 1832, quoted in Finlayson, 197^, p. l6l. Finlayson
also provides an example of Ashley's class motivations "[My] whole life
[has] been spent in endeavouring to build up the moral, social, politi¬
cal and religious estimation of the Aristocracy" (186?, quoted ibid.,
p. 1??). On Ashley's philanthropic career see any of his biographies,
for example J.L. and .8. Hammond, 1923; Battiscoabe, 197*1; and for his
work specifically in lunacy reform, X. Jones, 19?2, chap. 6.
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It is of course unlikely that Ashley ever thought that inmates 0f
lunatic asylums were going to cause an insurrection. What ho di-J. think
was that unless the ruling class fulfilled its duties towards the
unfortunates of society, they would have no moral right to continue
to rule. It is in this sense that Ashley may he called an evangelical,
a reformer like William wilberforce who believed that the purpose of
reform was to reinforce the moral fabric of society. Like wilberforce
and the Tukes, Ashley's conception of reform was essentially a meta¬
physical one, a3 can be seen from a remark he made when making a pre¬
sentation to John Conolly, a renowned moral therapist of the next
generations
I cannot confine my views merely to the physical results
of the new system. I look, also, to the moral results,
and I find that while the class of lunatics has been
raised in the moral scale of existence, society generally
has benefitted.-1-
Tory paternalism then, remained an influential feature of the reform
movement. Its representatives were few but as an ideology it held an
attraction far beyond the ranks of the old ruling class. It conferred
a moral legitimacy on the attempts at social control of the "lower
orders". But it was only one strand in the reform movement. The
other, main, impetus for reform came not from isolated members of the
aristocracy but from representatives of that other claimant to the
ruling class—the industrial bourgeoisie. They had a more direct aware¬
ness ox the social problems of the manufacturing towns, and while usually-
seeing the solution still in moral terms, they also tied their rhetoric
to specific social solutions. An eloquent representative of this
approach was Patrick Colquhoun, a Scottish merchant and founder of the
Glasgow Chamber of Commerce, who looked into the question more rigor-
From a speech given in l8jjl, quoted in Hunter and Macalpine' s intro¬
duction to Conolly, 1973, P- xi.
1.6?
ously than most ideologists of his class. In his Treatise on Indigence
of 1806 he attempted to define the causes of unemployment or, as he put
it, of "indigence, . . .the state of any one who is destitute of the
means of subsistence, and is unable to procure it to the extent nature
requires"
Colquhoun accepted that there were such causes as the "stagnation
of manufactures" or severe frosts which interfered with outdoor work,
but lie was overwhelmingly convinced that the main cause of unemploy¬
ment lay elsewhere. In short, he believed
that it is in the character of the labouring people that
the cause of the great and unexampled extent of indigence
is to be foundo2
The problem, Colquhoun argued, was not a social one at all but one of
individuals who did not fulfil their duty to society. And if the
problem was an individual one, so was the solution, be can "only find
a remedy", Colquhoun maintained,
ixi such restraints as shall improve the morals, and produce
habits of industry among this noxious class of the commun¬
ity, whose numbers have become exceedingly burthensome and
alarming, occasioning a vast pressure qn the more virtuous
and industrious classes of the people.-5
These two phrases, "improve the morals" and "produce habits of industry",
will appear repeatedly in this chapter. They indicate above all the
class nature of the argument, whether it was directed towards the poor
in general or towards the insane. These phrases are the injunctions
of a class whose major problem was no longer to establish itself within
the ranks of the old ruling class but one who now had to establish
control over the class which was to support it as the new ruling class.




Colquhoun, 181 p. 113.
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The substance of that control can be seen in all the ideological pro¬
ductions of the bourgeois class, in moral treatment as in the regu¬
lations pasted on the factory doors,' The subject of this chapter is
moral treatment as it existed in this world of class struggle, and not
in the rarified air of the Retreat when class antagonisms were concealed
within the religious rhetoric of the Society of Friends, because of
this it will no longer be possible to treat moral treatment as uni¬
versally applicable to al.l the insane. The need to "produce habits
of industry" did not occur to the moral therapists when treating pa¬
tients of their own class. In practice they often did something very
similar, but to understand this practice we must respect their own
consciousness of what they were doing and accept their own class-based
distinctions. Numerically the overwhelming majority cf the insane at
this time were classified as paupers, or at least within the "labouring
classes", and they will be given the bulk of attention here.
So far the main specialist provisions of care that have been
discussed for the pauper insane were the subscription hospitals ana the
private madhouses. There was one other type of institutional care which
has not yet been mentioned because it was hardly a real alternative in
1615» although by the end of the century it was to become virtually the
sole means of confining the insane. This was the county asylum, an
institution that, in the physical form of its buildings at least, is
still with us. The county asylum movement was to be the main express¬
ion of moral treatment, as it was for the birth of modern psychiatric
theory and practice. Rut by 1815 there were only three county asylums
in operation and they could hardly be said to embody all that was pro¬
gressive in the treatment of the insane.
Before tracing the history of the county asylums and the development
of moral treatment within them, one point must be emphasized about the
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personnel involved in the reform movement, and their motivations. The
treatment of the insane has been presented so far as making use of (a)
medical therapies which are applied to the faulty organ or physiological
process and (b) precepts of management which are applied to the lunatic
as a whole in his capacity as being dangerous, capable of self-restraint,
or whatever. This dichotomy had always existed and various theoretical
and practical approaches to insanity had emphasised one aspect or an¬
other. In the late eighteenth century the management aspect was empha¬
sized because of the changing conceptions of human nature which, rather
than banishing slaves, criminals, lunatics and other outcasts to a region
outside the moral universe, considered that they were capable of reform
within it. In other words, the impetus for reform did not come from
within medical advances in knowledge or, on the whole, from the custod¬
ians of that knowledge. Some members of the profession even argued that
medical knowledge proscribed the possibility of moral treatment. It
has already teen argued that the reason for this must be sought not in
the forms of knowledge themselves but in the intensely conservative
nature of the medical profession, who were more interested, in preserving
their own status than in applying knowledge to the changing social prob¬
lems of their time.
The impetus for reform in the treatment of the insane came not from
the medical profession but from that section of the population which
was interested in social problems; indeed, had its rationale in trying
to eliminate them. This was the magistracy, or the Justices of the
Peace, the basic unit of local government at this time.1 Before the
Moir, 1969. In class terms the justices represent a complex group.
They were quite often financially independent, not because their families
were established gentry, but because their fathers had made large amounts
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establishment of a police force or of standardized approaches to the
control of deviance, it was these Justices who were responsible for
dealing with problems of order as and when they arose. Because of their
proximity to local conditions all over the country, they were in a par¬
ticularly good position to notice the extent to which existing facilities
for the insane were inadequate. As the magistrates found out, in the
metropolitan areas where some of the physicians took a.n active interest
in the insane, there were, at least, asylum facilities. But in most of
the country, away from the larger madhouses and hospitals, the insane
were still being dealt with in the ad hoc manner they had always been.
One of the Justices wrote to the Secretary of State in l806, pointing
out what he considered to be the typical lot of a lunatic s
I believe there is hardly a parish of any considerable
extent, in which there may not be found some unfortunate
human creature of this description, who, if his ill treat¬
ment has made him phrenetic, is chained in the cellar or
garret of a workhouse, fastened to the leg of a table, tied
to a post in an outhouse, or perhaps shut up in an uninhab¬
ited ruin; or if his lunacy be offensive, left to ramble
half-naked and half starved through the forests and high¬
ways, teased by the scoff and jest of all that is vulgar,
ignorant, and unfeeling.-L
Other magistrates obviously felt the same because in January 180?
a Select Committee was formed "to inquire into the State of Criminal
and Pauper Lunatics in England, and the Laws relating thereto." The
members of this committee were C.W.W. Wynne, George Hose, Sir Samuel
Romilly, William Wilberforce, and Samuel whithread, names which were to
recur often in the reform movements of the time. The committee saw a
need for the erection of a number of public asylums, to be based on
of money in commerce and manufacturing. The implications of this back¬
ground for their policies can be seen below, in the career of John Howard.
1
Sir George 0. Paul, address to Earl Spencer, in 1807 SC .Report,
Appendix 'i, p. 85. —
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similar principles to the hospitals already established at Manchester,
Liverpool, etc. They felt that
r
public opinion appears to be so favourable (_to the idea
of having public lunatic asylums] that it may be suffic¬
ient for the legislature, at least in the first instance,
rather to recommend and assist, than to enforce the exe¬
cution of such a plan.1
They thus proposed authorising magistrates to charge the. capital expense
of erecting asylums to a county rate, and for the patients then to be
maintained by their parishes. The report also recommended that the
asylums should be as large as possible, up to a maximum of 300 beds,*
and that they should not be solely for paupers but also for paying
patients and for the poor who could be paid for or subsidised out of
charity.
The Committee's proposals were enacted the following year, in
2
"Mr Wynne's Act" of 1808. This Act embodied the Committee's optimism
about the need not to enforce provision. It was a permissive act which
merely empowered magistrates to erect asylums for either one or a combi¬
nation of counties, wherever they recognised the need. In the first
20 years of the operation of the Act, only eight counties saw the
erection of an asylum. These are listed in Table 3, together with the
numbers of beds available in 1826.^ As can be seen from this table,
^
18C7 0C Report, p. 6
2 4-8 Geo in, chap. 96.
3 There is nothing intrinsically important about this particular year.
It is used here because a survey of the provision available had. recently
been published. It is, however, indicative of the changes taking place
in that it stands mid-way between the County Asylums Act of 1808 and












































provision in county asylums was hardly extensive, especially in view of
the more than 3000 persons held as insane in private madhouses, the 33
in gaols, and the unknown, number in workhouses end single confinement^
at the same time. These figures are given to provide a context within
which the discussion of the "importance" of moral treatment must be
seen. The few clear examples of moral treatment never coped with more
than a small minority of the insane. But if they were not important in
a practical sense in the history of psychiatry, as the discovery of
chlorpromazine was, their ideological importance is undisputed.
Not surprisingly, given the social aims of the founders of the
early county asylums, there was often conflict between their approach
Source: Parliamentary Returns, 1826.
p
The public subscription hospitals of the eighteenth century which
figured so prominently in Chapter One receded very much into -the back¬
ground in the nineteenth century. They kept to their original sizes,
and when they became overcrowded the county asylums took on the ex Ira
patients. These older hospitals also "tended to concentrate on the private
sector so that in l8¥f, for instance, Manchester Lunatic Hoopital had
only 36 patients, all private.
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to the care of the insane and the concerns of the medical profession.
Not that there was anything in the concept of a publicly-financed asylum
necessarily antithetical to the medical profession—some of the early
county asylums were planned as subscription hospitals and built partly
by subscription and partly from a county rate. What was antithetical
to the interests of the medical profession was that although medicine
2
was not excluded from these asylums, as institutions they were envisaged,
at least by the social reformers, as a solution to a social problem.
Medicine was necessarily peripheral to this purpose of the asylums
while moral treatments a doctrine which emphasized rehabilitation through
talcing part in "normal" social activities, was not.
This whole topic of the conflict between the medical profession
ana the lay reformers has recently been exhaustively dealt with by
Gloucester and Nottingham Asylums are two documented examples of this
(Bailey, 1971» Nottingham, 1952, pp. 29, 92). Lincoln Asylum was financed
entirely by subscriptions aria donations (walk, 1970). In fact a close
examination of the hospitals founded about this time reveals that the
distinction between subscription hospitals and county asylums was not
as clear-cut as psychiatric historians have tended to make it. True,
there was the 1808 Act which was the legislative base for the comity
asylum movement, but its recommendations were themselves based on a rec¬
ognition of existing practice. A major cause of dissatisfaction with the
subscription hospital model was due to the war-time inflation. Sub¬
scriptions did not keep up with running costs, as Paul pointed out when
the Gloucester Infirmary accounts went into deficit (Paul, 1796, pp. 38ff).
For this and other reasons the old style patronage of hospitals was prov¬
ing inadequate. Partial subscription and partial public finance was seen
as a real solution, which in a sense it was until the stigma of associa¬
tion with paupers made all the administrating bodies realise that such
a method, was not going to attract the necessary private patients.
2
It is perhaps significant that the relatively new term "asylum" was
used, and not "hospital". However, the idea of calling a medico,1 insti¬
tution for the insane an "asylum" did not originate with the county asylum
movement. The subscription hospitals at York, Liverpool, and Leicester
were always known as "asylums". . The CM) dates this usage of the word to
1776.
17^
Andrew Scull and there is no need to rehearse all his arguments here.1
Since the main focus of this essay is the ideological production of
moral treatment rather than professionalisation of psychiatry or other
structural changes, the above conflict will only be dealt with here
insofar as it bears directly upon the course of moral treatment. All
that needs to be stated at this stage is that conflict did exist be¬
tween these groups because of their different understandings of the
aims of therapy. To express the alternatives :in the starkest terras,
on one side was the medical approach to insanity with all its arsenal
of chemical and depletive techniques; and on the other the social need
to confine and if possible reform the insane in the cheapest possible
way. Moral treatment occupied the main site on which the confronta¬
tion occurred. On some occasions it is possible to see this clearly
in terms of the medical profession and the magistracy expressing their
different social motivations in their allegiances to different fori,is of
knowledge. On other occasions the debate was internalised by individ¬
ual asylum superintendents who attempted to embody the medical and social
aspects in one practice.
One thing is certain? whatever the particular social praxis
which the Retreat attempted to express, with the publication of the
Description moral treatment became one more resource in the treatment
of the insane, bearing as much ©r as little relation to moral treatment
But see the discussion on Bedford Asylum at the ena of this chapter.
My only difference of opinion with bcull on this point concerns the em¬
phasis he lays on the "capture" by the medical profession of insanity(see his 197.5a, ESSSiSr)* My impression is that he overstates his case
to the extent that he ignores how much they vrore involved with it before
the county asylum movement. In other wordsf the birth of modern psychia¬
try should be seen not as a newly developing ideological imperialism, but
as the ideological expression of the medical profession coming to terms
with the social reformers, who were in effect trespassing on the traditional
province of that profession. The evidence to support this position (thatthe medical profession were involved with the insane in the*eighteenth
century) has already been presented in Chapter 0ne.
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in the Retreat as the readers of the description wanted to give it.
Moral treatment was set free from the constraints of the Retreat, only
to be captured—like all expressions of freedom—as soon as an attempt
was made to apply it to real conditions in the world.
The rest of this chapter will deal with the various manifestations
of moral treatment as they appeared in the day-to-day practice of caring
for and attempting to cure the insane in the first third of the nineteenth
century. Each aspect inevitably contains something of the others, and
it would be a denial of the totality of capital-property relations to
attempt to describe any ideology as discrete. On the other hand, moral
treatment was taken hold of by a variety of reformers. Some were phys¬
icians, others primarily interested in prison reform or in education.
Some may be described as "organic" intellectuals, others as "traditionals";
some were dominated by "expressive motivations, others by "instrumental"
ones. As such, they brought to the treatment of the insane different
emphases, different assumptions about the importance of therapy.
The major part of this chapter will deal with moral treatment in
the specific context of the county asylums. It was here that it received
its greatest development, albeit one narrowly circumscribed by the vic¬
issitudes of the class struggle, with which it will be seen to be closely
tied. At least three major themes can be perceived in the practice of
moral treatment in the county asylums.These nay be described as (l)
the idea of moral community, (2) the structure of order, and (3), the
imperative to work. These three themes will how be examined in detail.
That is. in the period up to the mid-l830s. After that time moral
treatment began to change under the influence of what was known as the
"system of non-restraint". This will be examined in. Chapter Five. The
themes examined in this chapter aid not disappear with the emergence of
non-restraint so there will be some overlapping in time, although this
will bo minimised In order to keep the thematic fragments distinct.
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The chapter ends Kith a section on moral treatment as it developed
outside of the pauper institutions , namely moral treatment aa a
commodity. This occurred predominantly in small private asylums run
by the middle class for their own use, and was even less extensive
than the moral treatment in the public asylums. A discussion of middle-
class moral treatment will, however, throw an illuminating light on the
number of ways in which the therapy could be practised, ana how closely
moral treatment was tied to the class struggle whenever it was taken
out of the textbook and applied to real life.
1. The Moral Community of the Asylum
The emphasis that the description laid upon the total environment,
the creation of a moral community in which a damaged mind could be made
whole again, was one which appealed to many in a period when industrial¬
ization appeared to be destroying those moral communities in which social
and behavioural deviance had not so far been a visible feature. Espec¬
ially for those conservative thinkers whose security stemmed from their
status within the old order (or for those who believed in the necessity
of such a world) the reproduction of a moral community based on natural
order was a dominant theme in the social rhetoric of the time.
A time there was, ere England's griefs began,
When every rood of ground maintained its man;
For him light labour spread her wholesome store.
1
A number of inciters have pointed out that it was not only the conser¬
vatives who looked back to the "good old days" on which to base their
belief in the possibility of a better world. The London Corresponding
Society called for universal suffrage by appealing to the model set by
Saxon England. And the widow of the working-class leader, John Thelwall,
maintained that her late husband was "descended from a Saxon family"(quoted an Thompson, 1968, p. 96). Sedgwick has captured the mystical
quality of this^phenomenon: "We may see our hankering for the 'natural'
as^a kina of tribute that men pay to use—value, to unmeditated sensualenjoyment, in an age dominated by exchange value, where the proper qual¬
ities of things are overlaid and distorted by the mystifying"equivalences
interposed in the commodity transaction and its social apparatus" (Sodginck.
1966, p. 171).
Just gave what life required, but gave no more?
His best companions, innocence and health;
And his best riches, ignorance of wealth.
Hut tames are altered; trcicie s unfeeling tranij^
Usurp the land and dispossess the swain; . . .
This era which Oliver Goldsmith was mourning in 1769 was gone for
ever, but this never prevented wistful poets and thinkers striving to
recreate its moral certainty in numerous if short-lived experiments.
Fou.cault has been one writer to see within the Retreat the resemblance
to a return to nature of this kind. In the .Description there are cer¬
tainly references to such features as pollution-free air, the view
over unspoilt country, the fertile garden, and the therapeutic value
of working on the land.^ On the basis of these remarks Foucault has
written,
Toutes les puissances imaginaires de la vie simple, du
bonheur campagnard, du retour des saisons sont convoquees
ici pour presider c. la guerison des folies. . . .les saisons
et les jours, la grande plaine a'York, cette sagesse des
jardins, ou la nature coincide avec I'orare des hommes;
doivent iricanter jusqu'a son plein reveil la raison un
instant cachee.
Foucault appears to be suggesting that the Retreat was trying to recreate
"The Deserted Village" (in Davison, 19?3f PP- 128-9)• 6r, as "the
Tory Quarterly Review expressed itself in 1816, "all the freshness and
delightful simplicity of rural happiness is gone J" (Anon, 1816, p. 399;.
This reviewer also drew the not Uncommon corollary to this belief j that
insanity was actually caused by the "artificial state cf society which
grows necessarily out of a constant advancement in civilization". The
argument he used, the essence of which is still heard today, was that
"in proportion as man emerges from his primeval stats, do the Furies of
disease advance upon him, and would seem to scourge him back into the
paths of nature and simplicity" (ibid,f p. 398).
2
Description, pp. 36, 93-6.
3
Foucault, 1972, pp. 492, 493. "All the imaginary strength of the simple
life, of rustic happiness, of the return of nature's order are summoned
here together in order to preside at the recovery of sanity. . . .the
passage of time, the open country around York, that wisdom of the garden
where nature coincides with the oruer of men; all tills must work its
spell until the full awakening of the momentarily hidden reason."
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something that had gone for ever. Given the settled nature of York
society in the 1790s1 it is perhaps more true to say that the .Descrip¬
tion does not plead for a return to a natural moral orders it merely
states its existence within a world where that moral order had not yet
"been destroyed. But whatever the case about the world which the Retreat
attempted to reproduce, there is no doubt that, by the time the des¬
cription appeared, the social relations of capitalist production were
far more extensive. Rot that this meant that the idea of moral community
was abandoned in the 1810s and 820s; merely that those who used it then
had to take into account the realities of the changed world. One of
these realities was the need to find and maintain a disciplined work
force to man the factories; another was the feeling of many that the
social relations engendered by factory production were inhumane and
themselves the cause of many social problems.
One well-known figure who confronted this problem was Robert Owen,
and although he had nothing to do specifically with the treatment of
the insane, his ideas and schemes do cast some light on the contempor¬
ary meaning of moral treatment. Owen's most famous project, his indus¬
trial village of New Lanark, became known to the general public with
the publication of his A New View of Society. This appeared in 1813,
the same year as the Description of the Retreat. The precept with which
Owen opened his description might equally well have been applied to the
1
Although the population of York rose by about a third between 1760
and 1800 there was little work for the extra population and the pauper-
rate has been estimated at between a quarter and a third of the popula¬
tion (Tillott, 1961, p. 295)* That the world seemed to be passing York
by did not go unnoticed. As one correspondent to the York Chronicle
vrrote in lf'90, "Xf the inhabitants of this city would rouse themselves
to some spirited exertions. . .and the Corporation open the gates to all
tradesmen and manufacturers inclinable to settle among us York might
once again lift up its head and recover its ancient consequence" (quoted
in Armstrong, 1974, p. 20).
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regime at the Retreats
Any general character, from the "best to the worst, from
the most ignorant to the most enlightened, may be given to
any community, even to the world at large, by the applica¬
tion of proper means; which means ere to a great extent at
the command and under the control of these who have influ¬
ence in the affairs of men,1
The difference was of course that the Takes vehemently denied the ration¬
alist "basis of their work, whereas Owen was constantly proclaiming it
for his. This rationalism about which Owen was very proud certainly
offended his business partners; but if we look at the type of society
that Gwen envisaged, hxs apparent radicalism soon disappears.
As fax- as Owen was concerned, hew Lanark was never more than a
compromise between his ideals and the physical constraints that the
construction of that particular village laid upon them. It is in his
later works, where he expressed his vision of an ideal society, that
1
R. Owen, 1970, p. 99.
p
The narrow parameters of Owen's radicalism are well known and prob¬
ably appeared even more so to his contemporaries than to those later
writers who insist on emphasizing his socialism. Owen's conception of
rationality was the inverse of that informing this account: that is, one
that recognises man's own powers and the necessity to bring those powers
under conscious control. In Marx's words, "The materialist doctrine
that men are products of circumstances and upbringing, and that, there¬
fore, changed men are products of other circumstances ana changed up¬
bringing, forgets that it is men who change circumstances and that the
educe.tor must himself be educated. Hence this doctrine is bound to
divide society into two parts, one of which is superior to society (in
Robert Owen, for example/' (Feuerbach Thesis Ho. 3. in MFC*, vol. 5,
p. 7). Owen himself had become conscious of the need to change society
but he was not able to recognise the rational basis of this achievement
of consciousness in himself, because of this his "rationalism" became
as metaphysical in its assertion of universal laws as the mystical beliefs
of William Allen or Samuel Tuke. To say this is not to deny that Owen held
some socialist views. This aspect of his work is expressed in such state¬
ments as "it is only in a state free from the fear of poverty, and of
unjust opposition from wealth and power, and when placed upon an ©Quality,
to the extent of age, with add his fellows, that man can know himself,
or the state of excellence and happiness to which he can attain"
(R. Owen, 1891, p. 60).
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can be found a clearer picture of the moral community he would really
have liked to establish. In l84l Owen published a book on what he
called "Home Colonies". The aim of these "Colonies" was described in
the book's subtitle:
A most secure and profitable investment for capital, and
an effectual means permanently to remove the causes of
ignorance, poverty ana crime; And most materially to benefit
all Classes of Society; by giving a right application to
the now greatly misdirected powers of the human faculties,
and of physical and moral science.
1 2
Like William Allen and Rowland Hill, two other authors of books on
"Home Colonies", for Owen the New Society was to be a replication of
the old—but without the antagonisms between classes.
The primary underlying aim of all these writers was to establish a
moral imperative within the minds of the working class.**' This was one
There is a nice irony in the fact that William Allen wrote a book
on Home Colonies. Allen was originally one of Owen's partners at New
Lanark who disagreed with Cwen's principles. He was a fervent Quaker
to whom Owen's avowed rationalism appeared as blasphemy, a comparison
of their criticisms of each other with the practical suggestions they
both made for the reform of society provides a vivid example of the use
of incompatible beliefs to serve nearly identical ends. For Allen on
Home Colonies see his 1827 £-nd 1832 (first ed. 16Z6), and for a review
of Owen's New View see w. Allen. 1613. See also his Life (>-<. Allen,
I8y46-l8^7)« Lor Owen on. Allen see his Life (R. Owen, 1967, vol. l).
For Owen on Home Colonies see specifically his 18^1, although most of
his published works contain references to his concept of a "New Society".
2
For Hill on Home Colonies, see his 1832.
3 This is not to say that their proposals were all directed to identical
ends. Owen's scheme was originally intended to accept only those who
were already aspiring to middle-class norms of individual achievement:
"mechanics, artisans, and the superior kind of servants" (R. Owen, 184-1,
p. 4.1), For Hill, on the other hand, "the first settlers should con¬
sist of the most industrious and able among the paupers" (R. Hill, 1832,
p. 21). And whereas Hill saw the need for Colonies in terms of the
social problems ana the needs of the industrial towns, for Allen "the
most natural and most healthy employment for man, is the cultivation of
uha soil' (w. Allen, 1&32, p. 3)« These, or any other differences of
practical application, ao not affect the argument being presented here:
that the Home Colony movement constituted a source of ideas ana concrete
proposals that could be usee, by enthusiasts of moral treatment in the
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of the reasons the past was invoked so much. If only, the home colon¬
ists argued, it were somehow possible to re-establish the social re¬
lationships between worker and capitalist that had been so powerful
when they had existed between Lord and peasant. As Owen put it,
the \ children} were generally trained by the example of
some landed proprietor, and in such habits as created a
mutual interest between the parties, by which means even
the lowest peasant was generally considered as belonging
to, and forming somewhat of a member of, a respectaole
family. Under these circumstances the lower orders exper¬
ienced not only a considerable degree of comfort, but they
had. also frequent opportunities of enjoying healthy rational
sports and amusements? and in consequence they became strong¬
ly attached to those on whom they depended; their services
were willingly performed; and mutual good offices bound the
parties by the strongest ties of human nature to consider
each other as friends in somewhat different situations;
the servant indeed often enjoying more solid comfort and
ease than his master I-'-
2
Ah, those "feudal, patriarchal, idyllic relations" which were gone but
not forgotten. But, as Owen and others realised, the mutual dependence
of the old society placed a responsibility on the ruling class as well
as on those who were to be ruled. What was needed was not a dependent-
class but, literally, a working class, a. class whose benevolence was
its own industry.
The very pith and marrow of a Poor man's happiness is self-
dependence. . .The -man who is self-dependent is more com¬
fortable, more virtuous, more dignified, than either pat¬
ronage, or bounty, can ever make hira; and he who would be
the true friend cf the Poor must teach them to be their own
benefactors.3
lunatic asylums. For a general discussion of. the Home Colonies see
J.P.O. Harrison, 1969*
1
.Observations on the Effect of the Manufacturing System. 1815 (in H.
Owen, 1967, vol. la, p. Wjl
2
Marx and Engels, Communist. Manifesto (in flECW, vol. 6, p. 486).
3 Nicoll, 1819, p. 31. ticell did not write specifically about Home
Colonies, but his work on the Poor Law and lunacy reform shows a concern
with the same problems.
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Many statements similar to this appeared in the first two decades of the
century. Societies were formed to propagate the message. One such was
the Society for Bettering the Condition and Increasing the Comforts of
the Poor,, and its aim was amply expressed by its founder, Sir Thomas
Bernard j
Let us give effect to that master spring of action, on
which equally depends the prosperity of individuals and
of empires—THE DESIRE IMPLANTED IN THE HUMAN BREAST OF
BETTERING ITS CONDITION.1
These types of statements express a profound, if familiar, contra¬
diction. On the one hand was the preferred reward—-independence, dignity,
freedom from patronage, And on the other was the force of the injunc¬
tion itself, a form of moral coercion backed up with often severe phys¬
ical measure®. This much-vaunted "independence" was above all an asser¬
tion, by the ideologists of capital-property relations, of their inde¬
pendence from responsibility towards the labour force on which they were
so dependent. Or, to put it in more abstract terms, capitalism as a
mode of production needed to take moral authority away from the individ¬
ual agents of benevolence and locate it in the system itself, or at
least in those who were to be its driving force. It needed, not slaves
or serfs, but "independent" workers. This motivation towards "indepen¬
dence" in the minds of the working class was not something its members
were supposed to consciously work out as a result of considered reflec¬
tion. It was to be manufactured in the workers' minds, just as material
1
Quoted in Poynier, 1969, p. 92, emphasis in the original. Bernard's
own motivation was a self-consciously ideological one. in his words,
"When I thought I had acquired in my Profession such a competence as
satisfied ray desires, I determined to quit the Law, & try what useful
Occupation I could find that was not likely to increase i'embarras des
richessea. The Endeavour to meliorate the domestic habits* of the lab¬
ouring Classes, was the first amusement that occurred" (Bernard, Pleasure
and. Pain, 1030, quoted in D. Owen, 196J5, p.
commodities were manufactured by the machinery in the factories. The
key sentiment underlying all this thinking is summed up in the pnicise
"habits of industry". These habits were to be the machinery that would
reproduce correct behaviour just as the factory machinery would repro¬
duce the commodities devised for it by the capitalist.1
It is often forgotten today just hovf much this fact was explicitly
recognised by the ideologists of capital themselves. Two well-known
manufacturers, with very different reputations today, both spoke out
strongly on this point, According to the "socialist", Robert Owen,
If, . .due care as to the state of your inanimate machines
can produce such 'beneficial results, what may not be expectea
if you devote equal attention to your vital machines. . .
Owen continued,
You will discover that the latter may be easily trained and
directed to procure a large increase of pecuniary gain. . . .
Give but due reflection to the subject, and you will find
that man, even as an instrument for the creation of wealth,
may still be greatly improved.2
Some of Owen's methods for the moral control of his workforce are
well known. Like Tuke'e exploitation of the "desire for esteem", they
played on the employees' attempts to improve their own evaluation of
3
themselves.
As with so many aspects of moral treatment, the germ of this one was
stated by Samuel Take in the Description. When writing about the effect¬
iveness of the "desire for esteem" as a means of raising his patients'
consciousness of their behaviour, Tuke admitted that with some patients
it was not entirely successful. But, he continued, even if it has no
'benefit to the patients as individuals, it "at least materially assists
them in confining their deviations, within such bounds, as do not make
them obnoxious to the family" (Description, p. 157). for em example of
this social effect of the desire for esteem in practice see his 1815,
p. 29.
p
"To the Superintendents of Manufactories", prefixed to his Third Essay
on Formation of Character, 1813, in R. Owen, 19?0, p. 95. Owen spoke *" '
with some authority in that in terms of numbers employed. Kew Lanark was
the largest centre of cotton manufacture in Britain at that time.
3
Geo well-known example is Owen's "Silent Monitor" system, which he
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Another manufacturer who pointed out the need for moral control in
the factory was the now infamous Andrew Ure J" If we are to take Ure at
face value, he really believed in the superiority of the factory system
2
over any other, exploitation of five-year-old children notwithstanding.
More important here, though, is his quite explicit recognition that
moral control is a branch of the social control of the workforce that
every manufacturer needed to maintain. In lire's now famcu3 words,
It is, therefore, excessively the interest of every mill-
owner, to organize his moral machinery on equally sound
principles with his mechanical, for otherwise he will never
command the steady hands, watchful eyes, and nroapt co-oper¬
ation, essential to excellence of product.-^
devised to improve conduct in the mills. This consisted of a, four-sided
block of wool placed by each worker. Each side of the block was coloured;
black, blue, yellow, and white. Whichever colour was visible aenoted the
conduct of the worker on the previous day. Each department had "books
of character" in which each worker's daily behaviour was entered, the
four colours being listed as numbers one to four. Owen was fully aware
of the moral omnipotence that this gave the mill master. In his words,
"The act of setting down the number in the book of character, never to be
blotted out, might be likened to the supposed recording angel marking
the good and bad deeds of poor human nature"' (R. Oven, 1967, vol. la,
p. 81), Kor was Oven entirely original in this approach. He got the
idea froia Samuel Oldknow, cotton Blaster at Mellow and Karple in Cheshire.
Ure has long been known as one of the sources that drew Marx and Engels'
venom in Capital and Condition of the "working Class in England. It has
been suggested that Ure was an easy and atypical target to attack. A
recent book, however, on The Ideology of Work (Anthony, 197?) shows
very clearly that "The organization of the moral machinery remains to
tills day a very good description of the purpose of the ideology of work;
the only development in the twentieth century is that the machinery has
been secularized" (ibid., p. 60).
2
Take for instance his statement that "It is, in fact, in the factory
systems alone that the demoralizing agency of pauperism has been effect¬
ively resisted, and a noble spirit of industry, enterprise, and intell¬
igence, called forth. What a contrast is there at this day, between
the torpor and brutality which pervade very many of the farming parishes,
as delineated in the official reports, and the beneficient activity
which animates all the cotton factory towns, villages and hamlets:"




The difference between human and mechanical machinery was, of course,
that the latter needed only minor servicing. Once it had been made it
could be relied upon to do its job. No such guarantee could be obtained
with the human element. This was the basis for all the ideologyj that
the working class did not recognise itself as imbued with the habits of
industry. Especially for many of those recently dispossessed from the
land, or discharged from the army or Navy, little inclination was shown
for accepting the discipline of factory production. They wanted to work
only to the extent of their recognition of their needs, not as a habit,
tied to the rhythm of machinery they did not own.1
The Home Colonies were envisaged as one of the means by which this
inculcation of moral and social habits could be accomplished. In the
cities there were too many other influencesj drink, promiscuous sex,
indiscriminate charity-"influences on the mind of the working man which
sapped his belief in the necessity to work. But in the Home Colonies
it would be possible
(i) To wean the Poor from a dependence on the Parish, and
what is falsely called Charity, and to put them in the way
of providing for all their wants by their own industry.
(ii) To enable them to procure an education for their children,
in moral, religious and industrious habits.
(iii) To raise such a moral and independent feeling in the
Poor, as may induce them to consider it a disgrace, and
shame, to receive alms from the Parish, or to engage in
marriage, until they shall have made a reasonable provision
for a family.2
On the difficulty of getting the labour force to accept the discipline
of factory production see the detailed account provided by Thompson, 1967.
2
W. Allen, 1827, p. 1. Or as Hill put it, "The habits of industry and
regularity which the members will acquire, will, in many cases render it
possible soon to restore them to society, with a security that they will
not again fall into a state of Pauperism" (ll. Hill, 1832, p. Z5j. There
is a striking parallel here with the re-education centres of the newly-
Communist states of Southeast Asia. This is not to say that the content
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Gc so the enthusiasts for Home Colonies argued, Of course these senti¬
ments axe not specific to Home Colonies. Similar rhetoric can "be found
surrounding the establishment of workhouses. But the Colonies, like
some of the lunatic asylums, do represent a trend at this time to des¬
troy deviance by resocialising what they saw as its causes; not at the
sites at which they occurred but at centres of moral and social excell¬
ence uncontaminated by the realities of class struggle.
However much any particular asylum superintendent agreed with moral
treatment or understood the principles of the Home Colonies, the very
existence of separate institutions indicates that the new philosophy
had some effect. There is nothing natural or necessary about treating
social or behavioural deviants away from their homes. What the enthu¬
siasts for this approach to social control had to argue was that it was
more effective in creating social order than older, less rigorous,
methods. Hot everyone involved in the asylum movement thought this
way; but one roan who did was the superintendent of two of the largest
asylums and a strong influence on the future course of moral treatment.
This was William Ellis, a man whose contemporary recognition included a
knighthood in 1835• In view of the dichotomy of interests already noted
that often existed between the aims of the lay reformers and the members
of the medical profession, Ellis must be seen as one of the key figures
of this period in that bis work appears to transcend the sectional
interests of one side or the other. Unlike most reformers, Ellis was
committed not only to the aims of moral rehabilitation, but also to
of these centres and the Colonies was the same, merely that each mode of
production (feudal, capitalist, or socialist) requires its own social




Ellis' opinions on the various aspects of moral treatment will be
commented upon below, but it must be noted here that he was fully aware
of the similarities between the regime he attempted to create in his
asylums and that at the proposed Home Colonies. As he wrote in the
Annual Heport for Harwell Asylum in 1836,
The Establishment of itself thus presents rather the ap¬
pearance of a little independent colony, than of a sick
hospital? each one talcing a share in promoting the general
welfare. .
Closer examination of the annual reports and methods of treatment prac¬
tised show just how much of an idealised picture Ellis was presenting
here. But insofar as Ellis believed in the establishment of "a little
independent colony" as an aim of therapy, the assertion is important.
William Ellis was born in 1?80, the son of a village rector, and began
his professional career as an apprentice to a surgeon in Hull, He
received his Membership of the College of Surgeons in 1800, ana in l8l4,
together with Dr John Alderson, he founded the Hull Refuge, a small
private asylum whose name and avowed philosophy were modelled on the
example of the Retreat. The following year Ellis wrote to Thomas
Thompson HP, a member of the 1815 delect Committee, expressing his thoughts
on the treatment of the insane (W.C. Ellis, 1815). His initiative was
soon rewarded in that he was offered the post of superintendent at the
West Riding of Yorkshire County Asylum, soon to be built at Wakefield.
He then obtained an Mb degree from St Andrews University, and when the
asylum opened on 23rd November I8l8 Ellis, together with his wife as
matron, took charge and remained its superintendent for 13 years. In
1831 he was chosen from 23 applicants to be the superintendent at the
newly-opened County Asylum for Middlesex at Kanuell. In 1838 Ellis
left Hanwell to run his own private asylum,, but he died the following
year. (On Ellis' career seejji.W. Ellis J 1868 ; Hunter and Macalpine's
introduction to Conolly, 1964, pp. 10-11? and J.A.R. and H.E. Bickfcrd,
1976, pp. 14-13, 23.)
See especially pp. 229ff.
3
Quoted in Hunter and Kacalpine's introduction to Conolly, 1968,
p. 18.
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Another exponent of moral treatment who appears to have drawn
heavily on a belief that a moral community could be established in the
asylum was W.A.F. Browne. Like Ellis. Browne has been remembered as
one of the "great men" of early nineteenth-century British psychiatry;
and if anything his influence was even stronger than that of Ellis.
He was a Medical Commissioner in Lunacy for Scotland from 1857 to 1870,
and President ox the Meaical-Psychological Association in 1866.1
The difficulty in assessing his work here is that it took place in
Scotland, in asylums founded upon a very different rationale to that of
the English county asylums. Moral treatment in the latter wa,s specific¬
ally for paupers; it was dominated by the attitudes of its administrators
to this lowest cla-ss of society. In Scotland on the other hand, the
asylums were usually founded by acts of private philanthropy for the
insane of all classes. The County Asylums Act of 1803 did not apply in
Scotland, and although a bill was introduced in 1818 to establish some¬
thing similar it was rejected as a result of petitions protesting against
2
the introduction of a Poor Hate. In other words, the Scottish asylums
presented a better opportunity to establish a complete moral community
within themselves because they held a more representative selection of
the population within their walls.
From the time of his appointment as medical superintendent to Montrose
Asylum in 1834, at the age of 29t Browne showed his lifelong interest in
1
Browne's medical career began with an I4D from Heidelberg and an LRCS
from Edinburgh. He was superintendent of Montrose Royal Asylum from 1834
to I838. and of the newly-opened Crichton Royal Institution at Dumfries
from 1838-1837. For a summary of his career see HMA, pp. 865-6.
2
Greenland, 1958. For more detailed material on the founding of individ¬
ual asylums see Poole, 1841 (Montrose, established 178l); Duncan 1809 and
1812 (Edinburgh, established 1813)i Stark, 1807 and Rice, 1974 (Glasgow,
established 1814); 'fait, 1972 and Easterbrook, 1940 (Dumfries, established
1839).
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developing the creative possibilities of moral treatment., Only three
years after this appointment he published a short but influential book
n
aptly entitled What Asylums were, are, and ought to be."*" ho asylum ever-
looked like Browne's vision of the future; but as ideology, lodged on
every asylum superintendent's bookshelf, it was a powerful force for the
continuing commitment to moral treatment.
As Browne and many others realised, the urban world was rent by
struggle, pain and exploitation. But in the lunatic asylum, under the
paternal eye of a gentle administrator, all differences might be recon¬
ciled, all anguish forgotten, and all unfairness eliminated.
Conceive a spacious building resembling the palace of a
peer, airy, and elevated, and elegant, surrounded by exten¬
sive and swelling grounds and gardens. . . .The inmates all
seem to be actuated by the common impulse of enjoyment,
all are busy, and delighted by being so. The house end all
around appears a hive of industry. . .There is in this
community no compulsion, no chains, no whips, no corporal
chastisement, simply because these are proved to be less
effectual means of carrying any point than persuasion,
emulation, and the desire for obtaining gratification. . . .
When you pass the loage, it is as if you had entered the
precincts of some vast emporium of manufacture? labour is
divided, so that it may be easy and well performed, and so
apportioned, that it may suit the tastes a.nd powers of each
labourer. You meet the gardener, the common agriculturalist,
the mower, the weeder, all intent on their several occupa¬
tions, and loud in their merriment. . . .For those who are
ignorant of these gentle crafts, but are strong and steady,
there are loads to cary, water to draw, wood to cut, and
for those who are both ignorant and weakly, there is oakum
to tease ana yarn to wind. . . .But there are gradations
of employment. You may visit rooms where there are ladies
reading, or at the harp or piano, or flowering muslin, or
engaged in some of those thousand ornamental productions in
which female taste and ingenuity are displayed. . , .The
curious thing is, that all are anxious to "he engaged, toil
incessantly, and in general without any other recompense
than being kept from disagreeable thoughts and the pains
of illness. . . .In short, all are so busy as to overlook,
or all axe so contented as to forget their misery.^
Browns, 1837.
^
Ibid., pp. 229, 230, 231.
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The dream of establishing a community in the asylum, Kith all the
patients acknowledging their places in the moral order, was obviously
an attractive one to the superintendent who was to preside over this
order. One of the fundamental legacies ox the example of the Betreat
was the recognition established there that control over the insane was
possible purely through moral injunctions. The Betreat had been success¬
ful because there the patients had occupied the same moral universe as
their therapists; they had, before their lapses into "irrationality",
been committed to the maintenance of the same values. But, as has been
stressed repeatedly, as well as this recognition of what is normative
behaviour there was a strong element in all moral treatment of what
ounlit to be. Certainly, outside the Quaker community the moral bonas
that the Quakers had been able to take for granted had almost disappeared,
in "the England of the 1820s and '30s. The attempts to establish Home
Colonies, Owen's "Hew View of Society", the "little independent colony"
of Hanwell Asylum, and Browne's vision of "What Asylums ought to be"
can all be seen as attempts to rebuild in their inmates' minds similar
moral bonds to those that some ideologists believed existed in an earlier
time when everybody was supposed to have known his or her place in the
order of things.
In none of the discussion up to now has there been any mention of
the benefits of medicine. It might be argued that, if the influence of
the social ideologies was so strong, why did the institutions for the
insane have medical superintendents; why were there separate "asylums"
and not specialist colonies or houses of industry where all deviants
might be resocialised together? This issue has been discussed at
length by Andrew Scull, who points out that the early asylums were not
medical institutions and that the history of the county asylum movement
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may "be seen as the history of expanding influence by a- nascent psychiatric
profession.1 It has already been argued that Scull overstates the case
for this development, but as far as moral treatment is concerned it
seems that the most enthusiastic moral therapists were men who were
influenced by both social and medical theories. Or, to put it another
way, moral threatmont manifested itself theoretically both as social and
as medical knowledge. Purely for ease of analysis, this chapter is
devoted to social theories and the next to medical ones. In practice
the two were indivisible, but in order to understand how praxis continually
reconstitutes itself out of disparate fragments it is necessary to analyze
them discretely.
One point that does perhaps need to be emphasized is the ideological,
almost romantic quality of so much of this "moral community" rhetoric.
It was expressive, but hardly instrumental!}' directed to what it proclaimed
as its aims. It was not scientific in the sense that moral treatment at
the Retreat had. been, in its rational application to the realisation of
specific and realisable goals. Samuel Take was one of the hardest-headed
of the moral therapists; unlike some of his more romantic colleagues Tuke
always based his attempts to develop moral treatment on a very realistic
understanding of what was possible, Writers such as W.A.F. Browne were,
at least in the 1830s» still rather young and idealistic. Their commit¬
ment to reform was still one that was more expressive of their rebellion
against the injustices of their society, rather than any clearly formed
attempt to change that society. Tuke, on the other hand, increasingly
took a more instrumental attitude towards the control of deviance. Re
realised that moral injunctions would not be enough when the patients
1
Scull 5 1974, 197.5a, 1976.
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were "common" paupers, men and women who were more at home in the gin-
shops and workhouse dungeons than in the refined air of the Quaker or
Methodist chapels. For this growing proletariat, large numbers of whom
were to find their v?ay into the new asylums, moral restraint had to be
backed up with more than mere words and encouragement. Moral restraint
had to be built into physical restraints, a particular "Structure of
Order" that would be strong enough to impose normality upon the most
degenerate lunatic. The ideal of moral community did not disappear,
but it had to co-exist in the public asylums with this more realistic
attempt to achieve the same end. It is to this attempt that we must
now turn.
go The Structure of Order
It has 'been argued that moral treatment at Bicetre Hospital and
at the Retreat developed as an attempt to produce in the minds of the
patients at those institutions a commitment to the order of the world.
This was done through a variety of methods, but was dominated by the
optimistic belief that the patient could internalise far more control
than had previously generally been accepted as possible. Another dominant
factor was that this optimism was specific to a narrowly-defined time
and place. In England the sifce of optimism was occupied by the Quakers,
the predominantly middle-class members of an exclusive sect whose patients
had already been heavily socialised with the norms of "sane" behaviour
that the Tukes attempted to re-instil in them.
In France the parameters of this optimism vrere not so much social
as temporal. As already noted, it was the euphoria induced by the
revolutionary upheaval of society that encouraged Pinel to believe
that his patients were capable of equally dramatic feats of rehabili¬
tation. But when the original hopes of the Revolution faded, so too
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did Pinel's enthusiasm for miracle cures,. This change can be seen quite
dramatically from a comparison of the two editions of his Traite. In
the first edition of 1801 (based on his experience in treating the insane
since being appointed to BicStre in 1793) Pine! devoted the major sec¬
tion of the work to "traiteiaent moral". By the time of the second edition
in 1809f everything had. changed, in the Traite as in the society that
gave it its meaning. In this later edition there was no separate section
on moral treatment, merely a chapter entitled "Preceptes generaux a
suivre dans le Traitement moral" in the section on "Police interieure".
The emphasis in this chapter was not on individual cures but on bureau¬
cratic surveillance. The contents of the chapter were summed up in the
first paragraph. In Pinel's words, there was a need for "un centre
general d'autorite. . .ce juge supreme doit etre ie surveillant de la
police interieure".1
The possibility of this authoritarian transformation of moral treat¬
ment had been apparent from its earliest announcements. The control of
the passions was always invested in the authority of the physician, a
surrogate "Reason" whose duty it was to represent the normality towards
which the patient had. to return. In Pinel's earlier work this control
was attended by a great deal of .imaginative manipulation of situations
in order to effect the desired result. In his later work this disappeared.
All the optimism that Pinel had expressed in the wake of the Revolution,
all that belief in. the infinite improvement of the passions, was forgot¬
ten in the face of the more pressing need to maintain order in society
and in the asylum9
In England an equally dramatic change in the concept of moral
Pinel, 1809f p. 251. Although the 1809 edition is much longer than
the lSOl edition (4$6 pages instead of 318), most of the extra space is
taken up with theoretical discussion about the nature of insanity, and
not its treatment.
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treatment can be seen once it left the Retreat, Even within the general
theme of creating a moral community around the insane, the structure of
order was envisaged very differently for those who were not already
committed to Quaker doctrine. As will be seen, Pinel's concept of a
"Police interieure" dominated by a "juge supremo" would prove to be a
very apt description of the main concerns of moral treatment in the
English attempt to institutionalise it.
As already stated, legislation had been passed in l808 enabling
magistrates to authorize the erection of public lunatic asylums. Aside
from the initiatives of the magistracy themselves, who were the main
force in founding the early asylums, there were a number of philan¬
thropists who attempted to raise interest in the subject of public asylums.
One of these was Edward Wakefield who, in 1812, wrote an article in The
Philanthropist calling for a number of asylums, each one to serve an
area of about six counties. Wakefield's intention was a catholic one;
As well as Luna.tics and idiots, I propose extending re¬
lief to cripples, blind persons, ana those who may be
afflicted with confirmed disgusting diseases.""
The following year Wakefield reiterated his plea with a reprint of
Sir G.O, Paul's letter of 1806 calling for county asylums. hothing
came of these proposals, but in April I8l4 Wakefield visited Lethlem
Hospital. "What he saw there has since become one of the legends in the
history of the treatment of the insane, and there is no need to repeat
yet again the accounts we have of the neglect and cruelty that confronted




Wakefield, 1812, p. 22?. Samuel Tuke also wrote to The Philanthropist
calling for more public asylums (S. Tuke, l8ll).
2
l-n loc.-K.it., vol. 3 (1813), PP« 214-2?. See also above, p. 170 note 1.
J On this see the evidence given by Wakefield to the 1815 SC (1st
Report, pp. 11-4).
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What is not so well known is that what he saw at Bethlem inspired
Wakefield to do something more than writing articles for other like-
minded philanthropists to read. Specifically, he formed a committee t.o
investigate the possibilities of establishing a "London Asylum". The
original Proposal for the London Asylum pointed out the inadequacy of
existing provision in London for the insane, and then pointed to the
shining example of the hetreat, nearly half of the Proposal consisted
of quotations from, the description. According to the Committee,
The Hetreat at York, has given the world such an example
of practical wisdom and humanity, and affords such admir¬
able illustrations of the successful, application of the
mild treatment for upwards of seventeen years, as to jus¬
tify an extensive diffusion ox its benefits—by estab¬
lishing a LQltDON ASYLUM, for the care ana cure of the
IB3ARE, on an IMPROVED SYSTEM OP KaRAGEMEKT™
The London Asylum was seen to be a direct descendant of the Retreat.
This point must be kept in mind in the following discussion of its
features, as they might appear at first sight to involve a radical change
from those in favour at the Retreat.
The general intentions of the Proposal were ratified by Wakefield
into specific suggestions as to the possible siae and shape of the pro-
2
posed asylum. The asylum was to be a large one: an initial figure of
kOO patients was given although this was later changed to 250 to 300.
Finance was appealed for with the understanding that the investment
would provide "a proper remuneration on the Capital advanced". Running
costs wore to come from the weekly income of the patients themselves.
But far more important than the financial return was the philanthropic
pay-off, the feeling the investors would get from knowing thev had advanced
1




the cause of "humanity". "
This was all in I8l4. In the following year Wakefield gave details
to the 1.815 Select Committee 011 the specifications that he was propos¬
ing the new asylum should incorporates.2 But lol5 was the year that the
new Bethlem was hui.lt, ana it is likely that the erection of this en¬
larged institution did much to take away the impetus for a Lonaon
Asylum"? The latter was never built, but the details of it that
"Wakefield made public are sufficient to provide a better understanding
of what was considered progressive in asylum construction in the 1810s.
The plan of the proposed London Asylum in shown in Figure 3• If
can be seen immediately that this -was no simple gallery model, such as
Bethlem was about to incorporate in its new building (see Figure 2),




See 1815 SC, 4th Report, pp. 18.5-6.
3
The new Bethlem was built for 192 patients compared with the 119 which
was all the old and by then dilapidated building could contain in l8l4.
The new Bethlem was erected not without the criticism that it reproduced,
the old, outdated, approach to insanity. John Haslam, the apothecary
to Bethlem, who was hardly in the avant-garde of contemporary opinion,
advertised in 1810 for a forthcoming work by him entitled "hints on
the Construction, Internal Economy, and Moral Management of an Hospital
for the Insane; pointing out the existing defects in such Institutions,
and proposed means For Ameliorating the Condition of Maniacs"(in the fly¬
leaf to Haslam, 1810J. Unfortunately for historians, this book was never
published but Haslam does give some hints in his book of l8l8 of what
he envisaged. His aim, he said, was that the. "new hospital might proudly
exemplify the science and display the enlightened humanity of the nine¬
teenth century" (Haslam, 1818, p. 51). More specifically, he went on,
"Its ample dome might have been omitted, and its stately columns sacri¬
ficed to the conveniences of internal construction" (ibid., p. 52;. But
it was not, and what still stands today as an imposing landmark in Lam¬
beth proudly proclaimed its allegiance to what Ha3lam graphically summed
up as "an Invidious aristocracy in the heart of a charitable common¬
weal th (j^bicU_)« i< or discussion and illustration of plans submitted to
the competition for a new Bethlem see Rosenau 19?'0, pp. 69-70.
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Figure 3
Plan of the proposed London Asylum
"l) Stewards Apartments 2) Matrons Apartments 3) Surgery 4) Apothecarys
Apartments 5) Pay Rooms 6) Porters Room j) Visiters Room 8) Inspection
Gallery 9) Rooms for Noisy Patients 10) Patients Water Closets ll) Warm
Baths 12) Airing Grounds 13) Store Rooin 14) Pantry 15) Kitchen
16) Wash—house 17) Drying Room .18) Straw Room 19) Servants Water Closet
One Pair Floor 20) Committee Room 21) ^omen Servants Bed Rooms 22) Mat¬
rons Bed Room 23) Stewards Bed Room 24) Men Servants Bed Rooms 25) Cov¬
ered Walks "
Source; 1815 SC, Report, plate 2®
I?8
Yorkshire and some other asylums, was not derived from medical precedent
at all "but from another area of social control—that of the penitentiary or
penal reformatory. To understand the full implications of what wakefield
and his philanthropic colleagues were proposing, it is necessary to turn
for a moment from the history of the insane to that of their colleagues
in deviance—those who had 'broken the law.
As was seen in Chapter One, the change from local ad hoc and private
provision for the pauper lunatic to specialist ana public facilities
took place over a long period of time. The first specialist workhouse
existed in the seventeenth century and the first specialist hospitals
began to appear in the first half of the eighteenth. But in the pro¬
vision of facilities for the criminally deviant it was not until much
later that reforms were initiated. As has already been mentioned in
passing, eighteenth-century gaols were privately run for financial profit,
with every incident of prison life being charged for by the gaolers, from
making an arrest to the provision of bedclothes and the arrangements for
discharge. It is true that there were many insane kept in privately-
run custodial madhouses whose only rationale was profit, but the patients
often had fond relatives who were concerned with their welfare, or at
least a parish which was concerned with the money being spent on its
dependents. For those who had broken the law, on tho other hand, the
predominant concern of most authorities appears to have been one of
simply wanting to get rid of its nuisances. Most people were quite happy
to leave the responsibility of looking after the gaoled to those who were
prepared to do so. The gaolers were subjected to no central control;
they provided custodial facilities according to the ability of their
charges to pay for them. As the Webbs have pointed out, as long as
individual profit was the basis of custody there could be no attempt to
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secure healthy conditions for prisoners as a group, "let alone uniformity
or reformative treatment". But these latter values were what an in¬
creasing number of people were looking for in all aspects of deviance
control,^
The dominant figure in the history of penal reform is undoubtedly
John Howard. Howard, like a number of philanthropists in this period,
started life as a modest entrepreneur (in his case he was apprenticed to
a wholesale grocer) who, on his father's death or at marriage, inherited
a large sum of money. These philanthropists did not use this money for
straightforward investment in capitals rather they used it to support
their ideological investment in the social relations required by capital."5
Their financial inheritance, a direct result of the growing profitability
1
S. and B. Webb, 1922, p. 18.
2
As well as the change in values caused by the need to ideologise the
changing social relations of production, mention must be made of the growth
of the prison population. Itself a function of the urbanisation of poverty
and the consequent need of the poor to support themselves without tradi¬
tional family or social ties, the large increase in the number of prison¬
ers (as of lunatics) made the need for a solution to deviance more press¬
ing than it would otherwise have been.
3
Howard's father was a wealthy upholsterer who died when John was 16,
leaving his son with enough inheritance so that he would no longer have to
work for his living. (Cn Howard's career see Baumgartner and Huirhead,
1939-') Another example of this pattern is the career of J.G. Lettsom,
who started as a surgeon's dresser, but with the aid of the sale of the
family estate in Jamaica and the fortune supplied by his wife, a tin
producer's heiress, was able to move into "high society". He gave much
money to charities and visited prisons with Howard, as well as taking part
in other philanthropic activities. But, as one biographer has commented,
"Lettsom's philanthropy shows too much of a tendency to cure immediate
and obvious evils without seeking out and attacking the economic sources
of such^evils" (Trent, 19^8, p. 337). Another philanthropist who inherited
"a considerable estate" (1KB) on his father's death was Godfrey Higgins.
Higgins was Justice of the Peace for the West Hiding of Yorkshire, and in
today's terras would be described as a "liberal activist". He was influ¬
ential in exposing the mismanagement at York Lunatic Asylum and in found¬
ing the County Asylum at Wakefield. He was also involved in the movements
for the abolition of the Corn laws and the disestablishment of the Irish
Church.
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of the capitalist means of production, was transformed through their
ideological work into institutions which were designed to make more
efficient, and hence even more profitable, the exploitation of labour
which was one of the bases of the whole system.
In other words, argued Howard, what the criminals of society needed
was not exclusion, but rehabilitation, to make them more productive.
Howard first noticed the condition of prisons and Houses of Correction
in the course of his duties as High Sheriff for Bedford. He was appointed
to this position in 1773 and four years later he published his btate of
the Prisons in England and "wales.1 This was followed in 1798 with his
2
Account of the Principal lazarettos In Europe, the result of his exten¬
sive research into hospitals for the poor all over the Continent. How¬
ard's works contained not only a detailed account of what he saw, but
proposals for model penal institutions based on what he considered to
be important in the confinement of those who had broken the law. He made
four main proposals for penal .reform; (l) the necessity for structurally
secure and sanitary buildings in which to house prisoners; (2) subjec¬
tion of all prisoners to a reformatory programme; (3) transformation of
the gaoler from independent profit-maker to salaried servant of a public
authority; and (^) systematic inspection by an outside authority.
An aspect of proposals (l) and (2.) was the need for an appropriately-
shaped building in which the prisoners could most efficiently (that is,
with least expense) be reformed. Practically all the writers on penal
reiorin at this tine pointed out the dangers of the old mixed gaols in
1
Reprinted as J. Howard, 1973, vol. 1.
2
Reprinted as J. Howard, 1973> vol. 2. Useful discussions of Howard'sideas
^ appear in o. and £. Webb, 1922, pp. 37ff„ and Rosenau, 1970,cnap« tc
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which there existed a community of thieves and from which "the novice
will depart an adept"] as one of them put it. This writer continuea,
This surely is a most unjust, as well as impolitic, mode
of treating those, who by a separation from evil compan¬
ions should "be preserved from farther corruption, who
should be taught good habits by the discipline of labour,
and be admonished by the friendly voice of instruction. '
But while the writer here was praising the positive virtues of being a
member of society, rather than being permanently excluded from it, we
must not let the rhetoric conceal from us exactly what resocialisation
was being planned for these deviants from normality.
According to the logic of the reformers, if mixed gaols encouraged
crime the prisoners must be separated. Howard was the first in this
country to popularise the principle of solitary confinement, a principle
that was to be developed far beyond what Howard personally intended. It
was also the principle that was to dominate much of the discussion about
suitable facilities for the insane. As a direct result of Howaru's work,
an act was passed in 1779 which stated the principle that
if many Offenders, convicted of Crimes for which Trans¬
portation hath been usually inflicted, were oraered to
Bowen, 1797. p. 9 (see also Aikin, 1792, p. 172; Wedderburn, 1793,
p. 13). This sort of remark is very similar to that made by bamuel Tuke
and others, criticising the way in which large custodial madhouses soc¬
ialised their inmates into norms of insane behaviour, as Tuke put it,
writing about one such institution he had visited, "In the midst of soc¬
iety, every one seemed in solitude; conversation or amusement was rarely
to be observed—employment never. Each individual appeared to be pursuing
his own busy cogitations; pacing with restless step from one end of the
enclosure to the other, or lolling in slothful apathy upon the benches. It
was evident that society could not exist in such a crowd" (b. Tuke, 181J5,
pp. 14-3).
2
Bowen, op.ctt., pp. 9-10. Bowen was the Chaplain to Bridewell Hospital
and also to Bethiem, about which he had already written a descriptive
account (Bowen, 1784).
?.Q?
solitary Imprisonment, accompanied by well-regulated Labour,
and religious Instruction, it sight be the Means, under
Providence, not only of deterring others from the Commis¬
sion of like Crimes, but also of reforming the Individuals,
and Inuring them to Habits of Industry.x
"Well-regulated Labour'5 which would inure the prisoners to "Habits of
Industry", and solitary confinements two principles so new (in this con¬
text) and so strongly believed in that a new term was devised to describe
the institution in which they were to be embodied—the Penitentiary.
The principle of work as an instrument of reform was not new, as
the discussion on the workhouses has shown, but some of the early reformed
gaols caarried its practice to new extremes. The House of Correction
built at Preston in Lancashire in 1790 was run, as near as possible, on
the lines of a cotton-weaving factory, employing ljjO men on handlcoias
and the rest working at tailoring, shcemaking or cotton-picking, and
other simple occupations. Eut almost as soon as institutions like this
became operational, there was criticism that they were not indoctrinating
their inmates into the right sort of labour. It was an argument that was
later to be applied to the lunatic asylums, and it centred around the
different conceptions of the end product that were expsctea from the
reformative process. In the minds of many administrators and reformers,
a prison which allowed skilled artisans to engage in their traa.es which,
because of the nature of the productive processes, required association
of the prisoners; and which would even teach some prisoners a traae:
such a prison was not the terrible place it should be. From this point
of view the emphasis that some prisons laid on output of production was
ill-conceived. Although, argued many reformers, the work done had to
be useful, it was the principle that was more important. As one of them
^
19 Gao III, chap. 7'*, quoted in Rosenau, 1970, p. 9^.
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put it,
neither the absolute value of the work produced, nor the
proportion it bears to the maintenance of the workman, is
the principle object; the point is, that he should be
EMPLOYED; whether more or less usefully, depends on the
ingenuity of those who let him to work, and the profit
of it is a local concern; but it imports the publick that
he should WORK, let the value be ever so trifling.
In other words, what was needed was the inculcation of work habits into
the prisoners' very nature so that when they were released they would no
longer turn to crime but to the factory for profitable employment.
The other principle that the Penitentiary was to embody, and which
was intended to complement that of habits of industry, was solitary con¬
finement. All reformers at that time expressed a commitment to the prin¬
ciple of segregation, but there was a continual debate as to the length
of time a prisoner should be kept in isolation. One extreme was that
of Philadelphia Prison, founded by the Quakers in 1790. Here the prisoners
were kept in their cells hours a day, the aim being, according to the
Webbs, "the religious and moral regeneration of the prisoner, which, it
O
was supposed, would be promoted by uninterrupted introspection". 11113
introspection or reflection is the sort of quality we might expect the
Quakers to value, given their commitment to each man becoming conscious
of his place in a world that was dominated by the moral relationship of
man to God. For most prison administrators, confinement to the cells
3
was used as punishment or because separate confinement made the admin-
Wedderburn, 1793, P« 17, emphasis in the original.
S. and B. Webb, 1922, p. 116. "Alone in his cell, the convict is handed
over to himself; in the silence of his passions and of the world that sur¬
rounds him, he descends into his own conscience, he questions it ana feels
awakening within him the moral feeling that never entirely perishes in the
heart of man "(Journal des economist.es, l&i2, quoted in Foucauit, 1977,
p. 238).
3
The Webbs give an example of an inmate sentenced to two years' solitary
confinement for "uttering seditious words" (S. ana B, Webb, op.cit., p. <?!)•
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istration of labour easier, as when individual treadmills were installed
in each cell. The lack of association with other prisoners and the con¬
stant labour were obviously meant to have some effect on the inmates'
minds, but it was intended to be more along the lines of instilling habits
of industry rather than of creating in the prisoners' minds a conscious
recognition that hard work could lead to social mobility or the attain¬
ment of other social values."'*
In the years following the publication of Howard's dtate of the
Prisons, numerous plans were published and buildings erected in attempts
to express these penitentiary principles. Although Howard also proo.uc.ea
plans to show what he envisaged as an ideal basis of confinement, he was,
as a recent commentator has pointed out, "not remarkable for his archi-
tectural vision". His plan for a penitentiary is shown in Figure k.
This plan allowed for work, segregation, and inspection to be enforced
on the prisoners, but it hardly did so in the most efficient way. A
number of architects and reformers argued that if these were -the prin¬
ciples on which the penitentiary was to be based, what, was needed was a
building that incorporated the maximum of each of these principles within
it.
This line of thinking reached its apotheosis in the concept devel¬
oped and made famous by Jeremy Hentham: the Panopticon. Figure 5 shows
There was a long-standing debate between the advocates of the Philadel¬
phia model, in which the ideal was the confrontation of each man with his
own conscience (the Quaker "Spirit of God"); ana the advocates of the Auburn
model, in which the aim was a replication of an ideal world, a "microcosm
of a perfect society in which individuals are isolated in their moral exist¬
ence, but in which they come together in a strict hierarchical framework,
with no lateral relation, communication being possible only in a vertical
direction" (Foucault, 1977, p. 238).
2
Rosenau, 1970, p. 82.
Bentham, 1791. The full title of this work makes clear the meaning of
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Source: Howard, 1973, vol. 1, facing p. 229#
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Figure 5
Bentham's design for a Panopticon
"Explanation: A. Cells B to C, Great Annular Sky Light D. Cell
Galleries E„ Entrance F. Inspection Galleries G. Chanel Galleries
H. Inspector's Lodge I. Dome of the Chapel x. Sky Light to D°
jj® Store Rooms &c. with their Galleries; immediately within the outer
"all all round place for an annular Cistern Q M, Floor of the ChapelN. Circular Opening in d° (open except at Church times), to light theInspector's Lodge 0* Annular Wall from top to bottom, for li^ht, air
and separation," 0 '
Source: Bentham, 1843, vol, 4, facing p. 172.
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the Panopticon as penthan conceived it. He meant it as a general plan,
to be applied not only to penal institutions, but
it will be found applicable, I think, without exception
to all establishments whatsoever, in which within a space
not too large to be covered or commanded by buildings, a
number of persons are meant to be kept under inspection,
ho matter how different, or even opposite the purpose:
whether it be, that of punishing the incorrigible, guarding
the insane, reforming the vicious, confining the suspected,
employing the idle, maintaining the helpless, curing the
sick, instructing"the willing in any branch of industry, ^
or training the rising race in the path of education. . ."1"
Each inmate was to be confined to his individual cell, there to work,
sleep, eat, and reflect on his condition, all under the omnipotent eye
of his keeper. It was this latter function that was so distinctive
about the Panopticon: it allowed total surveillance of its inmates. In
practice, as Bentham and all who accepted this principle realised, to
do this would be impossible without a. staff numbering nearly as many as
those they were watching. The alternative, which was the whole point
of the Panopticon, was "to make them not only suspect, but be assures.,
that whatever they do is known, even though that should not be the
2
case". This would be particularly applicable to the control of lunatics,
argued Bentham, in that it would establish an invisible restraint, the
the unfamiliar -term: Panopticon, or The Inspection House. Bentham pub¬
lished a second defence of his ideas on the subject in 1802 (see Bentham,
1843f vol. 4, pp. 174-248).
Bentham, 1791, vol. 1, p. 2, emphasis in the original. Or, as he put
it later in the book, "what would you say, if by the gradual adoption
and diversified application of this single principle, you should see
a new scene of things spread itself over the face of civilised society? -
Morals reformed, health preserved, industry invigorated, instruction
diffused, public burthens lightened, economy seated as it were upon a
rock, the Gordian knot of the Poor-laws not cut but untied—all by a
simple idea in architecture?" (ibid., pp. 139-40).
Ibid,, p. 137.
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gaze of the keeper, which "would render the use ox chains and other modes
of corporeal sufferance as unnecessary in this case as any".1
There is a strong echo here of Francis Willis* "piercing eye"
which could "read their hearts and divine their thoughts as they formed"
in his patients, and which technique he used to control the mad King-
George III/" But the "eye" technique was labour-intensive and was also
more appropriate to the individual patron-client relationship that aris¬
tocratic patients would expect. For paupers and criminals, the aim was
maximum control which at the same time established -the subject as one of
the many who had to be made conscious of their communal impotence under
the authority of the ruling class.
The essence of it [the Panopticon] consists then, in the
centrality of the Inspector's situation, combined with the
well known and most effectual contrivances for seeing with¬
out being seen.-'*
Through a system of spy holes and strategically placed windows, the con¬
fined were to be given the impression of being continually under surveill¬
ance. Control was to be established, not through crude mechanical res¬
traint, nor through a reliance on total 5_nternalisation, but through
something which utilised aspects of both; the suggestion of an authority
that, like God himself, coula see all and from whom one's only aefence
was total conformity. The principle was established. Within these rigid
and massive structures of order the deviant was to be reclaimed to society,
1
Bentham, 1791» vol. 1, p. 111.
2
Anon, 1796, p. 76^. (See above, p. 68 , note 3.)
3
Bentham, op. c-it.. p. 2.3, emphasis in the original. As well as the
brilliance of fulfilling so many functions which Bentham was always main¬
taining for his invention, we must not forget his trump cara, economy.
The Panopticon, argued Bentham, would be cheaper than transportation,
cheaper indeea than any method which did not effectively refona its
charges, (dee Bentham, 18^3, vol. 4, p. 17*1.)
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through reflection and through work.
Hot everyone agreed with Bentham as to the necessity for prisons to
be built entirely on the cellular principle. For one thing, it was ex¬
pensive, and for another, continual isolation bore no relationship vO
the social structure cf the world to which the prisoner was supposed to
be returning. One cogent criticism of Pentonville, built on the Panopt¬
icon principle, was that its cells were the equivalent of the lunatics'
straitjacket:
In order to teach the untamed criminal to restrain the
violence of his passions, [Pentonville} isolates him from
his fellows, and proposes to give him the power of over¬
coming temptation by removing him out of its reachJ Of
all questionable means to effect a given end, this seems
to me the most questionable. In the name of reason, what
discipline can the cell afford to the uneducated? . . .
We have lunatics in strait-jackets, very quiet and very
harmless, who, if out of them, would be very violent.
But is this a good argument for putting ail lunatics, with¬
out exception, into strait-jackets? The cell is, in fact,
the criminal's strait-jacket. It keeps him very quiet ana
makes him very obedient; but the question nevertheless,
remains open—Does it make him a better man? What we want
are sound minds, not quiet men in strait-jackets; good
citizens, not submissive criminals in silent cells.
Everyone agreed with the principle of segregation, what was needed
was a model which could incorporate it along lines which reproduced the
structure of society, and not the extreme individualist dreams of Bentham.
Bentham reduced all social and psychological values to the prouuction of
pleasure and the avoidance of pain, as they were created by individual
actions. "The interest of the community then is what? - the sum of the
interests of the members who compose it." So, argued Bentham, make the
• r\
individual members of a community happy" and all society will experience
Hepworth .Dixon, quoted in D.L. Howard, i960, pp. 66-7.
2
Bentham, 184.3, vol. 1, p. 2.
3 BeEthaa used the term "happiness" to refer to such disparate achieve-
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the same state of happiness. Thus the Panopticon was devised to trans¬
form each individual on an individual basis because, for Bentham,
society was no more than the sum of its individuals.
Compared to many of his colleagues in the reform movement, Bentham
was ahead of his time. He was a truly bourgeois ideologist who saw all
social relations in terms of a simple profit—ana—loss account, such as
a small shopkeeper might use. He attempted to transform deviance within
the logic of purely bourgeois values. But many of the people associateu
with penal and lunacy reform, and especially the magistracy ana repre¬
sentatives of the Church, were committed mere to traditional values.
According to them, the planning of institutions for the reformation of
deviants should be made subordinate to the reproduction of the correct
relationship between classes, specifically that between the "lower"
classes and their "betters"."^
It was pressure from these quarters, notably from Sir G.C. Paul
and the Beverend J.T. Becher, that led to the Panopticon not being recom¬
mended by the l8ll Select Committee on Penitentiaries. They favourea a
model which still allowed for inspection, segregation, and employment,
ments as "advantage", "good", "benefit", and "pleasure" (see Benthara,
18^-3j vol. 1, p. 2). This idiosyncratic usage must be kept in mind when
reading such phrases as the following, in which he extolled the virtues
of the Panopticon? "Would happiness be most likely to be increased or
diminished by this discipline? - Call them soldiers, call them monks,
call them machines, so long they were but happy ones, I shoula not care"
(Bentham, 1791, vol. 1, p. 128j.
1
In many ways my analysis here parallels that of Foucault in his disci¬
pline and Punish (Foucault, 1977, especially part 3), which appearea after
I had completed the draft of this thesis. As Foucault points out, the
opposition between the advoca.tes of alternative models of reform was basea
on many arguments—economic, religious, administrative, and medical,
"But at the heart of the debate, and making it possible, was this primary
objective of carceral action; coercive indivisualisation, by the terrain-'
ation of any relation that is not supervised by authority or arranged
according to hierarchy" (ibid., p. 239).
but within structures of order that did not reduce ail inmates to an
identical atomistic status. In place of the totally impersonal and
tottery type of accommodation that the Panopticon entailed, the 1811
Select Committee decided to recommend reformative institutions that
relied on some degree of segregation, but which also allowed re-social¬
isation within groups that bore a resemblance to the outside world as
the Committee saw it. They looked favourably on the House of Correction
at Southwell on the grounds that
It is there supposed that the vigilance of those who have
tho care of the prisoners will be able to prevent any mis¬
chief that might result from the communication of a few
individuals with each other; and that in the small circle
in which the offender is allowed to move, he may be ex¬
pected under proper management to form habits of industry
and self-restraint, which, he will be likely to practise
on liis return to society.~
This ideal, based primarily on the Auburn model of penal reform, was
expressed in the plans for Ipswich Gaol and in the plan for a peniten-
2
tiary that Sir John Soane drew up. It was also expressed in the plan
for the proposed London Asylum (Figuce 3)« As can be seen from that
plan, in the centre are the representatives of order, who would patrol
the inspection galleries, inspecting the day rooms where homogeneous
groups of inmates would congregate. At night the patients would return
to their single cells. The totally insensible or "noisy" patients, those
on whom order had proved to be redundant, were relegated to ths furthest
reaches of the asylun. For them confinement only was required.
2
loll SC, 1st Report, p. 20. This Report contains evidence by Bentham,
Lecher (a rounder ox Nottingham Asylum), and Paul (a founder of Gloucester
Asylum) showing tho various arguments presented for and against the Pan¬
opticon design. The Panopticon principle did experience a revival of
interest in the 1920s. (See Society for the Improvement of Prison Disci¬
pline, 1826.)
2
Illustrated is Rosenau, 1970, pp. 8^5.
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Here, apparently, was the model that had been looked for throughout
the eighteenth century, and that neither the workhouse nor the special¬
ist hospitals had been able to provide. At. last deviance of all kinds
was to be abolished, to bs made to wither under the penetrating gaee
of authority. This was an authority which now had the self-confidence
to confront its deviants rather than to transport than to distant coun¬
tries or to herd them unclassified into centres purely for confinementj
but it was also an authority which realised that the cosy family control
of institutions like the Retreat could hardly work with the majority
of those who did not conform. Intorealisation of control was still the
long-term alia, but the type and jsethods of control had to be made
appropriate to those who needed it. Segregation, inspection, employments
three principles by which deviance was to bs coerced back to normality»
three principles which did not originate with the penal reform movement
but vlsich were developed by that movement into specific practices which
could be used by others interested in devianca control.
As already stated, the London Asylum was not built, but others on the
same model were, and in them can be seen the same structure of order.
One of these was the Glasgow Asylum. According to H.G. Sennet, a member
cf th© 1816 Select Committee on madhouses, "I have no hesitation in
saying this is the best Lunatic Asylum I have over seen". The reason,
he concluded, was that
its principle merit consists in the great classification
oi the patients, and in the separating them into small
families, there being a great number of galleries, and
only seven or oight colls in each gallery, with a common
room belonging to each, with a window at the end command¬
ing a lawn, with a very gay and chearful prospect.1
1
l8.l6 oC, Jrd Report, p. /• That Glasgow Asylum was the best in Britain
was a sentiment reiterated by the Edinburgh Review (Fitton, 1817, p. 460).
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Figure 6 shows the plan of Glasgow Asylum as drawn by its architects
William Stark. As car be seen, classification was effected not only by
state of illness or convalescence, but by sex and "rank". In other
words, 16 different sections were needed to encompass all the different
classifications. A throe-storey building was erected (Figure 7) arid was
divided for use according to the principles laid out in Table b.
Stark acknowledged the value of having been able to communicate with
John Ferriar, physician at Manchester Lunatic Hospital, whose own attempts
at management had been hampered by the physical shape of Ms building.
Ferriar, it will be remembered, was one of the first amongst the medical
profession to state what the penal reformers were beginning to realise
with lawbreakers. A3 Ferriar, writing of the insane, put it,
in the cure of diseases of this nature, the patient must
"minister" to himself$ medicine may restore his more early
and more completely to the command of Ms Intellectual
operations? discipline must direct him in their exertion.
This recognition must be seen as a progressive move because it
exchanged an absolutist punishment, which saw deviance purely as a symbol
of moral disorder, with an attempt to communicate with deviance on
naturalistic terms. Deviants ware merely human, like everyone else:
therefore, argued the reformers, they must be subjected to the same
processes of social control as everyone else. Although as far as
Stark's own model of an ideal asylum was concerned, it must be said
that in attempting to replicate what he saw as the natural divisions
of society, he let the principle of classification blind him to the
realities of administering an institution. Samuel Tuke, for one,
criticised Stark's design on the grounds that he overdid the degree of
classification. According to Tuke, Stark's plan was based toe much on
1
Ferriar, 1792-1793, vol. 2, p. 112.
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prison design. It did not allow sufficiently for the "facility of inter¬
change"1 which lunatics required but prisoners did not. As fable 4
showst some classifications (for example, the male higher-rank frantic)
had an allocation of only about five beds out of 120. This might have
reflected an ideal conception of the world held by Stark, and it certainly
Biade for a beautifully symmetrical architectural design. But it was
extremely impractical and can never have been adhered to except in the
2
early years when the asylum was less than half full.
Although Stark's design was undoubtedly an extreme one, the principle
of classification based on the patients' discipline or conformity to
3
norms of correct behaviour was accepted by all as correct. When Take
was able to exert some of his own influence on asylum design, ho put
forward suggestions that owed much to Stark's model.
At the end of l8l4 advertisements began to appear in the Wakefield
and Halifax Joi:rnal and other newspapers, inviting designs for a public
u
lunatic asylum to be built at Wakefield. ' A first prise of one hundred
guineas was offered. James Bevans, the architect of the proposed London
Asylum, submitted plans, as well as extensive details of his design, to
5the 1815 Select Committee, But Bevans was only one of 40 entrants, and
the winners of the competition were to be Watson and Pritchatt of York,
1
S. Tuke, 1815, p. 24.
p
According to evidence given to the I8l6 SC, there were only 36 patients
in the asylum at that tirae (3rd Report, pp. 7-8).
3
A fuller discussion of the role of classification in moral treatment




See I8I5 SC, 3^ Report, pp. l60-l.
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friends of Samuel Tuke, who had based their design on his suggestions.'
Building was "begun in February I8l69 and the asylum opened in
November l8l8. It was built, on Tuke's recommendation, for 150 patients,
75 of each sax. Figures 8 and 9 show, respectively, the plans of the
ground and first floors of the asylum as it was built* Tuke favoured
the "K" shaped design as it allowed for the maximum separation of male
and female patients, as at Glasgow; but unlike Glasgow, allowed more
2
mixing of the patients under suitable supervision, "Supervision" was
still the operative word. Tuke criticised the Panopticon design as not
allowing sufficient supervision or surveillance, not of the inmates but
of the staff themselves. Like Bentham, Tuke agreed that inspection was
the major principle of care. Everything had. to be made subordinate to
inspection of the patients. In designing an asylum, argued Tuke, whatever
the other principles to be taken into account,
some sacrifice in regard to easy inspection, an object
to which even cheerfulness is but secondary, must prob¬
ably be made.--'
1
S. Tuke, 1815, 1819; Watson and Pritchett, 1819.
2
Note that the category of patients consigned to the most distant cells
are no longer described by the medical category of "frantic" as at Glasgow
Asylum, but under "the reformatory,category of "refractory", that is,
"stubborn" or "unmanageable" (0Ed).
3 S. Tuke, 1815, p. ^0, Eevanfs unsuccessful design also accepted the
necessity for inspection or, as he put it, "With regard to Inspection,
the object is one of such importance, that of itself it would have been
sufficient to have induced me to have placed all the Patients as nearly
as possible on one floor" 1815 SC, 3rd Henort. p. 162). Sevan did in¬
corporate the principle of inspection into his design by providing
"sash-doors" so that the Superintendent and Katron could see the patient
wrohout themselves being seen. This was apparently not recognised as
being as efficient a method of surveillance as that submitted by the
winners of the competition.
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Figure 8
Plan of ground floor, W^k^field Asylum
. A"*
<; r t> r a /> /■ /. . / a
Source: Watson and Pritchett, 1819, plate 3.
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Figure 9
Plan of first floor, Wakefield Asylum
rut. 4
s /: r o X /» s ton r.
Source: Watson and Pritchett, 1819, plate 4«
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Out of tills principle of inspection Tuke proposed the first step to an
institutionalised bureaucracy of control?
The regulations of an Asylum should establish a species of
espionage, terminating in the public? this cannot be effected
in an ill constructed building. One servant and one officer
should be so placed as to watch over another. All should
be vigilantly observed by well selected and interested
visiters; and these should be stimulated to attention, by
the greatest facilities being afforded to persons who,
from motives of rational, not iale^ curiosity, are desirous
of inspecting such establishments.-'"
Some idea of how this principle of espionage was built into the
physical fabric of Wakefield Asylum can be seen from Figures 10, 11,
and 12. Figure 10, as its label indicates, shows a section through a
staircase (of a plan of the asylum). Figures 11 and 12 show more clearly
the. actual spyhole through which the "espionage" was to take place, and
which was in existence until the 19.50s. These stairwells were made
accessible only to staff. The senior staff would be able to look from
the top platform at the keepers, who would in turn be inspecting the
patients in the day rooms. And at night,, or whenever the keepers were
patrolling the galleries, the superintendent could check the keepers'
progress through the spyholes to the galleries.
Here was a vision far removed from the comparative disorder of the
Retreat; but at that institution all were agreed on their place in the
social and natural order as defined by God." In the pauper asylum the
S. Tuke, 1815, p. 28, emphasis in the original. For a recent commentary
c-n this principle, see Fcucault, 1977, pp. 170-7.
Z
Samuel Tuke did acknowledge that the Retreat was not arcMtectursdly
perfect as an asylum (see Description, pp. 105-7), but unfortunately he
left no precise details as to how ho would have liked to see the Retreat
improved, except to state that he would have liked more window space in
some "rather gloomy" rooms. More Interesting is the fact that Tuke nut
a lot- o£ effort into trying to prevent national statutory inspection of
asylums being extended to private institutions like the Retreat. In an
"Observations" on a Bill of I8l4, Tuke accepted the need for "independent
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Figure 10
Section through staircase, Wakefield Asylum
Wakefield Asylum: Section through Staircase
Source: Broadbent, 1956, facing p. 107
?23
Figure 11
Spyhole through staircase, Wakefield Asylum
Figure 12
Spyhole from ward., Wakefield Asylum
order had to "be established in bricks and mortar. This principle of
surveillance or espionage, which Pinsl had come to see as the most impor¬
tant aspect of "traiteiaer.it moral", was now in Britain the dominant theme
on which progressive asylum architecture was based, within the spaces
formed by this new physical structure of order, the practice of moral
treatment continued its emergence into the world.
In terms of the history of moral treatment, the architectural
principle of espionage or surveillance can hardly be said to mark an
advance on moral treatment as it was practised at the Betreat. It was,
after all, the primary aim of moral treatment there to provide "means
[by which! the power cf the patient to control his disorder, is strong-L
thened and assisted"."'' Self-restraint, in other words, rather than the
harsh coercive restraint of chains and whips. From that standpoint,
the emphasis on constantly watching the inmates of an asylum was a retro¬
grade stepi it seemed to admit that for many self-restraint could never
bo achieved, -that it remained an ideal but one that had to bo reinforced
by the invisible restraints of surveillance. This typo of approach may
have been partly due to the influence of the penal reform movement
(specifically the Auburn model of reform), and it may have been partly
due to the conservatism of reformers like Samuel Tuke who never really
trusted the ability of the (non-Quaker) members of the working class to
public visitors" of lunatic asylums but maintained that the introduction
of National Commissioners to inspect all asylums "would tend to diminish
the interest of the local Committees now entrusted with their management,
and repress, rather than stimulate, the right seal and energy of their
principle officers" (S. Tuke,[i8l^aj p, .1), dee also S. Tuke. Il8l4bl
for a similar statement, this time within the stronger format of a
petition to the House of Commons.
Description, p. 138.
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control themselves. As will be seen, this attitude diminished in strength
when a new generation of reformers emerged.
Before moving on to another fragment of moral treatment, a word
should be said about one idea dominating all discussion on asylum
architectures economy. A member of the l8l6 Select Committee had com¬
mented on what he saw as a defect of the otherwise excellent design of
Glasgow Asylum:
I feel it, however, necessary to add, that for general
adoption I should think the external decoration of the
building much too costly, as undoubtedly the architect
who built it had in view no less the convenience of the
unhappy maniacs confined in it, than the ornament of the
great capital of the western part of Scotland.1
As can be seen from Figure 7, the building is impressive, but hardly
in the grand manner of Bethlem (Figure 2). A further distinction which
Bonnet did not mention was that Glasgow Asylum, like the English sub¬
scription hospitals and like Nottingham and Stafford County Asylums,
was not built solely for paupers. The patients of "higher rank" at
Glasgow paid from 15 shillings to £l.lXs.6d. per week, whereas the paupers
were paid for by their parishes at the rate of eight shillings to 10s.6d,
per week.
Stark, like Robert Owen, saw no contradiction in trying to establish
a moral community in which rich and poor were to share at least the same
building. The only necessity was that the rich should not be physically
mixed with the lower classes. As Stark pointed out, writing of mixed
madhouses,
In such abodes persons of liberal education, and of respect¬
able rank in society, are unavoidably mixed with those of
lowest rank, of the most brutal manners, and of the most
profligate habits; almost every possible state of the dis¬
ease, is, in like manner, exhibited in the same ward, as if
mental derangement, like the hand of death, levelled all
1
H.G. Rennet. 1816 SC, 3rd Report, p. 8.
distinctions.^"
But even to mix the classes to the extent of confining them within the
same building was too much for Tuke and most of the English reformers.
It might work for Scotland, where an organic paternalism still seemed
2
to hold the "ranks" of society together in a symbiotic relationship;
but in England by this time most reformers were beginning to acknowledge
the class basis of society. The point has already been made that moral
paternalism did not disappear with the rise to political and economic
power of the manufacturing class. What is noteworthy from the point of
view of the self-image of that class is that it has, in spite of its
material dominance, remained ideologically content to see itself as a
"middle" class. An aspect of this is that the moralistic attentions
of the middle class have seldom been directed "upwards". Samuel Tuke
maintained, in relation to the insane rich, that
It is not very likely that County Asylums will ever be made
acceptable to the highest class of society. . . .1 am in¬
clined. to think, that in regard to the most v?ealthy class
of insane persons, all that can be done for them is, through
legislative means, to provide for the careful and efficient
inspection of the establishments appropriated to their use.-^
What these "highest class establishments" were like will be examined
4
below. But at Wakefield, in an asylum built solely for paupers, every¬
thing was made subordinate to the strongest possible commitment to econ¬
omy. As the architects themselves pointed out,
1
Stark, 180?, p. 10.
^
This point is made by J.F.C. Harrison (1969) in relation to Hobert
Owen's ambiguous attitude to the Poor Law.
S. Tuke, 18^1, p. xiv. Even today, the Hetreat remains a select private
asylum for those who wish to locate themselves outside the ideological
hegemony of the Welfare State.
See pp. 247ff.
22.8
Ho attempt has boon made, in these elevations at architec¬
tural display. Neither magistrates nor architects forgot
that this was a Pauper Lunatic Asylum. . . .Even the cornice
is not solely for ornament, gutters for the water being
hollowed out of it.-1-
This was an aspect of the construction of this asylum that Tuke himself
was very conscious of$ that its capital cost was to come from a County
rate, and therefore it should cost no more than the absolute minimum
required to produce its effect.
This was a perfectly realistic considerations it was always a com¬
plaint of asylum administrators that the Overseers of the Poor were
reluctant to release their insane charges from the workhouses as long
as the asylums were more expensive. At Wakefield, for instance, in spite
of all the attempts to reduce costs,, the rate of maintenance charged, to
Overseers was initially 10s.6d. per week, or over three times the cost
2
of keeping a pauper in a workhouse, To justify this expense, the
/
asylums had to proclaim loudly their added advantages over other forms
of confinement. To remove from public view the offensive spectacle of
undisciplined behaviour was certainly one function of the asylumsf more
important, though, was their commitment to rehabilitation, their pro¬
claimed ability to return useful members of society to active functioning.
This is why the architecture of the asylum was so important—it had to
incorporate not only a means of inspection, but also a system whereby
the reformative process could most efficiently be put into action.
The ideal model for the reformation of deviants was thus slowly
taking shape. On the one hand was the paternalistic attempt to create
Watson and Pritchett, 1819, p. 30.
2
Personal communication from Mr A.L. Ashworth, Archivist at the Stanley
.doyd Hospital in Wakefield. On the continuing imbalance between asylum
and workhouse charges see K. Jones, 1972, pp.*129-30.
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a moral community, non-punitive, yet almost totalitarian in its implica¬
tions. And on the other stood the model of the prisons and the physical
constraints that could ha brought to the aid of inculcating the right
habits. There is one further theme which runs through both these approaches,
which was common to all reformative ideologies of the time, and which was
ons of the core features of moral treatment. This is the incorporation
of productive work into therapeutic programmes, an incorporation which
was seen as so vital to the whole enterprise that it might justly be
said to be the glue which held the whole edifice together.
3. The Imperative' to Work
Scattered throughout all the pronouncements on the aims of therapy
examined up to now have been repeated references to the value of work,
and to -the general need to create "habits of industry" in all paupers.
The Eclinburgh Hevisw summed up the prevailing attitude in l8l?«
For the lower classes, laborious occupation is the best
form of exercise, and is well described by the master of
St Luke's [Lunatic Hospital} "as the best doctor they have".""
The principle vras clear but, before examining the precise meaning of this
ideological proclamation, it is worth asking to what extent "laborious
occupation" vras actually engaged upon in the early asylums. Lid it
remain an ideology, or were any creative attempts made to reproduce the
working part of patients' lives in the asylum?
As was made clear in Chapter Tiro, Samuel Tuke was convinced of the
central!ty of work in the treatment of the insane. He never lost his
belief that, as he put it,
Of all the modes by which patients may be induced to restrain
themselves, regular employment is perhaps the most generally
efficacious.
1




la his instructions to the architects of the West Riding of York Asylum
at Wakefield, Tuke insisted that "A work room, where from 20 to 30 pat¬
ients may be employed in weaving &.c. mast be provided"As was usual
with Tuke, the reason he put forward for this was one based on custom
and. not on commitment to a theory. In his words,
It has, as may be supposed, been found most easy to induce
the patient to engage in pursuits, to which he has been
previously accustomed; and it is probable, that a consid¬
erable proportion of the West-Riding pauper patients,
will have been engaged in weaving.2
Tukecommitment to incorporating work into the daily life at the wake-
field Asylum was also stated by the asylum's first superintendent,
William Ellis, in 1815. Ellis had been working in a private madhouse
in Hull. The high cure rate that the house had. achieved -was attributed
by Ellis almost entirely to the patients' "being kept almost constantly
employed in the gardens".2 The types of work recommended by Ellis were,
as with Trice's suggestions, dependent on the patients' own past exper¬
iences.
As a general rule, work of all kinds in the open air, when the
weather will permit; in the house, for mechanics in the var¬
ious kinds of hanaycraft business, with which they are ac¬
quainted, as they will turn their attention more readily
to what they know, than to that of which they are ignorant,
because it requires much less exertion, ana the mind being
in a state of debility is easily fatigued.. *
When he took up the post of superintendent at Wakefield, Ellis lost no
"Instructions drawn up by Mr Samuel Tuke for the Architects who pre¬
pared designs for the West-Riding Asylum" in Watson and Pritchett, 1819,
p. 2. Tuke's "Instructions" were incorporated into the official require¬
ments for the plans of the asylum, as can be seen from the Competition
requirements given in the 1813 EC, 3rd Report, pp. 160-1.
2
Sc. Tuke, 1815, p. 43.




time in putting his "beliefs into practice. From the beginning, all the
manual work was done by the patients. Ko aspect of asylum life was
exempt, from the brewing of the asylum, beer to the gardening and engin¬
eering tasks that had to be done. The head of each department—kitchen,
garden, etc.—was a member of staff, but beyond that all the asylum
work was dona by the patients. Here indeed was a glue by which the
moral community of the asylum could really be held together.
A year after the asylum was opened, Ellis was able to announce that
Within doors, as far as is possible, every patient is reg¬
ularly set to work, and in time, it is probable, that the
principle part of the clothing for the Patients will be
manufactured in the Asylum,-*•
The following year self-sufficiency had almost been achieved, as Ellis
was able to report at the end of 18205
The employment in some way or other, of every Patient
capable of it has teen constantly persevered in, during
the year and this has been attended with the test effects.
Almost the whole of the clothing has been manufactured
by the persons under confinement. All the shoes and the
clothes, both for the males anp; the females have teen
entirely made by the patients/"
This was with an asylum population of 123, but the employment did not
cease as the asylum got larger. In 1833, when its population was over
2.50, and when Ellis had teen two years out of office, the new director
was able to report that
A considerable reduction has been made in the expense of
clothing the patients, by the profits arising from the
sale of cloth made by them.-'
Similar profits were reported by Ellis at Hanwell where he was superin¬
tendent from 1831 to 1838. In I83T when the asylum there was at bursting
1
West Riding of Yorkshire Pauper Luna,tic Asylum, Annual Report. 1819.
2
Ibid., Annual Report, 1820.
3
Ibid., Annual JReport, 1833.
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point vrith 558 patients, he was able to announce that the average number
of patients employed at any one time was 320, These patients were not
only the recently invalided, but included many who must have spent years
confined in workhouse or madhouse cells. Ellis attempted to find employ'
ment for all. In 1836, he wrote bow
Within the year, a species of employment has also been
discovered for the imbecile, and even the mischievous
Patient. It is that of picking in pieces the fibres of
the outer husk of the Cocoa-nut, which is becoming gen¬
erally used for the same purpose as horse-hair. Six pounds
ten shillings a ton is received for the work; and the
employment saves more than the sum paid for the labour in
keeping the Patients from destroying their clothes, and
it also renders personal confinement less necessary.
The enormous extent of this change of attitude towards the insane
2
can- hardly be overemphasized. When Wakefield Asylum was first opened,
detractors of Ellis' plans had argued that no patient should be allowed
to work in the asylum grounds unless chained to a keeper. It was also
proposed
that a corner of the garden should 'be allotted for their
labour, and that they should dig it over and over again
all the year round.3
This attitude was one that still considered the insane as a category
different from normal people. On the contrary, argued Ellis,
One great error in dealing with the insane is in treating
them fis if they were differently constituted from the
sane.1''
1
Quoted in Hunter and llacalpine's introduction to Conolly, 1968, p. 18.
2
Ellis' contribution was certainly recognised by Samuel Tuke. later
in his life Tuke honoured the memory of William Ellis because "to him
we are indebted for the first extensive and successful experiment to
introduce labour systematically Into our public asylums" (S. Tuke, 1511,
p. xxvii).
2
W.C. Ellis, 1838, p. 8.
^
Quoted infk.W, Ellis,J 1868, p. 60.
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This in of course the argument implicit in all moral treatments that
the insane, given the opportunity, can develop their capabilities just
like anybody else. What was distinctive about Wakefield Asylum was that
the precept was put into practice there more rigorously than at any other
asylum. But, while it was one of the earliest and most extensive exam¬
ples of industrial- therapy, it was by no means the only one in exist¬
ence at this time. At Glasgow, that other asylum of which oamuel Take
and the Edinburgh Beview spoke so highly,
Every encouragement. . .is given to the exertions of in¬
dustry, because nothing contributes so much to promote a
cure, and prevent a relapse.-*•
Glasgow Asylum was opened in December l8l't, and two years later had two
looms installed plus a number of spinning wheels. As the asylum had
been built close to the centre of the city and at a time when the city
was growing fast, it was not able to engage its patients in agriculture,
as were the more rural asylums. But large amounts of stone-breaking were
done for the new building taking place in Glasgow, as well as rope-making
for the ships that used the Glasgow docks.
W.A.F. Brovrns was another enthusiast of the value of work, and his
comments on -the subject are perhaps the most imaginative of all the moral
therapistsc. As he showed in his What Asylums are. . «. he was well
aware of the healing effect of taking part in normal purposive activity.
Here, for instance, are his comments on the value of works
If a man, who imagines himself an outcast from society, the
object cf contempt and scorn, be placed at a loom, and in¬
duced to produce ten or fifteen yards of cloth per day, it
is quite clear, that during the execution of his task, if
it be done well, he is forced to oxert his whole attention
and no little ingenuity and manual dexterity upon the man¬
agement of the shuttle, bean, & c., that while his mind
is so directed, it cannot be under the dominion of morbid
sorrows, . ,2
2
Glasgow Lunatic Asylum, Annual Report. 181?, p, 9,
Browne, IS37, pp. 93"^•
?,y+
Browne did not only present this as a theoretical principle. As he
pointed out* productive labour had been engaged in for years at Montrose
Asylums
Weavers, shoemakers, tailors, gardeners, carpenters, watch¬
makers, have all been tried for years, and found to work
as diligently, and to produce as good articles when confined
as when at liberty.1
©ther writers had already pointed cut the value of letting the patients
practice the crafts and trades at which they were already competent.
Browne went one step further and asked, in relation to laying turf,
masonry, and other tasks, why "should not lunatics be taught to do these
2
and many other things"? The essential thing to keep .in mind, argued
Browne, was that the patient could see the point of the vrork he or she
was given to do. In work
which is evidently prescribed as an occupation, and of no
utility either to himself or others, his pride is offended
. . .and the moral effect is lost.-'
This may appear a truism to us, but the realisation by physicians and
reformers of the value of this principle was not the same thing as the
acceptance by the. patients that work was good for them. As William
Drury, the superintendent at Glasgow Asylum, remarked,
several of the Patients refuse to labour, some from laziness,
others from an opinion that they ought not to do any thing
beneficial to a house fully paid for their support.+
It is not unlikely that it was the nature of the work (stone-breaking)
Browne, 18j?, p. 96« The extent to which Browne trusted his patients
can be seen by the fact that he allowed one patient to transcribe the
text of his 1S3? book, and another to proofread it.
2
Ibid.„ p. 191f emphasis in the original.
3
Ibid., p. 192. see also pp. 94 and 196.
4
Glasgow Lunatic Asylum, Annual Report. 1817, p. 9.
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engaged in at Glasgow that made it unpopular with the patient. At
about- the same time the physician at Cork Public Lunatic asylum., VI.8.
Hallaran, was able to report that
The easy labour of the garden, in which force is never
employed, becomes at once a recreation and an amusement;
to be permitted the indulgence is generally the reward
of previous good conduct.x
But this was unusual and, since Hallaran went on to argue that the amount
of work produced by his patients "is seldom inferior to four times as
? ....
much" as was usually done by ordinary labourers, we are justified in
taking his whole account with more than a pinch of salt.
A slightly different approach to motivation on the part of his
patients is expressed in Ellis' remark that
If the patients are in good health, and in a proper state
to work, they are allowed no beer, and every little indul¬
gence is withheld, so long as they are idle. They soon
find out that employment tends to their comfort.3
All the moral therapists appeared to have tried the carrot approach as
well as the stick. Both Ellis and Browne mentioned the importance of
rewarding the patients with extra tea or tobacco if they would agree to
work. Only if this failed were the sanctions to be applied. Browne's
argument on the importance of rewards is down-to-earth and clears
Could we act upon all lunatics through higher motives than
by wages or bribes or commands, it would be well, but the
great majority of the worst cases, at least, are ceasing
to be lunatics, becoming convalescent, before you can do
so. As the minds of the lower orders are at present con¬
stituted, the most powerful stimulus is gain, and if by
.dctil^rcui( 1818, p. 173• Cork was another large asylum by contemporarystandards, with 2.51 patients in 1818.
^
Ibid., p. l?!i.
^ N.G. Ellis, 1838, p. 311.
/f
Browne, 18??, p. 197? W.C. Ellis, op.cit., p. 308.
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addressing ourselves to the propensity to acquire, we can
subdue more violent propensities, or still the agitation
of disease, it would be inprudenj and unphilosphical to
reject the aid of such an agent,,
Note that Browne saw no distinction between the "Binds of the lower
orders" outside of the asylum and those invalided by disease within its
walls. And yet he did not consider the idea of paying the patients for
the work they did as an appropriate one, although on occasion necessary
to gain their confidence, he preferred instead to reward the workers
with commodities such as tobacco, extra clothes, and food5 items that
their fellow patients would also want to acquire. It is this action
of rewarding the patients like good children, instead of paying them as
the workers they were (in that they enabled many of the asylums to be
nearly self-sufficient) that makes "moral treatment" such an appropriate
term to describe this process. Work was not recognised as the productive
activity that in fact it was. Its meaning was constantly mediated through
the authority relationship of the physician or asylum superintendent to
his patients.
Whatever the particular characteristics of moral therapists like
Browne and Ellis, productive employment was one form of moral treatment
that caught on fast in the county asylums. In 1826, out of the nine
asylums surveyed by Sir Andrew Halliday, the patients were regularly em-
2
ployed in six of them. Halliday pointed out that it was not so much a
disinterest in employment that prevented its greater application but the
want of space for different workshops, and of a sufficient
quantify of ground on which the patients can be employed
in agricultural labour. ^
1
Browne, 1837, p. 197.
2
Halliday, 1828, pp. 19-23.
3
IbicU
The amount of ground available for cultivation by the patients varied
from 30 acres for 15.5 patients at Stafford to 3 acres for 52 patients
at Bedford. At Lancaster, a large asylum of over 280 patients,
all who are in a fit situation, are employed in such occu-^
pations as are adapted to their abilities and previous habits:
some in husbandry and gardening, getting stones, ana making
roads uron the waste ground adjoining the house, under the
superintendence of the keepers; but as yet no manufactory
is carried out in this asylum.'
Ten acres were cultivated as a dairy farm and there were plans to increase
this acreage to 30. At Lancaster Asylum the superintendent believed that
the best occupation for his patients was for them to push wheelbarrows,
if necessary with their bands tied to the barrow handles. By engaging
up to six patients at a time, all pushing their wheelbarrows in a neat
row, Knight, the superintendent, maintained that be was able to demon¬
strate to his patients in a very practical way the usefulness of their
actions.^
Ten years later employment in asylums was recognised to be so impor¬
tant that a Parliamentary Return on the numbers of patients in the asylums
included a question on the modes of occupation and numbers of patients
3
employed. There was great variety in the extent to which the asylum
authorities bothered to answer the question. Some ignored it altogether
or dismissed it in one line (Cornwall, Norfolk) while Ellis at Hanwell
littered references to work throughout his eight foolscap pages of report.
According to the Return, the numbers regularly employed in the various
asylums ranged from 360 plus out of 580 at Kanwell to 15 out of 425 at
4
Lancaster. The West Riding of Yorks Asylum, then under the superintendence
Quoted in Halliday, 1828, p. 20.
P.S. Knight, 1827, pp. 85-90.
Parliamentary Return, 1836
4
Rote tho drop at Lancaster from its high level in the previous decade,
of Dr Corsellis, provided a complete breakdown of its workforce of
194 regularly employed out of some 300 patients. This division of labour
is shown in Table 5® It provides a fairly typical picture of the kinds
Table 5















House (Servants) 3 3
Clerk 1 —
Whit swashers 4 —
Kitchen & Hairy 4
Sewing —„ 30
Knitting 12
of labour engaged in by inmates of pauper lunatic, asylums at the time and
2
throughout most of the nineteenth century. Productive manual labour had
a change that vras directly due to the change in superintendence. Knight
was sacked from his post in 1824. and it was not until I84I that the
asylum again became a centre for progressive methods. (On the conditions
facing the reformers in I84I see Lancaster Moor Hospital, 1966, pp. 4-5)*
Sources Parliamentary Return , 1836, p. 30.
2
For a recent and detailed account of the place of productive employ¬
ment in one particular county asylum (Colney Hatch) in the second half
of the nineteenth century see Hunter and Macalpine, 1974? pp. 125-33®
thus become an integral par t of the county asylum regime by the second
quarter of the nineteenth century. It had. been agreed that not only was
work good for pauper lunatics, but tliat the county asylum was the appro¬
priate place in which the work should be done. What must now be established
is why work was good, for the insane, or at least, what were the reasons
given for holding that belief at the time.
First of all, there were vaguely medical reasons based on the idea
that work, like diet or ventilation, was a branch of physical hygiene.1
Work, maintained Ellis, "occupies their minds and prevents the intrusion
2
of many painful thoughts and musings".Browne drew an analogy with the
treatment of a wounded limb. We d.o not use it, but allow it to rest "by
employing the others. So also with
prescribing occupation then to the insane, it is proposed
to engage the healthy, the unwounded powers arid thereby to
save those which are pained or diseased, and would be injured
by exertion.-*
Alongside these reasons, which were concerned with the individual benefit
4
of the patient, were the more moral ones which applied to the mainten¬
ance of moral community in the asylum. This was the aspect of life at
Kanwell Asylum that Harriet Martineau noticed there in 1834: its non~
conflict-ridden atmosphere with everyone busy at his or her allotted task.
In Tharnam' s Observations on. . .Insanity (184.5a) the then superinten¬
dent of the Eetreat listea the importance of employment under the heading
of "General hygienic conditions", aithough this did not stop him discussingit again under the heading of "Moral treatment".
2
Quoted in Ashworth, 1973, p. 21.
3
Browne, 1837, p. 93.
4
Those vaguely medical reasons will be examined in more detail in the
next chapter, which is about the epistemological bases of moral treat¬
ment.
5
Maxtineau, 1834, especially pp. 30.5-7
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The there© of moral community has already, been discussed above and the
use of work as a contribution to the idea of community added nothing to
the points that have already been made. Where the idea of employment
does stand out as a distinctive element is in its general quality of
uniting all the reformers together, whatever their ether assumptions
about moral treatment. On this they were all agreed! that the insane
could be made to work and that it was to their advantage as convalescent
invalids to do so.
To return for a moment to the Ketreat, it was pointed out in the
discussion of the place of work in moral treatment at that institution
that it always involved a conceptual ambiguity. The value of employment,
as of all moral treatment, rested on a concealment of its joint meaning
as at one and. the same time a reflection of the patients' praxis, and
as a coercive attempt by the therapist to reproduce his ideas of what
that praxis ought to be. Sometimes the coercive element appeared to bo
very small because the therapist's understanding of improvement coincided
with that of the patient. In the work of William Ellis and his wife, for
example, there occasionally appear glimpses of a compassion that was
jinked only to the needs of the patient. Ellis' grand-daughter gave
an exa,m.ple of one case where a patient was asked to make a dress, but
refused on the grounds that no-one would wear it. "Oh yes," replied
lady Ellis, "I will wear it," and she did."*" ' It is this sort of example
that provides the grounds for those historians who wish to see moral
treatment as an essentially humanitarian activity, unconnected with ulter¬
ior motives except a concern for the patient as a human being.
Anotner area in which Ellis is said to have made an innovation is
'
(K.W. Ellis J 1868. p. 46.
?.kl
in providing financial assistance for cases of hardship, Some of the
profits from the work done "by the patients at Wakefield went to a "general
fund" which was established to help in cases of need, One case that Ellis
recorded was of a patient whose insanity was brought on by "hard work,
scanty fare, and anxiety (over children's illness)" The patient was
admitted but his daughter could not afford to pay the rent. In order to
avoid further distress to the patient or to his family the rent was paid
out of this general fund.
These attempts to help the patients certainly existed and in many
cases provided a foundation for attitudes and approaches that are still
with us. On the other hand, what needs to be emphasized again and again
is the precise extent of this concern. The county asylums were built with
the greatest economy, and were meant to be run with the same concern for
this economy before the individual needs of the patients were even con¬
sidered. At Hanwell, Ellis was able to reduce the cost of maintenance
of the patients from nine shillings per week in 1831 to jjs.lOd. in 1836,
solely from the profits of the patients' labour. The visiting justices
pointed out the saving of £650 per annum on the cost of milk alone because
2
of the asylum's farm. John Conolly, resident physician at Kanwell
after Ellis, was later to comment on this aspect of Ellis' moral treatment.
As he put it,
The employment of the patients. . .was put too prominently
forward as a source of pecuniary profit, whilst every item
of expenditure was kept as low as practicable, to avoid the
charge of unnecessary extravagance.3
1 t r-
Case cited in|H,W. Ellis,) 1868, p. 21, On the growth of funds of this
nature under Ellis' superintendence see Hunter and Hacalpine's introduction
to Conolly, 1968, p. 17.
^
Hunter and Macalpine, loc.clt,
Conolly, 1973, P. 181.
It was also realised that as well as producing marketable comModiti.es,
when the patients were working they were not causing trouble or needing
as much supervision as they would, need if they were merely confined.
This allowed a saving on asylum staff, as Ellis was well aware:
Once take away the inducement for them to employ themselves,
and you must immediately increase by far the most expensive
part of the establishmentr the servants; and there would,
be no little addition to the expense in the injuries that
would be done by the patients, by their applying, to mis¬
chievous purposes, that muscular or nervous energy, which
is now profitably spent in useful labour. -L
These are realistic concerns, and to raise the issue here is not to imply
criticism. Ellis and the other asylum superintendents had to compete
for their charges with the workhouses and the private madhouses, insti¬
tutions which could always cut their costs as long as their aim was solely
to provide a physical confinement for the insane. To use asylum patients
as laundry maids, floor scrubbers, or in any other cleaning positions
was, it seemed, a natural way of avoiding the expense of employing out¬
side staff to do the same thing.
The introduction of work into the asylum had. then two major functions
individual therapy, and tho maintenance of the social system of the asylum
It was because these functions were never clearly separated that employ¬
ment therapy was allowed to degenerate into nothing other than a means
of economising on the running costs. Especially as the asylums grew
larger, it was less easy to devise employment facilities matched to indi¬
vidual needs or skills. A major textbook on lunatic asylums published in
18<& made this point, its author complaining that the use made of employ¬
ment in the treatment of the insane did not take into account the patients
£
own motivations for working. ' One of the reasons for the decline in the
1
W.C. Ellis, 1838, p. 313.
2
Ksrcier, 1894, chap. .14.
use made of work in the asylums was the conflict between the medical
profession, who increasingly saw work therapy as irrelevant to the phys¬
ical forms of treatment they came to believe in, ana the lay authorities
who were financing the asylum service and who wanted to run the asylums
as efficient workhouses. As Scull has shown," the meaical profession
gradually won the struggle for ideological control of the asylums, and
it was not until the 1950s that work therapy appeared to regain any
2
attraction for psychiatrists.
In a very real sense the conflicts within the asylum stand as a
representation of the conflict between the functions of work in the out¬
side society. For many of the patients in the asylums, engaged in their
skilled trades and occupations which had been interrupted by their ill¬
ness, it would be easy to agree with Paul Blade Knight, the superinten¬
dent at Lancaster Asylum, that
It is. . .of the utmost importance for the care of the in¬
sane, that ample means be provided for every gradation of
exercise and labouri because, superadded to mere exercise,
the contemplation of our labour when we see it is useful,
See especially his 1976.
In the mid-1956s work was reintroduced in this country as an active
means of therapy for individual patients (Carstairs et.aj,. f 1956)» but
it has never become generally accepted as a necessary basis of rehabili¬
tation. A survey in 1967 found that 33# of all male ana 21yo of all
female patients were engaged in some form of inaustrial therapy, but these
figures conceal a wide range of opportunities (Wansborough, 1970;. One
of the most imaginative of modern industrial therapists is Roger Morgan,
who has pointed out the needs of working patients to strike and to be
paid a living wage out of which they can be charged for board and lodging
(R. Morgan, 1970s on the lack of official support for Morgan's ideas see
Sedgwick, 197?). The material reasons for these changing vicissitudes of
work therapy are complex and unlikely to be located in any "decline of
a work ethic". One possible reason is the continuing conflict in the
minds of psychiatrists regarding their commitment to the mentally ill.
On the one side is their image of therapy based on professional knowledge
and norms of behaviour, and on the other is the nexus of social, political,
moral and. ideological beliefs that psychiatrists may share with other group
in society. At any given time there are always likely to be some psychia¬
trists who feel mora influenced by non-professional beliefs than they do
by the norms of their profession.'
m
is pleasing and healthful to the mind; it never fails to
produce a certain degree of gratification and content;
whereas the contemplation of a mere idle use of time js
impleading, and tends to relax and enervate the mind.
In other words, the act of engaging in useful, subjectively meaningful
labour creates a consciousness that can at least aid in the creatxon of
self-respect. Consciousness, as was shown in the Introduction, is itself
a step in the dialectical construction of human nature. Created out of
labour, it is the basis for the further expression of labour.
Lt was this aspect of the value of work that was emphasized by
the moral therapists as confirming that the bourgeois way of life was
intrinsically more healthy than that of the indolent gentry. This was
the point that had been made by Pinel, and it was one that was empha¬
sized by other authors, according to the phrenologist, Spurzbeim,
It has been observed that, in all institutions for insane,
the male patients who assist in cutting wood, making fire,
and digging in the garden, and the females who are employed
in washing, ironing, and scrubbing floors often recover;
while persons, whose rank exempts then from performing such
services, languish away their- life within the walls.^
This idea that work provided a meaningful rite de -passage back into
the real world is an attractive one that load its roots deep in the bour¬
geois consciousness; but how many of the patients were offered this as
a real possibility? When the asylum superintendents were not merely
using them as cheap labour, their aims were more often to create just
enough consciousness in their patients' minds to inculcate "habits of
3
industry". Or, perhaps even more likely, once the imperative to work
1
P.s. Knight, 1827, p. 90.
2
Spurzheim, 1817, p. 2.9+. Spurzheia's contribution to moral treatment
will be examined in the next chapter. The physician John held also re¬
affirmed rine.L's point that in Spain ''the poorer classes are made to work
and are generally cured", whereas the aristocratic patients were not
(J. Held, 1821, p. U00),
A comment made in the Report of the Select Committee on Labourers'
2h5
had been established as a normative aspect of asylum life, superintendents
merely followed the trend without really considering what they were doing»
According to Conolly in 1846,
as regards county asylums, there is now a great disposition
in the officers to set every patient to work as soon as
admitted; sometimes very improperly, and when, perhaps, work
lias made the poor creature mad. A man just admitted is per¬
haps sent off to the shoemaker's shop before his case can
have 'been considered by the physician; ana a poor melancholy
woman, or a frightened, agitated girl is set to work immed¬
iately with a needle ana thread, to pur-sue, as if in a mere
workhouse, the same sedentary occupation which has already
destroyed her health.
John Conolly, as will be shown in the next chapter, was one of the most
perceptive and creative of all the moral therapists. He always retained,
his vision of the real potential for growth that moral_treatment implied.
Per most reformers though,a commitment to the potential of work was merely
an ideological commitment. It proclaimed their humanity ana it proclaimed
the democratic basis of the society of which they were enthusiastic mem¬
bers.
In concluding this assessment of the place of work in the asylums,
it may 'be said that it affirmed a central belief of all moral treatments
the recognition of the possibility that, the insane could take an active
and conscious part in the life of their society. «s a practical accom¬
plishment in the county asylums, the meaning of employment was very
Wages in 1824 summed up this aspect of the imperative to work: "There
are but two motives by which men are induced to work: the one, the hope
of improving the condition of themselves and their families; the other,
the fear of punishment. The one is the principle of free labour, the
other the principle of slave labour" (quoted in Poynter, 1969, p. xvii).
It was this commiteant to "free labour", a commitment whose whole point
was to inculcate an unthinking conformity in the minds of the working
class, that provided one of the central tenets of all moral treatment
in the public asylums. On this aspect of work in the penal reform
movement, see Foucault, 1977, pp. 239-44.
1
Conolly, 1968, p. 73.
?A6
different. By narrowly circumscribing the range of activities it offered
its recipients it reveals to us the limits of its initiators' horizons,
themselves circumscribed within narrow assumptions about the nature of
their society and the place of men within it. This antagonism between
theory and practice was not unique to the asylums it is a description
of daily life in a capitalist society. It is a necessary product of
a system in which the necessity to sell one's labour power is not equally
distributed. As Sartre has pointed out, "Absolute respect for the free¬
dom of the propertyless is the best way of leaving him at the mercy of
-1
material constraints". The county asylums attempted to abolish the old
constraints of chains and depletions and replace them with the far more
effective forces of the market.
It must be emphasized that there was nothing intrinsic in moral
treatment which located it so exactly as the ideology of a specific
class. To accept that would be to accept an idealistic definition of
what was a very material practice. The notion of moral treatment had
merely raised the possibility of treating the insane like other members
of the human race. It was the application of this idea by a particular
group of people that made moral treatment into the force for social
control of the working class that it became. Even Samuel Tuka, who
had done so much to increase the opportunities for the insane, had no
Sartre, 197o, p. 110. To appreciate the full significance of employ¬
ment under capitalism it is necessary to compare it with conditions in
other social systems based on the exploitation of surplus value, namely
socialist societies. Unfortunately such a comparison is outside the scone
of this thesis; but it must be emphasized that it is riot employment j>er ~
se that is being discussed, but the specific manifestation of it in the
conditions of early industrial capitalism. Under* that system the meaningof labour was defined, not by the owners of that labour, but by a class
who depended for their very existence upon the exploitation of that labour.
In a society where the meaning of labour is defined by those who own it,
the place of employment as a rehabilitative function of psychiatric ther¬
apy will be directly dependent on that definition and on the interests
of that class.
wish to. go further than the reproduction of society as he saw it. In
I84I he wrote the following passage, which attempted to reconcile his
religious beliefs with what he saw as the state of the world. "It
appeal's to be. a providential ordination", 'Puke wrote,
that our healthy and most agreeable feelings are connected
with the employment of our time in the moderately active
pursuit of some apparently useful object.
Given Puke's religious commitments, this must stand as an honest appraisal
of his material life. But, he continued,
even if this were not the constitution of our nature, the
habits of that class of person, which mainly supplies our
public asylums, would point out the importance of keeping
up that association between the enjoyment of health and
labour which their circumstances have indueed.^
In other words, even if the natural order of the world is not as we
perceive it, we must still accept the social order just because it is
there#
To appreciate the narrowness of this application we may turn now
to the administration of moral treatment outside of the pauper asylums#
It was only here that other possibilities for its practice could be
envisaged.
2
4# Moral Treatment as Commodity
Up to now this chapter has dealt almost exclusively with the version
of moral treatment received by the majority of the insane in the early
S# Tuke, 1.841, p. xxLx#
r\
*
The term "commodity" is used in this section merely to refer to some¬
thing which has the capacity of being bought or- sold; it is not used in
the wider, more theoretically informed sense in which it was discussed
in the Introduction. That definition of a commodity includes the ability
of a product to be bought or sold, but also refers to the wider frame of
reference of the society in which commodity production is the dominant
rationale underlying all communication and discourse. That definition
of commodity pervades every page of this analysis of moral treatment,
whereas the explicit presentation of moral treatment as a marketable
commodity was a special case, applicable only to the moral treatment of
those who paid for it with money.
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Table 6
Numbers of private ana pauper patients in the ^
public hospitals and asylums, in England and Wales in 18H
Original Private Patients
Source of Private Pauper as a Percentage
Asvlum . Shading* ... Patients patients of the Tot?
Bedfordshire CH 0 139 nil
Cheshire CR + Sub 9 155 5-5
Cornwall CR + Sub 20 133 13.1
Dorset CR + Sub 0 107 nil
Gloucestershire CR + Sub 68 189 26.5
Kent cat 0 2to? nil
Lancashire CR 0 6.11 nil
L-e icestershire CR + Sub 27 101 20.6
Middlesex (lianwsllj CR 0 975 nil
Norfolk cat 0 161 nil
Nottinghamshire GR + Sub 52 125 29.1
Staffordshire CR + Sub 62 183 25.3
Suffolk CE + Sub 7 206 3.3
Surrey CR 0 382 nil
West Riding of Yorks cat 0 133 nil
Guy's Hospital End 25 0 100.0
Lincoln. Sub 30 73 29.1
Liverpool Hospital Sub 37 36 50.7
2-ianchester hospital Sub 36 0 100.0
horthampton hospi tal Sub 50 181 21.6
York Lunatic Asylum Sub 103 52 66.9
*CR = County Rat/.-; Sub - Subscription; End = Endowment
county asylums. This version drew much of its inspiration from the
example of the Retreat, but it applied what it saw as the lessons of
the Retreat in such a way that was only appropriate to the lowest class
of society. This should hardly surprise us, given the class-ridden nature
of early Victorian society. Put not all the insane were paupers, and
not all moral treatment was confined to the county asylums.
It has already been mentioned that seme of the early public asylums
were not only for pauper lunatics, but were funded partly by subscrip¬
tions and donations, and, in Scotland, by endowment. These institutions
Sourcet Parliamentary Returns. 1811.
were meant for the insane from all classes of society, from the
paupers paid for by their parishes at the absolute minimum possible,
to the private patients with unlimited, financial resources® Table 6
shows the relative numbers of private and pauper patients in the public
asylums in 1844. As can be see from that table tho percentage of pri¬
vate patients in these asylums ranged from nil to nearly 30% at
Nottingham.
The definition of "private" is necessarily a crude one which con¬
ceals the variety of rates th&t were offered to the prospective patients.
At Gloucester Asylum, for instance, it was proposed that the scale of
rates should extend from the paupers who would pay 12 shillings per
week to the "opulent" patients at three guineas.1 An extreme example,
but one which clearly illustrates the types of facilities that the
different rates paid for, is shown in Table 7. This table is of the
rates of board at the Crichton Royal Institution in Dumfries, one of
the centres of excellence of moral treatment, according to contempor¬
ary opinion, but one at which the practice of moral treatment was
carefully measured according to the patient's finances.
Browne was quite clear as to the justification for this. He
wanted the insane restored to their rightful place in society. He
drew an analogy with the status of the blacks in the United States of
America, who were not permitted to worship in the same church pews
as the whites. Similarly, in regard to Harwell, Browne pointed out
that a proposal to let the patients go out in a pony chaise was objected
to by the local inhabitants on the grounds that it was an invasion of
2their rights. ' These were the sort of attitudes he wanted to over-
Bailey, 1971, p. 187.
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"Tobacco and beer to
the industrious males"
"Wine to tlie Industrie
oub; pianof billiards,
and society to the well
behaved"
"Use of a, carriage as
an indulgence, and a.
piano, Sc Co as a right"
"Use of a carriage
three times a week or
use of a horse"
Carriage or horse every
aay
for Paupers from Dumfries and 'Wigtown only
for all other Paupers
come* But, if the insane were to receive the same rights as the sane,
they must also reflect the same distinctions as the sane. Browne
believed that
In a country where the distinctions of rank and riches
are so broad and practical as in this, it is absolutely
necessary that the first principle of arrangement of the
inhabitants of an Asylum should be founded upon the
amount cf board paid. . . .It separates those who could
have no thought or occupation or feeling in common, and
groups together those who are similar in station, and
whose language, sympathies, and sentiments are alike,
or* closely assimilated.2
Sources Information extracted from a leaflet entitled "Crichton
Royal Institutions Rater, of Board" in. Crichton Royal Archives.
2
Crichton Royal Institution, 6th Annual Report. 1845, p. 20. In a
It was within this structure of "rank" that Browne put into practice
all his ideas on the rehabilitation of patients. Within each of the
fee-paying sections all patients were divided into three (for the
females) or four (for the males) smaller groups depending on their
degree of convalescence or conformity to the rules. All, that is,
except the paupers, who were lumped together into two great divisions,
the "industrious" and the "idle". One powerful reason Browne could
afford to be imaginative in the practice cf moral treatment at
Crichton Royal was precisely because he was dealing there with members
of his own class. His "language, sympathies, and sentiments" were
the same as those of his patients. Crichton Royal was never predom¬
inantly a pauper institution, with all that meant in terms of economy
and overall policy. In tiie first ten years of its existence the aver¬
age number of paupers staying at Crichton Royal was 45.6 ?. and that
of private patients 76.4.^" The paupers were to receive "the minimum
amount of board"' and the rich "every luxury which the pres-ent state
2
of society has rendered necessary". In 1850, a separate building
similar way the proposed London Asylum vvas also adjusted to the real¬
ities of the social structure in spite of its commitment to .a firm
philosophy (in its case, that of the Panopticon principle of order).
The main Panopticon-shaped building was never intended to be'"for Pa¬
tients cf Superior Rank" as Edward Wakefield put it in 1815 (1815 SC,
4th Report, p. 186). For them there was to be a separate building
which "will not in any respect have the appearance of a place of con¬
finement" (ibid.). This other building was to have "proper water-clo¬
sets" t not privies, and was to include the novel feature of a "coffee-
room" .
1
Figures extracted from the tables in Easterbrook, 1940. The number
of private patients as a percentage of the whole was '62.6$, a greater
proportion than all but one of the English asylums. Neither does there
appear to have been much robin for cases of financial hardship. The
second patient admitted to Crichton Royal, a farmer, was transferred
six years later to Glasgow Asylum "to be placed upon the Pauper Rate"
as his friends could not afford to pay for him any longer (Crichton
Royal Institution, Case Book I).
2 . .
Crichton Royal Institution, 1st Annual Report, 1840, pp. 5-6.
was opened, to house the paupers<>
In other words, Browne's clientele was exceptional for a public asy¬
lum , and this must he taken into account when assessing the "progressive"
nature of his contribution to the development of moral treatment. In
1851, for instance, Browne was proclaiming that
Patients are participators in every arrangement, c .They are
led to understand that each progressive step is not merely
for them but by them. They are their own gardeners, labour¬
ers, players, musicians, precentors, librarians, and under
certain restrictions, their own police.
At a first reading this might appear to mark a dramatic improvement over
the moral treatment at Wakefield or ether public asylums. On the other
hand, if this is seen in the context of the 98 private patients who were
the cole occupants of Crichton Royal at the time it was written, it is little
different to what had been practised at many of the private madhouses that
had been operating in the previous half century, where the patients had
always taken an active part in the running cf their own asylum, regimes.
Where it may be said to mark an advance is in the public sector, in
that all the patients at Crichton Royal received seme moral treatment, how¬
ever tailored to their position within the class structure. The opposite
end of the spectrum is portrayed at the socially mixed asylums like Glou¬
cester where, in 1841, a Belgian physician was told by the founder that
"a fifth of my patients are under no restriction whatever"; yet, when
the visitor examined the conditions, he found the contrast between the
private patients and the paupers "00 great and so revolting as to pro¬
duce the most painful impressions on. anyone with human feelings".^
3
Crichton Royal Institution, Annual Report, 1851, p. 23'
2
Dr C. Crommelinck, quoted in Walk, 1954, P® 832.
Crommelinck, quoted in Walk and Walker, 196I, p. 615*
2.53
That, of course, was only one observer's opinion of one asylum, but
it was hardly a surprising one given, apart from anything else, the
enormous differences in charges for what was essentially the same
thing™-a cure. It was precisely because this cure involved a return
to an unequal world that so much effort had to be put into making the
route to it so similarly unequal.
The alternative form of care for those who lived far from the
catchment ax-ea of a reputable asylum, or for these who wished to evade
what appeared to them as the stigma of the public asylum, was the
private madhouse, or "private asylum" as it was coming to be known
in the 1830s. This alternative remained a very real one throughout
the nineteenth century. In 1844, for instance, there were 2399
privately paying patients in private asylums (compared to 2774 paid
for by their parishes). By 1874 the number had risen to 3122 (with
only 1394 paupers). Not that this was accepted as a satisfactory
state of affairsi public condemnation throughout this period contin-
ued to look down upon the madhouse proprietors, those "wholesale
dealers and traffickers in this species of human misery", as one
p
well-known writer on the subject put it.'
But, just as not all county asylums were models cf enlighten¬
ment , not all the private asylums were dungeons of despair. Doctors
such as William Ellis realised, once they had made their reputations
in the public asylums, that there was a lot of money to be made by
going private, as well as the more pleasant conditions of working
1
Report of the Metropolitan Commissioners in Lunacy, 1844;
D.H. Tuke, 1882, p. 252.
2
Sir Andrew Halliday, writing in 1826, quoted in Scull, 1974, p. 120.
On the variety of madhouse provision at this time see Parry-Jones,
1972, pp. 77-90.
among the "refined" sections of society. There was as much money
and certainly more status to be gained from running a private asylum
on respectable and rehabilitative lines as there was from cramming
large numbers of pauper patients into what was purely a centre of
confinement.
If the pauper asylums were able to rehabilitate their patients,
the solution of the needs of patients from other classes must be
sought with the same methods. In the words of Harriet Martineau,
Circumstances will be, must be overruled, so that the
rich shall be raised to an equality of advantage with
the poor, in the single instance in which they are at
present sunk below their pauper fellow sufferers.J"
This was said after a visit to Ellis at Iianwell in 1834 and, as will
be seen, Ellis thought the same way—although what was meant by
"equality of advantage" was certainly not similarity of conditions.
This was not purely an ideological defence of the interests of the
middle class. Few patients from any class received the "best" moral
treatment as it has been described here, but the county asylums did
at least exist, which was more than could be said for an organised
movement for the middle-class insane. Seme years later there was an
attempt to found a public middle-class asylum in London, financed by
2
subscriptions and donations, but it was not successful.
It has been argued so far that moral treatment developed as a
Quoted in (h.W. Ellis^j 1868, p. 57.
? r n
See Asyrum for. , .^1849^ « The copy of this prospectus in the
British Library contains, on the front cover, the words "Patrons"
and "Committee of Management" with a spa.ee underneath but without
names. If this is a. typical copy it suggests that the prospectus was
never actually issued. Hunter and Macalpine have pointed out that th
idea of a public middle-class asylum was dear to John Conolly, end
that he made a number of attempts in the 1840s to raise an appeal for
one (introduction to Conolly, 1973, pp. xli-xlii, especially note 132
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means by which the social relations of production could be reproduced;
the creation of the willing worker. In the Retreat there was a degree
of consensuss caused by an overall commitment to Quaker social philo¬
sophy, that allowed this means to bo moulded into a full scale thera¬
peutic programme* In the county asylums it was possible to exercise
a degree of coercion over the patients in order to achieve the same
thing, through a system of espionage, through withdrawal of privileges
if beliavioui' did not "improve", and through other means of intimida¬
tion. But with the wealthy, non-religious lunatic these methods were
no longer applicable. For this sort of patient moral treatment had
to be modified yet again.
It had to retain its essential feature of the inculcation of
self-control over unwanted behaviour, but it had to appear, as a means
of doing this which was entirely within the values and interests of
those v/ho were paying for it„ In mox-al treatment for the pcor, the
main direction of" the ideology was towards other reformers and espec¬
ially the progressively-minded magistrates who decided cn the alloca¬
tion of public funds. In moral treatment for those who were paying
for it directly out of thoir, or their relatives', pockets, the aim
of the ideology was itself mere direct. It was no longer to get
public administrators to spend public money on a branch of social
There is no doubt that the advertised picture was often far dis¬
tant from the realities of day-to-day practice. The pronouncements
still have value as ideology in that they disclose the values and
assumptions of the moral therapists, but it must be remembered that
they often had no other substance. Unfortunately there are very few
first-hand accounts of thoss who were held in the respectable asylums,
but those that do exist conflict with the image presented by the
asylum proprietors. For Brialington House in 1831-1832. there is J,T.
Perceval's vivid account of restraints and punishments (Bateson,
1962); and for Matthew.- Allen's High Beech in 1837-1841 there is* the
experience of John Clare who found the conditions oppressive and event¬
ually escaped (on this see Barnet, 1965).
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control. 5 it was to get the wealthy to spend their money on them¬
selves while at the same time acknowledging the humanitarian nature
of the therapists' intentions. As such„ the ideology had to appeal,
to the luxurious yet virtuous benefits of moral treatment rather
than to its ability to produce subservience or any other working-class
traits which might be required. It had, in short, to be presented as
a commodity which could be purchased like any other0
An insight into this appeal can be gained by comparing the chang¬
ing function of therapies for the insane with the changing function
of music. In the eighteenth century, musical works were commissioned
by individual patrons, much as Jewson has demonstrated that medical
therapies were produced for those individuals who paid for theio.A
Bourgeois demands were different, in music as in medicine. A greater
number of people wanted to benefit from new ideas, although, any one
pf them had less money than the old aristocratic and ecclesiastical
patrons. A free market wg.s established in which the musical produc¬
tions, or psychiatric therapies, or whatever, were presented as
commodities available to all. An essential characteristic of these
commodities was their apparent universality: they could be partaken
of by all, provided of course that their prospective purchasers had
enough acney. At the same time the existence of the market meant
that all the therapies (and musical productions) had to compete with
each other. They had to appear, simultaneously, as available to all
2
yet appreciable only to those with discretion.




On the changing social function of music at this time see Hawser,
1962, vol. 3, pp. 73™7«
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were very wealthy. It wasr a continual complaint of many who dealt
with the middle-class insane that a long illness could financially
destroy those who had done most to create their own wealth. Pauper¬
ization was not simply a condition of poverty} it involved a recog¬
nition of class membership—the lowest, most degraded class in a
society that was obsessed with maintaining its inequalities of oppor¬
tunity and reward. Above all, the private asylums had to advertise
their distance from pauper life. At one madhouse in Kensington, for
instance, with fees of from one to five guineas per week, the pros¬
pectus proclaimed one of the virtues of the house to be the tibsolute
exclusion of pauper patients"
An obvious model for the small private asylums was the Retreat,
and a number of houses borrowed directly from its inspiration. Its
name was used by many madhouse proprietors, thus enabling them to
2
proclaim where their intentions lay. Some of the Retreat's minor
innovations, such as the way it disguised the iron window bars to
make them look like ordinary wooden sashes, were also borrowed with-
3
out acknowledgement. The private asylums could not compete with the
1 [Finch], 1830, p. 11, emphasis in the original. This proprietor had
previously been in charge of Laverstock House, of which Edward Wake¬
field had said, "In this establishment I saw all that Tuke has written
realized; and no words in which I can describe it. . .can characterize
it in too high terms"' (1815 SC, 1st Report, p. 48). But Y/akefield had
also said that the paupers at this madhouse were kept separately "in a
building at a distance from the house", and when he was asked, "Do you
know whether each of the male pauper patients has a bed to himself?"
he had to answer, "I cannot speak to that"" ('1816 SC, 1st Report, p. 37).
2
There were six private madhouses named "The Retreat" in the East
Riding of Yorkshire before 1850 (J.A.R and M.E. Bickford, 1976).
Other "Retreats" existed near Leeds (The Scotsman, 15th September, 1838)
and in London ([Pinchj , 1830).
3 *"?
M. Allen, 1829, |p. 1.J For this practice at the Retreat, see the
Description, pp. 98-100. Although Allen cited Tuke enthusiastically
in Ms 1837, he maintained four years later that "I was the first who
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public ones in terms of the amount of capital they could invest in
purpose-built accommodation or in agricultural land for the patients
to work on. Instead, like the Retreat, they advertised a small,
family-type atmosphere Kith a high proportion of staff to patients.
At Ticehurst, for instance, an asylum of which many of its 50 patients
"spolce with pleasure of their residence. . .and expressed unwilling-
ness to quit it", there were 36 members of staff.
In William Ellis' asylum at Southall Park, which he ran for the
last year of his life, "his great principle was that of family
p
association"* At 8.30 a.m. all staff and patients attended family
worship, and from then until breakfast the time was spent by Ellis
3
in "kind and genial converse with each inmate". At dinner time all
who were well enough ate at the same table "where they were frequently
joined by Sir William's personal friends and the relatives of the in-
4
mates." ' According to one madhouse proprietor, even the principle
of sex segregation, strictly adhered to in most asylums, could be
carried cut a system of kindness and liberality about which others who
have been to imitate it, have made so much puff and fuss in puffing
themselves off" (letter to Cyrus Redding, 21st April 1841, quoted in
Parry-Jones, 1972, p. 94).
1
Comment of offic?-ai visitors, 24th November 1827, quoted in Scull,
1974, P* 115.
^ {h.W. Ellis^j 1868, p. 66. Other examples of commitment to this
principle include Matthew Allen, who advertised his asylum at High
Beech on the grounds that "everything resembles a family house"
(H. Allen, 1829,[p« 10 * Arthur Stilwell, who kept the Moorcroft
private asylum in Hilliugdon, was praised in an obituary letter to
The Lancet because of the family lines on which he had conducted his
asylum over the previous 30 years (The lancet. 1840-1, 1, 23rd Jan¬
uary 1841, p, 631).
^




broken In the interests of the right sort of rehabilitation.
The seperation [sic] of the sexes is complete at leopards
Kill lodge, where most of the cases are of a decided nat¬
ure, but at Pair Mead where they are more correct, the
occasional intercourse (especially at meals and some amuse¬
ments-"-music—lectures— cards &c.) is highly advantageous,
it preserves that mutual restraint and softening influ- ^
ence which the sexes so powerfully exercise on each other.
Ad can be seen, there was little difference in principle between
this sort of moral treatment and that reserved for the paupers. The
principle remained tha same? the difference, was in its application.
Willi em Ellis had pointed out that
The great means of. . .influencing the conduct of the
patients in any. » *r©gpect, ±s by ascertaining what
they particularly like and. dislike, and then granting
or withholding the indulgence, according to their
behaviour. . .These preferences are the lever, and
frequently the only lever, by which, the moral man can
be moved."
In the pauper asylums this had meant bribes of alcohol, tobacco,
extra food, and even money to achieve the desired effect. Whereas
the moral affectations that motivated the working class were held to
bo of greed or simple self-interest, with the upper and middle
classes there were more noble appeals that could be made. According
H» Allen, 1829, [p. 2.] Mixing of the sexos in order to help with
rehabilitation was "hot unheard of before this, but it was rarely prac¬
tised as a matter of course in the pauper asylum. In his recommenda¬
tions for such asylums Samuel Tuke had insisted upon the complete
separation of the male and female patients, but had then modified the
rule for those patients who could be trusted to behave themselves.
In his words, "where the judgement and moral feelings, are in great
measure restored, benefit appears to arise from their [that is, the
male and female patients] occasionally meeting together. It is far
indeed from occurring, in all instances of insanity, that the passions
are strong, and the moral feelings obliterated; and no disadvantage
has been found, at the Retreat, from a majority of the patients be¬
ing assembled in the same room, for the purposes of reading or
devotion" (S. Tuke, 1015, p. 12),
?
W.C. Ellis, 1838, p, 194.
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to Ellis,
An appeal to the raora.l and benevolent feelings will
arouse a patient to action, when a merely intellectual
inducement is ineffectual. Point out the sufferings
of the poor. ♦ .and many will cheerfully exert them¬
selves whom no other inducement could influence.x
Similarly, Allen pointed out that "it is not known. . .how powerful
2
with the higher class of patients is the principle of honour".
These imputations of motivation were not carefully matched to the
individual desire of each patient, but were attributed to them on
the grounds of their class membership. The rewards were defined by
the therapist according to his perception of how his patients ought
to live.
One interesting point is that none of the moral therapists came
frca anything except a lower middle-class background, and many of them,
like Ellis and Allen, appear to be examples of people with few quali™
3
fications and many aspirations. In other words, xt does not seem
*
Quoted in J~H• W• Ellis] , 1868, p. 60,
2
M. Alien, 1837, p. 66.
^ On Ellis' career, see above, p. 18.7, note 1. Matthew Allen's bio¬
graphy is an especially interesting one from the point of vie?; of
seeking the class motivations of the moral therapists. Allen was
born in 1783, the youngest son "of a dissenting minister. He began
his medical career as an apprentice to his brother, an apothecary,
but gave it up in favour of itinerant preaching and shop-keeping.
He was a poor entrepreneur, being imprisoned for debt and for trading
without paying stamp-duty. His brother helped him out and secured
for him the post of apothecary at York Lunatic Asylum, a position
from which he was sacked in 1824. The following year his entrepre¬
neurial ambition surfaced again, and he borrowed some money to fin-
once High Beech Asylum. Here he settled for the rest of his life
(that is, until 1845)s although he never stopped thinking up new ways
of making money. In 1837 the Tennyson family moved near High Beech
and Allen persuaded Alfred Tennyson to lend him a large sum of money
to finance "a patented process for carving wood by machinery". The
money was lent and the scheme failed. (On Allen's career see jar-net: J. C it 5,
1965, and Allen's preface to his 1837.) Although Allen, cannot be said
to be a "typical" member of any class, many of his inspirations were
clearly those of the self-made businessman who was such a model for
the Victorian bourgeoisie.
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unfair to describe some of the ideal asylums as portrayed by men
like Allen and Ellis as examples of a status in society to which
thej' personally would have liked to belong.,'*" "For persons in the
higher rank of society", wrote Ellis in 1838,
a mansion should be provided, with park, woods, lawns,
hot-houses, gardens, and green houses. It should be
fitted, internally, with every convenience and luxury
for the gratification of the taste. Science and the
fine arts ought to be pressed into the service of stim¬
ulating the dormant faculties to healthy exercise. . ,
and one evening per week should be specially devoted to
a dress concert or oratorio, to which all, in a fit state
to attend, should be invited,
This image of a perfect way of life was written at the end of a career
which Ellis had begun as a surgeon*s apprentice, in which he had been
honoured with a knighthood, and in which he had finally acquired a
private asylum of his own.
Allen's understanding of non-working-class needs was more intell¬
ectual and psychological, but no less clearly stated:
. „ .a person of high moral and intellectual endow¬
ments, possessing the most ardent desires for the joys
of moral and intellectual friendship, but who, instead
of receiving appropriate and healthy food for these
desires, is confined to such as have nothing in common
with him, . .then these oesii^es are not satisfied; on
the contrary they are all disagreeably affected. . . ,
This disagreeable excitement may amount to pain, aver¬
sion, hatred, contempt, and furyI• . .and throws the
mind open to all the spirits of vice and misery, which
torture and distract, irritate and inflame, paralyse and
derange, all the physical functions of body and mind, and
destroy all that for which existence was given us.3
The patients at Allen's High Beech Asylum consisted of people with
such occupations as gentlemen, merchants, solicitors, surveyors,
shoemakers, surgeons, and innkeepers (Barnet, 1965, p. 23).
2
W.C. Ellis, 1838, p. 201
M» Allen, 1831, pp. 44~5»
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Allen's language is so strong, his belief so fiercely argued, that
it is reasonable to suppose that he had had a personal experience of
non-discriminatory confinement. Perhaps it was the fact that he had
been in prison at least twice that had helped him form his belief
in the need to maintain class distinctions. But whether or not Allen
had a personal reason for his belief does not detract from the main
points moral treatment for the rich and the middle class was as ir.ueh
dependent on a social definition of normality as it was for those
patients who were to return to the cotton mill.
One aspect of moral treatment that was not so easy to establish
amongst those who were paying for the service was the idea that em¬
ployment was good fox* them, All the moral therapists mention this
problem, and attempted to adapt the imperative to work to what thoy
saw as the interests of their paying clientele. Ellis pointed otit
the problem as he saw its
As might reasonably be expected, from their previous
habits, a much greater difficulty exists in inducing
persons of higher rank to employ themselves in bodily
labour, than those of the lower classes.~
The generally accepted solution was not even to try. Bodily exercise
was achieved through such suitably refined pursuits as "bowls in the
garden", "coursing. . .daily on the downs", "a carriage in which the
2
ladies ride out". The ruling class was intended to thinks not to
1
W.C. Ellis, 1830, p. 138. E.L. Pox also pointed out how at Bris-
Xington House "The greatest difficulty has been experienced in find¬
ing employment for Gentlemen" (letter to Lord Seymour, in Fox, [1809] ).
2
Edward Wakefield, referring to Dr Finch's madhouse at Laverstock
(1816 SC^lst Report, p, 36). See also Fox, op.cit. ; [Finch) , 1830?JJBradburyJ , 1836, This latter publication was an advertising leaflet
for a private asylum in Kensington described by Sir Henry Halford,
President of the Royal College of Physicians, as "the very best estab¬
lishment for the reception of insane patients which I have ever seen"
(p. 6). At the back of the leaflet are a number of engravings of ladies
doing genteel "calisthenic exercises" in the grounds of the house.
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get its hands dirty, and so it was not bodily labour it was given to
do, but mental. For them there should be "lectures on chemistry",
"botany ought to be sedulously cultivated", and other intellectual
pursuits should be encouraged.1
Perhaps the only exception to this rule that the upper-class
patients should not engage in manual labour appears to have occurred
at Francis Willis' private madhouse in Lincolnshire. Willis was the
idiosyncratic physician who was able to control the mad King George
III by the use of his (Willis') "eye", and his methods of caring for
the patients at his private madhouse appear to be no less original.
A contemporary observer reported that
As the unprepared traveller approached, the town, he was
astonished to find almost all the surrounding plough¬
men, gardeners, threshers, thatchers and other labourers
attired in black coats, white waistcoats, black silk
breeches and stockings, and the head of each 'bien poudre,g
frise, et arrange8. These were the doctor's patients. . »
But this was unusual, and in 1846, John Conolly, who probably knew
more about the subject than anyone else, had to conclude his survey
of the different means of employment used in the treatment of the
insane with the comment,
1 do not know that any systematic attempts have been
made to introduce work among„patients in England of a
higher class than mechanic3.^
Again, like many others, this fragment of moral treatment
reflected a practice begun at the Retreat. But what had been merely
1
W.C. Ellis, 1838, p. 203. At Crichtcn Royal the first theatrical
production put on by asylum patients anywhere received its premiere on
Sth January 1843. The following year a highly erudite literary maga¬
zine began monthly publication, produced entirely by the patients.
2
The Life arid Times of Frederick Reynolds, quoted in Parry—Jones,
1972, p. 183. See also Anon, 1796., Parry-Jones provides a discussion
of the extent to which work was encouraged in private madhouses (ibid..,
pp. 182-4)®
3
Conolly, 1968, p. 82.
2&r
one aspect of Retreat life, heavily mediated through Quaker ideology,
was presented here, in isolation;, as a purchasable commodity. And,
like all commodities, the living praxis which had given it its mean¬
ing was concealed and presented as something with no value other
than that which the exchange of money gave to it. The inequalities
of daily life, which the Retreat had demonstrated could be changed,
were once again petrified, and by the very practice which had revealed
their possibility of change.
Such was moral treatment in the 20 or so years after the Descrip¬
tion of the Retreat was published. The initial vision was fragmented
into a hundred parts, each to express in its ovm way the different
values and interests of those who practised it. As we have seen,
these fragments drew their inspiration from a number of social move¬
ments and ideologies. It might appear that too much emphasis has
been placed on too few people: after all, it may be argued that there
were only 1100 insane persons held in public asylums and at least an¬
other 4000 outside in 1826. Any one moral therapist could only deal
with a very small number of these people. In particular, it might
seem that too much has been made of William Ellis and his version of
moral treatment.
Briefly, two points may be made in support of the approach
followed here. One way of assessing Ellis* importance is to cover
the subsequent history of the treatment of the insane, and to show
the extent to which his work was seen as .important by later practi¬
tioners. This will be done in Chapter 5. On the other hand, this in
itself is1 net enough. There is always a danger of writing history
with too much hindsight,, which in this case means assuming that as
moral treatment did become generally diffused, if was always going
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to bs accepted as necessary. Nothing was further from the truth,
at least in the minds of the moral, therapists. They were constantly
aware of the struggle involved in gaining acceptance of their new
ideas. The success of moral treatment was always problematic: in a
very real sense it could be said that it never was a success. Its
general acceptance marked an institutional diffusion which, like the
aftermath of all too many political revolutions, killed off all that
was dynamic in its inspiration. But all that v?as a long way in the
future. In the 18203 and early 1830s the outcome was far from
settled.
An alternative way of assessing Ellis' practice and demonstrating
the significance of his work is to describe- the material configura¬
tion out of which his practice emerged. Exceptional ideas derive
from exceptional circumstances: what has to be determined is whether
this exceptionality is a fluke with no significance beyond its own
appearance, or whether it is the circumstances that are themselves
significant and which by a chance combination allow what is normally
found in moderation to be expressed in acute form. Only by answering
this sort of material question is it ever possible to discover the
extent to which "social being determines consciousness".
One overridingly important factor in the successful application
of moral treatment was an institutional environment in which it was
allowed to dominate all aspects of the life of the asylum. It was
only when such conditions had existed at the Retreat that moral
treatment emerged as a distinct practice at all, separate from isol-
lated attempts at physical and psychical management. This, aside from
any ideological reasons, was a major determining factor in the emer¬
gence of moral treatment as a viable practice. As public opinion
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changed these experimental conditions became less necessary but, at
a time'when moral treatment represented something new and untried,
it was only possible to introduce it when the innovator had complete
control over his asylum or institution.
As far as Ellis was concerned, there are two main reasons he
should have satisfied these conditions. One was his own personality
and the other was the social context of his appointment as superin¬
tendent to the West hiding of Yorks Asylum. Ellis had always had
what could be called an authoritarian attitude towards the management
of the insane. As early as 1815, before he was appointed to Wake¬
field, he had written,
It is absolutely necessary, that to manage such a house
[[as a lunatic asylum} . and such inhabitants, the heads of
it ought to possess the most sovereign authority over all
the rest; and consequently to be accountable for every¬
thing.
When appointed as superintendent (or Director, as he was usually
called) to Wakefield Asylum Ellis, with his wife, was given complete
control to run the institution as he liked. If we are to believe
the visiting physician, Caleb Crowther, Ellis ran the asylum with
a complete disregard for all those who might legitimately have viewed
themselves as his colleagues. nI have been opposed and thwarted1-,
wrote Crowther in 1828 to a visiting magistrate, "by a Director,
whose object it has been to become the Autocrat of the Asylum, to
2
govern rae and govern you."
While we may accept that this accusation of being an "Autocrat
W.C. Ellis, 1815, p. 17. Another moral therapist with similar views
on asylum management was W.A.F. Browne. In 1864, he argued that the
organisation in the asylum should mirror that of the society outside
it, "The power or government by which such communities are ruled should
be monarchical. The details, as well as the principle, should emanate
from one central will. « .{andJ subordinates should be chosen, their
vrews and acts should be influenced, their whole bearing determined by
the supreme official".
?
Letter to G. Higgins, 16th February 1028, in C. Crowther, 1830, p. 7,
of the Asylum" says something about Ellis' personality, it also
says a lot about the authority relationships in existence at Wake¬
field Asylum. It is this that leads on to the other aspect of Ellis*
work-~the social context and significance of his appointment as
Director.
It was pointed out at the beginning of this chapter how the
1815 Select Committee exposed the appalling conditions under which
the insane were kept all over the country. Legislation had been
passed in 1808 allowing the local authorities to establish public-
asylums. The Description of the Retreat had been published in 1813.
And yet there was no organised movement to build asylums or to imple¬
ment Tube's proposals. Only six asylums were built in the 10 years
after 1815. Wakefield Asylum was an. exception, rather than the rule.
What were the reasons for this lack of interest? One important factor
was that the small group of reformers who had been largely responsi¬
ble for the enquiries of 1807 and 1815 had begun to tbreak up. Whit-
bread, Romilly end Rose died between 1815 and 1818, and Seymour
1
retired from active life. All attempts at further national reform
p
were blocked by the House of Lords for another decade."
The changes that did take place were initiated not at national
level but locally, by magistrates such as Godfrey Kiggins in York,
the man who had exposed the conditions at York Lunatic Asylum and who
was partlj1- responsible for appointing Ellis as superintendent at
Wakefield. Because of the lack of a national policy it was up to
the Asylum Committee in each county to decide on the administration
q
K. Jones, 1972, pp. 36-7.
2
Halliday, 1828, p. 12.
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of its asylum. At Wakefield,, there were men on the committee with
a general interest in the reformative possibilities of pauper care
as well as specific knowledge of v/hat was possible with the insane."1"
In othei" towns, the Asylum Committee turned to more traditional
areas for its inspiration. Samuel Whitbread, founder of Bedford
Asylum, was a friend of Thomas Dunston, the head keeper at St Luke's
Lunatic Hospital, and Whitbread had asked Dunston* s advice on suit¬
able methods of controlling the patients. Dunston replied,
A Chain for Arm and Leglocks to be fixed to, by a
Staple in the Bedstead, the Wall or Floor as may be
required.
Because Whithread's conception of the function of the asylum was
mainly a custodial one, he was not concerned to employ a superinten¬
dent with therapeutic ambitions. Instead, the Committee appointed
as the asylum's first "Governor" a William Pither, a house painter
by trade who, together with his wife, was employed more in the capa¬
city of workhouse master and mistress than as superintendent and
matron of a medical establishment. This leads on to a vital factor
which underlies this whole discussion: the medical status of the
person in charge of the asylum.
As Scull has pointed out in his detailed paper on the medical-
isation of insanity control, Pither was eventually forced to resign
as a result of pressure from, medically qualified critics of his
3
regime.*' At Wakefield, Ellis was able to withstand medical criticism
The first Chairman of the West Hiding of Yorkshire Asylum Committee
was J.p. Heywood, a magistrate with experience of running the Wake¬
field Lancastrian School and the town Dispensary. Godfrey Higgins was
also a member of this Committee. He was a close friend of Samuel Tuke
and had worked with him in the attempt to expose the conditions at
York Lunatic Asylum.
2
letter to Whithread. 23rd April 1812 (in Beds, C.R.O., LBP/1).
J
Scull, 1975®, pp. 247-50. Scull emphasises the fact that Pither
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of his work because he did have at least a minimal medical training.
Scull presents the conflict as a fairly straightforward one between
the lay reformers and the medical profession, but it was a conflict
exacerbated by the divisions in the medical profession itself. The
three strata of the profession—apothecaries, surgeons, and physic¬
ians—did not make up a unified whole. Their members came from diff¬
erent sections of the population, received different forms of trainin
and practised on widely different groups. After the establishment of
the College of Surgeons in 1800 it was common for apothecaries to
take the licence of the College as an additional qualification, but
there still remained a social and professional gulf between these
medical practitioners and the physicians.
Mad-doctors came from all three strata, and Bedford Asylum was
unusual in that its superintendent was wholly medically unqualified.
It was far more usual for the superintendent to be trained as an
apothecary or surgeon. At Nottingham Asylum from 1812 to 1844 the
superintendent's post was held by Thomas Powell, a surgeon (with his
wife as matron). At Lancaster, Paul Slade Knight held the posts of
manager, treasurer, medical superintendent and surgeon from 1816
was not medically qualified while his opponents were. Scull uses
this to make his point about the growing medicalisation of the treat¬
ment of insanity. A less didactic explanation is simply that Pither
v/as not very good at his job of governing a large institution, He
was criticised repeatedly by the Visiting Justices for such matters
as keeping pigs and fox1 excessive expenditure (Beds. C.R.O.,, corres¬
pondence relating to Bedfordshire County Asylum, WI/136-130)„ It
is significant that Pither's replacement, John Harris (whose medical
training was only to the level of apothecary), was a keen moral
therapist. Harris demanded a major change in the asylum regime,
incorporating such features as that every patient "should have some
occupation suited to his former habits" (letter to Visiting Magis¬
trates, 2nd March 1829, in Beds. C.R.O., L.B. 1/2).
HolXoway, 1966, especially pp, 107-9.
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until he was sacked in 1624c, Although trained initially as a
surgeon, Knight, like Ellis, had upgraded his status to that of
physician by qualifying as an MD from St Andrews University—a title
which could be bought without further training as long as the appli¬
cation was countersigned by two other physicians. It was a very
similar course to this which marked Ellis5 own career. Ellis, it
will be remembered, began as a surgeonfs apprentice and only obtained
his LSD from St Andrews after he had accepted the post of director at
the West Riding of Yorlcs Asylum.
What is significant about all this is that as long as the super¬
intendent was not himself a physician, his authority was likely tc be
severely curtailed by the instructions of the visiting physician, who
was appointed on a consultancy basis to look after the medical inter¬
ests of the patients. As has already been seen, Ellis had to cope
with a great deal of sniping from Crowther, the visiting physician
at Wakefield Asylum. Crowther attacked Ellis, not only for his "auto¬
cracy", but also on the grounds that his medical training was insuf¬
ficient? "he ^Ellisj never had received any regular education for
the profession; of course, his medical knowledge, when he came to
Wakefield, was scanty".^ Maybe-it was, but Ellis' qualifications
(especially once he had received his knighthood) were quite suffic¬
ient for the majority of the medical profession to accept his posi¬
tion at Wakefield as one of medical directorship. Ellis thus incor¬
porated into his reputation the acceptance of the lay reformers who
saw moral treatment as essentially a social movement, plus that of
C. Crowther, 1338, p. 50. Little is known about Crovther's own
medical career. He was a CP in Wakefield for 20 years, as well as
being physician to the Dispensary there. However, he was not a member
of any of the medical societies or Colleges, which is surprising if
his apparent professional pride is taken as a real reflection of hiu
status in the profession.
??1
being in the top stratum of the medical profession. As such, his
career must be seen as highly significant; occurring as it did in
a period when the administration of asylums was changing from a
predominantly lay to a medical one, he was respected and respectable.1
Confirmation of Ellis' status, if such is still needed, can be
seen in the very large salary he was making as an asylum superinten¬
dent. Together with his wife, he received £550 per annum, plus
another £400 per annum in kind (services, provisions, accommodation,
and servants). As Jones has pointed out, "He was thus in receipt
of a gross wage of nearly £1000 per annum at a time when a living
2
wage was well under £1 per week".
In Ellis' career, as in the Tukese before him, it is possible
to see in action many of the social forces of his day. At the same
time it is possible to see, and this chapter has been written to show,
that moral treatment was not necessarily tied to the praxis of any
I
This of course is a recognition of Ellis' ideological significance,
not a description of what his moral treatment was "really" like. To
search for that is a harder task, especially when most of his critics
were other professionals v;ho saw him as a threat to their status.
Apart from Crowther's complaints, there is an interesting comment
made by Sir Alexander Morison (later to be visiting physician at Han-
well) when he visited Wakefield in 1823. Morison noted that on Thurs¬
days (the day on which patients were received) and Itridays (the day
on which patients' friends were allowed to visit), Ellis was "always
at heme on these days", as though he v/as not around for the rest of
the week (Morison, diary entry for 2nd June 1823). That Ellis was not
present every day was something finaly stated by Crowther. "Require
him," wrote Crowther of Ellis, "daily to superintend the convalescent
insane, in the field and in the garden, during the hours of labour;
and. you will secure to him better health than by permitting him to
go out with the fox-hounds and to visit watering places" (C. Crowther,
1838, p. 104).
p
K. Jones, 1972, p. 121. Ellis was also the highest paid of the
county asylum superintendents of the time. In the Cornwall Asylum
the tioint salary for the superintendent and matron was £200, and. at
Stafford the superintendent received £200 and the matron an additional
£40 (ibid., pp. 91-2).
one individual or class. It was simultaneously a basis for psych¬
ological development and an instrument of social control. Ellis®
fragment of moral treatment reflected the various interests of
certain sections of the bourgeois class. This ability to reflect
such a breadth of interests was a powerful force in maintaining
moral treatment as an active ideology.
And yet, as the picture has been portrayed so far, moral treat
ment appears as peculiarly lifeless, as little more than a vehicle
for the ambitions of aspirants to the ruling class. In short,
this past chapter has examined moral treatment from an external
perspective and has ignored the internal dimension of its dynamic.
It has been a necessary perspective, in that to loca.te any social
phenomenon in the history of its time it is essential to provide
this external view of its existence, fashioned as it must be out
of the hopes and dreams of men who lived in that external world.
But that is only half the picture. A major part of the strength
of moral treatment was that it appeared as an autonomous reality,
as ideology with a life of its ovm. It had an internal history—
with of course a social 3ignificance-~but with an immediate meaning
that derived from medical and other fo:ms of knowledge. It is only
now, with the social dimensions of moral treatment having been
firmly established, that we may enter its internal, epistemological
history.
CHAPTER POUR
Moral Treatment as Knowledge
Bourgeois ideology continuously transforms the
products of history into essential types.
Just as the cuttlefish squirts its ink in
order to protect itself, it cannot rest until
it has obscured the ceaseless making of the
world, fixated this world into an object which
can. be for ever possessed, catalogued its richess
embalmed it, and injected into reality some
purifying essence which will stop its trans¬
formation, its flight towards other forms of
existence.
—Roland Barthes, 1972
. . .residing amidst six hundred lunatics,
no day passes over in which the truth of
Phrenology is not exemplified,
—W.C. Ellis, 1836
J
By the 1820s, moral treatment was an established fact confront¬
ing the medical profession. As social practice it was apparently
successful, and certainly as ideology it proved an adequate vehicle
for a number of contemporary opinions. But medicine is not only
the reflection of social fashions, however closely they may be tied
to the realities of class struggle. Its rationale is the production
and application of specialised knowledge. What was the relationship
of moral treatment to medical knowledge? It is this question that
the present chapter will attempt to answer.
As we have seen, neither Pinsl nor the Tukes attempted to tie
their moral therapies to a precise medical theory. The idea of
manipulating the passions had a long history of medical associa¬
tions, but it was never presented by Pinel as an advance in medical
knowledge. Indeed, as modern commentators have pointed out,"'' moral
treatment appeared to present the medical profession with something
of an anomaly. There they were, overwhelmingly committed to a somati
or physicalist theory of disease, and moral treatment, the new wonder
2
therapy, appeared to work upon their patients' minds.
1
See for instance Bynun, 1974, pp. 329-*31; Cooter, 1976, 135-6;
Scull, 1975a, 250-4.
2
Very few physicians at the time held the view that insanity was
simply a disease of the mind involving no degeneration of the phys¬
ical structure of the brain. Perhaps the strongest commitment to
the idea of a sick mind that was held by a practising mad-doctor
was that of V/.S. Hallaran, physician at Cork Lunatic Asylum. Hall-
aran defended his concept of "mental insanity" with a quotation
from the Bible; "The Spirit of man will sustain his infirmity; but
a wounded Spirit who can bear?" (Proverbs XVIII, verse 14, quoted
in Holiaran, 1818, p. 22). Not that Hallaran entirely rejected
the need for somatic treatment, but he saw insanity as a disease
having physical and mental properties in a far more distinct way
than most writers on the subject. (See also ibid., pp. 64, 150.)"
One extreme, and not very commonly held, position was to argue
that moral treatment could have no value in dealing with the phys¬
ical disease of insanity,. A clear statement of this position was
put by the visiting physician to Wakefield Asylum in 1827:
Prom morbid anatomy we learn that in ninety-five cases
out of a' hundred of the deranged patients examined after
death, the structure of thebrain is materially injured
by chronic inflammation of its investing membranes, or
by an effusion of water into its ventricles. It must
be evident to every individual possessing common sense,
that water in the ventricles and chronic inflammation
of its membranes, can neither bs obviated nor cured by
moral treatment.-*-
Cr-owther maintained that he did not devalue the possible contribu¬
tion of moral treatment in helping the insane, but he emphasized
that this must remain secondary to the medical help the physician
could provide. According to a petition he submitted to Parliament
in 1834,
after curing the bodily disease incident upon the first
attack of insanity, nothing contributes more towards
removing tho mental alienation, than employment suited
to the circumstances and habits of the patient.^
But the curing comes first, insisted Crcwther, and it is only phys¬
icians who were competent to handle this aspect of treatment. This
distinction between curing the illness and restoring the patient to
full mental health is similar to the one that, the private asylum
owner, George Man Burrows, made in writing of Abercrombie's comments
on insanity, John Abererombie was physician to the Edinburgh Public
Dispensary, and had a considerable reputation as a Society physician.
The significance of his written work lies in the fact that he was a
1
Caleb Crowther, letter to Visiting Magistrates of West Riding of
Yorkshire Pauper Lunatic Asylum, 26th December 1827, in C. Crowther,
1830, pp. 16-7.
2
7th February 1834, In C. Crowther, 1838, p. 144.
follower of the Scottish "Philosophy of Mind" school developed by
Thomas Reid and John Gregory, a.r;d this made his theories too mental-
istic for most- English physicians. Abercrombie was unconcerned
with somatic bases of insanity* what he saw as import ont was the
1
inculcation of "mental discipline". Burrows' point was that this
was all very well "for purposes of instruction, to guide the impress
ry
ions and associations of early life",c but that as far as insanity
was concerned the mental functions were too badly damaged for this
sort of approach. The physician, according to Burrows, had to use
methods that were more drastic and more fundamental than those which
involved a mere exercise of mind.
Although this argument could be seen to possess (and still does
a great deal of theoretical attractiveness to physicians holding .a
somatic theory of insanity, in practice most doctors actually work¬
ing with the insane recognised that such a distinction was untenable
The doctors had to deal with their patients as whole people; the
restoration of" health was as much an essential part of treatment
as the destruction of disease. This was an old established truth
that the moral therapists had rediscovered for themselves; although,
3'
For Abercrombie on the treatment of insanity see his 1832, pp.
306-49; and for his general attitude towards "mental discipline",
his 1837, pp. 13-21. John Gregory had published a book as early
as 1765 arguing for the inseparable effect of the mind on the body
and vico versa (Gregory, 1765). That Gregory's work was not recog¬
nised as important by reformers of the treatment of the insane is
perhaps to be located in the reasons that Shapin gives (Shapin,
1975) for the unpopularity of the "philosophy of mind" outside of
the Scottish universities generally. Shapin argues that it was
the contingent elitist associations of this philosophy, as propa¬
gated by the professors of philosophy in Scottish universities,
that made xt uncongenial to the democratic aspirations of middle-
class intellectuals. There was certainly nothing intrinsically elit¬
ist or obscure about its intellectual content; indeed it was a psych*
©logical approach which would seem, on the face of it, to be very
congenial to the moral therapists.
2 T-Burrows, 1828, p. 5.
for reasons which have already been discussed, this initiative for
a new approach to mental health did not come predominantly from
within the medical profession. But once that initiative existed,
the medical profession had to come to terms with it. This was
especially so in view of the association that many people made
between the primarily medical institutions like Bethlem, and neglect,
and lay-administered asylums like the Retreat, and compassionate
concern,
One solution, and this was the one most popular with many of
the less well-qualified mad-doctors in charge of private asylums,
was merely to pragmatically accept moral treatment as something
which worked. It was practised alongside medical treatment, and
defended on practical, not theoretical, grounds--just as had been
done at the Retreat. A vivid example which illustrates this eclectic
approach to therapy is the use made of the swing or the "rotatory
machine" in the treatment of insanity.
The idea of swinging a patient to induce sedation mechanically
goes back to Greek medicine, but it was reintroduced by J.C. Smyth
who recommended it in 1787 for reducing fever s.nG promoting expec¬
toration in consumptive patients.Whatever the original theoret¬
ical justification for the swing, Smyth's (and subsequent) recom¬
mendations of its values were based purely on a supposedly empir¬
ical observation that it caused a lessening of the symptoms of
consumption, fever, mania, or whatever. Its value was that it could
be defended on purely pragmatic grounds; that it worked, whatever
the conflicting medical theories exhorting physicians to use one
1
Smyth, 1737, p. 47.
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method rather than another. Smyth had erected a swing in the
grounds of the Middlesex Hospital, and from his account it appears
to have been an ordinary garden s'wing. The idea v/as taken up by
Erasmus Darwin who recommended the principle of swinging to reduce
fever, only in Darwin's case his rationale was based on how a
mi11-wright
told me, that he had more than once seen the experi¬
ment of a man extending himself across the large stone
of a corn-mill, and that by gradually letting the stone
whirl, the man fell asleep.
Smyth had based his reasoning on the observation that sea voyages
were good for consumption and that, according to Smyth, neither sea
air, exercise, nor vomiting on its own had any effect. What was
common to Smyth's and Darwin's suggestions was the belief, based
oxi observation, that a regular swinging motion reduced fever. Since
the symptoms of fever appeared to have many similarities with those
of mania, it is not surprising that the principle of swinging was
adapted for use on the insane. Joseph-Mason Cox, a mad-house proprie¬
tor in Bristol, was the first to popularise the swing in this way
in 1804-, and 20 years later G.M. Burrows maintained that most British
2
asylums were then using the swing.
The patient was strapped into a chair and rotated by means of
3
a windlass mechanism. Both the horizontal and vertical positions
t
were used, at speeds of up to 100 revolutions a minute. Burrows
also recounted the necessity of changing direction every six to
eight minutes. The physical results of all this were understandably
1
Darwin, 1794-1796, vol. 1, p. 218. See also vol. 2, pp. 608-9,
2
Cox, 1804, pp. 102-12; Burrows, 1828, p. 601.
For illustrations of swinging machines, see OTA, pp. 601, 650.
■» P. 95.
2?9
dramatic* "The consequence is, an instant discharge of the con¬
tents of the stomach, bowels, and bladder, in quick succession.""''
It also had an immediate and powerful effect on "lowering the circu-
2
l&iion., and the general temperature of the body".
All the writers on the subject advised caution; these were
powerful results .and, as Burrows pointed out, mad-doctors already-
had a bad enough reputation—what would be the consequences for the
<■»
profession if a fatal accident were to occur? What is interesting
in the context of the present discussion is that, as Ccx put it,
swinging "is both a moral end medical mean in the treatment of
4
maniacs". He explained why; once it had been used on a patient
the physician will often only have to threaten its
employment to secure compliance with his wishes, while
no speqies of punishment is more harmless or effica¬
cious. ^
Ke gave a case history to show the success of this principle. One
patient was repeatedly treated with the swing. He made a partial
recovery
but his former mental peculiarities soon after return¬
ing, the swing was prepared, . .but rather than repeat
the ride in the whirlygig, as he termed it, he sub¬
mitted entirely to my wishes and with some occasional
returns of obstinacy. . .1 had the pleasure to see him
gradually improve and advance to perfect reason.
Burrows, 1828, p. 601.
2
Hallaran, 1818, p. 94.
3
Burrows, op.clt., p. 605• For an example of contemporary opinion
against the swing, see the letter to The Times, 18th August 1827.




Ibid., p. 112. This moral advantage of the swing was reiterated
by Burrows (op.cit., pp. 601,602); W.C. Ellis (1338, p. 228); pri~
chard (1835, pp. 2l6ff).
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The swing thus worked on the body and the mind. It is per¬
haps more correct to say that the swing worked on the body and the
thought of being strapped into it worked on the mind, but the two
aspects were necessarily joined as far as both the patients and
their doctors were concerned.1 The point about the example of the
swing is that it•illustrates the pragmatic way that methods of
treatment were accepted as having an effect on their patients'
minds as well as their bodies. In view of the apparent belief
by some present-day historians that late-eighteenth-century mad-
doctors had some difficulty in reconciling physical and mental modes
of therapy, it is worth emphasizing this point by reference to two
more examples.
Bringing the patient into contact with water had been a perenn¬
ially used method of treating the insane. Its justification had
varied depending on the intellectual fashions of the times. In
the eighteenth century it was still possible to point to examples
of the use of water as a means of driving out spirits, but its
most frequent justification at that time depended on a pragmatic-
recognition that the mind and the body did "interact1* and that what
was done to one affected the other.
James Currie, physician at Liverpool Lunatic Asylum, gave a
vivid example of a case of "furious insanity" admitted there in
Although at least one physician (Sir Alexander Morison) saw a
direct "moral effect" created by being on the swing itself because,
as he put it, "the disagreeable sensations produced by it tend to
excite fear, and to rouse the indolent insane; the former effect
may sometimes divert the mind from the train of ideas impelling
to suicide" (Morison, 1828, p. 50).
2
D.H. Tuke, 1882, pp. 11-23; B. Clarke, 1975, pp. 127-33; and for
a commentary on the diverse justifications of the use of water, see
Fouceult, 1971, pp. 166-72,
1796» The patient
was thrown headlong into a cold bath - He came out
calm, and nearly rational. . .jjVhen his calm state
wore off two days later] he was again thrown into the
cold bath in the height of his fury, as before. As
he came out, he was thrown in again, and this was re¬
peated five different times, till he could net leave
the bath without assistance. He became perfectly
calm and rational in the bath, and has remained so
1
ever since.
Such examples do not appear to have been exceptional. Perhaps the
most frightening story of all is that of the woman patient who
eventually agreed to "become a Loving obedient and dutifull Wife
for ever thereafter" as a. result of having 15 tens of water dropped
2
on her in the space cf 90 minutes.
Sometimes the proponents of these schemes looked for thecret«
ical justification of their therapies in terms of contemporary
knowledge, but more often they were likely to advertise them on
thegrounds that they worked—for -whatever reason. A second example
of a therapeutic means coming into popularity at this time was a
machine for administering electric shocks. The treatment was so
common for a variety of ills that few writers bothered to comment
on it. The London Electric Dispensary was founded in 1793 "with a
3
view to afford a new benefit to the lower orders of mankind".' In
the first nine years of its existence the Dispensary treated 3274
and "cured" 1401, including such ca.ses as
Hannah Atherway, for several years. , .subject to
Hysteric Pits, so as to render her incapable of ser¬
vice; she was Electrified once a day for two months,
1
«?. Currie, 1805, vol. 1, p. 185.
p
Patrick Blair, Borne observations on the cure of mad persons by
the fall of water, 1725, quoted in HMA, pp. 326-9™
3
Hignmore, 1810, p. 348®
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which entirely removed her complaint.
An electrical machine was bought for Bethiem in 1796* and for the
i.
Retreat in 1798. William Ellis compared the values of the "eiec-
trifying-machine" to those of the swing in that "patients soon
learn to put themselves under that discipline which will exempt
4
them from such uncomfortable circumstances"
These were therapies which were popular because they appeared
to work. There is no doubt about their popularity, but where ther
was some doubt was in the extent to which they relied on esoteric
knowledge to which only those in the medical profession had access
To some there seemed a danger that once the principle of nanything
that works" was accepted, the medical profession would be made re¬
dundant in the treatment of the insane. This could, after all, be
construed as the lesson of the Retreat, Medicine had not been out¬
lawed from that institution, but it could be argued that the statu
of the medical profession had been severely compromised by the prs.f
5
matic attitude of the Tulces1 approach to therapy. To combat this
the profession had to demonstrate why it should necessarily be jjx
charge of the treatment of the insane, To do this, it had to show
that not only could physicians .practice moral treatment, but that
what they were doing could only be fully appreciated by another
1
Berarcso, 1794, p. 10.
o
Bethlem Hospital, Committee Books, 7th June 1796.
Rexreat Archives, Cash Book, entry for 12th October 1798.
^
W.C. Ellis, 1833, p. 228.
5
See for instance Scull, 1975a, pp. 250ff; Bynum, 1974, pp. 324-5
283
member of the medical profession. In other words, moral treatment
had to be incorporated not only into medical practice but into
whatever it was that gave that practice its validity as medicine.
The medical profession thus felt the need to demonstrate, to them¬
selves and their critics, that moral treatment worked because it
was merely exploiting in practical terms what the profession knew
already in theoretical terms. This was something the Tukes had
attempted to do for the religion of the Society of Friends. How
could medicine assert its authority in this area?
One possible inspiration for the theoretical work that had to
be done was of course the French tradition pjropuunded by Cabanis
and Pinels that it was only the physician who understood the physical
nature of man, so it was only the physician who could appreciate
man8s moral nature. A similar point v/as made by Thomas Percival
in his influential work on medical ethics published in 1803. Accord¬
ing to Percival5 only the physician could
unite an intimate knowledge with the laws of assoc¬
iation ; the controul of fancy over judgement;, the force
of habit; the direction and comparative strength of
opposing passions; and the reciprocal dependencies and.;
relations of the moral and intellectual powers of man."
What Percival was saying, as Cabanis, Pinel, and many others bad said
before him, was that there wore indissoluble links between man's mind
and his body. What worked on one had an-effect on the other. The
point is a trivial one only if we ignore the enormous weight of the
Christian tradition, which had in effect appropriated the spiritual
aspect of human nature for so long. As the importance of this
authority waned—as concepts like "Reason", for instance—became
■L
Percival, 1003, p. 27.
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increasingly secularised—so the medical profession attempted, to
include men's mind as well as his body within its province. Num¬
erous medical texts around the end of the eighteenth century pointed
out the interrelation of the mind and the body and the unique posi¬
tion of medicine in being able to appreciate the full subtleties of
. 1
thxs pnenomenon.
There were two conclusions that physicians drew from this
interrelation. One of these, as the visiting physician.for Bedford
Asylum argued in his attempt to get a medical superintendent for
that insititution, was the need for physical medicine for disorders
of the mind:
Daily experience teaches me that a costive state of
the Body, a Disordered State of the Stomach, and a preg¬
nant condition of the Womb are capable of inducing temp¬
orary Melancholy, and great irregularity of moral action;
end little difference is, I think, to be observed be¬
tween the Ravings of the Drunkard, and the Paroxysms of
the Maniac, beyond the length of their Duration. The
influence of these circumstances upon the Mind prove
its dependence and subjection to Physical Agents; and if
Physical Agents cen thus induce Moral Disorder, it is
reasonable to presume that Moral Disorder may be corrected
by Physical Agents. . . .great encouragement is I think
held out for placing a lunatic Asylum on the footing of
a Medical Institution.2
The other conclusion was simply the obverse: disorders of the
body could be affected by approaches to the mind. Pinel and Enquire!
had done much to reawaken the profession's awareness of the role of
the passions in this process, and a few English physicians reasserted
their value in mad-doctoring. Thomas Young, reviewer of Pinel®s
Treatise for the Quarterly Review, gave a clear account of their
1
See for example J. Gregory, 1765, p. 6; Beddoes, 1802-1803, vol 3,
frontispiece; S. Walker, 1796, pp. 212-24? J. Reid, 1816, p. 15.
2




the passions may be expected to be extremely active in
exciting and not wholly ineffectual in curing the dis¬
eases since the violent passions appear to increase and
the depressing passions to diminish the powers of the
circulation in general, and both to affect particularly
the state of the blood-vessels in the head- Passion,
in a physiological sense, may be defined an affection
of the nervous system, communicated from the brain to
the sympathetic or visceral nerves, which govern the
involuntary motions; and indicated in general by the
acceleration or retardation of the heart.-
William Ellis was one moral therapist who recognised that much
of his moral treatment consisted in manipulating his patients'
passions. According to Ellis,
In the moral treatment of cases of insanity, it is of
great importance to ascertain the ruling passion of the
patient: an appeal to this will frequently divert the
attention, and obviate the necessity of having recourse
to violent measures.^
This was a theoretical principle. In practice Ellis appeared, to
believe that one of the most useful passions was that of fear. He
described the case of one patient who he frightened by threatening
her with removal from her ward if she did not stop moaning at night.
From fear of the consequences, she refrained from making
the noise and laid still in bed. In a few nights the
restraint she imposed upon herself produced sleep.3
Similarly, to threaten a patient with a session on the swinging
machine was, in theoretical terms, merely to invoke the passion
of fear.
The theory of the passions did then provide an intellectual
basis for psychical intervention in cases of physical disease. On
1
T. Young, 1809, p. 153.
2




the other hand it would not be fair to say that it was widely
proclaimed as such: it was perhaps so much a part of "common sense"
that to have announced it as a new discovery would have made the
medical profession susceptible to ridicule. How could something
which had been known for centuries involve an advance in science?
What the medical profession, and especially that section of it con¬
nected with the treatment of the insane, needed at this time was
1
esoteric, not taken-for-granted, knowledge.
If nothing else had appeared, presumably sensationalism or the
doctrine of the association of ideas would have been developed to
fit the bill. But, as research of the last few years has demon¬
strated in detail, a particularly appropriate "scientific" theory
did appear. This new "knowledge" of human nature was phrenology.
is- ■»
The contemporary importance of phrenology for the branch of
the medical profession connected with the treatment of the insane
can no longer be doubted following the meticulous and extensive
work by Rcger footer on the subject." footer has described in de¬
tail the scientific and social significance of phrenology to the
asylum physicians, and other writers have pointed out its more
general social implications.*5 There is no need to repeat any of
the excellent work that has been done, and much of what follows is
1
It is perhaps this aspect of passion theory which leads both
Scull (1975a) and Bynum (1974) to ignore it altogether in their
accounts of the theoretical bases of moral treatment.
O
footer* s long article of 1976 is based on part cf the research
undertaken by him for a Cambridge University PhD thesis.
DeGiustino, 1975;; Maclaran, 1974;; Shapin, 1975.
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dependent on these secondary accounts, at least for its inspir¬
ation. The following account may be seen as complementary to this
other work in that it does not intend to replace it, but to add to
it by approaching the significance of phrenology from the stand¬
point of the specirCic concerns of this thesis.
Phrenology was a doctrine, originating in the work of Franz
Joseph Gall, which located the faculties of the mind in the organs
of the brain. Some of the early works on phrenology use the term
"organology" to refer to this new description of the brain.The
mind, it was argued, occupied a series of organs, much as the
ability to digest depended on the functioning of a number of phys¬
ical digestive organs in the body. Gall attributed his original
theoretical inspiration to his observation when he was a schoolboy
"that fellow pupils with excellent memories had prominent eyes".
Gall later became the physician to a lunatic asylum in Vienna and
his observations there and in schools and prisons convinced him that
men's characters could be deduced from their physiognomy. Gall
divided the brain into 27 organs, each one supposedly representing
a discrete mental function. His pupil and colleague, J.G. Spura-
heim, coon increased this number to 35» Figure 13 shews a typical
popular illustration of a phrenological head, indicating the loca¬
tion of the various faculties.
All the boundaries of human nature, its attributes and func¬
tions, were redefined at a stroke. Morality was no longer to be
a function of man's purpose in the world according to a metaphysics
1
See for instance Forster, 1815a,
HMA, p. 712. Gall lived from 1758 to 1828. For a summary of his




1. A.MA.TTVKsnss, Love between the sexes.
L. Conjugality, Matrimony—love-of one. [etc.
2. Paeextal L"Vi; Regard for orr-ymug, pets,
3. r r.iEXosirip, Avihesivvness—sociability.
J. JvnA3:T£VE;«?«sf., Lore of home
5. Coxtixtjitt, Oiio thim* at a Lime.
11. Yitati vexes*, Love of life.
6. Combatiyeness, Resistance—defense.
7. Desteuctivlxxss, Executivcness—force.
P. A limsntiveness, Appetite—hunger.
9. Acquisitiveness, Accumulation. .
10. Sjceetivenes?, Policy—management.
11. Cautioussr.«3, Prudence—provision.
• 12. arrhonativ2xf.ss, Ambition—display.
13. Self-Esteem, Self-respect—dignity.
14. Firmness, Decision—perseverance.





20. CoxsTr.ucTivF.xr.ss, Mechanical ingenuity
21. Ideality, Refinement—taste—purity.
E. Sublimity, Love of grandeur—infinitude.
22. 1 snratiox, Cop>ing—patterning.
23. ?>lir;TiiEu:.N»s, •Joooacness—'wit—fun.
21. I.ndividuality, Observation.
25. Form, Recollection of shape.
2C>. Sir.r, Measuring by the eye.
27. "Weight, Balancing—c!iniv>ing.
2S. Color, Judgment of colors.
29. Order, Method—system—arrangement.
50. Calcui.at.ox, Mental arithmetic.
51. Locality, Kecollec.ion of places.
32. Eventualitt, Memory of facts.
83. Tike, Cognizance of duration.
34. Tone, Sense of harmony and melody,
35. Language, Expression of ideas.
33. Causality, A pplying causes toeffect. [Hod.
ST. Comparison,Inductive reasoning—illustra*
0. Human Nature, Perception of motives, \
D. ag&efasleness, Pictumatuc&s—suavity*
Sources 0„S. and L.1I, Fowler, no date, p. vi.
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of being; morality henceforth was to become a function of the
natural properties of human nature, as they were given and could
be observed by scientific methods. This emphasis on naturalistic
observations, on human nature as a product of "the independent
operation of the natural laws",1 was to have a profound effect
on the future of the treatment of the insane. And yet this was
not a total]y original idea; it was after all in 1804 that the
French physician, P.G. Cabanis, wrote that
it is now beginning to be perceived, that medicine
and mora.l philosophy form but two branches of the
same science.2
Cabanis had in his turn formed his ideas partly out of the physio¬
gnomical theories of Lavater,
the science or knowledge of the correspondence between
the external and internal man, the visible superfic¬
ies ana the invisible contents.
What the phrenologists appeared to do was to place this embryonic
body of knowledge on a firm scientific basis. Although they believed
that the position of the organs of the brain was set, they also main¬
tained that there were large differences in size between individuals,
with the size of each organ being directly related to its importance
in that person's character. It'was this aspect of phrenology that
G. Combe, I860, p. 22, emphasis in the original.
2
Cabanis, 1806, p. 304 (published in French in 1804).
3
d»C. Lavater, Essays on physiognomy. 1789, quoted in HMA, p. 521.
In Cabanis* words, " [in lunatic asylums and prisons] you may find
numerous proofs. . .of those constant relations between the physical
and moral constitution of man. From their inspection you may learn,
that criminal habits, and aberrations of reason, are always accom¬
panied by certain organical peculiarities, manifested in the exter¬
nal form of the body, in the features, or in the physiognomy"
(Cabanis, op.cit„, p. 311)«
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led to its reputation as "being primarily concerned with, people's charac¬
ters in terms of their "bumps on the head"*
The implications of phrenology for theories of insanity were quickly
noted. Spurzheira published a phrenological treatise on insanity in 1817»
as did Thomas Forster. However, as Cootor has pointed cut, it was not
until after lecture tours by Spurzheim and others in the 1820s that the
principles of phrenology began to be widely accepted by the medical pro—
2
fession or by the literate public. Much of this acceptance was due to
the energetic proselytising of the popular writer George Combe, who, together
with some assistance from his brother Andrew, became largely responsible fox-
spreading phrenology in this country."5 George Combe's The Constituticn of
Man first published in 1828, had reached nine editions by 1860.^ Andrew
Combe published a long and detailed phrenological treatise on insanity in
1831 and this work "was influential in making the possibilities of using
phrenology in the treatment of the insane both well-known and respectable.
The following year the 22—year—old Forbes Winslow published a short book
on the connections between phrenological knowledge and the understanding
of insanity,^ and although this was before Winslow had any sort of wcpu-
tation (he was later to become the President of the Medico-Psychological
Association), the publication of this work is indicative of the interest
that phrenology was creating among the younger members of the profession.
Spurzheim, 1817; Forster 1817 •
Cooter, 1976. pp. 7~9«
■>
J
G* Combe, l8pC; Gibbon, I8780
^ G. Combe, i860. See also his 182/]. and 1836®




John Conolly, then a lecturer- in medicine at London University, pub¬
lished his Indications of Insanity in 1830 as a textbook for his students*
While this work was not meant as a phrenological treatise, it shows the
1
obvious influence on Conolly's mind of phrenological ideas* After leav¬
ing London, Conolly moved to Warwick where he was the founder and presi-
2
dent (in 1834) of the Warwick and Leamington Phrenological Society*
That other famous moral therapist, William Ellis, helped found a phren¬
ological society 'while he was superintendent at Wakefield Asylum,"^ and
in 1836 he wrote to George Combe that
I candidly own, that until I became acquainted with Phren¬
ology, I had no solid basis upon which I could ground any
treatment for the cure of the disease of insanity*^
The perceived importance of phrenology can be documented for many other
notable physicians connected with the treatment of the insane® W.A.F.
Browne was a lecturer on phrenology before and after his appointment at
Montrose Asylum,^ and Matthew Allen (proprietor of High Beech private
asylum) was a lecturer in phrenology as early as 1817*^
1
Republished in facsimile as Conolly, 1964* See especially po. 79-81*
261 e
2
See Hunter and Macalpine's introduction to ibid., p. 13e
^
Cooter, 1976, p. 5*
^ Quoted in KMA, p. 872. For the Combes' impressions of Ellis, see G.
Combe, I85O, pp. 230-1. George Combe's own appreciation of the virtues
of the phrenological treatment of the insane can be seen in his comment
that "The great lesson is taught here [Harwell Asylum") that by honouring
humanity even in its lowest forms and conditions (in the pauper-idiot? and
insane) it may be improved, and that it may be rendered comparatively
cleanly, orderly, quiet, tractable, and useful" (diary entry for 9th May
1846} in Gibbon, 1878, vol. 2, p. 214).
5 „
Cooter, loo.cit., note 17* See also the Annual Reports of Criohicn
Royal Institution for the continuing use by Browne of phrenological con¬
cepts. Andrew Combe had intended to apply for the post of superintendent
at Montrose but stood down when he realised that Browne was also inter¬
ested in it (G. Combe, op.cit.. p. 229)»
K. Alien, 1837, p. ix? Barnet, 196%
After detailing the extent to which phrenology was accepted by-
leading physicians, Cooter rightly points out that
Altogether these alienists make up a list as impressive as
it is substantial® It numbers ten of the medical superin¬
tendents of the twenty—three public asylums in England and
Scotland in 1844 and among them all those which were consid¬
ered most advanced in management and humanity® It includes
too the proprietors, managers, surgeons and apothecaries of
some of the more highly regarded borough and private asylums
of the time.
What was it about phrenology that made it so appealing to these
reformers? The first point that must be made is that there was nothing
intrinsically progressive or reformist about the phrenological doctrine
2
per so® As 8hapin has pointed cut, ' one of the major tenets of phren¬
ology—that the faculties of the mind are innate—was used, by British
phrenologists to show the possibility of change® They argued that envir¬
onmental influences could move one faculty to increased or decreased activ¬
ity, as well as offset the effect of a deranged faculty with the influence
of a healthy one. But the idea of the innateness of mental functions
could just as easily be used to justify the status quo. This was exactly
what happened on the Continent, where phrenology retained its conservative
associations.J
One attraction of phrenology as understood by the medical profession
Cooter, .1976, pp. 6-7* it may be noted in parenthesis that Cocter
vises the term "alienist" as though it was a contemporary term replacing
the older "mad-doctor". On the date he gives as a reference for it (1889)
it certainly did fulfil that function, but the OED dates it no earlier
than I864 and there is no use of the term in any of the texts examined
for the purposes of the present research® There was a curious hiatus after
"mad-doctor" went into disrepute during which physicians, apothecaries, etc.
who dealt with the insane, had no generic title. This may perhaps be at¬
tributed to the lack of confidence of practitioners in their speciality
(due to its bad reputation) existing at the same time as an urgent desire
to be seen as ordinary and respectable members of the medical profession®
^
Shapin, 1975? PP« 232-3®
fomkin, 1947? PP® 2o7ffe
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was that it wade mental derangements apparently mora tractable* By-
dividing mind into a number of functions, the derangement of mind could
similarly be appreciated as the manifestation of many minor dysfunctions.
John Conolly, for instance, defined insanity as
the impairment of any one or more of the faculties of the
mind, accompanied with, or inducing, a defect in the com¬
paring faculty.
This understanding cf insanity as due to the derangement or faulty func¬
tioning of one or some of a large number of material organs gave the
physicians plenty of scope for vivid accounts of what had gone wrong
with their patients. Insanity was attributed to the over-activity of
individual or combinations of two or three particular organs. In some
of Matthew Allen's published ca.sc notes he attempted to provide full
plirenological descriptions of his patients; for example,
Pride, benevolence, hope, combativeness and amativeness
full; caution, conscientiousness, and veneration par¬
tially defective."
William ELlis also provided such descriptions of his patients as
On examining her head I found Destructiveness Secretive—
ness Combativeness Firmness & Self Fsteem all large.
Intellectual faculties, Benevolence & Veneration & Tune
very large.^
The therapeutic indications of this understanding of insanity were
twofold. One was based on the simple acceptance of the principle that
if the deranged organ had a precise physical location, then it could be
treated with precise physical therapies. One physician apparently had
^
Conolly, 1964? P* 300 (first published I830).
2
M. Allen, 1831, p. 204.
^ Letter to unknown recipient, 31st December 1835, in HMA, p. 820.
29''+
much success "by applying leeches directly on to the affected cerebral
organ,-'" This sort of approach was an -exception: the moral therapists
on the whole were not great enthusiasts for physical therapies. Phren¬
ology for most of them was important because it provided an intellectual
basis for psychological remedies; it confirmed that the state of the
various organs could be changed through an approach to the mental func¬
tion corresponding to them. This other indication of phrenology, that
the insane were susceptible to individual psychological therapies, which
in turn depended upon the physician appreciating his patients as indivi¬
duals with infinitely variable problems, provides the main connection
between phrenology and moral treatment. It is also often recognised as
a lasting legacy of phrenology which had a real effect, separate to the
now discredited intellectual content of phrenological knowledge. Hunter
and Kacalpine, for instance, have written,
It is a remarkable fact that phrenology which—as Ellis
exemplifies—was so great a stimulus to psychology and added
so much to moral treatment and the management of the insane,
achieved all this almost despite and not because of its fun¬
damental untenable tenets of innumerable propensities read
frosa bumps on the head. How then did it achieve its great
and progressive influence in this field? Surely because the
the application of the doctrine made physicians take an indi¬
vidual interest in patients and their personalities. By pro¬
viding an ology" it satisfied man's intellectual n,§ed to
shelter under a system and follow a. prescribed line.""
The main inadequacy of this type of interpretation is that, although
it attempts to subject the intellectual content of phrenology to a crit¬
ical analysis, it passes without comment the equally problematic notion
of "individual interest". As has been shown, Pinel and the Tukes8
^
John 1bps, reported by Winslow, 1832, p. 27-
HMA, p. 873*
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"individual interest" in their patients was closely circumscribed by
their particular values® Phrenology represents an attempt to justify
moral treatment with a different type of theory to Samuel Tuke's relig¬
ious doctrines, but it was no less imbued with the values of its prac¬
titioners * This can be seen quite easily in the type of "individual
interest" that the moral therapists gave their patients as a result of
a phrenological assessment of their character®
In spite of all the assertions of noticing an over-endowment of
one faculty or a derangement of another, the moral therapists rarely
advocated any form of personal psychotherapy® As far as a general psy¬
chological approach was concerned, the contribution of phrenology can be
seen in two v;ays. One was in the intellectual support it gave to
what were quite unexceptional commonsoneo type observations» In his
Treatise on® c slnsanity William Ellis proclaimed that he "should
strongly recommend the study of phrenology,"* but instead of giving
detailed instructions on how to do this, he made such remarks as
A single glance will show, to a person in the habit of ob¬
serving, whether the formation of the head indicates a ^
naturally bold and passionate, or a timid and retiring man®
It is this kind of remark that gives support to Hunter and Macalpine's
interpretation of the value of phrenology. But diagnosis is one thing,
treatment another, and it is with the latter that can be seen a more
interesting and profound use of phrenology®
Phrenology was more than just a wild theory, a rationalization, or
1
W„C* Ellis, 1838, p. 255®
?
Ibid®, p. 256, See Shapin, 1'975» P« 237 for a discussion of how this
simple empiricism was phrenology's strength in making it a popular science
which could be understood by all®
an essentially unimportant intellectual "basis for starting societies in
which like-minded social reformers could demonstrate their solidarity.
It was a body of knowledge by which social practice was interpreted.,
assessed and reformulated as the basis for fresh knowledge. It was taken
seriously by the moral therapists and as such we must accept it as part
of the dialectic of history. The subsequent history of moral treatment,
as of the entire treatment of the insane, was heavily determined by what
phrenology established as normative practice. It is because of this
that it must be allowed a far deeper appreciation than the usual cava¬
lier "interpretations".
Phrenology did not just provide a "system", an apparently scientific
front behind which the moral therapists could masquerade their interests
as objective knowledge. It did do this, but it also provided the intell¬
ectual basis by which a variety of ad-.hoc suggestions about moral treat¬
ment could be petrified into distinct forms of knowledge.
One of the "benefits" of phrenology was its supposedly scientific
validation of the belief that the insane could be educated far mere than
v/as generally believed possible. The idea that anyone could benefit more
from education than v/as normally supposed was not in itself a new idea.
It had been expressed as early as the 1790s by educationalists like the
2
Edgeworih.Sc .And in 1810 the erstwhile revolutionary, John Thelwall,
This latter thesis is one put forward by McLaren, 1974»
2
See for instance their comment that "It is not from want of capacity
that so many children are deficient in arithmetical skill and it is absurd
to say 'such a child has no genius for arithmetic, such a child cannot be
made to comprehend anything about numbers'. These assertions prove no¬
thing, but that the persons who make them are ignorant of the art of
teaching" (R. L. and M. E&geworth, Practical Education, 2nd edition
(l80l), quoted in Simon, I96C, p. 4?)•
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in a treatise on speech defects, wrote that
the development of the organic faculties, is so far dependant
[sicj upon mental impression, and educational culture, that
few persons are at all aware of the extent of improvability
in the respective organs, or of the power that there is in
one organ, of supplying the deficiencies, and performing the
functions of another.^
It is this principle that the phrenologists developed and made the basis
of their therapeutic optimism. A commitment to this principle signified
a commitment not only to the education of those who were "normal" but
asserted the possibility of improving everybody. What did it matter
if the working classes were, as individuals, virtually mentally subnormal
•They could be improved through education. According to John Conolly in
1830,
The faculties of uneducated people, and particularly of the
lower order, who are neither instructed by precept nor
observation, are so little used, as to be incapable of
many kinds of mental exercise. . .Even their senses are
so unskillfuliy employed and unimproved that we cannot
always depend on what they believe they have seen with
their eyes, or heard with their ears.^
These are strong words, but Conolly did not draw from them a pessimistic
conclusion. Instead of dismissing the poor and the mad as capable only
of limited improvement, he saw, mediated through his phrenological belief
something of the full possibilities that education could provide.
Of all the moral therapists, Conolly took the formal education of
pauper lunatics the most seriously. In 1842, when he was superintendent
of Hanwell Asylum, he had classes started in reading, writing and arith¬
metic, and drawing and singing. The classes were suppressed by order of
the visiting magistrates who objected on grounds of economy—that there
was no point in spending money on the mental improvement of paupers who
*
Thelwall, 1810, p. 77* See also pp. 58—9«
^
Conolly, 19o4? P* 99»
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were only going to work at menial tasks if they were ever discharged.
Classes were started again in 1847 and 1848, "but again were not allowed
to continue. Something of the point that Conolly saw in education ap¬
pears in his comment that
As the lessons proceeded, it was found that more command
was obtained "by the patients over their powers of atten¬
tion, and that they read with more confidence.-1
This sort of statement is very similar to those that other moral thera¬
pists made on the value of work. By engaging in purposive activity,
whether it was pushing a wheelbarrow or learning tc write,, everybody
could increase his or her self—respect and grow to something more than
he or she had been before. In Conolly's words,
whoever will determine to employ the faculties of his mind
diligently, and especially his attention, will discover
that he can understand more, and effect more than he at one
time believed possible to do. Whatever talents are pos¬
sessed, it is a positive duty to exercise them.^
It is no distortion to see moral treatment itself, in yet another
of its fragments, as simply a form of education. The patients were
taught, sometimes formally but more often not, a variety of precepts and
skills by which they cculd develop those aspects of their personality
that were not damaged. W.A.F. Browne pointed out how this principle
would work, even in relation to such minor aspects of asylum life as
the lending of library books:
the ordinary rules of moral treatment must be rigidly
observed, and every reader (in the asylum library} sup¬
plied, not according to his wishes, but his wants, riot
merely in relation to recreation, but in relation to his
Conolly, 19<58, p. 129. See also his 1973, PP* 249-52, 275; and J.
Barlow, 1849* PP* 108-19 for further commentary on education at Hanwell.
^
Conolly, 1964, pp. 74-5®
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recoveryc . .Patients have been cured by being re-educated."*"
This active education of the patients' appears, at face value, to have
been a more radical proposal than giving the patients work to do. Cer¬
tainly the fact that it was never more than a short-lived experiment
was not Conolly's fault. It was the dismissal of the schoolmaster in
I852 for reasons of economy that led Conolly to finally resign his
remaining position at Hanwell.^
What is more to the point here is the philosophy underlying asylum
education. As Conolly himself pointed out, education of the insane was
qualitatively 110 different from education of the poor or other disad¬
vantaged groups. All were capable of learning far beyond previous ex¬
pectations. But what was the point of this learning: why should man's
faculties be developed in particular ways? It was one thing to suggest
that a lunatic dominated by an obsession with religious guilt should be
encouraged to develop his faculty of self-esteem, but the phrenologists
took education much further than the mere cancelling out of a bad function
with a good one (the "balancing of the passions" that Pinel had intro¬
duced). Why was education so popular with the phrenologists?
First of all it must be said that education based on phrenological
principles may only superficially be presented as resting on the same
intellectual and radical tradition as that established by writers like
the Edgevrorths and Thelwall® The full picture is more complex: education
of the insane may have involved a radical departure from the usual concept
Montrose Lunatic Asylum, Annual Report, 1837*
r>
c Hunter and Macalpine, introduction to Conolly, 1973* P» xxxiv*
Conolly was at this time only visiting physician, having resigned his
post of medical superintendent because of a policy disagreement in
1844.
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of therapy, but it could no longer have the same radical connotations
it might have had in the 1790s®
At that time the aim of the ruling class was the maintenance of
order in ways that differed as.little as possible from the methods
sanctioned by centuries of tradition® The significance of education-
alists like the Eigeworths is that they represented a radical alterna¬
tive to the more typical "inculcation of morals" type of education
popular at that time. The following view of education by Hannah More
was far more common among the ruling class than the rationalist enthu¬
siasm of Thelwall:
My plan of instruction is extremely simple and limited. . .
they learn on weekdays, such coarse work as may fit them
for servants. I allcv; of no writing for the poor. My
object is not to make them fanatics, but to train up the
lower classes in habits of industry and piety."
By the 1830s the face of Britain had changed dramatically and aicng
with it the opinions of the ruling class. The owners of capital and
their ideological representatives realised that education could be used
in a far more active way, to create a maintenance of order in what
appeared to them as a very unstable society. The ideological justifi¬
cations that were used to maintain order in the villages were neither
appropriate nor accepted in the industrial towns. Formal education
provided the means by which to instil fresh values in the minds of the
. 2
working class.
What happened was that the idea of personal growth, which repre¬
sented a radical idealism in the 1790s, was adapted by bourgeois
Quoted, in Simon, 1060, p. 133. For a methodical summary of the main
approaches to education at this time see Silver, 1.965 r chap. 1.
2
On the social control function of education in this context sec
R. Johnson, 1970; Shapin and Barnes, 1977•
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ideologists to fit into the specific requirements of the reproduction
of the social relations of capital. "The point is easily illustrated by
a hook that Conolly was responsible, for producing- in 1831." This work,
entitled The Working Man's Companion, announced quite unambiguously a
conception of mental health as a product of individual effort tied to
the creation of capital. One. vivid example that Conolly provided for
the "working-man" to model himself upon was of a "poor but industrious
lad" who got a wholesale tea merchant to sell him a pound of tea on
2 1
credit» The boy then sold the tea to his neighbours at 1-gd. per ounce
more than he paid for it (6d. instead of 4yd., a mark-up of 33$>0* The
trainee capitalist kept on doing this until he had enough capital to
buy a shop® The moral that Conolly drew from this story was not that
there was so much poverty in England because the poor were constantly
being exploited by capitalists, but that only by the creation of capital
was it possible to provide sufficient work. The aim of all workers
according to Conolly, must be, like that of the boy selling tea, to
create capital
The poiht that was repeatedly emphasised in this work was that it
1 [Conolly], 1831. On the attribution of this work to Conolly, see
Ct Knight, I864-I865, vol. 3, p. 159* It is not known how much if any
of this work was actually written by Conolly, but he had total editorial
responsibility for it.
2 t-
[ConollyJ, op.cit., pp. 103-5•
^ It was not uncommon for enthusiasts of moral treatment to compare
its effects directly to the accumulation of capital. Nathaniel Bingham,
for instance, defined the power of moral treatment as "founded on the
well—ascertained fact, that persons labouring under various degrees of
incapacity may have what remains of their understanding improved by cul¬
tivation, just as. o »a tradesman increases a small capital by good
management" (Bingham, I84I, p. 62).
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was not the end result that mattered but the means by which it v?as achieved*
Saving money, for instance, was good; not because it produced a material
advantage such as comfort in old age, but because, according to this
publication, it had a moral worth of its owns
every working man or woman, whatever may be his or hex'
condition, and. whether the savings made are great or
small, does, without any doubt, become a better man, or
better woman, than any of those can be, however rich, who
lay by nothing.1
It was not the rationalist utopianism of unlimited improvement that was
being argued here. The objectives were narrowly defined and all too
easily recognisable. As Conolly put it, writing of a successful car¬
penter, "So both he and his wife agreed, that the best fortune for their
2
children would be a good education, and regular habits of industry".
With that sentiment we are back full circle to the issues raised
in Chapter Three. Education arid individual improvement were only recog¬
nised as worthwhile as long as they contributed to "habits of industry";
as long as they manufactured, to put it bluntly, a conditioned working
class e
The long-term result of this approach to education has been perhaps
even more insidious. By emphasizing the rewards that can be achieved by
£conolly|, 1831, p. 26.
2
Ibid., p. 44° In Conolly!s defence it must be said that his early
idealism mellowed as he appreciated the real social constraints on many
of his patients. Instead of continuing to proclaim the virtues of indi¬
vidual effort as a solution to all problems, he came to recognise in the
later 1840s that much could be done to improve conditions by social means.
In a lecture he gave at the Royal College of Physicians in 1849 he crit¬
icised the lack of social conscience in the medical professions "successive
examples of disease occur, and successive epidemics destroy and pass away",
he said, "and we do not apply ourselves to the true wisdom of so amending
the lot of labour as that it may shield each honest family from the pest¬
ilence which always first assails the wretched and the unprotected"
(Conolly, 1849} vol 2, p. 44b)»
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each individual as a result of Lis or her personal effort, this segment
of "bourgeois ideology has done much to prevent the formation of a con¬
sciousness by the working class of itself as a class, with interests
separate to those of serving capital*
A recent study of a particular adult education enterprise at this
time has pointed out its function as an attempt
to build an alliance or a community of interest between
the bourgeoisie and the upper section of the working classes,
the emerging labour aristocracy. In contrast to crude at¬
tempts at coercion or suppression, liberalizing strategies
involved policies of "cultural aggression" which by bribe
or indoctrination would ensure that the "natural leaders" of
the working classes identified with and affiliated to those
above them rather than those below.
Conolly was heavily involved with the Society for the Diffusion of Use¬
ful knowledge and with the Mechanics' Institutes, two institutions that
aimed very much to appeal to a "labour aristocracy". Conolly believed,
like all moral therapists, in the need of the individual to liberate
himself from whatever difficulties he found himself in. In the context
of what was happening in English towns in the 1830s and '40s, this type
of education can only be seen as a means to destroy the potential of the
working class to act as a class for itself. This subject leads outside
the scope of this thesis, but it must be mentioned because it is one of
the pervading aspects of what may be called the "doctrine of individ¬
ualism". As long as each individual is encouraged to believe that his
way out of poverty and deprivation must be at the expense of his fellows.
then there is little chance of developing a mental health, which is more
2
than a reflection of capitalist social relationships#
•Shapin and Barnes, 1977} p« 40® Another discussion of this aspect
of the Mechanics' Institutes appears in Royle, 1971® On the acceptance
of middle-class ideals by the nineteenth century labour aristocracy see
also Perkin, 1972, pp. 305-8.
2
In this connection it is worth mentioning what that other famous
30k
Even vn.-th.in the context of early industrial capitalism there were
other paths to social improvement'which were being discussed and which
did not rely quite so heavily on individualist ideology. The various
models discussed in Chapter Three indicate something of the range of
ideasj from the extreme individualist logic of the single-celled Panop¬
ticon to the moral community of the Home Colony. Robert Owen's ideas,
for instance, cannot simply be labelled "socialist", but he did have a
more socialist attitude towards "community" than did the phrenologists,
who saw the environment primarily in terms of a greenhouse in which
individual talents could be nurtured.The strength of phrenology in
this context was that it appeared to explain all the social problems of
the time—poverty, ignorance, crime, insanity—as well as to provide a
solution to their control and eventual abolition. It seemed to explain
why some individuals were happy and rich and others miserable and poor.
It confirmed, at a theoretical level, than an individual's interests
were best served by applying reformative programmes and sanctions to
his personal behaviour. In this sense the moral treatment of the insane
may be compared to a system of education.
But phrenology did more than that. It appeared to provide a sci¬
entific basis on which to classify the categories of insanity itself.
It was at this time that the formal medical categories of insanity
moral therapist, W.A.F. Browne, wrote in 18495 the year after the greatest-
ever demonstrations of power by the European working class: "To become
a Communist is not necessarily to become a madman; but when persons of
education and fortune reduce such a theory to practice, when with their
new creed comes a revolution in all their habits. . .the true origin of
the mental change may be suspected" (Crichton Royal Institution, 10th
Annual Report, 1849? P® ii)*
1
This point is elaborated in Be Giustino, 1975? PP® 139"45«
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underwent a major transformation; this was not directly connected with
moral treatment hut it was governed by the same rationalising process
that made moral treatment appear as a meaningful activity, and as such a
discussion of it will help to clarify the significance of moral treat¬
ment „ Phrenology was not the only intellectual force of importance in
this process but the other physicians of insanity did not markedly dis¬
agree with the phrenologists about this subject. Whatever the differ¬
ences between the various theories on the nature of mind, all the phy¬
sicians (who bothered to write about it) agreed on two principles when
it came to classifying insanity: the location of the problem in the
characteristics of the individual presenting the symptoms, and the need
to subject the deviant properties of insanity to more efficient technical
control.
The emphasis on the first of these principles can be seen in such
remarks as Winslow's that "Insanity is frequently only an exaggeration
of the natural character of the person afflicted". What he meant by
this is that, for instance, the organ of acquisitiveness, perhaps al¬
ready highly developed in a particular individual, could be allowed to
become over—excited and thus cause insanity. The historical signifi¬
cance of this idea can be seen by recalling the medieval and renaissance
concepts of madness.
For the period up to at least the raid—seventeenth century, madness
was not considered as being qualitatively distinct from normal behaviour.
The distinctions that were made were more quantitative, emphasizing
for instance that there was "no difference between anger and madness,
2
but continuance; for raging anger is a short madnesse. . «"«" Similarly,
A
Win-slow, 1832, p. 22.
2
Joseph Hall, writing in 1625; quoted in Bamborough, 1952, p. 17®
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with drunkenness,
Rede ail bokes and thou shalt neuer fynde
That dronkennes and wysdome may togyther "be
For where is dronkennes, there madnes is by kynde
Gydynge the hauer to all enormyt e.^-
In other words, all men could be equally moved by the passions, or
affected by the moon, or struck by disease,, Man in general had a cer¬
tain responsibility to try and control his sensitive appetite but, in
line with religious doctrine, it was accepted that men in particular
could not avoid sinning. And while both sin and madness were to be
avoided if possible, there was an established machinery to absolve the
individual from any particular act of deviance. The responsibility for
the control of moral deviance rested ultimately with God's representa¬
tives in the Roman Catholic Church here on earth.
As this essentially feudal notion of responsibility crumbled with
the social relations of production which had given it some relevance,
so the ideologists of the ascending ruling class attempted to introduce
into the concepts of deviance something more appropriate to the repro¬
duction of the social relations they wanted to maintain. Madness changed
from being an attribute of the individual act of deviance to an aspect
of the mental constitution of the person who exhibited it. The devel¬
opment of concepts like "character" indicate this growing emphasis on
individual endowments and responsibility to control them rather than on
the attributes held by all mankind which, were primarily the problem of
the feudal authorities.
As we have seen, this change had a liberating power as well as a
Brandt, 18'74> vol. 1, p. 97• (This was a reprint of A, Barclay's 1509
translation of Brandt's Ship of Fools of 1494») On this subject see also
the many examples in Boob, 1970, chap. 2.
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narrowing one: it opened the door for the recognition of individual
achievement and effort. But its corollaryt at least as far as most
mad-doctors were concerned, was the "belief that insanity was a problem
not so much of the human condition but of the individual who exhibited
1
the disease. The medical theorists of the eighteenth century attempted
to incorporate greater awareness of this in their nosologies of disease,
but most of these appear to owe far more to their creators' academic
?
interests in presenting formal and intellectually satisfying systems.
They bore little relation to the types of insanity that many mad—doctors
noticed in their daily practice. Especially for the physicians who wanted
to apply ELlis® dictum that "in the moral treatment of insanity it is of
great importance to ascertain the ruling passion of the patient",3 the
old divisions of mania and melancholia were too general and too vague.
Pinel noticed this, as did his piipil Esquiro!, who did much to theorise
Pinel's practical intentions, ffequirol pointed out that if the passions
could be used both to cause and to cure insanity, then it made sense to
categorise varieties of insanity corresponding to the particular exciting
cause. Quite often the derangement of mind appeared not to be general,
destroying all its faculties, but partial, affecting those faculties
relating to the cause. To these partial insanities Ifequirol gave the
name "monomania".
1
One indication of this is the number of psychiatric studies of Hamlet
that appeared in the nineteenth century, and which interpreted his be¬
haviour in terms of mental pathology. Conoll.y, Browne, and Combe all
wrote such accounts, and Bucknill wrote a book on The Had Polk of Shakes¬
peare.
^
See for instance Cullen, 1784? vol 4» PP» 125-35? Arnold, 1782, vol,1,
pp. 1-74.
3 W.Co Ellis, 1838, p. 220.
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Monomania, characterized by a passion either gay or sad,
exciting or depressing, and producing a .fixed and perma¬
nent delirium, attended also-by desires, and determina¬
tions depending upon the character of the prevailing pas¬
sion, is naturally divided into monomania properly so called,
which is indicated by a partial delirium, and a gay or
exciting passion; and into monomania which is signalized
by a partial delirium, attended by a sad or depressing
passion. ■*-
hbquiroi's work was very influential in Hhgiand and the concept
of monomania was generally accepted as marking an improvement in class—
ificatory principles. Esquirol's rather narrow emphasis on the role of
the passions was extended to apply to all of the faculties cf the mind®
One of the clearest definitions of monomania in this country was pro¬
vided by J.C. Prichard, author of an influential textbook on insanity,
though not a phrenologist. In his words,
Monomania, or partial insanity, in which the understanding
is partially disordered or under the influence of some
particular illusion, referring to one subject, and involv¬
ing one train of ideas, while the intellectual powers
appear, when exercised on other subjects, to be in great
measure unimpaired.2
As Cooter has shown,^ the concept of monomania was seized upon by
the phrenologists; it seemed to provide a perfect justification for
their belief tho,t the mind consisted of discrete functions. The phren¬
ologists also emphasized that the existence of a multi-faceted mind gave
credence to their assertion that the brain could be similarly divided
into numerous discrete functions. To appreciate the full significance
of this point it is necessary to recap briefly the changes in the rela¬
tionship between moral treatment and the concept of mind as they have
been presented so far.
*
Afequirol, 1963s V* 203 (from his essay on "Lypemania" first published
in 1820).
2
Prichard, 1835, p» 6. A similar definition was used by Sir Alexander
Morison in his lectures on insanity (Morison, 1828, p. 55)®
Cooter, 1976, pp. 136ff.
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The word "moral" was, as has heen shown, originally derived from
"moral affections" or "moral sentiments"; that part of the mind which
dealt with affectivity and feeling, and originally derived from the med¬
ieval concept of man's sensitive appetite® This was essentially the sense
in which the word was used by Pinel and fbquirol. In terms of this mean¬
ing, Fbquirol's definition of monomania provided a perfectly consistent
vehicle for showing the effect of moral causes and the moral treatment
of insanity® By extension, the word "moral" continued to he used for
all the causes and therapies of insanity which worked by acting on the
mind, as in the monomania of Prichard and Morison. A separation between
body and mind was not implied by this model—indeed such a connection
was implicit in it, as it had been in the humoural understanding of psych-
ophysiology from which it was derived.
But this was only one of the sources from which the English use of
"moral" treatment took its meaning. The other was the ethical use of
the term signifying the ability to distinguish right and wrong, and
this of course was the dominant meaning of "moral" as used at the Retreat.
Tuke's understanding of moral treatment did not deny a relationship be¬
tween mind and body, but neither did it contribute towards demonstrating
the existence of such a relationship. For Samuel Tuke, "moral" was a
suitable adjective to apply to the workings of the mind because, accord¬
ing to the Quakers, by exercising our mind in certain ways we show our
moral purpose in the world as laid down by God. This ethical overtone
would also have appealed to William Ellis, a devout Methodist with a
strong religious concept of his place in the world. For ELlis, as for
the Takes, we may say that religion was the mediating force through which
their belief in a particular social order appeared to them as a moral
order, and their belief in this.moral order was given expression by them
3io
in the social order of "their asylums But, while this was one strand
in the meaning of "moral treatment", it was not one that was particularly
appropriate to the interests of the other moral therapists.
The hourgois class did not want to deny the existence of God, hut
it did want to show the purely material basis of man, In its everyday
existence it "was transforming the world in a more fundamental way than
had ever been done before: not surprisingly it began to reflect this
power in its consciousness of itself. One example of this was in the
increasing secularisation of the concept of "Reason" itself. "Reason"
had been gradually secularised in the eighteenth century, although groups
like the Quakers and the Evangelicals still gave it a mystical quality
and looked upon it as something which would remain forever beyond man's
understanding. It was simply there, something by which man had to
regulate his life. What Gall and the phrenologists did was to reject
the existence of such vital principles in the world, and to assert that
reason was merely the function of man's abilities. Reason thus became
no longer something given, but something that man had to makej no longer
an a priori feature of human nature, but "the result of a happy develop-
2
ment of all anterior-superior parts of the brain"." Gall evaded the
accusation of materialism by saying that these faculties which gave
man the ability to develop reason were specific to man and given by
God. It was not the first time that this type of theory had been used,
but phrenology did accept its own materialist implications far more
For an indication of the commitment ELlie made to Methodism see
the biography of him by his granddaughter ({h.W. Ellisj, 1868); and
on the moral force of Methodism at this time, see Thompson, I96S,
chap. 11.
Gall in 1819, quoted in Temkin, 1947s P* 284«
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than, for instance, Hartley's doctrine of the association of ideas,""
Insofar as it did, it can he seen as indicative of a growing self-con¬
fidence by the bourgeois class of their ability to make their own future,
although not yet confident enough to discard the notion of a prime mover
2
who put them there to do just that.
This ambiguous attitude towards their own authority can also be
discerned in the discussions that took place on free will. The phreno¬
logists asserted that man does have freedom of will, that "God in giving
the power, does not inflict the necessity",^ and that
liberty consists in the possibility of doing or not doing
anything, and in the faculty of knowing the motives and
of determining one's-self according to them.^
Whatever the individualist implications of this statement, it does
Although Hartley provided a psychophysiological model of human
nature in which the existence of mind was firmly placed, he also wrote
into his theory "a scholium making it against the rules to deduce the
materiality of the soul from his physical model of the mind" (Bynum,
1974, P« 320, referring to Hartley, 1749? vol. 1, p. 33). It must be
stressed that there was nothing instrinsic, in phrenology which caused
it to become a scientistic theory of human nature. The phrenologists
could, like David Hartley before them, have emphasized the moral connec¬
tions between God and man. Instead, some writers drew the radical con¬
clusion that phrenology "strikes at the very source of religion, and is
a new and invincible proof of the good foundation of the science called
Atheism or Materialism. • «" (Richard Carliie in 1*826, quoted in McLaren,
1974, p. 92).
2
This explanation is not markedly different to that appearing in
Scull, 1975a, pp. 250—5; or in Bynum, oo.cit.. Where my account does
differ is in the emphasis I lay on the significant factors. Bynum
emphasizes the epistemological barriers to the emergence of a psycho¬
physiological account of insanity, and Scull emphasizes the profession¬
al imperialism of the asylum doctors which led them to look for one.
While not denying that these factors existed, I have attempted here to
locate them within the structural features cf a society which in effect
gave the physicians little option but to do precisely what they did.
Spurzheim, 1815, p. ^>00«
^ Ibid,, p. 505.
assert the essentially humanistic !basis of all value. As one physician
enquired; even if it were discovered'that man had an. organ of destined -
iveness,
does this doctrine (of phrenology] diminish the responsi¬
bility for the crime of cruelty or murder, or the necessity
for controlling that had disposition?"
The answer given was always "no": man did have the ability and the
responsibility to exercise his freedom of will over his various facili¬
ties, But what the phrenologists did not appear to notice was that
this "freedom" was always lost the moment it was gained. Whatever the
philosophical assertions, in practice the prescription of moral laws
extended as tightly over the exercise of freedom of wi.ll as it did over
2
the propensities this freedom of will was supposed to control.
Discussions of morality by phrenologists, while always asserting
the need for man to act responsibly, also located very firmly the
boundaries of that responsibility in specific functions of the mind.
The implications of this for the nascent science of psychiatry were to
be profound because they appeared to demolish at a stroke the ambigu¬
ities surrounding the word "moral".
J. Johnson, 1836, p. 74«
2
This point has of coarse been made above in relation to the practical
therapies of work and education. All that is added here is the cpistemo—
logical argument on which the practice was based. For an example cf a
phrenological treatise written specifically about the relation of the doc¬
trine to morality, see iibps, 1834. More generally, it is worth mention¬
ing that there is a very interesting parallel here with the Marxist con¬
cept of "praxis" which is of course the theoretical concept on which this
whole thesis rests. Praxis recognises that "It is by transcending the
given toward the field of possibles and by realising one possibility from
among all the others that the individual objectifies himself and contri¬
butes to making History" (dartre, 1968, p« 93)» The difference between
these two concepts of human nature is not at this moment a theoretical
one, but lies in the extent to which they accept in practice the ability
of morality to be determined by conscious men themselves. Phrenology
imposed a traditional and well-worn series of moral precepts on to its
theoretical recognition that such precepts could be decided by man him¬
self; and historical materialism has in practice no better a reputation,
whatever its theoretical commitment to class morality*
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The immediate semantic history of the term has just "been traced;
it referred to "both mirid and to morality, "but not explicity to medicine's
recognised area of authority, the "body. What phrenology did was to take
the two meanings of "moral" and place them clearly within the organs of
the "body* As with "Reason", morality was to "be divested of its metaphy¬
sical associations and redefined as a function of man's normative be™
haviour.
A large part of Andrew Combe's treatise on insanity oan be seen
as an attempt to make this point clear. One way in which he did this
was through his discussion of the moral causes of insanity. He indi¬
cated that he was quite aware that he had translated "moral" into
"functional" and justified his action on the grounds that
The iera moral cause has a reference to disease in the
mind itself, and was used by those who subscribed to this
hypothesis. The term functioral has a reference to dis¬
order in the action of the organs of the mind, and is
therefore more proper for our purpose.
This was a momentous step, for it marks the foundation of one of the
bases of modern psychiatry—-the existence of functional disorders such
as schizophrenia. We are starting now to enter the same language that
we use today, implying the same apparently scientific assumptions as
2
to how things "really" are. With phi'enology, a metaphysics of the mind
1
A. Combe, 1831, p® 149® Combe exaggerated the contemporary use of
"moral" to refer to diseases of the mind. Very few doctors held that
hypothesis. The most that was usually accepted was that it was possi¬
ble to consider moral causes and moral therapies without enquiring what
their effect, if any, would be on the workings of the body.
2
Nor is it only psychiatry that "benefitted" from this change. Inca
paper entitled "The history and derivation of the word 'function' as a
systematic term, in psychology", the author, K.M. Dallenbach, concluded
that "phrenology is the matrix from which our term is derived" (quoted
in Cooler, 1976, p. 3).
3l-f
was formally abolished from the definition of insanity. Andrew Combe
recognised this quite clearly, as have psychiatrists ever since.
Had insanity been recognised to be a symptom of cerebral
disease, the insane would never have been rejected and
excluded from our sympathies as the detested of Heaven,
nor would they ever have been tortured by the lash or
the chain, or exposed to public derision. . . .The mo¬
ment 'we know that madness is an effect of disease in the
material organs with which the Creator has connected the
principle of mind, and that to this infliction alone are
to be ascribed the waywardness, violence, and impetuosity,
which often characterize that state, our feelings towards
the unhappy patient, and our attempts at cure, will be
very different indeed from what they would be, were we
still ignorant of its true nature.
Combe meant by this that the naturalistic understanding of disease
eliminated the possibility of the physician condemning the insane, just
as it eliminated the possibility of condemning a sufferer from consump¬
tion. As shown in the Introduction, this opinion is held by many influ¬
ential psychiatrists today.
This argument is no doubt emotionally satisfying to those physic¬
ians who hold it, but it begins to appear rather strange once the con¬
tent of the new functional disorders are spelled out in any detail. As
will be seen, the moral (ethical) connotations ox mind were not abolished
when mind was given material substance* they merely underwent a trans¬
formation in keeping with the interests of those who held the nexv doc¬
trine. This can be clearly seen in the content of the monomanias that
were being discovered.^
^
A. Combe, 1831, pp. 77*~8<>
2
The following passage is perhaps not meant to be taken entirely
literally, but it does show something of the climate of opinion: "There
must be a kind of rough understanding as to the forms of lunacy which
can't be tolerated. We will not interfere with the spendthrift, who
is flinging his patrimony away upon swindlers, harlots, and blacklegs,
until he has denuded himself of his possessions and incurred debt. We
have nothing to ssy to his brother madman, the miser, who pinches his
belly to swell the balance at his banker's—being 73 years of age, and
without family,—but, if he refuse to pay taxes, society will not accept
his monomania as pleadable in bar" (anonymous letter to The Times, 22nd
July 1833, quoted in Skultans, 1973, P» 172).
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Some of the human behaviour whibh had a long history of being
regarded as sinful and against the lav; of God was now being incorpor¬
ated into specific disease entities. Sir Alexander Morison, in a
collection of physiognomical drawings for the use of students,"*" provided
a series of descriptions of the monomanias he considered to be the most
important. There were monomanias "with vicious propensities"f "with
propensity to steal", and "with unnatural propensities" (homosexuality).
Morison considered that a patient exhibiting any of the monomanias could
be considered as normal "until the propensity overcame him". Ke gave
a clear example of how this might happen in the case of monomania "with
propensity to drunkenness". The patient was a married.woman of 40?
with a large family.
She is a good wife and mother until seized with this pro¬
pensity; then she leaves her house, pawns .her goods, and
commits acts of insanity; after some months confinement?
she is able to resume her duties.2
The treatment that Morison recommended was not couched in phrenological
terms because he was not a phrenologist, but in practical terms it was
no different to that which a phrenologist would have proposed:
medical means [are necessary] to restore the digestive
organs to a state of healthy action, and moral means must
be resoxxted to, in order to fortify the power of the will,
and to lessen the desire of self—gratification."1
Morison, 1838. Morison was a Society physician, at one stage of
his career the Physician Artraordinary to the Prince of Hales, and also
the visiting physician to a number of asylums, including Hanwell and
Bethlem. Morison began giving lectures on mental disease in 1823, but
this was to only six people, and although his textbooks went into many
editions, his lecture courses ware never very popular.
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11; hardly needs saying that concepts of morality saturate this diage¬
nesis of monomania, no less than in the medieval equations of drunken¬
ness with sin. The difference is not that moral concerns were eliminated,
but that the infringement of moral law was now tied to functional disorder
of the individual®^ For instance, another monomania which began to
appear about this time as a distinguishable entity was "(kleptomania"
or "insanity®, . »in a tendency to steal"® Its causes were to be sought,
not in the nature of man in general, but in the nature of the particu-
lar men or women who appeared as the moral deviants®
If we analyse this affection, when it amounts to insanity,
we shall find that it may depend upon either a desire to
elude the vigilance of the proprietor of the goods at the
moment of making the attempt, or upon a passion to accum¬
ulate all sorts of tilings without the least regard to
their subsequent utility. In other words, to use the
language of the phrenologists, it may depend upon a morbid
condition of the organ of secretiveness or of acquisi¬
tiveness,^
Another example of highly individual behaviour, but one which is
universally regulated by moral sanctions, is sex. Textbooks on insanity
literally began to fill with new diseases as the medical profession
realised that it was now apparently competent to proclaim on this con¬
tentious area of human existence. With the development of the concept
of monomania, homosexuality, for instance, became a clearly—defined
An interesting variant of this was the changed designation of those
believed to be under the power of devils. Supernatural explanations
were rejected by the nineteenth century physicians, but many of their
patients continued to believe in the old superstitions. The solution
was to provide another monomania. As G.M. Burrows explained, "Lunatics
are often possessed with an extraordinary dread of witchcraft, or of
supernatural beings or demons, and will fancy themselves, under their
baneful influence. Hence this state of delusion has been designated
daemonomania" (Burrows, 1828, p« 274)*
2
J.F. Duncan, Popular errors on the subject of Insanity examined and
exposed, 1853, quoted in iE'A, p. 1008®
disease syndrome, described at length by Morison and others® Not that
every specific deviance had its own monomania. Two could be joined
together, or as one writer put it, "When religious monomaniacs are
addicted to sodomy—a very frequent complication—the case is incur¬
able". And more than, that, according to this writer, "the case is still
more hopeless, when they select idiots for the indulgence of their
„ 1vices"•
Similarly, masturbation began to appear at this time as closely
cojmected with causing insanity, although it was to be some time before
2
it was "recognised" as a disease syndrome in its own right. For
William Ellis, "by far the most frequent cause of fatuity" was mastur¬
bation;^ and Efequirol and Combe were two other moral therapists who
proclaimed at length their conviction that masturbation was a direct
cause of insanity. The physical basis for all these sexual diseases,
according to the phrenologists, was in the organ of amativeness. This
was believed to be a fairly large organ cf the brain, and consequently
likely to cause a lot of trouble if it became overexcited. This faculty-
has obvious connections with aspects of the medieval concept of the
faculties of the soul. The phrenologists brought it up to date,and,
while still asserting the universal nature of its existence, were able
to describe it in the following terms:
*
Millingen, 1840, p. 37.
2
On the "disease" of masturbation ses Engelhardt, 1974; and on the
history of its connection with theories of insanity, Hare, 1962. Neither
of these accounts shows much appreciation of the social implications of
their subject. For this see Szasz, 1973, chap. 11, which, in spite of
its author's obsession with demonstrating "psychiatric imperialism",
provides a stimulating discussion of the issues involved.
3 W. C. Ellis, 1838, p. 336.
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Uses: It produces love "between the sexes: ferriage springs
from Amativeness, Philoprogenitiveness, and Adhesiveness,
acting in combination. - <•
Abuses: Promiscuous intercourse with the opposite sex;
seduction; marriage with near relations; marriage while
labouring under any general debility or serious disease;
marriage without possessing the means of maintaining and
educating a family.-*-
And this was supposed to be a faculty "common to Man with Lower Animals"—
these Victorian values were not even equally applicable to men and women,
let alone to other animals.
With .hindsight it is easy to see that the phrenologists smothered
their supposedly naturalistic observations with specific moral prescrip¬
tions. In the classification of insanity this appeared to transform
morality into a branch of pathology. For instance, most of the above
causes of insanity, from masturbation to drunkenness, were not recognised
as having a moral base at all. Their actions were held to be solely in
terms of the physical effect they had on the human brain.
Andrewdombegave an example of a man who became insane "in the
very act of coition" with an "abandoned woman". How the woman8s aban¬
donment led to the man's brain being disordered beyond repair was not
explained. But on dissection "the hemispheres of the cerebellum (Organ
of Amativeness) were highly inflamed. . " Similarly, William Ellis
believed that it was the irritation and physiological excitement caused
by unnatural sex and alcohol that led to their being the major causes
3
of insanity. An example of the distinction that was made between moral
and physical causes is shown in Table 8. This is a fairly typical list
G. Combe, 1850, p. 543c
2
A. Combe, 1851, p. 162.




Moral and physical causes of .insanity ascertained in






or Intemperance of Wife
Loss of Situation and Dread
of Poverty
'Want of Employment, and
sufferings therefrom







Intemperance and Debauchery 57
Bad Company 1
Masturbation 5
Fatigue and Over-exertion 3
Over-study 6
Injury to Head 14
Disease of Brain 2
Delirium Tremens 1
Loss of Wife or Children 3 Fever—Typhus ,Yellow ]
) .
1 -
Disappointed Affection 3 Erysipelas]1 ^
Unhappiness at Home 1
Small-pox j
Erroneous Views in Religion 3 Epilepsy 14





Pride 3 Injury to Retina
2
Non—success in Business
Disease of Lungs 31
Responsibility and over—
" " Liver 1
1
anxiety Old Age 4
Sudden Loss of Several Cows 1 Congenital Deficiency 1£5
Regret for a Theft l 140
Suicide of a Brother 1
Over-excitement at the 1
Great Exhibition
22
Hereditary Predisposition was assigned in a further 20 cases.
for the time, with the moral causes limited to those working super¬
ficially on the mind through the agency of the passions and through
1 oSource: Hunter and Macalpine, 1974? P« 195*
shocks to its various functions. As can be seen, by far the largest
single cause cf all cases of insanity was the .supposedly physical one
1
of "Intemperance and Debauchery"® But,-the physicians always maintained,
they were merely observing what they saw in front of them and were not
2
invoking any values of their own.
The physicians did. not forget the traditional manifestations of
insanity such as hallucinations, thought disorder, maniacal fury, or
despondency; these new monomanias appeared more as additions to the
collection of symptoms with which physicians had to deal, although
they did necessarily lead to some redefinitions of the older classifi¬
cations. One of the "largest" of the new diseases that T^ere carved out
of the old classifications was that of "moral insanity" or the disease
of the "moral feelings exclusively".^ It is often said that this is a.
precursor of our present-day concept of psychopathy although, as Hunter
1
There was very little change in the half century following this date.
The 51st Reoort of the Commissioners in Lunacy (l897b, Appendix A, Table
XXV") gives the yearly average for the period 1891 to 1895 and locates the
primary cause of insanity as "hereditary influence ascertained", closely
followed by the physical cause of "intemperance in drink"• Major moral
causes were given as "domestic troubles" and other "worry".
2
It is interesting in this connection that opium addiction or '''abuse"
was never recognised in the nineteenth century as associated with in¬
sanity, Tinlike the experience of this century when the medical profess¬
ion has seen fit to draw such conclusions. Two reasons for this omis¬
sion could be (a) that the medical profession could hardly proscribe
something it made so much use of itself; and (b) that opiate use was
not as disruptive to family and industrial order as the use of alcohol.
The use of opiates in the nineteenth, century is discussed by Loraax
(1973)® One reason she gives for opium not being prohibited is that the
British government was aware of the difficulty of interfering with domes¬
tic opium use while it encouraged its production in China. It was not
until I90S that opium was placed on the list of restricted poisons.
^
Prichard, 1835s P* 5s writing about Pinel he recognition of this type
of case.
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and. Macalpine have pointed out, the use of the term "moral insanity"
by its recognised author, J.C. Prichard, involved much more than we
mean by "psychopathy" ®~ Moral insanity was not described as a monomania;
it was more a term which covered a whole class of derangements of the
mind, those
consisting in a morbid perversion of the natural feel¬
ings, affections, inclinations, temper, habits, moral
dispositions, and natural impulses, without any remark¬
able disorder or defect of the intellect or knowing and
reasoning faculties, and particularly without any insane
illusion or hallucination®
Or, in more practical terms,
the disordered condition of the mind displays itself
in a want of self government, in continual excite¬
ment, an unusual expression of strong feelings, in
thoughtless and extravagant conduct. . .3
The essential feature of moral insanity was that the person who had
it did not need, to exhibit any illusions or hallucinations. He merely
had to show, in the eyes of his physicians, that he was not able to
judge right and wrong.
In spite of Prichard's reputation as the author of the concept,
the term "moral insanity" was defined in detail by another medical




Pricliard, 1835* P° 6e
^
Ibid^, p. 384®
^ Mayo, 1834* According to the Appendix to this work, Mayo appears
to have first put forward his views in the London Review in 1829® An
even earlier recognition of this disease of the "potion of the moral
faculty" was made by the American physician, Benjamin hush, in 1793*
(Rush, 1793® This paper was first read to the American Philosophical
Society in 1786. For Rush on moral insanity see also his 1962, chap.
19*)
Thomas Mayo, suggested that moral insanity had always existed, "but
until then 'been seen as a symptom of some other derangement of the
mind. Kayo insisted that it was not that
insanity in many cases unseats the moral principle. . .
[but that] the patient is insane, because, in him th£
moral principle is in a vitiated or imperfect state.
Mayo drew strong conclusions from this new rationalisation of the def¬
inition of insanity. It gave the physician a new responsibility in
looking after society's deviants. "At present", he maintained,
it is a most painful consideration, that we are com¬
pelled to wait until an ojjportunity is given of correct¬
ing a moral defect by its ripening into the commission
of a crime.^
Instead of appealing to these individuals* "supposed sense of right",
which they do not haveJ what the physician must do, with full institu¬
tional support, is force them to "appreciate the cogency of an obliga¬
tion, vihich leaves them no choice".^
The concept of moral insanity is an interesting one because it
raises a number of questions about the changing appreciation of human
nature. By locating the source of the disorder in the functions of
the mind it reiterated the point made by phrenology that the boundaries
of man's responsibility were dependent on the purely natural properties
of his constitution. In so doing, it appeared to take away the moral
injunctions that would previously have "been imposed on people who were
without the ability to appreciate them. In other words, it was more
humane because it worked 'with an understanding of human nature based
Kayo, 1834, p. 22.
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on naturalistic observation and not on .one which relied on a system
of- metaphysics. Such at least was the ideological camouflage in which
the concept of moral insanity was wrapped./
Enough has already "been said to indicate why this should "be con¬
sidered as an inadequate justification for what was "being done* The
deeper implications of this reformulation of human nature, the question
of not only how, hut why, it took the form it did, will "be examined in
the Coda to this thesis. For the present, it is enough to note that
in the early period of industrial capitalism, the categories of insan¬
ity underwent a rationalisation that paralleled that occurring in the
field of treatment.
Theoretical models of insanity were necessary to get the insane
admitted to specialist institutions in the first place. The trouble
was that from the point of view of the practical concerns of those
actually treating the insane, the methods of classification which were
very good for getting the patients into the asylum., or for recognising
2
them as insane once they were there, were not much help in leading to
their cure and discharge. What was needed in this latter case was a
These extremely schematic comments on moral insanity do very little
justice to what was to become a major ground of contention amongst
nineteenth century alienists and large sections of the lay publica
The best discussion of the social and intellectual significance of
moral insanity is to be found in the as yet unpublished essay by
Roger Smith (1977? chap. 9) •
2
This point must be emphasized. The above discussion may have given
the impression that people were admitted to the asylums "suffering"
only from masturbation, or kleptomania. From examples of cases given,
and from general discussions in medical textbooks, it seems more likely
that admissions depended on more traditional displays of insanity (hal¬
lucinations, inability to cope, etc.), but that once the patient had
settled into the asylum routine the physicians noticed those attributes
they considered the most important. And in an age obsessed with estab¬
lishing a moral control over its deviants, the infringements of the code
of personal morality became the most obvious ones.
system of organising the patients, not around a code of morality they
were supposed to have broken, but around norms of behaviour they had
to relearn. The distinction is an important one because it is at the
core of the difference between what we call mental health and mental
illness. The conformity to or deviance from behavioural norms is the
practical basis of any such distinction, but it is only in the case
of justifying the removal of the deviant from the community that re¬
course has to be made to theoretical models of illness or "badness".
As the sociologists of deviance have pointed out,"*" this theoretical
work both legitimises the removal of the deviant and strengthens the
moral community from which the deviant is being ejected. Not sur¬
prisingly, in a period when the bourgeois class was attempting to
establish an ideological hegemony to complement its new-found pol¬
itical and economic power, the boundaries of moral community were
constantly being displayed.
But once the deviant was captured and his infractions noted,
the administrators of the institutions for the control of deviance
had a more practical task on their hands. They needed to return
their charges to the community as resocialised examples of normality.
The main focus of their work was a practical one, and not the theo¬
retical one of demonstrating the existence of disease. Concepts of
morality still saturated the process, but they were now incorporated
into the logic of convalescence, a different one to that which justi¬
fied the description of the unfortunate individual as insane.
The classification of these convalescent programmes begins
1
See for instance Pearson, 1975, PP* 103-4*
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with the very existence of the asylum itself. The commonsense assump¬
tion that all the mentally disordered are hotter off in a specialist
institution is one that we are only today seeing gradually dismantled:
it was in the period being examined here that this assumption was
established as a normative aspect of therapy* Virtually every treatise
or textbook on insanity included a long section presenting the reasons
why the insane should be dealt with outside of their homes and in
specialist asylums."'' A number of reasons were given, ranging from
stressing the bad influence of the patients' home environments to
emphasizing the specialist knowledge and experience of the physician.
VJhat all the reasons had in common was their reliance -on the assump¬
tion that the recovery of the patient depended on an active process
of resocialisation. The insane person was not to be haphazardly
dosed with piece—meal remedies, he had to be subjected to a thorough¬
going process of reform. The asylum was to be the site of that process,
and the classification of the patients within the institution was to be
a further means to the same end.
The early specialist asylums were, in effect, the eighteenth-
century subscription hospitals, so it is not surprising to find there
the basis of what was to become the "classification of convalescence".
In this, as with so much else in moral treatment, the work of John
Perriar at Manchester Lunatic Hospital is seminal. It was pointed
out in Chapter One how much Perriar had wished
that a room be appropriated in our hospital, to conval¬
escents, and that the privilege of admission to it
might be made the reward of regular behaviour among the
patients.^
For examples see Burrows, 1.820; Prichard, 1835.
d
Perriar, 1792-1798, vol. 2, pp. 111-2.
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F'erriarTs aim, as was shown in Chapter One, was to provide some form
of assistance to enable his patients to exercise discipline over them¬
selves. He and a number of other eighteenth century physicians had
noticed that the conditions of the large hospitals and madhouses
actively worked against the possibility of the patient exercising any
degree of self-control. The patients were often distinguished by nothing
except their ability to pay, with long-term and apparently incurable
patients mixed with the recently ill. As Ferriar noticed, these re¬
cently ill were often made worse by being mixed in this way. He sug¬
gested a means of isolating the different levels of insanity so that
those who still had a chance of controlling themselves could be en¬
couraged to do so.
One of those who took note of this suggestion was William Stark,
architect of Glasgow Asylum. As shown in Table 4 (p• 216), Stark
divided the patients into "frantic", "incurable", and "convalescent"
groups (as well as by sex and "rank"). The main difference between
this and a more traditional hospital such as Bethlem was the intro¬
duction of this new category of "convalescent". It was to become a
central feature of every asylum, a half-way stage between disease
and health. In some of the progressive asylums, such as Wakefield,
the convalescent part of the asylum became so dominant as to disappear
as a category. It appeared as the main part of the asylum, with the
few exceptional patients who needed firmer control relegated to the
"refractory" cells at the extremities of the building (see Figures
8 and 9)« Wakefield was unusual in that it allowed such, a small area
for patients who were not improving: the confidence shown at that
asylum in its ability to rehabilitate its patients never extended
3?7
throughout the asylum movement
What did permeate the whole movement, though, was the principle
of classifying the patients according to their personal "behaviour*
The criterion wgs not whether they experienced hallucinations or other
traditional symptoms of insanity, but whether they could reproduce,
at least on a superficial level, the behavioural norms of the asylum
administrators. It did not matter what the patients were thinking as
long as they conformed to the rules. For instance, J.B. Steward,
physician to Droitwich Lunatic Asylum and owner of Southall Park
Asylum after William Ellis, classified his patients according to the
following system: First of all they were split into two groups,
"Quiet" arid "Noisy". Both groups were divided again into "Cleanly"
and "Dirty", and these groiips into "Not Dangerous" and "Dangerous",
2
and finally into "Mischievous" and "Destructive".
Another example can be found in Matthew Allen's private madhouse
which consisted of two separate buildings, and in which he divided his
patients according to their approximation to normal behaviour. In
his advertisement of the facilities he was offering in the two build¬
ings he concluded,
It may be added by this system of classification I possess
a powerful moral restraint. They [the patients] are moved
from one house and from one part to another according to
their conduct.^
But see Spurzheim's plan for an asylum in his 183,7* plate 3. He
turned over nearly the whole of the building to the convalescent,
except for a space for the "dirty, noisy and dangerous" patients who
would be isolated from the rest.
2
Steward, 1.843* p. 77.
3 M. Allen, 1829, [p. Jj .
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At Lincoln Asylum in 1828 a new plan of segregating patients was
proposed, whereby they would be classified as "Convalescent, Ordinary,
Insensible, Noisy or Frantic". Only in the "Ordinary" section, the
central area of rehabilitation, would the patients be further sepa-
rated into "Ranks". Further,
the Upper Rank patients are brought from the Back to
the Front; and the degrees of rank are more rigidly
observed as the patients approach to convalescence,
and as they consequently become more sensible of such
distinctions."
In contrast to these fairly rigid classificatory systems, John
Conolly appears to have had a very flexible approach to the classi¬
fication of his patients, reclassifying them as oft en-and as much as
was necessary. An aspect of this was his insistence that single bed¬
rooms should be provided for patients, rather than the large dormitories
wThich have always been attractive to economy-minded administrators.
Conolly also pointed out the medical rationale that supposedly xinder-
lay all these systems of classification. According to him,
So long as one lunatic associates with another lunatic,
supposing the cases to be curable, so long must the
chances of restoration to sanity be very materially
diminished. Convalescents should not even associate
with convalescents, except under the strict watching
of persons of sound mind: they can hardly assist, and
they may retard, the recovery cf one another.^
The idea expressed here is simple enough: only through his own efforts
may a lunatic be restored to health, his fellow patients acting as a
form of contamination of this endeavour. This assumption was not
directly dependent on phrenological theory, although the strong emph¬
asis of phrenology on individual improvement would obviously have given
*
Charlesworth, 1828, Appendix C«
2
Conolly, 1964, p. 29.
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intellectual support to any system of convalescence which relied on
the doctrine of individualism. And whatever the hindsight with which
Vie dismiss phrenology as unscientific, this strong individualist emph¬
asis has remained a core feature of most psychiatric practice up to
the present day.
And yet , in'spite of Conolly's emphasis on the need for frequent
moving of patients, in this as in all the other fragments of moral
treatment the principle of classification was gradually institution¬
alised into a rigid formula which allowed for very little modification
according to individual needs. Something of the direction in which
the change was going cante seen from the 1844 Report of the Metropolitan
Commissioners in Lunacy. The Commissioners defined classification
as
the distribution of patients with reference to their
mental disorders, and in associating these persons whose
intercourse is likely to be mutually beneficial, and in
separating others who are in a state that renders their
society a scarce of mutual irritation and annoyance.
The distribution of lunatics, on this principle, is found
to have a most beneficial influence in promoting their
recovery.^
Already a significant change can be seen in the rationale employed
as a basis for classification. Although the aim was still to facili¬
tate recovery, the distribution was now held to be not so much in
terms of approximation to "regular behaviour" (Perriar) but "with
reference to their mental disorders". In practice, it involved the
same system of discrimination;and rewards, but in theory it demon¬
strated a commitment to the general shift from a moral to a medical
language. Even so, the language was still a long way from making
2
Report of Metropolitan Commissioners in Lunacy, 1844® P* 122.
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use of such euphemisms for moral normality as today's "self—actual—
isation". The Commissioners found.that Lancashire County Asylum had
the "most complete" system of classification of any asylum- Its ten
wards were divided on the following principles:1
1. Dementia cases, plus "active, orderly, and quiet cases, who
have been some time in the house, and are capable of render¬
ing assistance to the cases of Dementia",
2. Recent cases, plus "active- - etc- as above,
3» Non-violent, non—suicidal, and non-escapees,
4- Convalescents,
5- "Refractory and excited cases",
6. "Suicidal cases, associated with cheerful and watchful cases",
7. Refractory and violent epileptics,
8. Non-violent epileptics,
9« Aged quiet cases,
10. Infirmary.
What is interesting about this classification, apart from its
obvious implications for later practice, is the way that "active,
orderly and quiet" patients are used to help maintain order in the
asylum. But, as the Commissioners admit, such a well-defined class¬
ification system was exceptional. Par more common was the type of
system they found at Gloucester Asylum. There the patients were
divided into:
1. Quiet and nearly convalescent,
2. Epileptics,
3- "Fatuous",
Report of the Metropolitan Commissioners in Lunacy, 184-1, pp. 126-7*
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4. Dirty and noisy,
5. "The working class", comprising some convalescent and some in¬
curables who could be induced to work regularly*
This classification was still based predominantly on the social and
moral characteristics of the patients, but it was the underlying belief
that these characterististics referred to manifestations of the state
cf mental disorder itself that gave these divisions their medical, and
increasingly rigid, character. This insistence on classifying the pat¬
ients quickly became entrenched in asylum practice, so much so that
already by 1857» a writer in the Quarterly Review was criticising it
for preventing precisely that which it had been devised to achieve.
"The vice of classification", wrote the reviewer,
is that it separates the population of an asylum into
so many mental castes, which in some measure prevents
that easy transition from lunacy to sanity, which it
is desirable to maintain.
What did remain in the ideology of classification, what ever its
degeneration into rigid forms of control, was the belief that the move¬
ment from one classificatory section to another depended on the ability
of the individual lunatic to restrain his own insane propensities. As
will be seen in the next chapter, it was the growing pessimistic view
that individuals really could not change themselves very much that led
to the decline of moral treatment. But the emphasis on the "doctrine
of individualism" remained, as indeed it still does in psychotherapy
today.
There is nothing surprising about this. Just as the medieval
notion of insanity as a variety of normal, if extreme, behaviour only
disappeared as the means of production came to depend on more standardised
1
Anon, 1857, p. 367-
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techniques and the need to exploit a narrow range of normal "behaviours;
so it is likely that an individualist appreciation of deviance control
will only disappear when the means of production are organised on a mora
ccllectivist basis than they are now® Some indication of this can be
seen from the following example, in which the rehabilitation of the
insane is tied to a very different set of social interests to those
discussed so far.
In the Feoples* Republic of China, the economy is run on a self—
consciously collectivist basis: individual achievement is denigrated
unless it is seen to be in the service of the community. Similarly,
the creation of mental health in psychiatric hospitals is achieved in
the same way, with the patients regaining their health by taking part
in the same sort of activities that would be encouraged outside. The
overriding principle is a pragmatic one of utilising whatever forces
can be marshalled, from drugs to acupuncture, from group therapy to
intensive after-care."'' The aspect of this therapeutic programme that
is of particular interest in the present context is that convalescent
patients are not isolated from the more insane. The opposite is true,
in fact: there is an explicit policy (at least in the Peking and Shanghai
Hospitals) of pairing the sicker patients with, those who are nearly
2 _
recovered. rach ward is organised into a number of "collective fight¬
ing groups" which include the medical and auxiliary staff as well as
as the patients. The aim is to fight the insanity collectively, with
each individual benefitting from the-experience of his comrades.
On psychiatry in China see Kagan, 1973, Ratnavale, 1973; V.W. and R»
Sidel, 1974, chap. 7, and my 1975*
2
On this see especially V.W. and R. Sidel, op.cit..
o
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Rather than feeling that the convalescent patients can he contaminated
by the more deranged, the overriding belief is that the convalescent
patients have the experience (of getting better) which can be of help
to those patients who have not yet overcome their illness, as well as
simply being able to provide emotional and moral support to their less
able comrades. As with the theories of the moral therapists, each indi¬
vidual is held to have some part of his mind which is not damaged; but
rather than encourage him to develop this healthy part in isolation,
the whole aim of therapy is one of mutual help and participation within
a ccllectivist conception of mental health. This example is not provided
to suggest that all treatment of mental illness in China is like this, or
even that China is necessarily a socialist country. But it does demon¬
strate the possibility of alternative modes of convalescence, given the
fact that those who are responsible for the administration of the psych¬
iatric services can be convinced of the need for an alternative practice.
Returning again to the treatment of the insane in nineteenth-cen¬
tury Britain, it must be concluded that social philosophies of normality
existed at every level from the moment a patient was admitted to an
asylum to the time that he left it. There is nothing to be decried in
this—it is only by placing such activities as the treatment of the
insane on a rationalist basis that it is possible for men to eliminate
the superstitions that affected these endeavours when men were less con¬
scious of their own abilities. This is an aspect of moral treatment that
critics of capitalism, such as Michel Poucault, tend to ignore. The new
regime may have imposed an almost totalitarian control on the range of
possibilities that the insane could \ise to rehabilitate themselves—but
at least this new philosophy offered hope to many who otherwise would
merely have been confined at minimum expense. This latter motivation
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has of course never disappeared: few people in any age are willing "to
devote time or money (or "be taxed) for such groups as the insane. But
in the early period of industrial capitalism, when a lot of people were
concerned with establishing their version of moral order, the treatment
of the insane was often optimistic, imaginative, and at the least, a
real improvement on what went on before. In the words of the 1827
Select Committee Report, enquiring into the extent of actual practice
of moral treatment,
In the moral treatment of the Patients, it it considered
an object of importance to encourage their own efforts
of self-restraint in every possible way, by exciting
and cherishing in them feelings of self-respect, by
treating them with delicacy, more especially in avoiding
any improper exposure of their cases before strangers
in their own presence; and generally by maintaining
towards them a treatment uniformly judicious and kind,
sympathizing with them, and at the same time diverting
their minds from painful and injurious associations?1
Given the evidence of the last two chapters, we are now in a pos¬
ition to claim that something of an answer has been given to this quest-
tion. That this "self-restraint" should have been produced by methods
which reiterated the general values of the parent society should not
surprise us. Moral treatment, like capitalism itself, gave to men the
chance to create their own lives, but it did so in ways which were
heavily dependent on the material need to reproduce the capitalist
social relations. At the time there seemed no real alternative to any
of those who concerned themselves with the question of improving the
treatment of the insane. It is only because we live today within a
different praxis which generates a different set of values that we
are able to evaluate moral treatment as a significant but limited im¬
provement en what 'went before.
1827 SC, Report t p. II*
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This concludes the examination of the epistemologies that allowed
moral treatment to appear as a meaningful and progressive activity. In
this chapter, more than any of the others, it has heen possible to see
seme of the ways in which that which began with moral treatment is still
with us today, just as the reproduction of the social relations required
for the maintenance of capitalism is still with us. At the same time
there have been many changes in the last century and a half in the
treatment of the insane, as in the exploitation of the means of pro¬
duction. To follow these changes would lead outside the subject matter
of this thesis—the moral treatment of the insane-—because as the nature
of capitalism changed, so moral treatment effectively disappeared. Many
of its images have remained to provide psychiatric practice with a legend¬
ary past, but its practices, as described here, were to be slowly for¬




The Transformation of Moral Treatmentt
Its diffusion and dispersion after the
1830s.
At the present time, when people go into an asylum,
they see everything cleanly, orderly, decent, and
quiet, and a great niimber of persons in this later
generation cannot believe that there was ever any¬
thing terrible in the management of insanity.
—Lord Shaftesbury, 1859
In a colossal refuge for the insane, a patient may
be said to lose his individuality, and to become a
member of a machine so put together as to move with
precise regularity and inevitable routine; - a triumph
of skill adapted to show how such unpromising material
as crazy men and women may be drilled into order and.
guided by rule, but not an apparatus calculated to




Most of the work described in the last two chapters took place
in the twenty or so years following the publication of the Description
of the Retreat« During that period, moral treatment never became the
dominant mode of treatment for all the insane, but it was recognised as
the only important approach by those who were concerned with improving
the treatment of the insane. As we have seen, rmach of the impetus for
moral treatment rested with very few people: William Ellis at Wakefield
and Hanwell Asylums, W.A.F. Browne at Montrose and Crichton Royal, and
John Conolly at Hanwell were perhaps the three most influential moral
therapists* The point has been made many times in these pages that
moral treatment meant many things to many people, but it was these
three physicians who did most to raise the possibility of change in
the treatment of the insane, whatever the particular ways in which they
and others tried to direct it.
There was one other well-known moral therapist who has not yet
been mentioned because he attempted to develop moral treatment into
something more than it had previously been taken to signify. The man
was Robert Gardiner Hill, and his innovation became known as "the abo¬
lition of mechanical restraint". To what extent Hill, or anyone else,
ever achieved this "abolition" is a debatable point and will be examined
later in this chapter. But whatever the particular interpretation we
make of the words "non—restraint", there is no doubt that in the late
1830s and early 1840s, when "non-restraint" was first being proposed,
the whole idea of such an extension of moral treatment was highly con¬
tentious, Because of this, many physicians connected with the treatment
of the insane felt they had to take a stand for or against the new pro¬
posals. From our point of view the controversy thus provides a window




1» The T?.on-restraint Controversy
Robert Gardiner Hill was born in 18.11, 27 years after Samuel Tuke
and 31 years after William ELlis. He therefore represented a whole new
generation who had grown up with moral treatment of the insane as an
established ideology. This is not to say that many of the insane in
the 1830s were not still chained or ignored, but that the work which had
been done, far from appearing as recent innovation, was seen as a long-
established practice which itself needed reforming. To a large extent
this description applies to John Conolly as well because, although
Conolly was 17 years older than Hill, he did not become an asylum super¬
intendent until 1839» or four years after Hill was appointed as the
superintendent to Lincoln Asylum. It was in those four years that
Hill attempted
to complete that which Finel began. I assert. . .that
in a properly constructed building, with a sufficient
number of attendants, restraint is never necessary, never
justifiable, and always injurious, in all cases of lunacy
whatever.i
What v/as it that had led him to this dramatic conclusion?
First of all, it must be remembered that the extent to which mech¬
anical restraint was practised always depended upon the social status
of the patient. The physician at Bethiem in 1815, Thomas Iferro, prob¬
ably relied on chains as much as anyone to restrain his public charges,
but for his private patients he had a very different approach, as the
following dialogue between himself and George Rose, a member of the 1815
Select Committee on madhouses, makes clear:
R.G. Hill, ^1839], p. 21, emphasis in the original.
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George Rose; Why is ' not the restraint by chains and
fettersT in your private Tmad] house?
Thomas Monro; There is such a number of servants, there
is no sort of occasion: I have forty odd patients, and
as many servants.
Rose: What are your objections to chains and fetters as
a mode of restraint?
Monro: They are fit only for pauper Lunatics; if a
gentleman was put into irons, he would not like it. . . .
it is a thing so totally abhorrent to my feelings, that
I never considered it necessary to put a gentleman into
irons.-1-
All that was really innovative about non-restraint was that it attempted
to extend this philosophy to all the insane.
Lincoln Asylum was not a county asylum—it was originally funded
by subscriptions and donations—but in most other respects it was sim¬
ilar to many of the small public asylums. It was opened in 1820 for
up to 50 pauper and private patients. In 1834 it was enlarged to accom¬
modate over 100 patients, but it never went through the massive expansion
experienced by many asylums. In 1844 it had 103 patients, of whom 30
2
were privately financed. Also, unlike some other asylums, it had
always attempted to provide a strong medical service to its patients.
Three visiting physicians were appointed on a monthly rotation basis
when the asylum opened, and one of them, Dr E«P, Charlesworth, took
sufficient interest in his job to publish a book on the treatment of
the insane.^ Charlesworth was responsible for getting rid of many of
the instruments of restraint at Lincoln, although he did believe initially
in keeping some of the male patients in manacles "to protect the weak and
^
Minutes of Evidence, I815 SC, 1st Report, pp. 95"~6«




quiet from the outrages of the strong".^"
There had been three superintendents at Lincoln Asylum "before Hill
was appointed; all, like Hill, trained as surgeons, although none of the
others had ever had a reputation for reform. Prior to his appointment to
Lincoln Asylum, Hill had "been a medical officer at the Lincoln General
Dispensary. When Samuel Hadwen, the then superintendent at the asylum,
was forced to resign in 1835, Hill's colleagues in the Dispensary nominated
him for the vacant position. Hill was then only 24 years old, and his
period of superintendence lasted a mere five years "before he in turn
2
*fas forced to resign. It was in that five years, though, that Hill
took the moral treatment of the insane a significant step beyond what
it had previously been taken to mean.
In a passage written much later, Hill described his first impress¬
ions cn entering Lincoln Asylum.
The first thing that struck me on my introduction to the
Asylum was a poor fellow with poultices on his wrists,
and an attendant standing by him to prevent him eating
them. The wrists were poulticed in consequence of injuries
produced by the use of handcuffs.3
Here, thought Hill, was a case of restraint making the patient's condition
worse rather helping to prevent insane behaviour. This was of course what
Pinel and the Txdces had. observed a long time previously, and it was what
had led. to the attempt to control patients by "moral" and not physical
means. But up to this time none of the other moral therapists had
Physician's report for 1823, in Appendix A to R.G. Hill, [l839~|»
2
For biographical details of Hill's career see Frank, 196?; balk, 1970*
3 R.G. Hill, I857, quoted in KMA, p. 887.
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"believed it possible to eliminate entirely the need for strait jackets,
leather belts, or ether more rigorous instruments of restraint * At
Harwell Asylum, for instance, during Ellis' superintendence there were
600 instruments of restraint. What Hill did was gradually to reduce the
number of instances of restraint, a practice begun by Charlesworth, but
which Hill carried to its ultimate conclusion. Table 9 shows the dramatic
Table 9
Instances of Restraint at Lincoln Asylum, 1829-1838"
Year
Total Number








1829 • 72 39 1121 20,424
1830 92 54 2364 27,1134
1831 70 40 1004 10,830
1832 81 65 1401 15s67ii-
1833 87 44 1.109 12,003i
1834 109 45 647 6,597
1835 108 28 323 2,874
1836 115 12 39 334
1837 130 2 3 28
1838 148 0 0 0
drop in restraint that Hill effected. It is some indication of Charles'
worth's and the superintendent Hadwen' s interest in the subject that
figures were kept at all. But it was not until Hill 'was made super—
intendent that all instances of restra.int were stopped.
The means by which this abolition of restraint was achieved did.
not involve anything beyond that which, has already been discussed as
constituting moral treatment. Nor did Kill use different concepts cr
language to describe his methods. He summed up his approach in a lecture
1
Source: E.G. Hill, jj.839)also in KMA, p. 892.
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"to the Lincoln Mechanics' Institute, given there on the 21st June 3.838
and subsequently published#"" In familiar words, Hill described his
method. "Moral treatment", lie maintained, "with a view to induce habits
p
of self-control, is all and everything." " The means by which this could
be achieved, according to Hill,
may be summed up in a few words, viz - classification -
watchfulness — vigilant and unceasing attendance by day
and by night — kindness, occupation, and attention to
health, cleanliness, and comfort, and the total absence ^
of every description of other occupation of the attendants•
On "watchfulness" Hill reiterated Bentham's point about the need for
absolute surveillance:
It is essential. . .that the patient should be aware that
he is observed though not suspected of wrong: and aware.—*■■■ —- ■ Ju——. .. — ■ ———
also that the person who observes him is powerful enough
to control him.4
According to Hill, surveillance of this kind lessened the likelihood of
s\iicides, incontinence, and accidents. He argued that as long as the
attendants were plentiful enough, the patients would soon exhaust them¬
selves, whereas restraint merely exacerbated the likelihood of conflicte
He argued further that the consequences of this position were increased
>
patient satisfaction and an increased recovery rate.
This "invisible" restraint of' strong young attendants was of course
^
As E.G. Hill, £18393j as °4 ^is 1857®
2
E.G. Hill, [l839]j P® 45®
^
Tbid., pp. 37-8, emphasis in the original.
^ Tbide, p. 45f emphasis in the original.
5
E.G. Hill, letter to The Lancet, 1839-40, 1, 22nd February I84O,
PP* 796-7®
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more expensive than traditional forms of restraint, and Hill admitted
that he could not employ as many attendants as he would have liked to
have done,, To back up what attendants he did have, Hill turned to that
other essential of moral treatment—-classification. Ke divided his
patients into three ranks and then into three classes—convalescent,
moderate, and frantic. Movement between these divisions was swift and
frequent, depending on the patients' daily conduct.
In this Asylum when a patient misconducts himself, he
is immediately removed to the Refractory Patients Gallery
where he remains until he has pledged himself that his
future conduct shall be more orderly
Hill did not place as much emphasis on the value of work as some
moral therapists. Its value, he maintained, lay not in its socialising
aspect of creating "habits of industry", but in the exercise it would
p
provide and "the enjoyment of the sweet music of spring". Unlike ELlis,
he believed that "no patient should be compelled to work in any way"
So Hill did not develop any new mexhods. What he did do was to
suggest that moral treatment itself was far more powerful than previous
moral therapists had realised. The question of whether Hill did actually
abolish restraint depends very much on how the word "restraint" is de¬
fined. While Ilill may have refused to use strait jackets, straps, etc.,
there are at least txvo ways in which it could be said that he did use
physical restraint. In the first place, the confinement of patients at




Ibid*t emphasis in the original. See also the extract from the 13th
Annual Report, quoted by Hill in ibid.-, p« 103.
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"hers of society and subjected them to the rule of the asylum. Once in
the asylum, any control at all of patients implied some form of coercion,
otherwise a large number of them would have just walked out. And secondly,
Hill and all the other moral therapists always relied on further means
of confinement—the seclusion room, the "Refractory Patients Gallery",
etc.—to coerce their patients into normal behaviour. Also, of course,
whatever the state of abolition of physical restraint, there was cert¬
ainly no claim made by the moral therapists that they were abolishing
mental restraint. This was made quite explicit by Conolly in 1839:
The example of the Lincoln asylum, in which no patient
has been put in restraint for nearly three years, came
also powerfully in aid of an attempt to govern the' asylum
at Hanwell by mental restraint rather than by physical.^
What the abolitionists did claim was that they were getting rid of
3 4
mechanical restraints, and it was this that caused so much controversy.
Amongst the few who from the first agreed wholeheartedly with what
Hill had done was John. Conolly. In 1639} Conolly already had many years
This point was made in an editorial in The Lancet, 1840-1, 1, 5fh
December I84O, pp. 377-8®
Conolly's first report from Hanwell, in Conolly, 1973, p. 192.
3 "the titles of R.G. Hill, 1857; Conolly, 1973. Hill and Conolly
both made a distinction between "restraint" and "seclusion". At one
stage Kill defended his regime against attacks on it by his predecessor,
Samuel Hadwen, on the grounds that Hadwen "gives sham tables of late re¬
straint, dishonestly manufacturing them from seclusions" (R.G. Hill, let¬
ter to The Lancet, 1840—1, 1, 31st October 1840, p. 198)0 Conolly provided
a detailed explanation of what he meant by seclusion in his annual report
for Hanwell for 1840, reprinted in Conolly, 1973? pp. 207—15®
^ I am concerned here with the reaction to the new principle, not with
Hill's outspoken claim to be the discoverer of the new system. Hill spent
a large part of the later years of his life publicising his claim (see for
instance R.G. Hill, 1857, 1870), but he never received what he considered
to be his just recognition. On this controversy and its significance see
K. Jones, 1972, pp. 117-9? Scull, 1974, pp. 313-4®
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of reforming work "behind him, but it was in May of that year that he
was appointed to the position of medical superintendent at Harwell* By
1st June, when he took up his duties, he had visited Lincoln Asylum and
had decided to follow Kill's lead and abolish all restraints,"*"
Hanwellj of course, had a very different history to that of Lincoln
Asylum. It was built as a direct result of the findings of the 1827
Select Committee on madhouses in Middlesex. That enquiry had demonstrated
the existence of large numbers of pauper lunatics in conditions of neg¬
lect in the county, and so a public asylum had been erected for them.
From the start, Harwell had embodied a number of principles of moral
treatment. Its design (Figure 14) was based on the "IPf-shape which had
been used at Wakefield and which incorporated the principle of "espion-
age" used at Glasgow and Wakefield. The appointment of the first super¬
intendent was made under heavy competition, but the job was given to
William ELlis with his wife as matron. The asylum was opened in 1831
with accommodation for 300 patients (the majority recommended by the
Act of 1808). Ellis' regime there has already been described, a rigor¬
ous programme of rehabilitation formed mainly around his imperative that
as many of the patients as possible should work. In 1838 for instance
(Ellis' last year of superintendence), of the 610 patients, 454 were
constantly employed®
Ellis resigned in 1838 to move into private practice, and his
successor was a Br. J.G. Millingen, Conooly had applied for the position
1
Conolly, 1973, p. 178®
2
"Unlike Lincoln Asylum, which had been built on more conventional lines
but which Charlesworth did attempt to modify in order to facilitate





"but was. unsuccessful. He said later that he had "been told "by the
Chairman of the Asylum Committee "that my exclusion was occasioned oy
my politics"®^" In the event, Millingen's career ar Hanwell was short¬
lived: according to the new Chairman of the Asylum Committee (the old
one having died),
upon his appointment he had endeavoured to introduce
a system of military discipline among the officers of
the asylum. . .He had also introduced a harsher system
of treatment as regarded the patients; the restraints
were multiplied and the confusion increased.£-
Millingen was forced to resign and Ccnoliy was appointed as the new
superintendent in May of 1839. At that time there were over 800 patients,
many under restraint. In order to find out what tlie abolition of res¬
traint would entail, Ccnolly had an inventory made of all the instru¬
ments of restraint. He found
scattered through the wards, to be used for the most
part at the discretion of the attendants. . .of res¬
traint chairs, forty-nine; of restraint-sleeves of
ticking or leather, seventy-eight; of leg-locks and
handcuffs, three hundred and fifty-two; of long leather
straps, for various extemporaneous application, fifty-one;
besides ten leather, muffs. . .two extra-strong iron
chain leg-locks; and two dreadful screw—gags. . .8
And this in the asylum with the best reputation in the country for its
moral treatmenti
Conolly was soon able to report a dramatic drop in instances of
restraint.
After the first of July {_l83S?j ? when I required a daily
Conolly, quoted in Hunter and Macalpine's introduction to Conolly.
1968, p. 20.
2
C.A. ?ulk, quoted in ibid., p. 21.
3
Conolly, quoted in ibid., p. 24. For illustrations of the types
of restraint see ibid., figures 1 and 2. See also Conolly. 1973,'
pp. I89-9O. " ?
y*8
I
return to be made to me of the number of patients re¬
strained, there were never more than 18 so treated in
one day — a number which would seem reasonably small,
out of 800 patients, but for the facts that after the
thirty—first of July the number so confined never ex¬
ceeded eight; and after the twelfth of August never ex¬
ceeded one; and after the twentieth of September no
restraints were employed at all.x
The implications were profound. It was one thing for an unknown
surgeon to abolish restraints in a small provincial and partly private
asylum, but for a well—known physician to do the same in the main metro¬
politan asylum, the largest in the country, where all the patients were
paupers and where most had already spent many years in workhouse cells
and under regular restraint: this was an event that could not be ignored®
Samuel Tuke visited Kanwell in I84O, and he summed up the opinion of
many when he said,
Who can visit or contemplate the establishment at Kanwell,
containing eight hundred insane persons, governed without
any personal restraint, without admiration and surprise?^
Tuke had of course already experienced a lifetime of working for reform
himself, and although he may have been surprised, he could hardly have
disagreed with this new extension of liberty to the insane. There were,
however, a number of other people working in the field of the treatment
of the insane who had made gestures to moral treatment in the past but
who were not at all committed to extensive reforms. With this announce¬
ment- of the apparent feasibility of total abolition of restraint for all
lunatics, it became less easy for anyone to ignore moral treatment. At
this time many asylums—1et alone the workhouses and the private mad¬
houses—still chained some of their patients. A common argument was that
moral treatment was useful for some, but that other patients were so
1
Conolly, 1973, p. 179.
c
S» Tuke, 1841, P« xxxv»
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violent, bo degenerate in their habits, that there was nothing that
could be done for them except to control them with whatever was necessary
for their own and other patients' safety® Not surprisingly, this attitude
was soon given an articulate voice at Harwell itself.
The first person to speak out publicly against Conolly was the
Reverend H.S. Trimmer, the Chaplain at Ham;ell. He complained to the
visiting justices in January of I84O that the non-restraint system was
not working and had led to far worse consequences than had existed before®'
One of the allegations against Conolly was that in November, 1839 he had
ordered a shower bath fox- a patient named Dorothy Evans for striking the
matron and knocking her hat off® In the bath, the patient screamed to be
released and said that she would die. Conolly allegedly said that Evans
could only come out if "she would beg the Matron's pardon"® She did not
and was kept in the bath "until she was absolutely in a state of Syn¬
cope"® Letters were published in The Tines both defending and attack¬
ing Trimmer's allegations. The Middlesex Magistrates Court held an
official enquiry on 16th February I84O, but because of insufficient
2
evidence it adjourned without putting anything to a vote. This vas net,
however, the end. of the opposition to total non—restraint •
At about the same time an editorial appeared in The Lancefc which
discussed the 1839 Annual Report of the West Riding of Yorkshire Lunatic
Asylum®^ This article was to lead to a long debate in the pages of
This example was privately recorded by Morison (I84O, p. 17)® Morison,
it will be seen, was not an impartial witness®
2
Copies of the letters and a transcript of a shorthand account are in
Morison, op.clt.. The shorthand writer was employed by Trimmer so it is
possible that some of Conolly's evidence has been left out or distorted.
3 The Lancet. 1.839-40, 1, 8th February I84O, pp. 732-3,
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The Lancet and elsewhere, a debate that eventually led to legislative
action® The Report had "been written by C ®C ® Corsellis, who was both
Ellis* successor and a man who had attempted to maintain an active trad¬
ition of moral treatment. Corsellis load spoken out in favour of some
restraint, but only on certain grounds® First of all, he advocated the
restraint of as few of the patients as possible (only six out of 368 were
under restraint at the time of his writing). Secondly, Corsellis argued,
as long as restraint is used only when the symptoms demand, it will be
found that the patients will oft en ask for it themselvest
many instances have. « .been known of patients who,
feeling a return of excitement, have themselves requested
to be again restrained.; a proof that when they could ex¬
ercise a judgement, they ware sensible how beneficial
restraint had been to them®-®-
In other words, physical restraint could itself be used as a form of
moral treatment® The point was also made by Hadwen in relation to a
patient who had to be repeatedly secluded:
Had. the moral power of proper restraint been resorted,
to at first, the habits would not have formed v;hich. now
set us at defiance.2
Hadwen, however, was under no illusions as to the function of the
asylum. It was one thing for reformers to proclaim an unbounded opti¬
mism in human, nature, but what was the asylum really for?
Proper instruments of restraint, judiciously and humanely
employed, are'not ignominious manacles and fetters, as
the vain claimants of a pseudo-humanity love to represent,
■*"
Corsellis, quoted in The Lancet, I839--/1£!j If 8th February I84O,
P* 733« ' "
^
Hadwen, letter to The Lancet, l839~40, 2, 12th September 1840,
p. 9^6, emphasis in the original® And again, "Nor are [instruments of
restraint] simply physical agents; in the hands of the rational and ex¬
perienced practitioner, they form one of his test and most important
remedies; used with discrimination and judgement, a suitable instrument
cf this description is a moral agent of incalculable benefit" (ibid.,
p. 907)o
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any more than an asylum is an ignominious place of de¬
tention; for what is an asylum hut a house of restraint,
and keepers hut persons of restraint?-*-
Here was a point of view diametrically opposed to that of Hill. It
accepted the traditional view that restraint was necessarily involved in
the treatment of the insane: why then, it argued, deny it? An aspect
of this viewpoint which the non-abolitionists also emphasized was that
constant surveillance of patients was in itself a likely cause of irri¬
tation to the patients, and could lead to exciting their passions far
more than a neutral mechanical restraint. Corsellis quoted with approval
the nineteenth Annual Report of Dundee Asylum:
Is it hotter to enslave the mind, than enchain the hody?
May there not he greater benevolence and sympathy in
subjecting the members of the hody to salutary restraint,
than in the exercise of a moral discipline, which will p
ever appear to human feeling burdensome and oppressive?"
Corsellis was raising a fundamental issue of principle here. Just how
much self—control was it necessary or desirable to inculcate in the
insane, and was this the primary function of therapy? Corsellis1
question was very similar to those raised by Haslam and other thought-
ful physicians over a generation previously, when moral treatment had
first started to appear. In comparison to this essentially conservative
approach, the ideologists of non—restraint were believers in the great
bourgeois dream-—that every man can be his own master. They taught
this philosophy in the Mechanics'1 Institutes to the artisans and
1
The Lancet, 1839-40, 2, 12th September 18-40, p. 907. Hill replied
to this letter (The Lancet, 1840—1, 1, 31st October I84O, pp. 197-9)
accusing Hadwen of exaggeration, lies, and misrepresentation®
r'~
The Lancet, 1839—40, 21st March I84O, p. 963® A longer quota¬
tion from this Report appears in the Medico-Cbirurgical Review for
October 1839, p« 593®
mechanics, and they taught it to the insane in the asylums-, They
themselves had succeeded through hard work and perserverence and saw
no reason why, as a general principle, a similar approach should not
he used to solve all problems involving the maintenance of social order.
As we have seen, this driving force of the enthusiasts for total
non—restraint was not a humane desire to liberalise the treatment of
the insane. It was a firm belief in a particular doctrine which they
attempted to express in all conditions. The same as with the original
moral therapists, to initiate a change of this magnitude required a
great deal of moral courage and a strong belief in the Tightness of
what they were doing. The other side of this enthusiasm for a principle
was often an under-appreciation of individual cases and an intolerance
for all other points of view. For instance, the issue that Corsellis had
raised about patients developing initiative by asking to be restrained.
was condemned by Hill, who wrote,
As for lunatics asking to be restrained, I will say,
that they should not be indulged in their whim, but
trained to self-control. The perverted tastes and in¬
stincts of lunatics are notorious; I would almost say,
that their instinct was often towards what would injure
them.-*-
Corsellis1 reply to this was a comment which showed that he was
probably more attuned to the subjective needs of individual patients
than was Hill with his obsessional commitment to the doctrine of indi¬
vidualism. In Corsellis' words,
the preference, even of a lunatic, in a matter affecting
his own personal feeling, should, be respected. . .he is ^
not likely to choose that which is most painful to himself."
*
Letter to The Lancet, 1839-40, 2, 11th April 1840, p. 94, emphasis
added.
*
Letter to The Lancet, 1839-40, 2, 9th May 1840, p. 246#
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Corsellis had had many years experience as an asylum superintendent
(he had been Director at Wakefield since 1831.) and no doubt considered
that his sentiments were based on firm knowledges But the espousal of
total non—restraint was essentially an ideological and net a practical
question: its assertion involved a recognition of the explicit ethos
of capitalism as applied to the individual® To have opposed it outright
would, have been to oppose all that was held to be progressive and valu¬
able in human .relations®
What its opponents had to do was to appeal to other sources of
meaning in order to suggest that the total abolition of restraint was
inappropriate as a means of treating the insane® Again, given the con¬
text of cultural and professional pluralism, this was not very difficult®
There were the arguments already presented, that some form of restraint
or seclusion had always existed, and that physical restraint could
itself be used as the basis for moral restraint. There was also the
appeal that could be made to the physician as symbol of wisdom, an
appeal that rested on a long tradition in the treatment of the insane,
as well as on a strong belief in early Victorian society that the upper
class had a responsibility towards the "lower orders"® Restraint was
only used, according to this argument, because the restrainer understood
better than the restrained what he (the latter) would wish to do if he
was fully able® Thus Arthur Stilwell, described in an obituary notice
as "The fhglish Pinel or the English Ebquirol",was able to write,
I would have it [mild restraintJ used® as in the delirium
of fever, to prevent persons committing acts which in
their lucid moments they would regret.*-
^
The Lancet, 1840-1, 1, 23rd January 1841, p. 631.
^
Letter to The Lancet, 1840-1,■ 1, 5th December I84O, p. 371®
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If Stilwell's reputation is deserved, he used mechanical restraint in
the absolute minimum number of cases# But the medical profession as a
whole did not have a very good reputation in the treatment of the insane.
It was physicians after all who were responsible for all the madhouses
and asylums which offered little more than crude confinement and in
which physical restraint could be said to have no therapeutic role.
Eventually the debate moved outside the somewhat incestuous pages
The Lancet and into the realms of those who were in a position to
affect national policy. At a meeting of the Middlesex magistrates on
29th October I84O, Sir Peter Laurie, the President of Bethiem, declared
himself against total non-restraint on the grounds that the alternative
to non—restraint must be seclusion or solitary confinement, a practice
which he believed could cause madness in itself. In reply, C.A. Tulk,
Chairman of the Harwell Asylum Committee, pointed out that solitary
confinement was regularly practised at Bethlem.^ The majority of the
magistrates -were in favour of Conollyfs methods but declared that the
2
whole matter must go before Parliament. This it eventually did and
resulted in an Act passed in 1842."^ The main purpose of this Act was
Elsewhere Tulk described the details of a case of solitary confine¬
ment he had seen at Bethlem. The patient had been kept for three weeks
in total isolation and darkness. When he refused to eat he was put in a
strait waistcoat, strapped into a coercion chair, and a stomach pump was
used on him (The Lancet,, 1840-1, _!» 21st November I84O, pp. 296-7)®
A
" This meeting was reported in The Times (30th October I840) and in
The Lancet (1840—1, 1, 7th November I84O, pp. 238-9)* For further
editorial comment on non-restraint 'in The Lancet see I84O-I, 1, 5th
November I84O, pp. 377"~8® For further correspondence on the subject
see loc.cit., 28th November I84O, pp. 339""41 (Hill); ?th November I84O,
pp. 230—2~XCookson); 13th January I84I} p. 681 (Browne); 21st November I84O,
pp„ 298-9 ("Philanthrcpus")j and 24th October I84O (Anon).
^
5 and 6 Vict., chap. 87.
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"to extend and make more rigorous the existing provision for inspection
of madhouses arid asylums. The Act was instituted for only three years
in the first instance, mainly "because those responsible for its intro¬
duction realised that a thorough inspection of the facilities available
would point out the need for further and more comprehensive legisla¬
tions"'' In the event, that was exactly what happened. The Metropol¬
itan. Commissioners in Lunacy (the "body responsible for inspection)
issued their Report in 18-44? complete with a separate 246-page statis-
p
tical appendix." And the following year most of the Commissioners1
recommendations were written into two major and definitive Actof"
Returning for the moment to the controversy over non-restraint,
the I842 Act required the Commissioners to report on all aspects of
moral treatment in the institutions they visited, including non-restraint,
classification, and occupation. They did their job thoroughly and there
was a long section in the 1844 Report on non-restraint. The Commis¬
sioners took a cautious attitude towards non—restraint, mainly on the
grounds that ideological fervour was one thing but difference in prac¬
tice another. In their words,
Those who profess the entire disuse of restraint, employ
manual force and seclusion as parts of their methods of
management, maintaining that such measures are consis¬
tent with a system of non-restrainto It is said by these
Kb Jones, 1972, pp. 132-3»
2
Report and Statistical Appendix of the Metropolitan. Commissioners
in Lunacy, I844. On the background to this Report see KMA, pp. 923—6,
and for a discussion of the main proposals see K« Jones, on.cit.,
pp, 135-44*
J Lunatics Act (8 and 9 Vict., chap* 100) and the Lunatic Asylums and
Pauper Lunatics Act (8 and 9 Vict*,, chap. 126).
A
' 8spent of the Metropolitan Commissioners in Lunacy, 1844, PP«
137-59* The arguments for and against non-restraint are summarised
on pp* 156-8; and also in J).II, Tuke, 1882, pp. 2l6ff.
I
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persons that when, any of the limbs, o .are confined by
the strait-jacket? the belt, or by straps or gloves, he
is under restraint» But in cases where he is held by
the hands of attendants, or when he is for any excitement
or violence forced by manual strength into a small chamber
or cell, and left there, it is said that restraint is not
employed, and the method, adopted in these cases, is called
"the non-restraint system".^
They continued, not unreasonably,
It seems to us that these measures are only particular
modes of restraint, the relative advantages of which must
depend altogether on the results.
The Commissioners were in favour of as little restraint as possible,
as long as there was some provision for violent and suicidal patients.
This provision, they seemed to accept, could be best achieved by means
of the solitary confinement of those who needed it. They pointed out
that this practice was already beginning to supersede mechanical res¬
traint r
Seclusion, or solitary confinement is now getting into
general use in the treatment of the insane, and grea.t
numbers of the superintendents of public, and of the
proprietors of private asylums throughout the country
are fitting up and bringing into use solitary cells, enid
padded rooms for violent and unmanageable Lunatics.3
The Commissioners remarked that seclusion appeared to be effective "in
cases of paroxysms and of high excitement" but added the warning,
We are convinced, however, that it ought to be used only
for short periods, and that it should not be permitted
as a means of managing and treating those persons who are
permanently violent and dangerous.4
*
Report of the Metropolitan Commissioners in Lunacy, IS44, pp. 137-8•
2
Ibid.
I o.i 0.« , p • 1 ^.0 «
^ Ibidao The problem presented by permanently dangerous lunatics
(that is, the criminally insane) was largely being dealt with through¬
out this period (18.15 to I863) by the specialist wards provided at
Bethi em. It was not until 1863, when Broadmoor was opened., that a
"final solution" was believed to exist for violent lunatics.
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The solitary confinement of the insane thus received official
approvalo It was many years after Bentham*s original suggestions for
a Panopticon, and the principle of seclusion was used nowhere near- as
extensively as Bentharn had envisaged. But Bentham's original bourgeois
vision—that each man must ultimately control himself-—was finally
written into official policy* As with so many other aspects of moral
treatment, what had "begun as the product of individual initiative by
isolated reformers was now "being given formal recognition and approval
by the representatives of the bourgeois state. Solitary confinement,
classification, employment, self—restraint: all the disparate fragments
of moral treatment appeared to have been taken tip and announced s.s
official policy* Had the dream come true—was there really "moral
treatment for all"? LTe are now in a position to attempt an answer
to this question.
2c Moral Treatment for All?
It was with the statutory recognition of the proposals of the
Metropolitan Commissioners in Lunacy, the 1845 Lunatic Asylums Act,
that public responsibility for the insane was written into the statute
book. More specifically, this Act forced all county authorities to
make provision in county asylums for pauper lunatics. Lord Ashley,
Chairman of the Commissioners in Lunacy and the major figure behind
the 1845 legislation, summed up the aim underlying his efforts:
Our present business. » .is to affirm that poor lunatics
ought to be maintained at the public charge. I entertain
• « »a very decided opinion that none of any class should
be received for profit; but all, I hope will agree, that
paupers, at any rate, should not be the subjects of finan¬
cial speculation.^-
1
Parliamentary speech in 184.5, quoted in Parry-Jones, 1572, p. 20.
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Table 10
Distribution of patients in public and private asylums
in 1844, 1859, 187.9 and 18911
Paupers
Type of institution
„ 1844 I859a 187913 1891°
County and borough asylums 4,244 15,291 42,543 59,122
Other public asylums 464 2.10 117XX | 241
Private licensed houses • 2,774 2,139 1,040 1,449
Privately cared for as —- 5,798 6,230 5,813
"single" patients
Workhouses 7,963 11,697 11,259
Totals 16,821 31,401 61,62? 77,884
Private Patients
County and borough asylums 245 227 476 977
Other public asylums 1,146 1,669 3,060 3,724
Private licensed houses 2,399 2,661 3,531 3,059
Privately cared for as 282 122 472 440
"single" patients
Totals 4,072 4,679 7,539 8,200
a 682 criminal lunatics excluded
^
719 criminal lunatics excluded
c
711 criminal lunatics excluded
The ideological appeal of this concern for the poor was an attractive
one: converted into bricks and mortar its contribution was less impress¬
ive® As can be seen from Table 10, the proportion of pauper lunatics
in private accommodation was not a large one.
The private houses continued to fulfil" a useful function for non-
pauper lunatics until the end of the century® But as far as the paupers
were concerned, these whose insanity was synonymous with their poverty,
it was the county asylums that from mid-century were recognised to be
the only suitable source of care® Table 10 shows that the movement out
*
Source: Report of the Metropolitan Commissioners in Lunacy, 1844,
Special Report of the Commissioners in Lunacy, 1897a®
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of the workhouses was not rapid and, given the fact that many workhouses
had their own lunatic wards and that it was cheaper to keep a lunatic
there than in a purpose-built asylum, this is not surprising* In
spite of a commitment to fairly simple principles, the history of
provision for the insane in the second half of the nineteenth century
was no more straightforward than it was in the first* Prom the stand¬
point of the history of moral treatment, all that really needs to be
said is that the county asylum remained the main site for the treatment
of the insane® The major changes in therapeutic ideology continued to
emerge from within the county asylums, and insofar as the mental hos¬
pitals of today still occupy the same buildings, they 'still do*
Just as moral treatment was nurtured and grew in the county asylums,
so it met its demise in the same institutions. Its disappearance, or
more exactly, transformation, was a slow and gradual process which
occupied most of the second half of the nineteenth century* No attempt
will be made here to follow all the features of that transformation: to
do so would require another study as long as that already completed®
\
What can be provided here is an examination of some of the trends that
were already becoming apparent in the 184-Os and I85OS* These were the
trends, like "management" in the 1780s, that began as innovations in
the treatment of the- insane and were to be petrified into rules, common-
sense assumptions as to the best way that things ought to be* And just
as "management" contained many of the fragments out of which the crea¬
tive force of moral treatment was to be constituted., so did these trends
contain the fragments of the remains of moral treatment®
First of all, what happened to the major moral therapists whose
careers have been followed in these pages? Hill only lasted four years
at Lincoln Asylum before disappearing into obscurity as a private mad—
house owner; obscurity that is, except for his repeated, attempts to secure
for himself the title of "founder" of the non—restraint system®'*' SLlis
died in 1839? a year after having left Harwell, also to become the
proprietor of a private asylum® Samuel Tuke remained a,s treasurer of
the Retreat until ill health forced him to retire in 1.852® The daily
administration was the responsibility of a number of superintendents-
men and women who appear to have conformed to the original philosophy
of the founders of the Retreat without themselves being radical in the
sense that the early moral therapists were. Certainly, total non-restraint
was to arrive later at the Retreat than at most other institutions with
a progressive reputation®
Of all the moral therapists, it was John Conolly who remained the
most critical of his society, and the most imaginative of the practi¬
tioners® He disclosed one of the sources of his idealism in a letter
written late in his life:
Condillac's "fbsai sur l'Origine des Coimaisances Humaines"
is now on my table, — the very volume put into my hands
forty years age, and which I seem to remember every word:
perhaps to it I owe the direction of my mental life®-1
It is not know what aspect of Ccndillac's work most impressed Conolly,
but the following quotation from Condillac, which, expresses both
rationalist and individualist sentiments, would seem to sum up much
of Conolly's approach to the treatment of the insane®
Instructed by experience in the means of relieving or in
forestalling its wants, it will reflect on the choice
it must make® It will examine the advantages and disad¬
vantages of objects which until thcsa.it has either
See above pe 344, note 4„
2
On this see Conolly's comments in his 1973, pp. 314-3.
Letter to H« Battel, quoted in J® Clark, 1869, p« 4*
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avoided or sought* » . .It will feel the advantage of
being ruled by experience; hnd accustoming itself to
make use of its knowledge will learn to resist its
desires and even overcome them. Interested in avoiding
pain it tri.ll emancipate itself from the sway of its
passions, extend the power of reason ever its will, and
become free.-*-
This quotation has already been cited in Chapter One. It was seen
there how the progressivist optimism of Con&illac's sensationalist
doctrine was not generally taken up by the mad-doctors in the eight¬
eenth century; it was altogether too radical a proposal for the medical
profession. A hundred years later the whole face of Britain had changed,
including the structure of the medical profession and the treatment of
the. insaneo
And yet—although, as we have seen, there was a commitment by all
the bourgeois ideologists to individual self-improvement and develop¬
ment—were the insane any freer, any more able to construct their own
lives in the sanctuary of the asylum? Ccnolly never rejected the values
of his society, but of all the moral therapists he did the most to enable
his patients to grow as individuals within the system that constrained
them all. One suggestion he made was for a "half-way house", a step
between the asylum and home.
We require an institution, subsidiary to the asylums of
the poor, to which those cured or decidedly convalescent
and curable might be removed, and where they could be
supplied with work, receiving board and lodging, and some
small payment in money for a time, until they could find
work, and a home for themselves.'"
In a sense this was no more than an extension of the idea first mooted
Condillac, 1930, p. 200 (first published, in 175^). By "it" Gondillac was
referring to a hypothetical statue in order to make the point that
man is not imbued with a metaphysical essence but is no more than the
sum of his senses and the use he makes of them.
Conolly, 1846, vol. 1, p. 404»
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by Ferriar: that the convalescents should be segregated in order to
increase their chances of recovery* 'But it took .individual therapy
one step further and it is still a principle accepted today. Such a
suggestion was at the core of what was imaginative in moral treatment?
in the context of the 1840s it was fast becoming visionary and irrele¬
vant. Perhaps Conolly was able to retain more of his idealism than
other moral therapists because he did not remain in the asylum move¬
ment. He continued to retain an interest in the insane butf because
of frustration at the constraints placed upon him by the visiting
justicesf he resigned his position of resident physician at Hanwell
after only four years*"'' Rather than compromise his ideals, he moved
into private practice* He did remain at Hanwell as visiting physician
although, as already noted, he gave that up in disgust in 1852 when
the asylum schoolmaster was dismissed for reasons of economy*
Until recently, it was generally understood that Ellis resigned
from Hanwell purely because he too wanted to move into private practice*
However, Hunter and Macalpine have now discovered that there was another
more fundamental, reason. As they point out, Ellis was appointed, as
resident medical superintendent, steward, and treasurer.
The post was created on the principle that the welfare
of the whole establishment should rest on him, and the
fact that he alone was responsible for management would
in turn assure its welfare.3
It was this location of overall responsibility in one man that enabled
Ellis to develop moral treatment beyond a few isolated maxims. It was
^
Hunter and Macalpine, introduction to Conolly, 1973, pp® xvii—xdx.0
? o
oee for instance the account given in Hunter and Macalpine's introduc¬
tion to Conolly, 1968, ppe l8~20e
^ Hunter and Macalpine, introduction to Conoilyf 1973, p. xvii.
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this that gave Wakefield, and Hanwell Asylums their appearance of moral
communities, centres in which moral treatment could be all owed to
permeate every aspect of asylum life* But, as Hunter and Kacalpine
continue, "It worked in 1831 when the asylum opened for 300 patients®
It did not when there were 800"*"" In 183? the visiting justices de¬
cided "to appoint [separate positions of] House Steward, Treasurer,
and accountant"® SLlis' authority was restricted to the "sufficiently
arduous office of a Physician® 'This change", the justices admitted
2
much later, "led to his and Lady Tills® resignation". ConoIIy's
appointment at Hanwell was confined to that of resident physician and,
as noted above, he was never allowed to run the asylum as he wished*
Once the system of non-restraint, to which both he and the visiting
justices were committed, had been introduced, Conolly continually found
himself in conflict with the insistence of the justices that everything
be made subordinate to economy. It is surely no coincidence that Hill,
ELlis, and Conolly all resigned from their asylum positions following
deep-seated disagreements with the lay administrators.
A number of conclusions can be drawn from this regarding the real
centres of power in the asylum movement. Scull4 makes much of the
medical "capture" of insanity, but it was an appropriation heavily
circumscribed by what the non-medical administrators would allow®
Hunter and Kacalpine, introduction to Conolly, 1973, p» xvii*
2
77th Report of the Visiting Justices, I846, quoted in ibid*, note 42®
^ Hunter and Kacalpine point out that he could not even transfer pat¬
ients from one ward to another without the sanction of the Committee
(ibdcU)«
4
Scull, 1974; 1975a? 19760
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Indeed, it is very likely that if the medical profession had really
"been allowed to develop moral treatment as it liked, the history of
the insane in the second half of the nineteenth century (and up to
today) would have been very different* Whatever the intention of
individual physicians, they were repeatedly blocked by the practical
problems that confronted them. It is true that the physicians always
asserted their right to control the treatment of the insane although,
as already shewn above, this was not such a new development as Scull
implies® It is also true that with the increasing secularisation of
the concept cf mind, the physicians had the strongest professional
claim to consider the study of disorders of the mind as their legit¬
imate province. But the conditions under which the asylum physicians
were forced to work were not chosen by them; indeed the whole structure
of the psychiatric profession was formed, under conditions forced on
them by pressures over which they had no control*"'"
Scull argues that
To all intents and purposes* * .the medical profession
had secured the exclusive right to treat the insane by
mid-century. . .jbecausej the medical profession's control
The present Royal College of Fsj^chiatrists began with a "Meeting of
Medical Gentlemen attached to Lunatic Asylums' in 1641.*, A permanent
organisation was constituted in the same year with the name "Associa¬
tion of Medical Officers of Hospitals for the Insane" (which later changed
its name to the "Medico-Psychological Association"). Its official journal
was started in 1853 with the title of The Asylum Journal (later to become
The Asylum Journal of Mental Science), ^cuil makes much of this, quoting
Freidscn on the fact that any "profession bases its claim for its posi¬
tion on the possession of a skill so esoteric or complex that non—members
of the profession cannot perform the work safely or satisfactorily and
cannot even evaluate the work properly" (E. Preidson, Profession of Med¬
icine, 1970, quoted in Scull, 1974? PP« 497""°S)« it could be argued that
the medical profession has always done this and all The Asylum Journal
represents is precisely what its name implies—an attempt to produce
knowledge about insanity within the specific context of the public
asylum. (On the origin of the Medico—Psychological Association see
Walk, 1961.)
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of asylums, the only legitimate institutions for the
treatment of,insanity, effectively shut out all potential
competitors.1
To assert this is to ignore the social pressures which limited the
right of the medical profession to treat the insane in any institu¬
tion other than the county asylums. It also ignores the social press¬
ures which turned so many people into pauper lunatics. Rather than
seeing the medical profession as "being in control of the whole
operation, there is a strong case for describing the physicians as
s
manipulated by the social administrators in order to give an air of
respectability, of scientific enquiry, into what they knew was merely
a custodial solution to a social problem.It is hardly surprising
that within such constraints the psychiatric profession attempted to
develop as much autonomy as possible, but that is hardly a basis for
saying that they took over the control of the insane.
The national inspectorate, the overall authority for all the
institutions for the insane, was made up mainly of non-medical person-
3
nel,' as were the visiting justices who decided on asylum policy,
numbers, and staffing. Both nationally and locally, th© administration
1
Scull, 197-4, p. 515.
2
To suggest this raises of course the question of why science should
be called to the aid of deviance control, and not an alternative form
of legitimation. It is because Scull does not tackle this question that
his interpretation is unable to delve beyond the interests of a particu¬
lar group of professionals, and thus ignores the factors which determined
those interests. My own understanding of why scientific knowledge became
more important in the treatment of the insane should, be apparent to some
extent from the discussion in Chapter Four. A more general discussion
of the same issue is provided in the Coda to this thesis.
3
* The Metropolitan Commissioners in Lunacy between 185-2 and 1855 com¬
prised 15 to 20 officials, of whom only six or seven were physicians.
When the inspectorate was permanently reconstituted in 1855 as the
Commissioners in Lunacy, it was made up of a full-time staff of five
laymen, three legal advisers, and three physicians, the Chairman always
being a layman (IC. Jones, 1972, pp. 133, 155-6).
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of the county asylums was dominated by the social interests of the
bourgeois state and not by the professional interests of the "Asylum
Officers". Unless this is appreciated, it is impossible to make sens©
of the transformation of moral treatment.
One of.the major factors affecting the possibility of providing
a range of imaginative moral treatment was the sis© of the asylum. It
was one'thing for Ellis to say that "it is only in a large asylum that
1
moral treatment can be carried to its proper extent", but that was
when ho was at Wakefield and "large" meant 200 patients. In 1844 the
p f
average population of the 15 county asylums was 293," and by 1874 it
p
had risen to 634.*' /aid at Hanwell, the model asylum from which so many
others took their cue as to what constituted progressiva practice,
the visiting justices wanted to double the size from one to two thous¬
and beds. They were prevented from this by the Commissioners in Lunacy,
and another county asylum for Middlesex was built to relieve the press¬
ure on Hanwell. This asylum was at Colney Hatch and it opened in 18.51
with 1000 beds—the largest asylum for the insane ever built. As with
Eethlem before it, Colney Hatch attracted a lot of attention because
of its sise and impressive facade. So numerous were the tourists who
visited the new asylum as part of their trip to London to see the Great
Exhibition of 1851 that a .Leaflet was published to guide them through
4
the main points of interest.
W.G. Ellis, 3.827, P« 94, emphasis in the original.
2
And with a range from 10? at Dorset to 975 at Hanwell (Return ofthe Number of Pauper Lunatics. , ,, 1844). —
3 This was an average for 49 asylums (Report front the Committee onMadhouses in England, l82o, Appendix 131;T In 1897 the average was9j3 patients for ?0 asylums (51st Report of the Commissioners in
Lunacy, 1697b, p. 7;,
4
AJ^ieJfecugbjC^ex^tch Lunatic Asylum. London. 3 853 (see.
Hunter and Hacalpino, 19?4, p. 29).
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Hunter and Maealpine's detailed account of life at Colney Hatch
shows clearly how the massive numbers there stifled any form of
therapy directed to individual needs. The number of patients increased
from 1 in I8j53 to .just under 2000 six years later, and to 2584 in
I8963 And not only was every spare yard of space filled with extra
beds, but as the asylum increasingly took 011 the aspect of a warehouse
of human flesh, the cost of caring for the patients went down. In spite
of inflation throughout this period the cost per patient per week at
p
Colney Hatch dropped from 10s<y2-^-d. in 18.52 to 8:3. 9d» in 3.889»
Within this changing context of care in the county asylums it is
hardly surprising that the ways in which moral treatment was expressed
©leo changed. Essentially, two things happened to moral treatment after
the middle of the nineteenth centuryt its content became emasculated,
and its recognised importance diminished. The two are obviously connec¬
ted, but for the purposes of analysis may be examined separately.
The emasculation of moral treatment from the dynamic force it was
in the hams of Take or Conolly into what it became in the large county
asylums was to some extent a direct result of the increasing scale on
which it was applied. Purely in order to deal with the large numbers
then being cared for, the precepts of moral treatment had to be formal¬
ized and converted into rules which could be easily applied without
regard to individual needs and interests. Of course, this contradicted
some of the assumptions on which moral treatment was based, as J.T.
Arlidge, for one, pointed outs-
To treat insane people aright, they must be treated as





individuals, and not en masse; they must be individually -j
known, studied, and attended to both morally and medically.
But in spite of isolated attempts like this to draw attention to what
was happening, the medical profession had to come to terms with the
growing asylum population, with the different conditions under which
they had to treat the insane.
One aspect of community life which some asylums attempted to
establish was dancing. To allow the patient the opportunity to engage
in dancing might seem a progressive and therapeutic step; but at Han-
well, where there was a regular Monday ball, oven this aspect of asylum
life was subjected to a formalized routine. In 18.57, a writer for the
Quarterly Review visited Harwell for one of these Monday functions.
On the occasion of our visit there were about 200 pat¬
ients present. . . .A raised orchestra. . .soon struck
up a merry polka., and immediately the room was alive
with dancers.
But, he continued, after describing the enthusiasm with which the
patients involved themselves in the dancing,
At nine precisely, although in the midst of a dance, a
shrill note is blown, and the entire assembly, like eo
many Cinderalias, breaks up at once and the company hurry-
off to their dormitories.^
There would appear to bo some justification for seeing a conflict
here between the commitment to humanistic values and the practical con¬
cerns of running a large institution with minimum staff. On the other
hand, it is too easy for us to forget that these patients were not just
lunatics, they were pauper lunatics, and everything about their rehabil-
1
Arlidge, 1859t PP« 102-3. Arlidge was the physician to a number of
private and public asylums in his career.
2
jjnon, I857, pp. 375-6. See also the discussion in Scull, 197ll,
pp. 4-23-^, where this quotation is also given.
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itation had to be directed towards returning them to their particular
role in society. This can be seen very clearly in a letter by J.C.
Bucknill, aedical superintendent at Devon County Asylum and editor of
The Asylum Journal. He was replying to a questionnaire sent out by the
Commissioners in Lunacy in l8j& on the subject of non-restraint in ail
lunatic asylums. Bucknill had the reputation of being in the forefront
of progressive practice and he was certainly committed to a policy of
liberal humanism. First of all, he contrasted the contemporary approach
with the dark ages of pre-non-restraint.
The lunatic is unable, without assistance, to control
his actions, so that he may tend to his ovm well-being,
and to that of society. Ho is therefore placed under
care and treatment, that ha may be restored to the power
of self-control; under care, that while this power re¬
mains impaired, he may be assisted in its exercise.
This assistance may come in the shape of a strait waist¬
coat, or in the fear of one; or it say come in the sense
of duty imposed in the operation of a, gentle but effect¬
ive discipline, of honest pride, desire of approbation,
or personal regard, or the still nobler sentiments of
religion. The first motive, that of fear, belongs to
man and the animals, and its exercise is degrading and
brutalising; the latter motives are human, and humanising
in their influence, and their development is the true
touchstone of progress in the moral treatment of mental
disease. It was the brutalising influence of fear, and
the degrading sense of shame, which constituted the true
virus of mechanical restraints.1
Two pages later, however, comes the other side of these noble sentiments,
what they mean in practice to the inhabitants of the asylum.
Habits of industry, propriety, and order, ere inculcated
with so strict a surveillance as to leave to the ill-
disposed but little opportunity for the indulgence of
vicious propensities. By these means, habits of self-
control are gradually established; and frequently in the
end, self-respect is so far awakened that it becomes both
prudent and just to withdraw surveillance.2
1
Eighth Report of the Commissioners in Lunacy, l8j&, p. 126.
2
-■.bidt P- 128. A similar„ almost punitive, attitude is expressed in
the discussion on moral treatment that occurs in Bucknill and Puke's
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So nothing basic had really changed at all. "Habits of industry"
was still top of the list, the content of insanity was still being
described in moralistic terms, and the recipient of care was still being
treated as an automaton, to be programmed with so many attributes until
in the end he could be trusted to govern himself according to the laws
of industrial capitalism. All that had changed was that the formative
period in the creation cf this ideology was overs these precepts had
now become standardised, to be applied with as little attention to
individual differences as the eighteenth century "terrific" system had
done in its time.
Another fragment of the treatment of the insane that was at one
stage much affected by moral treatment was the classification of the
insane into various groups. As shown above, this classification re¬
flected a rationalisation of the concept of insanity as well as of the
stages of convalescence. To follow the intricacies of the changing
systems of classification after the mid-nineteenth century would be a
mapor task, but ens point may be noted. As with all other aspects of
asylum life, the principles of classification came to reflect the chang¬
ing needs of the asylum rather than the variety of individual disorders
presented in it. Peter Sedgwick has argued that Kraepelini&n nosology
(which was to be the major form of classification by the end of the
century, and from which the concept of schizophrenia is derived) can be
seen as an attempt to pin down behaviour occurring on a continuum,
into simple easily manageable groups. In Sedgwick's words,
influential textbook on Psychological Medicine which appeared in 1858s
"The^influence of example in enforcing obedience to law has a wonder-*ful potency. The lawless youth who has been the terror of his native
village, becomes ooedient and docile when he enlists, often without
suffering any punishment, and solely because ho finds himself in the
midst of an orderly system. The same influence tells forcibly upon the
new inmate of an asylum* he may resist at first, and his mouth may be oshard as that of an unbroken colt? but after a while, and without anyharshness, lie will answer to the slightest indications of the rein of
discipline" (bucknill and Take, 1858, p. 511).
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A dichotoraous diagnosis matched the dichotomising treat¬
ment decisions characteristic of a bureaucrat!sed psych¬
iatry based on large, impersonal piiblic asylums.1
There is no space here to explore the implications of this for nosolo¬
gies of insanity today2 but, given the validity of the argument for the
social determination of knowledge, it is the type of development that
might be expected in the expanding asylums.
Returning to the more strictly "therapeutic" fragments of the
changing practice, it must be admitted that they are fairly obvious
and have been noted by most observers. Andrew Scull has drawn attention
to the repeated attempts by the medical profession to increase their
control of the treatment of the insane, even to the extent of coining
phrases such as "medico-moral treatment" to indicate that doctors ought
3
to be in charge of all treatment. What this phrase meant was really 110
more than what other writers were still calling "moral treatment", as
can 'be seen from the Annual Report of Littieiaore County Asylum in
1855?
Medicines axe subordinate to that which lias been termed
Medico-Moral treatment. The removal of the patient
from the sources of his habitual excitements, necessi¬
tating his trust in the unseen resources of others; the
enforcing of rest; the regulating of habits; . . .these
and ensuring warmth'and food cf wholesome and suitably
varied quality become medical administrations to a mind
diseased.
What is really significant about this is not that the medical profession
proclaimed a right to control non-medical treatment, but that whole
1
Sedgwick, 1975* pp. 193-4.
2
Sedgwick Q-bicL) does provide some discussion of this question.
3
Although, as shown earlier, this tradition was established by atleast the time of Cabanis at the end of the eighteenth century. Scullseems to think that it was something which the profession did not really
~g n 1.0 10 d ur.tuj. the ruddle 0+ the nineteenth century. For examples01 this type of assertion see Scull, 197k, n« 92.9,
4
Quoted in ibid.. p. 510.
areas of treatment were eliminated by this type of redefinition of
moral treatment. By 1892, D.H. Tuke had so emasculated his father's
(i.e. Samuel Tube's) original concept that ho was able to >0:11-8, in a
1
Dictionary of Psychological Medicine, of "general or moral treatment"
to denote rest in bed, occupation, exercise, amusements, seclusion,
and mechanical restraint. These aspects of moral treatment were
certainly likely to work on the mind rather than on the body, but they
no longer involved an appeal to individual attributes, passions, desires,
etc. as Finel's and Samuel Tube's versions of moral treatment had done.
It is this which is the most noteworthy of the later manifestations of
moral treatment—the almost complete rejection of appeals to individ¬
ual minds. While this is entirely understandable given the social con¬
trol functions of the county asylums, it must be seen as largely respon¬
sible for the poverty of psychological medicine in this country until
an attempt- was made to incorporate into it that other "mental science"
of psychoanalysis.
The separation of moral treatment into "social" and "psychological"
fragments has been resisted so far because to do so would be to impose
distinctions that were not made at the time. At this stage of the
account, however, it is useful to examine the ways in which the earlier,
broader, concept of moral treatment had begun to break down as it was
applied in different situations. Most of the present account has been
concerned with what happened in the county asylums because they have
constituted the stage on which moral treatment made its major appear-
auca. But alongside this interpretation of moral treatment as predom¬
inantly a form of social control, it must not be forgotten that the
1
D.K. Tuke, 1892a, vol. 2, p. 131/4.,
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original moral therapists did raise the possibility of treating individ¬
uals as individuals, with problems arising from their own praxis. As
Esq.u5.rol had said,
Each melancholic should "be treated on principles result-.
3 rig from a thorough acquaintance with the tendency of
his mind, his character and habits.x
This "psychotherapeutic" fragment of moral treatment may also be seen
as constituting, in an embryonic form, the same approach to insanity
that was later to be developed by Freud and the psychoanalytic move¬
ment. The "psychotherapeutic moral therapists" did not occupy a large
or a significant role in the moral treatment movement, but their work
does illustrate another fragment of the ideology, ar.d one that by its
very insignificance emphasises the emasculation of moral treatment
that was taking place.
One physician whose work would seem to justify his inclusion in
this group is Sir Alexander Morison, a man for whom non-restraint was
"a gross and palpable absurdity, the wild scheme of a philanthropic
visionary, unscientific and impossible".' But if Moriscn was against
non-restraint, he was not against at least one version of moral treat¬
ment. Something of his approach can be seen from the fact that he used
the phrase "the mental or moral treatment"-^ of the insane to indicate
1
Esquirol, 1965, p. 22.8 (first published 1820>. It is possible to
trace this "mentalist" approach to therapy back even further, to the
"philosophy of mind" school of Reid and Gregory, although, as already
noteci, this was never recognised as an important source of therapeutic
knowledge. For an example of that approach see Gregory, 1770, pp. 22-4.
2
Quoted in R.G. 115.11, 1357» p. 3?= This v?as in reply to the visiting
justices at Harwell in respect of the specific practice of non-restraint
at that asylum. Korison had been the visiting physician at Harwell from
18.32 and had never agreed with Conolly's approach to the treatment of
the insane.
^ Morison, 1828, p. 7«
yfy
the. non-medical aspects of therapy. But his point was more than just
that the physician had to work with his patients* mindss what Morison
stressed was the need to understand the individual praxis which had
led to the insanity. As he put it,
In order to conduct the mental treatment with efficacy,
the cost important object is to obtain full information
cf the patient'3 previous history, and particularly of
the mental cause giving rise to, or at least intimately
connected with, the production of the disorder. . . .
possessed of such knowledge, -we are the better able to
appreciate the phenomena of his delirium, the association
of his ideas in general, and the tendency of those ideas
on which his mind chiefly dwells, thereby foreseeing and
preventing mental irritation, removing or diminishing
uneasy sensations, and lessening the frequency of fits
of fury or of despondency. •*-
As with Ellis' "ascertain the ruling passion" idea, this approach to
the treatment of the insane involved an individual assessment of each
patient? an assessment which in Morison*s phrases clearly pointed the
2
way to twentieth century psychotherapy.
Another physician who showed a sensitive appreciation of the
psychotherapeutic functions of moral, treatment was George Man Burrows,
a private asylum owner who earlier in his life had been responsible for
3
soma reforms of the medical profession. According to Burrows, moral
treatment ".is an art, in fact, that cannot 'be taught. . .the qualifi-
**"
Morison, 1828, p. 8,
2
Although, as was shown in Chapter Four, Morison's use of concepts
like "monomania" showed little concern for a deep analysis of his pat¬ients* minds. It is also noteworthy that Morison used the phrase
assocxauion ox ideas < As shown in Chapter One, this doctrine raised
the possibility of a psychological approach to insanity in the eight¬eenth century, but it was not taken up at that time.
3 Burrows was connected with the reform movement which culminated in
the Apothecaries Act ox 1815 (see Ho'lloway, 1$66, especially pp. 122-5).
Burrows5 career began as a surgeon's apprentice, but he gradually moved
up through the profession, becoming MD (d-fc Andrews) in 1824 and FRCP
in 1839 (DHB).
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cations are intuitive, not acouirod".1 For Burrows, moral treatment was
an art of therapeutics in which the therapist used caution, natural
aptitude, and a number of learned skills in order to guide a conval¬
escent back to health. He emphasized the importance of knowing the
right amount of trust, encouragement, or censorship to be extended to
the patient at the appropriate moment. Apart from the "intuitive" know¬
ledge a good moral therapist was supposed to have, Burrows did list
four general principles to be fo3.lowed t i) never exercise the mind of
an insane person on the subject about which he is delirious; 2) never
openly oppose the morbid ideas of the insane; 3) aim to excite "fresh
moral emotions, revive the dormant faculties";^ and k) never make a
promise to a lunatic, but if made, never break one. These principles
do not differ much from the precepts laid down by Finel, but what is
significant about Burrows' contribution to the moral treatment debate
is that he limits his review of moral treatment entirely to these
psychological factors. Unlike most other authors who saw it as merely
one aspect of moral treatment, for Burrows moral treatment was only the
relationship between the therapist and his patient.^ There is no men¬
tion at all of self—restraint, that main obsession of most moral
1
Burrows, .1828, p. oo?. This work was 8, large treatise on insanityand aroused considerable contemporary interest (see KMA,. pp. 777-8)."
2
Burrows, loc.clt.. pp. 667-79.
3
Ibid,, p. 668.
Another physician who conceived of moral treatment in this way wasThomas Kayo, the President of the Royal College of Physicians from18^7 tu 186/-.. Chapter 8 of his I838 is on "mental treatment" of insan¬ity, on the need to take note of the patients' changing mental statesana to adjust, treatment accordingly.
therapists.
It has been argued that an emphasis on self-restraint was one of
the major signs of the emasculation of moral treatment in the mid-cen¬
tury period. The other was a gradual realisation that perhaps moral
treatment was not as important as had originally been thought, and it
is to this that we may now finally turn.
The direction in which county asylum administrators were beginning
to turn their thoughts can be seen from the comments of the Commission¬
ers in Lunacy in 1847. At the end of a report devoted to en analysis
of the results of a questionnaire sent to asylum superintendents, the
Commissioners conclude that
there is reason to apprehend that the attention of med¬
ical men has been of late years too exclusively devoted
to what is termed Moral Treatment, to the neglect, in
some instances, of the resources of medicine. They ap¬
pear occasionally to have lost sight of the fact that
Insanity never exists without a physical cause,^namely
come disturbance of the functions of the brain. "
The Commissioners themselves had lost sight of another fact (or
they may never have known it)t it was only 3.0 to 15 years previously
that the science of phrenology had "solved" this very problem. The
phrenologists had argued that it was precisely because insanity was
clue to disordered brain functions that moral treatment (which attempted
to develop other, undamaged, functions) was such an appropriate and
It is interesting that Morison, together with Burrows, Easlam, and
a number of other physicians, formed a "Society for Improving the Condi¬
tion of the Insane" in 1842 in active opposition to the non-restraint
movement. Haslaia gave a paper to the Society in 1843 (printed in Scanners
1850, pp. 1-5) in which he argued that "restraint and. coercion" acted as
positive measures in getting the insane to develop 3, consciousness of
their own insanity.
2
Report of the Commissioners in Lunacy, 3.84?, p. 229. The Commissioner
defined moral treatment as "all those means which, by operating on the
feelings and. habits, exert a salutary influence and tend to restore them
to a sound and natural state" (ibid., p. 222). They included in this def
inition the abolition of "mechanical coercion", employment, a bright en¬
vironment and a resident chaplain.
effective method of therapy. In this context it is instructive to
look at the writings of W.A.F. Browne, a physician whose medical involve¬
ment with the treatment of the insane lasted from the wid-l830s to 18?0.
At the beginning of his career, Browne had been responsible for
tne almost Utopian message on the treatment of the insane, What Asylums
were, axe, and ought to be. This was published in 1837# the heyday of
phrenology and the same time that H.G. Hill was abolishing all restraints
at Lincoln. In this work, Browne affirmed that
They [the patients] literally work in order to please
themselves, and having once experienced the possibility
of doing this, and of earning peace, self-applause, and
the approbation of all around, . . .a difficulty is found
in restraining their eagerness, and moderating their ex¬
ertions.
Nine years later Browne had modified his early enthusiasm a little.
He then maintained that "while disposed to attribute great, infinitely
2
greater, efficacy to moral than to medical treatment", he felt it
necessary to emphasize that attention to bodily health must be a major
function of an asylum superintendent's responsibility.
By 1864 however, Browne had completely rejected most of his earlier
enthusiasm. In a lecture given to a class of students in medical psych¬
ology, Browne admitted that
Benevolence and sympathy suggested and developed., and in
my opinion, unfurtunately enhanced the employment of moral
means, either to the exclusion or to the undue disparage-
sent of physical means, of cure and alleviation. I confess
to have aided at one time in this revolution j which cannot
be regarded in any better light than as treason to the
principles of our profession.
In this lecture Browne agreed that many therapies (such as the shock of
1
Browne, 1837, p. 2p0.
2
Crichton Royal Institution, Annual Report, 1846, p. 20 (signed by
Browne).
^ Reprinted as Browne, "1804, p. 311.
378
a, shower bath) have a moral and medical character in that they worked
on the mind and on the brain.1 All that appears to have changed in
Browne's thinking was the evaporation of his earlier optimism that all
patients could improve themselves through moral treatment. What he felt
it necessary to emphasize in 1864 was not that men have more ability
than they are usually given credit for (the message of his 1837 lectures
but that many of the insane are not capable of much improvement at all.
"In many senses", he maintained,
an asylum should be a. grand moral school and reformatory,
as well as an hospital [because], . .the blight of alien¬
ation. . .falls heaviest and most poisonouslv upon those
of imperfect character, of ungoverned passions, and de¬
graded propensities. . . [Asylums]} should teach and ele¬
vate, but their lessons should speak of early habits,
former pursuits, natural proclivities.2
And so on. Nowhere in this whole essay is there any sign of Browne's
earlier rationalist optimism. By 1864, for Browne and for most of the
profession, we are justified in accepting Scull's comment that moral
treatment had become "simply a system of discipline".3
There is little doubt, then, about what happened to moral treatment
What still remains to be answered is precisely why all the earlier opti¬
mism evaporated quite so quickly, even within the lifetimes of those
who were largely responsible for it in the first place. Before looking
for causes, one point must be emphasised; only a very small proportion
of asylum superintendents were enthusiastic moral therapists. In 1844,
1
Browne had always shown an, awareness of the joint effect of many ther¬
apies. In 1841, for instance, he had pointed out that "the efficacy of
oven a drug may, and often does, depend as much upon the feelings of
repugnance or confidence with which it is swallowed, as upon the intrin¬
sic properties" (Crichton Royal Institution, Annual Escort,, l84l).
2
Browne, 1864, pp. 314-5, 313.
3 Scull, 1974, p.. 654.
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for instance, out of all the public asylums, the Metropolitan Commis¬
sioners found only seven in which they considered that non-restraint
was being practiced.1 The "outstanding" moral therapists can be counted
on the fingers of one hand, and even they had little long-term effect
on the asylums where they were employed. Even Harwell, at which both
Ellis and Conolly.had devoted so much effort, had, by 1855, degenerated
into
a very inferior, and in many respects an ill-built, ill
adapted, and an indifferently managed asylum. . .where
lunatics axe herded by the thousand, fed and clothed as
paupers, but not treated as patients.1-
But for reasons that have been stated many times in these pages, if
moral treatment and non-restraint were principles that few could emu¬
late as imaginatively as their founders, they were also principles that
few would care to disown. In other words, although moral treatment
remained strong as an ideology until the 1860s or even later, the deter¬
ioration in care was not as marked as it appears merely from locking at
what happened at Hanwell or at the Cyichtcn Royal Institution. In most
asylums the pauper lunatics never received much more than custody or
confinement at any time. The commitments to employment, classification,
abolition of mechanical restraints, etc., did gradually filter through
the system, but it was not until after the I8I5 Act and the establish¬
ment of a fTill-time, national inspectorate that any standardisation of
principles of care was really achieved. It must 'be stressed that until
that time, in talking of the importance of more,], treatment, we are
Lincoln, Hanweli, Lancaster, Suffolk, Gloucester, Northampton, andHaslar (Report of the Metropolitan Commissioners in'Lunacy, 1^4).
2
J.T. Arlidge, writing in IS56, quoted in Hunter and Macalpins'sintroduction to Conolly, 19'#, p. xxxiv.
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talking of an ideology which few would have denied, hut few jvjt into
practice»
It. has already "been argued in this chapter that the reasons for
the changes in care must he located outs5.de the asylum, in the changing
attitudes ci the authorities who directed social policy rather than in
the attitud.es of the profession whc had to carry out the requirements
of that policy. Some of the most perceptive comments on this have been
made recently by Vieda Skultans. Skultans argues that the decline in
the belief in:moral treatment must he seen in terras of the decline of
the need for the middle class to acquire new members. Until the middle
of the century (she maintains as late as l8?0), the middle class went
through a period of growth in its material possessions and in its confi¬
dence in itself. It had a physical need to recruit active and willing
members but it also had a need to establish a moral legitmacy—»to demon¬
strate that what it was doing was essentially right. In the context of
the treatment of the insane, moral treatment became important because,
theoretically, it confirmed che doctrine of individualism and the demo¬
cratic basis of change and, practically, because it showed that bour¬
geois means of improvement worked on the weakest of material.
In the earliest period of moral treatment (1790 to 1830), when the
middle class was not yet in a position of economic or political domin¬
ance, it emphasised opportunity, untapped resources, an enthusiastic
belief in the ability of man to make himself. In many respects this
reflected the. biographies of many bourgeois ideologists themselves,
who saw these features as the basis of their own success. This ideology
also reflected the physical need of the growing middle class to recruit
Skultans, 1975t introduction, especially pp. 21-5. The following
discussion receives its inspiration from her comments although it die-
agrees in.many details with the significance of the various phases of
capitalist growth.
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new membersP to build its strength from.all sections of society at a
time when that society was going through a period of unprecedented
d
change.
The second period of moral treatment (1830 to i860) coincided with
the time when the bourgeois class in Britain was consolidating its eco¬
nomic power into the realms of political and ideological power. It
no longer needed to emphasize its openness to all comers, or to new
ideas; it was able to harden its attitude towards those outside it.
The behavioural norms had been established—it was up to everybody to
exercise self-restraint in order to live up to them. After the l8?0s
this attitude was hardened further. In the treatment of the insane it
had the effect of eliminating moral treatment altogether as a, meaning¬
ful programme of therapeutics. Skultans suggests that this decline in
optimism was due to a number of external factors which checked the
confidence of the middle class in itself. Foreign competition and
economic depressions demonstrated to the British bourgeoisie that its
authority was nowhere near as powerful as it would have liked to believe,
as did the growing strength of the organised working class. The effect
of these factors on bourgeois ideology was to cause it to turn in. on
itself, to transform its earlier "optimism into a profound pessimism
as to the possibilities for further growth. While there is undoubtedly
some truth in this, it must not be forgotten that the last quarter of
the nineteenth century was part of Britain's heyday as an imperialist
power, lbs bourgeois class was still very optimistic about its oppor¬
tunities for itself: the pessimism is one that was directly mainly at
those whom this now-dominant class did not want to recruit.
The natives of the newly colonised territories, the paupers, the
morally defective, the insanet these and others were groups that the
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ideologists of imperialist Britain recognised as important, but only
because they were believed to constitute a threat to the order of Vic¬
torian society. Insanity began to appear, not as a minor problem affect¬
ing individuals, but as something which permeated the whole of society
like a cancerous growth. Andrew Wynter, a popular medical writer of
the 1870s, wrote of the hordes who "suffer from a paralysis of the
moral sense", who are intruthful, have degraded thoughts, etc.
They have long belonged to the Borderland of Insanity,
in the opinion of those who know them best; but it is
only . the last supreme act which, in the eyes of the
world, takes then over the frontier into the domain of
the insane. There axe thousands who, lacking the oppor¬
tunity or the power of will, never indeed do cross the
frontier, but remain and swell the vast army of undiscov¬
ered lunatics which leavens unsuspectedly the sane popu¬
lation.1
Against this vision of unlimited lunatics and moral deviants constantly
replenishing the asylum beds, what was the point of individual therapy?
It could neither cure individual patients nor turn back the tide of
degeneracy which the bourgeoisie saw all around it.
Another feature of this siege mentality was the growing belief in
heredity as a cause of deviance. Many of the unfortunates were supposed
to be in the state they wore in because of their own nasty behaviour,
but for many more it was their genetic inheritance that branded them
forever as members of the "Borderland of Insanity". Another famous
physician of the insane, Henry Maudsley, wrote at length on the effects
of the hereditary feature of insanity. He explicitly rejected the earlier
optimism of the moral therapists:
A true reformation would be a re-forming of the individual
nature;^ and how can that which has been forming through
generations be re-formed within the term of a single life?
1
Wynter, 187.5, p. 51. There was believed to be such a. large increase
xn the numbers of the insane that a government committee was set up toenquire into its causes (Special; Report of the Commissioners in Lunacy.
1897a). ~
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Can the Ethiopian change his colour, or the leopard
his spots?!
No, he answered, it cannot, and thus- there was little point in moral
treatment or in any other therapy which was based on an attempt to
change individuals through individual methods. Some people, groups,
races, classes, are necessarily inferior. By all means care for them
humanely, but to try and change their nature—that would be a waste of
time.
A waste of time, that is, as long as the methods were only applied
to individuals. The latter part of the nineteenth century was the time
which saw the birth and expansion of interest in eugenics, a reform
movement which believed that social improvement was possible, but only
through selective breedings a form of deviance management which took
the initiative for change away from individual entrepreneurs and put
it firmly in the hands of "the professional middle class"," And in the
United States of America, Rosenberg has shown how a similar change there
towards emphasizing the degenerative aspects of heredity led to "scien-
3
tific racism".- Enthusiasm-for change did not diminish in the latter
part of the nineteenth century, but the direction of that change was
increasingly being translated through a body of knowledge which left
moral treatment with no meaningful role to play. The needs of capital¬
ism had moved on.
providing a conclusion for the account of moral treatment
Mauds!ey, 1873, p. 131, emphasis in the original. See also the fam¬
ily tree he provided, on p. 13^ of the same work to show how murder and
robbery in the first generation led to suicide and imbecility in the
second and to mania in the third.
2
Mackenzie, 1976, p. 521.
3
Rosenberg, 1976, chap. 1.
presented in these pages, it nay be said that it appeared as a success
because, amongst other things, it reflected a commitment, to individual¬
ism and to rational self-reflections it appeared to confirm the value
of those attitudes to a class for whom they were believed to be the
basis of their own success. This was the "expressive" function of moral
treatment, its value as an ideology which proclaimed in the world of
beliefs, moralities, and epistemologies the praxis of a class of entre¬
preneurial capitalists. Sometimes this praxis was expressed reflex-
ively, illustrating the self-image of the middle class; and sometimes
it was expressed as a series of normative statements about the world—
comprising other classes and social interests—whose other images had
to be conquered in the realm of ideas.
But moral treatment was more than an ideology. It was also a
coherent, rationally constructed, attempt to produce and reproduce the
aspects of that world in which its protagonists believed. It was con¬
structed as an instrument to petrify the social relations of early-
industrial capitalism. As I have tried to show in these pages, these
social relations were rich and varied. Ultimately, it was always the
ownership of the means of prod.ucticn which determined the possibilities
of change, but within those limits there were a variety of individual
approaches. I have tried to illustrate something of this richness
here, without denying either the boundaries cf meaning within which
the moral therapists had to work, or the essential creativity of their
task.
Whether moral treatment was "successful" in curing the insane is
another matter and outside the concerns of this thesis. But the ideo¬
logical success of moral treatment (or of rationalist optimism in indi¬
vidual self-improvement) was one with a historically specific role.
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Once the bourgeoisie had. achieved its greatest strength its material
and .ideological needs changed. From a position of attack it moved to
one of defence, and "success" in this latter period was no longer to
be defined in terms of who could be recruited to the class, but of
who needed to be kept out. And in terms of these new interests it may
be said that moral treatment did rot demonstrate that it had failed,
merely that it was no longer appropriate as a means of dealing with
those who could not, or would not, conform.
The last word may be left with someone who, like William Take
before him, saw himself as an emissary for God in a world of evil.
But whereas Tuke pointed to the possibilities of nan in the 1790s, when
the bourgeoisie was just becoming aware of its capabilities, General
William Booth of the Salvation Army was writing a century later when
the greatest potential for change was emerging from within a different
class. And just as Tuke had reflected the interests of the bourgeoisie
at his time in history, so did Booth in his. "There are men", wrote
Booth in 1890,
so incorrigibly lasy that no inducement that you can
offer will tempt them to work; so eaten up by vice that
virtue is abhorrent to them, and so inveterately dishon¬
est that theft is to them a master passion. When a human
being has reached that stage, there is only one course that
can be rationally pursued. Sorrowfully, but remorselessly,
it must be recognised that he has become lunatic, morally"
demented, incapable of self-government, and that upon him,
therefore, must be passed the sentence of permanent sec¬
lusion from a world in which he is not fit to be at large.
. . .Between them and the wide world there should be reared
an impassable barrier, which once passed should be recrosssd
no more for ever.
That we still today make use of the asylums at Harwell and Golney
Hatch says a lot for the success of Booth and others in erecting that
'I
From Booth's I^arkestJ^ard, 1390, quoted in Skultans, 3 975,
pp. 24-5.
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"impassable barrier". But at the same time that these ideologists of
capital were attempting to write off whole sections of the population,
other intellectuals were aligning themselves with the interests of the
working class. That story takes us a long way from the history of
moral treatment. But the point at which it begins can perhaps be meas¬
ured from the time of men like Booth. With their attempt to confine
forever those they could not change, they proclaim to us all the final
end of the reign of moral treatment.
CODA
Praxis and the reification of human
nature.
The Conclusion is that imprisonment cannot be fully-
understood by those who do not understand freedom.
—Bernard Shaw
This part of the thesis is described as a Coda and not a Conclusion
for a number of reasons. It is not a "conclusion" because it is implicit
in the approach used throughout this thesis that description is its own
interpretation. My argument is that in writing history it is not possible
impartially to present evidence and then draw conclusions from what has-
been discovered in the process of research; it is rather that a conclusion
as to what is important is made every time a "piece" of history is selected
from the past and transferred as "evidence" to the researcher's notebook.
And further, this process is repeated every time the researcher gathers
a number of "pieces of evidence" together and presents them as part of
his reconstruction of history. A separate conclusion is redundant to this
work because, insofar as a conclusion is ever possible in historical re¬
search, it is incorporated into every page of the description itself,
A conclusion can be used, on the other hand, to present in a
different, perhaps more theoretical way, some of the points that have
already been made in the text. The term "Coda", while implying the end
of a piece of work, also implies an extension of the ideas which have re¬
ceived a systematic expression in the main body of the work. It is a
term used in music to denote a passage added after the natural- completion
of the final movement, in which some of the main ideas are presented in a
slightly different form, in order to create a more definite and satisfying
ending to the work. This makes it an appropriate term in the present
context.
In the Introduction I stated a commitment to a phenomenological
understanding of human nature, one which sees man as making himself but
always within the specific social context in which he finds himself. In
the main body of the work it was shown how a particular understanding of
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human nature manifested itself in early industrial capitalism. The cen¬
tral focus of the text was at the level of everyday practice, what people
thought and did about the specific problems involved in caring for the
insane. It was argued that this contributes not only to our understand¬
ing of the history of the treatment of the insane but also of how capitalism
reproduces itself through its constituent members. It may now be asked -
what are the implications of the above for a general theory of human nature,
especially insofar as it affects our understanding of the potential for
consciousness within the historical epoch of industrial capitalism? One
position with which the above account may appear to be in sympathy is that
held by the French sociologist Roger Bastide and, to some extent, by Michel
1
Foucault.
Bastide' s argument is 'that the treatment of insanity in capitalist
society is essentially a repressive activity, an exercise in social control
in which certain elements of consciousness are forever concealed. Purely
in terras of the language employed by the moral therapists, this would
seem to be a valid interpretation. Moral treatment was, after all, the
control of the moral affections, of aspects of human consciousness which
representatives of the ruling class had decided were anti-social and un¬
necessary. Both Bastide and Foucault appear to see this as a narrowing
of the range of the reasonable, with possibilities of criticism, creativ¬
ity, or consciousness exiled to the realm of unreason. Bastide argues
that attempts to evade the reign of bourgeois consciousness, as through
the artistic movements of dada and surrealism, are themselves merely
part of the dominant (and rational) system of commercial production/
1
Bastide, 1972, especially pages 186-200; Foucault, 1971, conclusion.
2
The surrealists made much cf their "automatic writing" in which they
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The only way out is through madness, "a resistant enclave of affactivity,
myth, and pure subjectivity within the dominant system","'' Foucault takes
this even further and holds up the existence of madness as a mirror on
the world. The particular examples that Foucault uses to typify madness
are hardly typical by any standards arid yet it is possible to see in them
implications for a general theory of consciousness. He points to the
creative work of Nietzsche, Van Gogh, and Antonin Artaud, and argues that
although "where there is a work of art, there is no madness", it is poss¬
ible to conflate the two and produce something which the sane cannot ig¬
nore, It is precisely "through madness", Foucault argues, that
a work that seems to drown in the world, to reveal there
its [that is, the work of art'sj non-sense, and to trans¬
figure itself with the features of pathology alone, actually
engages within itself the world's time, masters it, and
leads it; by the madness which interrupts it, a work of
art opens a void, a moment of silence, a. question without
answer, provokes a breach without reconciliation where
the world is forced to question itself.
Or, in the words of a man who spent many years in insane asylums, Antonin
Artaud,
And you, lucid madmen, consumptives, cancer ridden, chronic
meningitics, you are the misunderstood. . . .In the name
of what superior light. . .can they understand us, we who
are at the very root of knowledge and of clarity. . . .
We, when pain makes journey into cur souls in search of
a calm place to cling to, in .search of stability in evil,
believed their unconscious mind was allowed to be directly responsible
for artistic creation. But, as Sanchez Vazquez lias remarked, "Conscious¬
ness asserts its existence both through its decision to automate the
psyche, since it alone can determine the rate of progress towards that
automatism, and also throughout the process and its result. The very
radicalism of the Surrealist project. . .demonstrates that it is imposs¬
ible to exclude consciousness from the practical, artistic process"
(Sanchez Vazquez, 1977 > p. 229).
1
Bastide, 1972, p. 199.
2
Foucault, 1971. p. 288.
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as the others search for it in good—we aren't mad, we're
marvellous doctors, we know the necessary dose for the
soul, for sensibility, for the marrow, for thought.1
The argument will be familiar to the readers of R.B. Laing or David
2
Cooper, or of a number of other critics of bourgeois rationality.
It may be added that, whether or not we accept the pleading of indi¬
vidual "lunatics" and of their defenders, there is nothing in the defin¬
ition of psychiatry as examined in this thesis which denies that certain
expressions ©f affect!vity have "been excluded from bourgeois conscious¬
ness. It is not clear however quite what role this affectivity could
play if it was subjected to any form of non-exploitative but social con¬
trol. Artaud was always very outspoken in his
protest against any interference with the free develop¬
ment of delirium. . . .We simply affirm that their f_the
insane'sj concept of reality is absolutely legitimate,
as are all the acts resulting from it. . . .All individ¬
ual acts are anti-social.3
Is this conflict between the individual and the social, between the
rational and the irrational, a necessary one—or is it one which is
specific to certain forms of society? Although this was not the central
point of the above account of moral treatment, the account did provide
some leads as to the answer to this question. These leads may now be
1
"General security—the liquidation of opium" (circa 1925), in Artaud,
1965s, pp. 61-2.
2
The literature here is far too vast to cover in a footnote. It
stretches irom the early "Romantics" (Blake and Shelley) to modern prop¬
agandists of the same message such as Theodore Roszak. A related posi¬
tion is that expressed in the "critical theory" of the Frankfurt School,
a sociology which sees the increasing rationalism of the world as the
reliance on an order which necessarily excludes fundamental human
freedoms.
3 "Letter to the Medical Directors of Lunatic Asylums" (circa 3925),
in Artaud, 1968, p. 182.
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drawn together and some, tentative suggestions made as to the type of
answer that would satisfy it.
It was argued in the Introduction to this thesis that consciousness
is not a fixed attribute of human nature, but something created, like
the hand, out of human labour. Man creates himself in the world as he
appropriates the world that confronts him and turns it into his world.
This process is known by the term "obRectification". Man, the subject
of history, becomes for himself the object of history—his own destiny
1
and his own product. " The role of consciousness in this process is a
crucial one, but like the human nature it creates, it often appears
contradictory and confused. This is especially so in the period of
capitalist production because of the particular way in which production
has to be carried on in order to maintain the distinction (on which
capitalism rests) between capital and labour. In the above account of
the history of moral treatment it was shown repeatedly how moral treat¬
ment was itself a consciously-created product of men's needs, yet "was
never acknowledged as such; its meaning was always held to be located
in the moral or scientific laws within which the moral therapists be¬
lieved they were constrained. Moral treatment was created in a society
dominated, by the production of commodities, by the fetishistic belief
that such a material order was natural and not dependent on the working
out of men's interests. Moral treatment embodied those contradictions
and attempted to reproduce them in the area of the treatment of the
insane. As practice, the effect of moral treatment must be assessed
in comparison with other modes of treating the insane. But as ideology,
moral treatment appeared to demonstrate the existence of laws which
This theme is dealt with at length by Sarire in his .1968 and 1976.
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could improve the maintenance of the social relations of capitalism.
So much as already been argued many times in these pages. An at¬
tempt has been made to demystify the fetishism of commodities as it
applied to the treatment of the insane. But how are we to go beyond that,
to build a demystified view of human nature or social improvement? As
far as historical materialism is concerned, the direction from which
this question must be answered is clear. The creation of value is not
derived from metaphysics, from a particular social system, from capital,
or from individual members of society. It derives, as was stated in the
Introduction, from the labour power of the vast majority of the popula¬
tion. From this viewpoint it is possible to cut through many of the
mystifications of bourgeois logic and to point to real improvements in
the social conditions of a society.
The changes within capitalist society that can be said to mark an
improvement (within the context of the present discussion) are those
which modify the fetishism of commodities and thereby demonstrate that
society is the product of its constituent members. Thus Marx described
the Ten Hours Bill, which reduced the number of hours that factory op¬
eratives had to work, as
the victory of a principle? it was the first time that
in broad daylight the political economy of the middle
class succumbed to the political economy of the working
class.
Marx was under no illusions. He knew that even in working ten hours a
day the working class was being exploited and prevented from receiving
anything like the full reward for its labour. But this was the direc¬
tion in which improvement had to occur—the introduction of material
changes which were in the interests of the working class because they
Inaugural address of the Working Men's International Association,
2-S64j in K. Marx and Engels, 1958, vol. 1, p. 383.
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reduced the amount of exploitation and they showed the existing ruling
class that it no longer held undisputed power.
Improvements of this nature were never made merely to establish a
principle. Marx was always very clear about the specific material bene¬
fits tint he expected from any piece of reform. The reduction in the
working day, for instance, was seen by Marx as a fundamental necessity
in order to give to the working class the possibility for future growth:
that is, not only "to restore the health and physical energies of the
working class", but also "to secure for them the possibility of intell-
1
ectual development, sociable intercourse, social and political action"
The comment could also have been made in relation to the provision of
minimum facilities for the insane. Whatever the inadequacies of the
asylums, or cf moral treatment, as long as the intentions of therapy
were to restore the insane to a minimum basis cf normal functioning,
they must be seen as better than that which went before, in which the
role cf the lunatic in society was symbolic and not related in any way
to his or her individual needs.
So also in education. Marx and later Marxists have recognised that
whatever the force of the bourgeois educational system in reinforcing
the doctrine of individualism, it has also provided the working class
with basic skills, skills which the working class will itself need to
2
teach when it comes to power. What has to be remembered, though, is
that this "minimum consciousness" soon becomes class consciousness;
"Instructions for the delegates to the Geneva Congress of the Working
Men's International Association", 186?, quoted in Simon, 1977, p. 197.
Simon's whole article is connected with this subject of improvement with¬
in capitalist social relations. See also Mishra, 1975.
2
See Simon, op.cit., p. 700. This point is not accepted by all Marxists.
Simon is a vocal exponent of the viewpoint put. hero, but for a strongly
argued defence of the position iJiat bourgeois education is necessarily
solely coercive see Althusser, 1971.
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that it is really only in opposition to. what they do not want that the
interests of the bourgeois and working classes can ba said to have any¬
thing in common. In tarns of the treatment of the insane, they do not
want the mentally ill to be looked upon as subhuman, nor as symbolic
of universal metaphysical truths. They want all men to be "objectified"
into the fabric of society, but it is in the means by which this is
achieved that the different types of societies reveal themselves for
what they are.
One feature of the social reforms and welfare measures (including
moral treatment) dominated by commodity fetishism is that they create
the consciousness in their reformers' and recipients' minds that change
occurs at an individual level. These measures confirm in their praxis
that the basic unit of society is the individual, and that the basic
means of improvement is through competition between individuals. A
fundamental feature of the reforms dominated by the interests of the
working class is that they create a consciousness in their members' minds
that the basic means of improvement is their co-operation as members ox
a class. The work of the Brazilian educator, Paulo Freire, who was
mentioned in passing in the Introduction, is of significance here. In
his discussion of the different kinds of consciousness that different
societies propagate, Freire introduced a concept which helps to explain
the implications of the above discussion for the points raised by Fou-
cault and Bastide. Freire uses the phrase "culture of silence" to
describe the relationship between a dominating metropolitan country
and. the third-world country it exploits.1 According to Freire, in this
type of situation there is no possibility of a dialogue emerging between
Freire, 1972, especially pp. 57~9.
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the two sets of interests. The situation is defined "by the interests
of the dominating society, who effectively silence the voice of the
other and communicate with it only in terms of the concepts, values,
etc., of the dominant society.
The dependent society is by definition a silent society.
Its voice is not an authentic voice, but merely an echo
of the voice of the metropolis-—in every way. the metro¬
polis speaks, the dependent society listens.1
Friere is writing here particularly of Brazil, a country of which he
has much personal experience. But the same "culture of silence" syn¬
drome applies to the relationships between many countries—and of course,
although this is not Freire's concern, between the oppositional groups
within any one country. It is here that Freire's concept of the
"culture of silence" appears to have much in common with Foucault's under¬
standing of the silence that exists about the meaning of insanity in
our society today. According to Foucault,
The language of psychiatry which is a monologue of reason
about madness, has been established only on the basis of
such a silence.^
In both cases the dominant class or group has silenced the voice
of the dominated group, and substituted its own language, concepts,
logic—in short, its own reason—as the medium of communication. It
is in the way out of this stranglehold that the solutions offered by
Foucault and Freire differ. Foucault appears to believe that the actual
content of madness—repressed, yet the authentic voice of a sentient
individual—has some sort of possible function as a means of breaking
the domination of the "culture of silence". Freire, on the other hand,
also writing of unhappy, alienated individuals, sees no way out except
1
Freire, 1972, p. 59.
2
Foucault, 1971, pp. xii-xiii, emphasis in the original.
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through their collective action. In his words,
Hen are made free in communion with others through, a
situation we have to change, We have to make our freedom
together with others—"We" not "I".1
If we apply this dictum to the insane the implication must be that they
do have something to say vis—a—vis the sane , but it is a something which
derives its meaning from their common experience. In a sense this is
just another way of expressing the main argument of the substantive
pert of this thesis: that the "voice" of the pauper lunatic in early-
nineteenth century Britain is the voice of the oppressed and exploited
working class.
The "structural seeing" with which the therapists at the Retreat
were able to communicate with their patients derived from their common
material interests as Quakers and as members of a particular social class.
These interests were specific and sufficiently strongly held by the ther¬
apists and their patients for the insanity to be controlled by their
joint action, their class-specific "communion". Outside of the Retreat
and a few private madhouses, the community of interests diverged. In¬
stead of providing therapy which raised their patients' consciousness,
the aim of the reformers became one of instilling habits which would
merely confirm the insane as subservient, as members of a, dependent
class.
The implications of this for a socialist psychiatry are now, if
Freire, 1976a, p. 226. This was a point made by Marx both in relation
to the ultimate freedom from the realm of necessity and as the basis for
the immediate improvement of unfree conditions. As he put it in the last
volume of Capital, "Freedom. . .can only consist in socialised man, the
associated producers, rationally regulating their interchange with Nature,
bringing it under their common control instead of being ruled by it as by
the blind forces of Nature; and. achieving this with the least expenditure
oi energy and under conditions most favourable to their human nature. . . .
The shortening of the working day is its most basic prerequisite" (quoted
in Sanchez Vazquez, 1977, p. 335)•
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not explic.lt, at least clearer than they were. It would in any case
be idealistic to propose a programme for ideological reform in isolation
from the material conditions which would, make that reform both possible
and meaningful. What can be pointed to though is the need for a pro¬
gramme of reform which is based on a real dialogue between helper and
helped, and which is always open to modification. This is a concept
of improvement which is as applicable to the treatment of the insane or
mentally ill as it is to penal or educational reform. A partial recog¬
nition of the social construction of society was made by some of the
moral therapists, and it has been made by many twentieth century psych¬
iatrists. On this it is relatively easy to build.
More problematic, however, is the ability to maintain the conscious¬
ness that society (or therapeutic knowledge) is man-made. Hare Marxism
has just as bad a record, as the bourgeois ideologies. Hie moral ther¬
apists tried to rest their practice on the basis of "moral laws" and
"scientific knowledge". Socialist practice, if the existing socialist
societies axe a fair example, is also very prone to being reified into
apparently universal laws of nature. What socialism and mental health
have in common is their need to create in man the conscious recognition
of his own potential. This can be achieved only if the necessary mater¬
ial steps are taken, and only if man recognises that it is his own prac¬
tice that frill achieve it. Our consciousness may never be total, but
it need never be as partial as it is.
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I. Primary Source Materials
A. Unpublished institutional archival material
Bedfordshire County Lunatic Asylum (archives at Bedfordshire County
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